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OUR INDIAN EMPIRE:

Its History and Present State,

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FROM

THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENT OF THE BRITISH IN HINDOSTAN,

TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1846.



BY

CHARLES MAC FARLANE,

AUTHOR OF THE CHAPTERS ON

'CIVIL AND MILITARY TRANSACTIONS,' IN THE 'PICTORIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND.'

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

V V. d. 24

LONDON:

GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & CO., 36, SOHO SQUARE.

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OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.

VOL. II.



Drawn by Sam.l Laurence.

Engraved by R. Finden.

From the bust by Nollekens.

Wellesley

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OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD CORNWALLIS. A.D. 1786.

Lord Cornwallis, the second governor-general, was appointed governor-general and commander-in-chief of Bengal in 1786. Notwithstanding the unfortunate way in which he had ended the American War, he was still considered as an able general; and there seemed to be great advantages to be derived from intrusting the government of India to a tried soldier, and from uniting the highest civil with the highest military power. In every respect Cornwallis merited the eulogium which Dundas had pronounced upon him in the House of Commons in 1783. He was high-minded, disinterested in money matters, mild and equitable in temper, anxious to do good and prevent evil, steady and persevering in his application to business, and particularly distinguished by his sincere desire to promote the welfare of our Indian subjects, of whose wrongs and oppressions he had heard so much. Animated by these feelings, he began to introduce various internal changes as soon as he arrived at Calcutta; but though the motive was everywhere good, the new measures were occasionally characterized by a great unfitness for the purpose they were intended to serve. And Lord Cornwallis had not been long in India ere he found himself constrained to act, in politics and war, and with reference to the native princes, in much the same manner that Warren Hastings had acted. His lordship went to the banks of the Ganges with the intention and the hope of avoiding wars of conquest and extension of territory, and of keeping the whole of British India, and the states dependent upon it, in a happy, undisturbed peace. It was a pleasant vision, but it soon vanished. There were, however, several material differences between the present situation of Cornwallis and the late situation of Hastings. Pitt's India bill of 1784, now in full operation, did much to set aside the vacillating and frequently rash and contradictory policy of the Court of Directors, and to vest the government of British India substantially in the British government. It gave to the Board of Control the powers of war and peace, and relieved the governor-general from many of those heavy responsibilities under which Hastings had laboured. In some matters there was still a want of unity of power and intention; but under the Board of Control, or with the direction of one of the secretaries of state, the correspondence with the governor-general and council and other authorities in India became very different from what it had been when directed solely by a few trading directors sitting in Leadenhall Street as a secret council or committee — it became more clear, more consistent, more honourable and elevated. In Warren Hastings's time it had too often been a dark and disgraceful riddle, difficult to be understood, and easy to be misinterpreted. Moreover the general situation of affairs in India was infinitely less difficult and perplexing now than it had been, and Hastings, by breaking the only European power capable of contending with us, and by consolidating the empire which the great Clive had founded, had rendered comparatively easy the task of all his successors. In working out those two great

ends, without aid from the government at home, without money or any assistance from the Company, Hastings had committed many questionable acts, and, perhaps, some few evil deeds; but those acts and deeds had fully answered their end, and had left no necessity for recurring to them. If the conscientious, scrupulous Cornwallis had been governor-general at the time of the trying crisis in 1780-1-2-3, India in all probability would have been lost to us, for his lordship would never have done what Hastings did or caused to be done at Benares, Lucknow, and Fyzabad; but now there was little likelihood or necessity for his lordship's conscience being put to so severe a test by his patriotism. The power and prestige of the French in India were annihilated; and although they made some feeble efforts to re-erect the system of M. Bussy, by renewing the struggle in Hindustan, they never again became formidable in that part of the world, their efforts being checked by their great Revolution, and their energy and ambition being employed in other channels by the Republican and Bonapartean wars.

By *three* bills passed in 1786 several parts of the act of 1784 were explained and amended, and the powers of the governor-general were at once enlarged, and better defined than they had been in Hastings's time. The governor-general was vested with a discretionary right of acting, in extraordinary cases, without the concurrence of the Supreme Council at Calcutta, being held solely and personally responsible for any consequences which might ensue from the measures adopted under such circumstances. This went to do away with that divided authority, and that almost constant collision between the governor-general and the council, which had tormented and tortured Hastings, and which, more than once, had placed in jeopardy our dominion in Hindustan. Under Cornwallis there could be no such men—or no members of council could do such deeds—as Francis, Clavering, and Monson. The success which attended the new governor-general in India was also promoted by the high consideration he enjoyed in England. "His rank and character, while it placed him above the influence of the ministers of the crown or the fear of the Court of Directors, commanded a respect from the civil and military servants of the Company, which, added to the increased powers with which he was vested, freed him from every shadow of opposition. He was enabled from the same causes to stimulate to exertion, by the distinction which his personal favour bestowed, the first talents in India; and to combine the efforts of every ambitious and honourable mind in the support of the measures of his administration."* If we compare these advantages with the numerous disadvantages of Warren Hastings, our admiration and astonishment at the achievements of that extraordinary man must be greatly increased.

Mr. Pitt's government seemed fully determined to support Lord Cornwallis as the governor-general they had appointed, and to exercise and jealously guard all the powers which the India Bill of 1784 conferred upon them. In the year 1787, when a war with France was apprehended, the Board of Control, over which Dundas presided, resolved to send four additional regiments to India in the Company's ships; and this was unanimously approved by the Court of Directors. But when the alarm blew over, and pacific declarations had been exchanged with France, the gentlemen in Leadenhall Street thought that the additional regiments were not wanted, and that if the government wished to send them, it ought to defray the charges, and to pay and provide for them when in India. Ministers certainly did wish to send them—they were desirous, in fact, of forming a permanent establishment of king's troops in these distant possessions—but they did not wish to pay for them. The Board of Control and the Directors were again at issue.

The Directors quoted the act of 1781, by which it appeared that the Company was bound to pay for such troops only as should be sent out at their own requisition. The Board of Control quoted the act of 1784, by which they were invested

* Sir John Malcolm, 'Sketch of the Political History of India.'

with the power to send troops, and, in case of the Company refusing to pay them when sent, to defray the expenses out of their territorial possessions. The Company consulted eminent lawyers; and ministers, being evidently doubtful of the law as it stood, brought in a bill to settle the question and establish the right they claimed. Pitt himself moved in the House, on the 25th of February, 1788, for leave to bring in a bill declaratory of the intention of the act of 1784. He said it was incomprehensible to him how respectable men of the law could have questioned the interpretation of the statute of 1784; that "in his mind nothing could be more clear than that there was no one step that could have been taken, previous to passing the act of 1784, by the Court of Directors touching the military and political concerns of India, and also the collection, management, and application of the revenues of the territorial possessions, that the commissioners of the Board of Control had not now a right to take by virtue of the powers and authority vested in them by the act of 1784." This was the same as declaring that no power was left to the Directors, and that all power was absorbed by the Board of Control or by ministers themselves. And yet Pitt himself had declared, in 1784, that it was not his intention, or the meaning of the bill, to impair the power of the Court of Directors, but only to define and regulate it. The magnates in Leadenhall Street must by this time have sighed for Fox's bill. Dundas, as became his functions as leading member of the Board of Control, employed more comprehensive language even than that of the premier, affirming that by the act of 1784 the Board of Control might, if it chose, devote the whole revenue of India to the purpose of its defence, without leaving the Company a single rupee! As doubts, however, had been entertained, he thought the best way of meeting them would be by the special act now proposed. The opposition maintained that this proceeding was highly unparliamentary; that the opinion of counsel, taken perhaps upon an imperfect state of the case, was not sufficient ground for a declaratory bill; that, if such a practice were to obtain, declaratory acts would be multiplied *ad infinitum;* that the legislature ought never to have recourse to such an expedient, except when the wording of an act was so ambiguous as to stand in need of explanation, or where, in consequence of the clashing judgments of courts, or doubts expressed by judges from the bench, it became necessary for the legislature to propound anew its own meaning; that in all other cases parliament, by making declaratory bills upon previous acts, would quit its legislative and assume a judicial capacity, and, as in the present case, would decide in a cause in which it was, in some respects, interested as a party, and would be a gainer by its decision. If the minister, instead of submitting the claim of government to a legal decision, was resolved to supersede the question by an extraordinary declaration of parliament, what was it but to declare that he chose to remove the cause from the courts of law, where he knew he could have no undue influence, into the two House of Parliament, where he knew, and every one else knew, that he had an influence, and a great one? Surely such proceedings would amount to manifest and violent oppression. It was further argued that the measure proposed was liable to many political objections, and might be used as a precedent for the very worst purposes. A minister, strong in his majority, would have nothing to do but to bring in a bill for granting new powers, in doubtful and ambiguous words, and with clauses that had a double meaning—he would have nothing to do but to introduce this bill with a general declaration of its moderate principles and a sacred regard to the rights which it was intended to control. By these means the consent of the parties concerned might be obtained, and the alarm and unpopularity avoided; and then, when greater powers were assumed than were ever supposed to be granted, the minister might sweep away all objections and doubts by a high, over-ruling stretch of parliamentary authority, and declare that what he contended for was the law of the land. It was quite evident, they urged, that something of this sort

had happened in the present case; that the Company had been deluded into a consent to the bill of 1784; and that the minister, having obtained that consent, was now endeavouring to put his own construction upon the act. Mr. Baring, as a party interested, said that when the bill of 1784 was in agitation, it had not been intimated to the Directors that it gave any such power to the Board of Control as ministers were now contending for; and that, if the Directors had so understood the bill, they would not have given their support to it, as they would have seen it tended to annihilate the Company, and deprive them of all their rights and powers. After a long debate leave for bringing in the Declaratory Bill was granted without a division. On its second reading, on the 3rd of March, the East India Company were heard against it by their counsel, Messrs. Erskine and Rouse. The counsel endeavoured to prove that the construction now attempted to be put upon the act of 1784 was contrary to its true and original meaning; that such construction would vest in the Board of Control powers injurious to the rights and interests of the Company, and of a dangerous political nature. Mr. Pulteney, and some other members who had voted with the minister, declared that they supported him at the time from a conviction that the bill contained no such powers as were now claimed, for otherwise they would never have voted for it; that the construction attempted to be put upon it by this new declaratory bill made it as obnoxious as Mr. Fox's bill—with only this difference, that in Fox's bill all was open and without disguise, whereas Pitt's bill would work out its object by fraud and dissimulation. Mr. Powys said that in 1784 the House had no idea that any such meaning would be attempted to be given to Pitt's bill; and that if the House had conceived anything of the kind, the bill would have been rejected. Colonel Barré, whose ardour was cooled by years and a pension of 3000*l.*, affirmed that, having asked at the time one of the Directors why they had suffered the bill to pass unresisted, and with the sanction of their concurrence, the director had admitted that the bill darkly and tacitly conveyed powers to the Board of Control as hostile to the rights of the Company as Mr. Fox's bill, but that they had a confidence in the administration which introduced it, and had no doubt of their exercising those powers with gentleness and moderation. If the Directors had acted upon any such persuasion, they must have been insane; but Mr. Baring, who was one of the Directors, and a better authority in these matters than Barré, declared that the Directors had never so understood Pitt's bill, or foreseen the powers which would be claimed by the Board of Control. Fox followed Barré in endeavouring to show that the Company had submitted to worse terms from Pitt than any that were included in his own much-abused bill. "It will now," said Fox, "no longer be clamoured through the country that I am the violator of chartered rights, or the usurper of the powers of the East India Company. Had the right honourable gentleman (Pitt) acted in the same open way in 1783 as he does now, all that abuse which I have sustained, all that clamour that has been excited, all that popular frenzy which disgraced the kingdom from one end of it to the other, never would have been provoked." The opposition also contended that this new or declaratory bill would leave at the mercy of ministers all the money the Company possessed either in India or in England, so that the very trade of the Company might be interrupted or annihilated whenever the government should be very poor or very rapacious. It was idle to talk of the commercial powers of the Company being left undisturbed, if the chancellor of the exchequer could withdraw that capital without which commerce has no powers. Strong objections were likewise urged against the particular measure which had brought on the struggle between the Directors and the Board of Control. Colonel Barré, Colonel Fullarton, Mr. Baring, and several other members said that it would have been much more just, and a great deal more economical, to have suffered the Company to raise four regiments, or to have sent over 2400 men, which were wanting to complete the king's regiments

already in India, than to send out four new regiments of king's troops; that it was besides impolitic, and tended to produce confusion in the Company's government in India, to put the power of the sword into two hands, and create jealousy and disgust in the minds of the officers in the Company's service. They contended that the administration had adopted the measure proposed, only with the view of extending their own influence and patronage in the distribution of commands and commissions. Colonel Barré remarked that, before this plan for sending out king's troops, ministers had contended that there were already troops enough, and more than enough, in India, and had forced the Directors to adopt that opinion: "but," added he, "I have long seen, and I now see more distinctly, a system of patronage, a settled and digested plan at the bottom of the whole business. It is a regular progressive pl to grasp all the patronage of the Company, in order to use it in parliament." Barré conjured the House to look about them; declaring that if the present bill passed, a fatal stab would be given to the constitution. In the last place, doubts were started whether it was consistent with the principles of the constitution to allow the Board of Control to keep up an army of king's troops in India to any amount they chose, and take payment for them from the Company's territorial revenues, and without vote of parliament, it being declared that the king could have no troops but those for which parliament annually voted the money. It was represented that, if the Board of Control should be allowed to touch any part of the territorial revenues, there was no knowing how far they might go, or how great might be the influence they would obtain; and Sheridan reminded the House that those revenues amounted to nine millions sterling!* On the other side, Pitt urged that he had done nothing by stealth; that it was the declared intention of the act of 1784 to transfer the government of India from the Board of Directors to the Board of Control; and that he had never held a language which admitted of any other interpretation: that all the fears and doubts expressed were visionary; and that, in order to do much good and prevent much harm, it was necessary that the influence of the crown should be felt in India. Dundas reminded the House that the Board of Control had already exercised the right of paying the troops out of the territorial revenues: thus, in 1785, when the pay of the army was greatly in arrear, and when the troops in consequence were almost in a state of revolt and mutiny, the Board of Control had sent out orders to postpone payments of every other description, and apply the Company's money to the satisfaction of the army. He insisted that without the powers in question the Board of Control would be but a useless institution, and that, as the members of the Board of Control were responsible to parliament for all their doings, there could be no great danger of their doing wrong, let their powers be as extensive as they might. Pitt ventured to say that he thought all the troops in India, of whatsoever description, ought to belong to the king; that there ought not to be two establishments, one the king's and the other the Company's; and that it was really in preparation for this reform that he was now sending out the four regiments. As to the constitutional question about keeping troops on foot whose pay was not annually voted by parliament, he said that the Bill of Rights and the Mutiny Act—the only positive laws we had on the subject—referred to troops within the realm, and were, besides, somewhat vague in their wording. Indeed, he thought that one of the advantages attending the present question would be to draw attention to that important but defective part of constitutional law; and he was ready to receive from any quarter suggestions upon that head, as also respecting the best means of preventing any abuse to which the army and the patronage of India might be liable. Still, however, this declaratory act seemed so different from the opinions Pitt had expressed in 1783 and in 1784, and the suspicions excited by it were so violent, that he saw his great majorities sliding

* At this time the revenue barely exceeded seven millions.

away from him. The motion for committing the bill was carried, on the 5th of March, only by 182 against 125. Two days after, when the bill was to be brought up, he rose and said himself that he felt it his duty to move for its being recommitted, in order to obtain the insertion of some salutary checks on the sending of troops to India without consent of parliament, and on any improper application of the territorial revenues. On the 10th the bill was recommitted, and Pitt moved four additional clauses:—1. To limit the number of forces, for the payment of which the Board of Control were empowered to issue their orders to 8045 men of the king's troops, and 12,200 men of European forces in the Company's service; 2. To prevent the Board from increasing the salary of any officer in the service of the Company, unless such increase should be proposed by the Directors, and laid before parliament; 3. To prevent the Board from ordering the payment of any extraordinary allowance to any person on account of services performed in India, except with the concurrence of the Directors and parliament; 4. To oblige the Directors to lay annually before parliament an account of the produce of all their revenues, and of all their disbursements. These clauses were agreed to without debate. But resistance to the bill was not yet over. On the third reading, on the 14th of March, Sir Grey Cooper, Wyndham, John Anstruther, Francis, and others spoke strongly against the whole bill, endeavouring to show, by various arguments, that it was unparliamentary, illogical, and illegal. Sir Grey Cooper said that the bill had come out from the committee even more unparliamentary in its form than it was before: that it was inconsistent with the nature and principle of declaratory bills to superadd to the declaration of what was and is law, explanatory clauses, qualifications, and restraints; and that, if the present bill passed the House, it would have the effect of declaring that certain powers had been vested in the Board of Control, and yet not vested without certain conditions which previously had not had existence. Sir Grey added, that the new clauses proposed by the minister to cover his rear were *preposterous* in the correct sense of the word; they were in their nature antecedent to the declaratory bill, and ought to have made a part of the act to be explained, if that act really intended to give the extraordinary powers which this declaratory bill assumed, but which the omission of these clauses clearly proved that it did not give. Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, Addington, afterwards Lord Sidmouth, Lord Mulgrave, Hardinge, Thornton, one of the Directors, Rolle, and others, defended the bill, and the motives and plans of Pitt in his great bill of 1784; and the third reading was carried, though by a majority of only 54, which at this time was considered a small majority. In the Lords the ministerial preponderance was more visible, yet there too the declaratory bill was warmly opposed. Lord Porchester moved that the opinion of the judges should be taken upon the construction and meaning of the India Bill of 1784. Lord Hawkesbury said that this would produce unnecessary delay and enormous expense to the Company, whose ships were detained in port, and might lose their voyage for the present year. The motion was rejected by a majority of considerably more than two to one, as was also a motion made by the Duke of Norfolk, for deferring the second reading a week, agreeably to the prayer of a petition which he presented from some of the proprietors of India stock. The Marquess of Lansdowne expressed his utmost astonishment that any man who recollected what had passed in that House in the years 1783 and 1784, in debating the India Bill of Mr. Fox and the bill of the present chancellor of the exchequer, could contend for a moment that the powers or principles of the present bill were contained in that of 1784. He showed that their lordships had rejected Mr. Fox's bill upon the ground that it contained such powers and principles; and yet the very act which they afterwards passed in 1784, as now attempted to be explained, contained the very same principles which had been so much reprobated in Mr. Fox's bill. If there was to be a preference, he, for his part, would have preferred that bill which

gave the government of India to parliament for four years. By this time it would have expired. But, if the powers proposed should once be given to the crown, what time and exertion would not be required to restore it, or to keep within due bounds the influence of the crown, when all the patronage of India would be added to that influence! His lordship concluded with objecting that this declaratory bill, in some measure, decided a point hitherto left suspended, namely, the public right to the territorial possessions in India. He allowed that some decision upon that point must soon be made, and a general system for the government of India adopted. He was ready to enter into a cool discussion of that most important system; but he could not think that they ought to place so implicit a confidence in the profound wisdom and great experience of his majesty's present ministers as blindly and precipitately to adopt all their projects. The third reading was, however, carried by 71 against 28. The Dukes of Portland, Devonshire, and Bedford, Lords Carlisle, Porchester, Derby, Sandwich, Loughborough, Fitzwilliam, and six other lords, signed a long and powerfully expressed protest.

No India bill had ever yet been framed that could stand without after-explanations and amendments. Such was the case, whether the bill provided for the administration of law in India, or provided for the powers of the Government to be exercised at home. The famous Regulating Act was not the only one which required repeated explanations and alterations. Without the three amending bills of 1786 and the Declaratory Bill of 1788, Pitt's India Bill of 1784 must have limped and halted. Hard and embarrassing was the fate of men who had to act under these defective and obscure acts of parliament! It sometimes happened that they were held responsible for what they had never rightly understood.

Lord Cornwallis was strengthened in almost every way during three years of tranquillity, and his government in India had acquired consistency and regularity before any serious conflict commenced. The principal event which occurred during his administration was the war with Tippoo Sultaun. On the 29th of December, 1789, Tippoo stormed the lines of the Rajah of Travancore, a prince who was acknowledged to be under the protection of the English Government, by the stipulations of the treaty which Tippoo had concluded in 1784. This unprovoked aggression was the origin of the war. Our opposition party in parliament — conspicuous among whom was now Philip Francis—did not hesitate to blame Cornwallis as they had previously blamed Hastings; and they took it upon themselves to honour and applaud, and afterwards to commiserate, Tippoo Sultaun, as an inoffensive ruler sacrificed to our ambition and thirst for conquest. Yet Tippoo was the cruel, faithless, ambitious prince that we have described him. Hyder Ali, though a barbarian, had several of the qualities of a great prince; but there appears to have been nothing great about Tippoo, except the power and resources which his father had left him.

After the peace of Mangalore, in 1784, the dominions of Mysore, of which Tippoo remained in possession, extended over a tract of country some 500 miles in length by 350 in breadth: it was nearly all an elevated table-land, intersected everywhere with rivers, and cooling, fertilising streams; the climate is, for India, very temperate, and the soil as fertile as almost any part of the great peninsula. It swarmed with population, the Mohammedans being almost as numerous as the Hindus, the more ancient occupants of the soil. Several of the towns, besides Seringapatam, the capital, were strongly fortified; and the region abounds in places of great natural strength, affording admirable advantages for a defensive war. Anticipating and providing for a grand struggle, Tippoo, assisted by European engineers, chiefly French and Italians, had erected many new fortresses. His annual revenue was estimated at about five millions sterling, and his father had left him a well-filled treasury. Besides European engineers and artillery officers, he had a considerable number of Europeans to train and disci-

pline his native troops: but these fellows were chiefly common soldiers that had deserted from the Company's service to escape punishment for crimes committed; and, as Tippoo was a bigoted Mussulman, and fond of religious conversion, forced or spontaneous, they had all become renegadoes. He had clothed part of his regulars in uniform resembling that of the sepoys in the English service, and had armed them with French muskets. Their discipline, however, was very far from perfect, and their whole number inconsiderable, not exceeding three or four thousand. The rest of his infantry was a mere rabble, armed with old muskets, matchlocks, pikes, and scymetars. But his principal force was his cavalry—that Mysorean cavalry which had repeatedly rushed through the Ghauts like mountain-torrents, and swept the whole of the low country of the Carnatic. Yet the élite of this force, the Circar, or stable-horse, who were uniformly clothed and equipped, did not exceed 6000; all the rest being irregulars, who found their own horses and arms, and who did no military duty, except when called into the field on some emergency, or to make some plundering incursion into the territories of their neighbours. These fellows, however, were bold and clever riders; and the rapidity of their movements often made up for their deficiency in other points. His artillery was more than respectable, the French having furnished him with guns of all calibres, many of which, being larger and longer than any of the guns of Lord Cornwallis, gave him a considerable advantage over the English in this war. He boasted that, in artillery practice, he had left his masters, the Nazarenes, far behind him; "although, like the salamander, they passed their lives in fire." His heavier pieces were all drawn by elephants; and, besides four hundred trained elephants, the best that could be procured in India, he had an immense train of the finest bullocks. According to a British officer engaged, a hundred pieces of ordnance were frequently moved, during these campaigns, with a rapidity not easily to be conceived, and far superior to the best speed the English artillery could make; and the velocity with which his large bodies of cavalry changed their situations, and the general rapidity with which his whole movements were executed, gave him another great advantage. When the war was carried into his own dominions, his irregulars, who had been accustomed to rely only upon plunder for their support and reward, were engaged by what Tippoo called regular pay: but he only engaged them by the month or moon; and Tippoo lengthened months or moons beyond their natural duration to save his pocket. "Thirty, forty, and even fifty days," says Major Taylor, "constitute their duration; and the state of his treasury, or his own whim, regulates the calendar." But in matters where the advantage is less evident, Tippoo indulged his whims to excess. He was a reformer or innovator of the most persevering kind, changing all old things, and liking nothing but what was new and of his own creation. It seemed as if the soul of a French democrat had been transfused into this Indian despot. He changed the dates of the ancient Mohammedan festivals; he changed the name of everything in government, law, and military tactics; he gave new names* to the days and months, to weights, measures, coins, forts, towns, offices civil and military; in short, to all things and persons, exhibiting "a singular coincidence at nearly one and the same time, and in distant and unconnected quarters of the globe, between the extremes of unbridled democracy and uncontrolled despotism."* He created a fleet, which never existed except upon paper, and made admirals, who had never seen the sea. He drew up a commercial code, and considered himself the chief and best merchant in his dominions. He drew up a civil and criminal code, which is said to have been the maddest and the worst ever devised by man. In the criminal part, "he combined the terrors of death with cold-blooded irony, filthy ridicule with obscene mutilation, the pranks of a monkey with the abominations of a monster."† And whatever

* Colonel Wilks, Historical Sketches of the South of India.
† Id., Id.

the Tiger once did, he would never allow to be altered. Abbé Sièyes himself was not a greater formalist, or more given to rule-and-line work. Tippoo had a rigid method in all his madness, and he made laws and regulations for almost everything, however trifling. Besides keeping in pay a corps of authors to record his wonderful exploits, he was an author himself, and so busy a one, that the pen was for ever in his hand. His father and predecessor, Hyder Ali, was accustomed to administer justice sitting in his durbar, and smoking his pipe, and to pronounce sentence of death by waving his hand; or if he used words upon the occasion, they were only—"Take him away."—He thought no more of the subject, but proceeded coolly to other business.* Though summary and merciless, his decisions were generally equitable. But Tippoo delighted to give long explanations and reasons for his capricious sentences, to accompany his cruelty with insults to his victim and eulogiums to himself, and to record in the most inflated language every decision he gave in the durbar, and every monstrosity he committed. Hyder too was accustomed to do wrong among his neighbours without attempting to prove to the world that he was doing right: but Tippoo never executed or meditated an evil deed without writing himself, or causing to be written, some pedantic proclamation, or treatise, or book, to extol his project. So long as the Hindus he had conquered paid their tribute to him, Hyder cared little about their religion, but Tippoo resolved to convert by force all his subjects to the Mohammedan faith and to root out all the ancient usages of the country. In the year 1787, before marching with an army into the country of Calicut "to improve the *morals* of the people, and to realize the *revenue*," he issued a proclamation, stating that the poor Malabars were more shameless in their connections than beasts of the field, and that unless they forsook their sinful practices and lived like the rest of mankind, he would, in accordance with his repeated vows, honour all of them with Islam—that is, he would convert them all to his own faith. "From the period of the conquest," said he, "until this day, or during twenty-four years, you have been a turbulent and refractory people, and in the wars waged during your rainy season, you have caused numbers of our Mussulman warriors to drink the sherbet of martyrdom. Be it so. What is past is past. But hereafter you must proceed in an opposite manner." * He described his journey to the Malabar coast as the progress of an angel of light or envoy of the Almighty; and the butcheries he committed during his residence there, as acts of grace and heavenly inspiration. He was the "shadow of God"—his blood-stained steps were "propitious steps"—he claimed the gratitude of the Hindus for having slaughtered them or driven them from their country, for having destroyed their pagodas and burned their gods. His capricious but fierce persecutions of the Hindus, and his forcible conversions of some of them to Mohammedanism, made him odious to all that people; and his changes and innovations almost alienated his Mohammedan subjects, who loved change as little as the Hindus. It certainly could not have been from the people of Mysore or the Malabar coast that Francis and other opposition members drew the materials of the favourable character they made up for this Indian Sultaun.

Like Hastings, Lord Cornwallis found himself obliged to set up one native power against another, and to court the aid and alliance of the Mahrattas, themselves the most restless and unprincipled of men. After some delay, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun was concluded between the English government and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, the Peishwa engaging to furnish cavalry to serve with the English army. A similar treaty had been previously concluded with the Nizam of the Deccan. "My dependance upon the support of both these powers," said his Lordship, "is grounded solely upon the expectation of their being guided by the common influence of passions, and by consi-

* Dow, Hist. of Hindustan.

* Colonel Wilks.

derations of evident interest, which ought to dispose them to seize a favourable opportunity with eagerness, to reduce the power of a prince whose ambition knows no bounds, and from whom both of them have suffered."* Before this the governor-general had made sundry attempts to negotiate with the Mysorean prince, and upon the failure of the attempts had declared that no policy would prove so fatal in India as a tame submission to insult or injury at the hands of Tippoo Sultaun. His lordship warmly expressed the indignation he felt at the conduct of the dependent government of Madras or Fort St. George, which had disobeyed his express commands in order to save money, and which had recommended his lordship to renew negotiations with Tippoo. "So far am I," said he, "from giving credit to that government for economy, in not making the necessary preparations for war, according to the positive orders of the supreme government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation; I think it very possible that every cash of that ill-judged saving may cost to the Company a crore of rupees: besides which, I still more sincerely lament the disgraceful sacrifice made, by that delay, of the honour of our country, by tamely suffering an insolent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the dominions of the Rajah of Travancore, which we were bound by the most sacred ties of friendship and good faith to defend."† The two men, and the times and circumstances in which they acted, differed materially in many respects, yet was there much in the correspondence and general tone of Cornwallis to recall the recollection of the high national tone nearly always assumed by Hastings.

By the end of 1790, or early in 1791, the Rajah of Travancore was re-established in his dominions, and Tippoo was dispossessed of nearly all the dominion he had acquired on the Malabar coast. In the month of February, Lord Cornwallis, the governor-general, who had taken the command of the army upon himself, laid siege to Bangalore, and took that important place by storm. His lordship then resolved to penetrate into the heart of Mysore, and to dictate his own terms of peace at the capital. He began his march in the first days of May. The native troops, as well as the British troops with him, burned with impatience to take their revenge for the atrocious and brutal degradation Tippoo had put upon their brothers in arms during the last war, and even after the conclusion of it. The news of the fall of Bangalore and of the rapid advance of Cornwallis filled the mind of the tyrant with alarm, and induced him to make arrangements for removing from his capital his women and treasure. To gratify his taste and his vanity, the walls of the houses in the principal streets of Seringapatam had been ornamented with rude paintings caricaturing the English. In one place there was a tiger seizing a trembling Englishman; in another there was a Mysorean horseman rivalling the feats of Antar, and cutting off two or three English heads at a blow; and in other places there were Englishmen put into positions and subjected to treatment which will not bear description. "The anticipation," says Colonel Wilks, "must have been acute which suggested the obliteration of all these favoured triumphs, and a positive order for carefully whitewashing the whole of the walls. The removal of these foolish indications of hostility and contempt was a conclusive testimony of his considering the capture of the place highly probable; but conscience suggested more serious terrors in the mass of living evidence, at Seringapatam and elsewhere, of his detention of prisoners in direct violation of the treaty of 1784. Of the English boys educated as singers and dancers* twenty still remained; a secret order was dispatched for the murder of these unhappy youths as the first victims, and then the other prisoners of the preceding war were

* Letter to Sir Charles Mallet, dated 20th Feb. 1790, as quoted by Sir John Malcolm, 'Political Hist. Ind.'

† Letter to Mr. E. J. Holland, acting-governor of Fort St. George, in id.

* The instruction, performances, and dress of these English boys were precisely the same as those of the Hindustanee dancing-girls!



Seringapatam.—From an original Drawing.

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gradually and secretly put to death. It was difficult to obtain precise information regarding details in which no individual would acknowledge instrumentality, or even ascribe it to another: the bodies were carried out at the first opening of the gates, by the common scavengers, to places of distant sepulture, and the assassinations were supposed to have been perpetrated by Abyssinian slaves, by the well-understood practice of a sudden and violent twist to dislocate the vertebræ of the neck. The orders to the outposts were executed according to local circumstances, and the English army had afterwards direct evidence, even to exhumation, of murders so committed. . . . The horrible butcheries of this period exemplified the natural connection between cruelty and fear." Tippoo, however, took up a strong position on the main road, some miles in advance of his capital, behind the deep river Cavery, and seemed resolved to await there the attack of the English. The march of Cornwallis, and of General Abercromby, who moved in a different line, was excessively laborious. They had to make the roads by which they were to advance; and for fifty miles and more Abercromby's route was across steep mountains, where the battering-trains, provisions, and stores were moved with the *greatest difficulty*—"*every separate gun* being hoisted over a succession of ascents by ropes and tackle." They also suffered severely through a want of forage, Tippoo having carefully destroyed all he could; and in the latter part of their march, the periodic rains and bad food and long fatigue brought on sickness and disease. To complete their wretchedness, the small-pox broke out among the troops. Our Mahratta allies, who had solemnly engaged to co-operate with a great army of horse, came not at the time of their appointment, and most men doubted whether they would come at all, or, if they came, whether they were not as likely to join the Mysoreans as the English. Lord Cornwallis, however, arrived at Arikera, on the Cavery, and about nine miles from Seringapatam, on the 13th of May; and, crossing the river with difficulty, for it was swollen by the rains, he attacked Tippoo, who had steadily waited his coming in a very advantageous position, on the 15th, before General Abercromby could join him or get near enough to co-operate with efficacy. The Mysoreans plied their artillery with great spirit, and preserved a very imposing countenance until the British bayonets were near their breasts; when they broke and fled. They were driven from rock to rock, and from mountain to mountain, and were at last obliged to seek shelter under the guns of their capital. The setting sun displayed a glorious view to the victors as they halted on a ridge of the hills. Right before them rose Seringapatam, the proud capital of Mysore, in all the grandeur of Eastern magnificence, adorned with mosques, minarets, pagodas, and other buildings, defended by immense fortifications, and skirted by superb gardens; the rapid Cavery winding round its walls, which seemed everywhere lined with forts, and filled with crowds of the routed army. The road was open, the prize seemed within their reach; but in the very hour of victory the English found it necessary to retreat. The force actually with Cornwallis, though strong enough to beat Tippoo's army in the field, was not strong enough to invest a place like Seringapatam; and they had with them neither provisions nor stores enough for a long siege. Moreover the draft bullocks were dying fast, the camp was half filled with sick, and the pitiless rains continued to fall in torrents. Cornwallis sent orders to Abercromby, who had reached Periapatam, about three marches from Seringapatam, to retire towards the coast; and, after remaining some days on the Cavery, near the scene of his victory, to cover Abercromby's retreat, Cornwallis burst the greater part of his battering-guns,—having no cattle to drag them off—and began his mortifying retreat also on the 26th of May. Towards the end of his first day's march Cornwallis was startled by the sudden appearance of a body of horse that rode right in on his baggage flank; but, instead of being enemies, they proved to be the advance of the long-expected Mahratta army; and they gave intelligence that the main body of that army,

counted at more than 20,000 horse, under the command of Purseram Bhow, a celebrated Mahratta warrior, and Hurry Punt, a brahmin of the highest rank, who was also charged to act as minister plenipotentiary to the whole Mahratta league, were not far distant. Cornwallis halted for a day or two, and was joined by the two great chiefs: but the swelling of the rivers, the sickly state of his men, and now the want of his battering-train, forbade all thoughts of besieging Tippoo in his capital that year; and he continued his retreat to Bangalore, there to prepare better means for another campaign. Few retreats have ever been more disastrous. "The army," says one who shared in the misery, "had suffered exceedingly from the inclemency of the weather, from wounds, and from extreme fatigue in bringing up the battering-train and stores. . . . . The season of the year was unfavourable to the cattle: they were infected with an epidemic disorder, which killed them in vast numbers, and rendered the greater part of what remained of little service. The scarcity of grain was such, that the lower class of followers were reduced to the necessity of subsisting chiefly on the putrid flesh of the dead bullocks. . . . . The tents and the clothing were nearly worn out; the arrack as well as the rice was almost expended; and, in this situation, the assistance of the troops was necessary to carry back part of the entrenching tools, which it might be difficult to replace, and to drag the field-pieces and tumbrils attached to their corps,—a task to which the surviving cattle were unequal in their weakly state. Great part of the horses of the cavalry were so reduced by want and fatigue, that they could no longer carry their riders, and many, unable to march, were shot at their picquets. The ground at Caniambaddy, where the army had encamped only six days, was covered in a circuit of several miles with the carcases of cattle and horses; and the last of the gun-carriages, carts, and stores of the battering-trains left in flames, was a melancholy spectacle, which the troops passed as they quitted this deadly camp."*

* Major Dirom, 'Narrative.' The major was deputy adjutant-general to the forces.

Tippoo now boasted that he had obtained the greatest of victories; nevertheless he immediately renewed some overtures for peace; but Lord Cornwallis demanded the same ample reparation to the Company and their allies which he had demanded at the beginning, and the negotiation fell to the ground. The governor-general had recourse to measures almost as summary and bold as some of the most censured acts of Hastings. Finding that the Mahrattas would not keep the field unless they were gratified by the immediate payment of a large subsidy, and having no money in hand that he could spare, his lordship ordered the governor and council of Madras to take the treasure out of the China ships, coin it into rupees, and send it to him with all possible dispatch.

During the following autumn immense preparations were made for renewing the war in the centre of Mysore. A fresh battering-train, one hundred elephants from Bengal, an immense number of bullocks, stores, and abundant provisions of every kind were collected on the Malabar coast. The Company had sent out 500,000*l.* in specie; and the English government had sent out reinforcements to the king's regiments in India, together with some fresh detachments of the royal artillery. The Mahrattas were steady and active in their co-operation, and rendered important services with their light, rapid cavalry. The passes which lead from Mysore into the Carnatic, through which Tippoo and his father had been accustomed to descend, and through which Cornwallis was to receive supplies and reinforcements, were now cleared, and several strong forts which Tippoo had erected in them were taken by storm. Oosoor, though a very strong place, was carried with little difficulty; nor was there much fighting or delay at Rayacottah, although it consisted of two forts, the one at the bottom, the other at the top, of a high and rugged rock. The rest of the forts which defended this pass—the Policade pass—surrendered upon summons; and this direct road from Madras was opened to an immense convoy which presently came through it, headed by elephants loaded with treasure, marching two abreast, with



Works and Pettah of Outtradroog.

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the British standard displayed. Some hill forts, which interrupted Cornwallis's communication with the army of his other ally, the Nizam of the Deccan, were also reduced, none of them making a manful resistance except Nundydroog, which was built on the top of a mountain 1700 feet high, and apparently inaccessible to artillery. Here General Medows greatly distinguished himself. Guns were drawn up the steeps, breaches were made in the walls of the fort, and orders were given to storm. Some one cried out, in the hearing of the troops, that there was a mine near the breach. "If there is a mine," said Medows, "it is a mine of gold!" The troops, headed by the flank companies of the 36th and 71st regiments, rushed to the assault, entered the breach, and made the place their own. In another direction, in the mountainous wooded country that lies between Bangalore and Seringapatam, Savendroog, a place of extraordinary strength, was captured in the same manner, the bands playing "Britons, strike home," as the storming parties advanced to the breach. Ootradroog, another fortress of the same kind and in the same district, was also carried by storm; and before the end of December all the lines of communication for Cornwallis's ultimate operations were opened and rendered perfectly secure. Tippoo had sent a considerable army to keep open his communications with the rich provinces of Bednore and Mangalore, the only part of his dominions which had escaped the ravages of war; but his Mysoreans retreated on the approach of a division of the Mahratta army, and threw themselves into a thick forest, where, besides other natural defences, they were protected by the river Toom and some deep ravines. They were soon, however, attacked, defeated, and driven out of the forest, by Captain Little, with 750 men and two guns. General Abercromby, who, since the retreat from the upper country, had occupied cantonments at and round about Tellichery, began to move again towards Seringapatam early in December, but he was obliged to halt at the top of the Ghauts, as some Mahrattas, who were busily engaged in plundering, could not be got together to accompany him. Early in January (1792) Lord Cornwallis united his main army under Ootradroog, where he was kept waiting more than a fortnight by the tardy Nizam, who was to join him with his army from Hyderabad. At last the Indian potentate arrived; and at the end of January the combined forces pressed forward for Seringapatam, while Abercromby was advancing to the same point by a different route. On the 5th of February Cornwallis once more got sight of Tippoo's capital, and saw that the Mysorean army was encamped under its walls. He encamped himself at about the distance of six miles from Seringapatam. That capital is situated on an island formed by two branches of the Cavery; the island being from three to four miles in length, and the fortress standing on the western angle of it. The eastern part of the island was fortified by redoubts and batteries, connected by strong intrenchments with a deep ditch. On the bank of the river, where Tippoo lay encamped, there was another line of works, and no fewer than six large redoubts. This first line was defended by 100 pieces of artillery, while the second line, or the island, its fortress, &c., was defended by 300 pieces of artillery. Tippoo's army, at the lowest estimate, amounted to 5000 horse and 40,000 foot. The sultaun's hope was that he should be able to protract the siege till the want of provisions and the return of the season of rains should force his enemies to retreat. But the British did not come to loiter. In the night of the 6th of February Cornwallis led them in three columns right into Tippoo's camp; and they took several of his redoubts on the river bank before the Mysoreans well knew that they were coming. Colonel Knox, with one party, even penetrated to the island, and drove the Mysoreans, out of some of their works there, at the point of the bayonet. When morning dawned, Tippoo, assisted by some Frenchmen who advised some skilful manœuvres, endeavoured to envelope and bear down by weight of artillery and force of numbers one of the three columns of the British; but he failed in the attempt; and detachment after detachment rushed

across the Cavery, and got footing on the island. Tippoo fled across the river, and threw himself into the great fortress: many of his men immediately deserted; and 10,000 men, whom he had forcibly dragged from Coorg, the country his father had conquered, ran away in a body towards their native woods. The Mysoreans, who remained within the first line on the river bank, attempted to recover the redoubts which the British had taken; but they were repulsed with terrible loss. One of these redoubts, called the "sultaun's redoubt," was held by only 100 Europeans and 50 sepoys, who repulsed thousands after thousands. When the fighting on the river bank was over, and when Tippoo's people were all retiring to the island or to the bank of the river beyond it, 50 of the brave defenders of the sultaun's redoubt were either killed or wounded, and the rest were so exhausted by fatigue, hunger, and thirst, having no provisions with them, nor so much as a drop of water, that they could scarcely stand or hold their muskets. The loss of the English during the whole of this day's hard fighting amounted to 535 in killed, wounded, and missing; the loss of Tippoo, in slain alone, was estimated at 4000. By the morning of the 8th Cornwallis had completely established his army on the island, and Tippoo had shut up his within the works of the fortress, except the cavalry and the baggage, which he had sent across the other branch of the Cavery. His lordship made immediate preparations for the siege; and three European regiments, seven battalions of sepoys, and some artillery at once girded the place, preventing ingress or egress. On the evening of that day Tippoo sent for two English officers, whom he had kept as prisoners in spite of a capitulation, and gave them presents and letters to Lord Cornwallis, assuring them that he had always been anxious to live at peace with the English. At day-break on the 10th a desperate attempt was made by some of the Mysorean cavalry, who had crossed the river in the dark, to cut off Lord Cornwallis in his camp; but the only effect really produced was an increase of zeal and animosity on the part of the British soldiers and the sepoys, who were all greatly attached to their truly noble commander. On the 16th General Abercromby, who had crossed the Cavery at Eratore, joined Cornwallis before Seringapatam with about 2000 Europeans and 4000 sepoys. As his Mahrattas had, after all, lagged behind, Abercromby had been exposed on his march to several sharp attacks from the Mysorean cavalry. By the 21st the close investment of the fortress was well advanced; the first parallel, with a large redoubt in the rear, was finished, and the line was marked out for the second parallel. On the 22nd there was some smart fighting before the English could gain possession of a grove within reach of the guns of the fortress; but by the 23rd the second parallel was finished, and breaching batteries were begun and furnaces prepared for heating shot. In a few days more the walls must have been breached by the fire of fifty heavy guns, and the place must have been made untenable by the red-hot shot which would have set in flames the wooden edifices with which the interior of the fort was at this time crowded. General Medows had undertaken to head the storming party, and the men were eager for that close conflict. But, although he had not suspended operations for a minute, Cornwallis had listened to the overtures sent to him by the two released officers, and had admitted some of Tippoo's people into close conference. These conferences, held in the English camp, were prolonged from the 15th till the 21st, and ended then without any agreement; for, though reduced to despair, the Mysorean sultaun could not reconcile himself to the hard conditions proposed. But, on the 24th, he yielded to his fate, and Cornwallis ordered his troops in the trenches to cease working and to desist from hostilities. So inflamed were the soldiery against the sultaun, and so high their hopes about prize-money if the place should be taken by storm, that it was found difficult to restrain them from continuing their works. In general orders issued to them, their general said that he thought it almost unnecessary to remind them that moderation in success was no less expected from brave men than gallantry in action; and that he trusted they

Surrender of the Children of Tippoo Saib to Lord Cornwallis.—From a Painting by Stothard

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would not only be incapable of committing violence in any intercourse that might take place between them and Tippoo's troops, but that they would even abstain from making use of any kind of insulting expression towards an enemy now subdued and humbled. The troops, though fired upon by the Mysoreans, both by musketry and artillery, after they had suspended their works and their own fire, were dutiful to the injunctions of Lord Cornwallis; but, if Tippoo had not whitewashed his walls, it is probable that their admirable discipline and their devotedness to their general would not have prevented some acts of violence. The treaty which Tippoo was thus forced to accept contained the following articles:—1. That he should cede one-half of his territories to the allies; 2. That he should pay three crores and thirty lacs of rupees; 3. That he should unequivocally restore all the prisoners who had been taken by the Mysoreans from the time of Hyder; 4. That he should deliver up as hostages for the due performance of the treaty two of his three eldest sons. In conformity with these terms Tippoo began to send the treasure out of the fort to the camp of the besiegers; and on thd 26th the young princes, one of whom was about ten and the other eight years old, were conducted to the camp with great pomp and ceremony. They were each mounted on an elephant richly caparisoned, and seated on a silver houdah. They were dressed in long white muslin gowns and red turbans; they wore several rows of large pearls round their necks, from which was suspended an ornament consisting of a ruby and an emerald of considerable size, surrounded with large brilliants, and in their turbans each had a sprig of rich pearls. They were attended by their father's vakeels, mounted also on elephants. The procession was opened by hircarrahs, or messengers, riding on camels, and seven standard-bearers carrying small green flags; and it was closed by 100 spearmen, whose spears were all inlaid with silver. Some of Tippoo's sepoys and a party of horse followed at a short distance. Lord Cornwallis, attended by his staff and the principal officers of his army, received the princes as they dismounted from their elephants, at the door of his great tent; embraced them, led them in, one in each hand, and treated them, as it was his nature to do all men, with great politeness, attention, and tenderness. He seated them, one on each side of himself; and then the sultaun's head vakeel said—"These children were this morning the sons of the sultaun, my master; they must now look up to your lordship as a father!" Cornwallis assured the vakeels and the princes themselves that they should not feel the loss of a father's care. He gave each of the boys a gold watch, with which they were greatly delighted. The next day his lordship paid them a visit at the splendid tents which had been set apart for them. They came out to meet him with smiling faces; and his lordship again embraced them, and led them by the hand into the tent. There, each of the princes presented him with a fine Persian sword, and he gave them in return some beautiful English fire-arms. On the morning of the 28th Tippoo fired a royal salute from the fort to announce his satisfaction at the kind and honourable reception given to his sons.

Sir John Kennaway, who was appointed to conclude the definitive treaty, encountered much slowness and many difficulties on the part of Tippoo's vakeels. The sultaun particularly objected to restoring to the Rajah of Coorg his dominions, and expressed astonishment and indignation at the imperative demand. But as the rajah had risen in arms, and had very materially assisted the English and their allies, Lord Cornwallis was determined not to abandon him. There had been but too much of this work at the peace of Mangalore. Tippoo instructed his vakeels to tell the English negotiator that he had refused to see them or to deliberate on that point. At the same time it was discovered that he was diligently repairing the damages which the fortress had sustained, and strengthening its works. Cornwallis then issued orders—orders most welcome to the troops—for recommencing the siege, informing the young princes that he must send them to Madras, while he disarmed their guard, and treated them as prison-

ers of war. The next morning the princes were actually made to begin their march to Bangulore. This brought Tippoo to his senses; his vakeels assured Sir John Kennaway that he would agree to all that had been demanded from him. Cornwallis agreed to suspend operations for one day, and recalled Tippoo's sons, who, on the 19th of March, presented the definitive treaty, signed by their father, to Lord Cornwallis. By this treaty the English obtained all the dominions of Tippoo on the coast of Malabar, a district surrounding Dindigul, and some territory on the western frontier of the Carnatic, including the Barramahal and the lower Ghauts; the Mahrattas (for all the three allies shared, and about equally, in the dismemberment of the sultaun's dominions) recovered possession of the country as far as the river Toombudra, which had once been their frontier line; and the Nizam got all the country from the river Kistna to the Pennar, including the forts of Gunjecottah and Cuddapa. The territory thus acquired by the English did not yield much more than half a million sterling of annual revenue; but it was highly valuable as strengthening the Carnatic against invasion, as affording excellent land communications, and as containing ports on the Malabar coast highly favourable to commerce and to the extension of that influence which we aimed at. The Nairs and other Hindu people that occupied the coast of Malabar were made happy by the change of masters, and by the full freedom now allowed them in the exercise of their religion and in the enjoyment of their old customs.*

To soothe the troops for the disappointment of their expectations of booty in the storming of Seringapatam, and to reward them for their excellent conduct and rare exertions during the whole of the war, the commander-in-chief, upon his own responsibility, made them a gift, equal to six months' batta, out of the money paid by Tippoo; and both he himself and General Medows, his second in command, resigned their large shares, that the soldiers might have the more. The army returned to the Company's territories, good care being taken to place respectable garrisons in the districts ceded, and particularly in the towns on the Malabar coast, where, hitherto, we had scarcely had a footing. The conduct of Lord Cornwallis to Tippoo after this peace was honourable and generous; but the sultaun, whose pride had been so humiliated, and whose power had been so greatly reduced, seemed to receive every act of kindness rather as an insult than as a proof of friendship; and nothing in his conduct gave ground to hope that the peace would be permanent. More over, some of the Mahrattas took mortal offence at the refusal of Cornwallis to permit them to subsidize a British detachment.

While Lord Cornwallis was engaged with Tippoo, Lord Macartney, formerly governor of Madras, proceeded on his famous embassy to China, in the hope of opening that closed and jealously guarded country to English trade and enterprise. But the result really obtained was little more than a good book about the country and the people, from Mr. (now Sir John) Barrow, his lordship's secretary. Our gradual conquests had brought our Indian frontier almost close upon the frontiers of the Celestial Empire; and the Chinese, who at least knew something of the history of our aggrandizement in Hindustan, were alarmed at our near neighbourhood, and thus more than ever disposed to persevere in their ancient excluding laws.

The desire of not destroying what has been termed "the balance of power in India," is generally stated to have been one of the principal causes which prevented Lord Cornwallis from prosecuting the war to the total annihilation of Tippoo; but it is believed, by one well acquainted with the political history of the country, that his lordship must have been influenced by more powerful and more proximate causes than the speculative apprehension of danger from the increase of the dominions of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, which has been so often ascribed as his motive for conclud-

* Colonel Wilks, Sketches.—Major Dirom, Narrative.—Mackenzie, Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultaun.—Moore, Narrative.—Major Taylor, Travels overland to India.

ing the peace with Tippoo Sultaun, whom he continued to describe as "a faithless and violent character, upon whom no dependence could be placed." Among the more obvious and stronger reasons which may have influenced Cornwallis, the following have been cited:—The finances of government were in a very embarrassed state: the general sentiment in England was adverse to any war whatever in India: the Court of Directors had, in several of their dispatches, earnestly called his lordship's attention to the conclusion of an early peace, as essential to the finances and true interests of the Company; and they had declared in a dispatch received just before the conclusion of the definitive treaty, their readiness to sacrifice some of the advantages which they might justly expect from the success of the war, rather than risk its continuance. Great jealousy subsisted between the Nizam and the Mahrattas; and while it was difficult to manage the unwieldy force of the Nizam, serious apprehensions were entertained of the treachery of the Mahrattas, who made some very alarming movements and demonstrations while Cornwallis and his army were engaged at Seringapatam. The accounts which had arrived in India a short time previously to the conclusion of the treaty, left little doubt that England would soon be involved in another war with France; and this was certainly a strong inducement for Cornwallis to bring the war with Tippoo to a termination, so that he might be prepared to repel any attack of the French, and direct the efforts of our arms against the settlements in India which had been restored to France by the peace of 1782.*—When the account of war between France and England reached him at Calcutta, Lord Cornwallis hastened to Madras to take the command of an army; but before he could reach that coast, Pondicherry, the French metropolis in India, was attacked and taken by that army from Fort St. George, under the command of Major-General Sir John Braithwaite. All the French factories were seized without any difficulty; but it was not found possible to shut out all the adventurers of that bold and adventurous nation, or to prevent their intriguing with Tippoo Sultaun and the other Indian princes most hostile to the English.

After the conclusion of the present war against the Mysorean sovereign, our amicable relations with the Nizam became more intimate, from the sense of the mutual benefit which had attended the alliance; and a subsidiary British force was allowed to remain in the Nizam's service. With the Peishwa of the Mahrattas the case was very different: he had been unsteady to his alliance during the war, and at the peace he made propositions with which Lord Cornwallis thought it impolitic to comply. The Peishwa wanted to subsidize a British detachment, of the same force and on the same terms as that which remained with the Nizam, openly declaring that the purpose for which this force was required, was to enable him to reduce to obedience any of his dependent and tributary states that might prove refractory, but secretly intending to employ these disciplined troops in making conquests at the expense of his neighbours, and the neighbours and allies of the Company. Lord Cornwallis stated in his dispatch that the principal cause of objection to the measure was his conviction that it was meant to obtain the countenance and support of the British government against Madhajee Scindiah, the chief of a Mahratta confederacy, who was nearly as powerful as the Peishwa, and who, for some time past, had been aspiring to the rank of supreme chief and ruler of all the Mahrattas. The Peishwa interpreted Cornwallis's refusal of the subsidiary force into an intention of the British to take part with his rival Scindiah; and this evil impression remained, although the governor-general and commander-in-chief refused to hire two disciplined battalions to Scindiah, who offered to pay a high price for their services. The foundation was already laid for the contest which soon afterwards ensued between the great native powers; and it was evident that the Company could not remain neutral in that inevitable and extensive war; but the British legislature had rigidly prescribed a system of non-

* Sir John Malcolm, Sketch of the Political History of India.

interference, and, obedient to it, Cornwallis did not think himself at liberty to make even a political effort to prevent the collision, or to check the aggrandizement of either of the great Indian potentates. All that the English gained by this temporary neutrality was a longer, a more expensive, and a more doubtful war when hostilities commenced, and when it became apparent that all Hindustan would be devastated and thrown back into anarchy, unless British troops and well trained sepoys in the Company's pay should succeed in breaking up the Mahratta power altogether. If Lord Cornwallis had been allowed by his employers to pursue a different course now, his successor, the Marquess Wellesley, might have been relieved from the necessity of waging that long Mahratta war, which cost such extensive sacrifices and such strenuous exertions, but which was a war we can never look upon without grateful emotions, as it served to develope the genius of Wellesley's greater brother, the Duke of Wellington. It was during the government of Lord Cornwallis and the prevalence of our neutrality system that the independent power of Madhajee Scindiah was matured, and that his authority was completely established over the northern parts of Hindustan. Partly by intrigue and partly by force this powerful Mahratta chief got possession both of the person of the Mogul and of all his dominions: the dominions were very limited, but the possession of the person of the degenerate imbecile descendant of Aurungzebe was of immense advantage, as it allowed him to issue his firmans in the name of the Mogul; and as the mere name was still potential among the Mohammedans of India. Though denied the two British battalions, Scindiah found means to raise a large and formidable corps of infantry under European officers, chiefly French; to erect founderies and arsenals, and, in short, to accumulate those vast military powers and resources which enabled his immediate successor, his nephew Doulut Rao Scindiah, to carry on a war at the same moment in the Deccan and Hindustan against the British government and its allies.* Even before his power was thus matured, Scindiah did not refrain from intimating his intention of turning his advantages against the Company. In the summer of 1792 the public news-writer of Delhi stated that the Great Mogul had informed Scindiah and the Peishwa that he hoped through their exertions to obtain tribute from the British territories of Bengal. Lord Cornwallis felt this insult very acutely, and the neutrality system of the legislature did not hinder him from resenting it. He instructed his resident at Delhi to tell Scindiah that, in the present situation of the Mogul, he must consider all letters written upon political points in his name to be written by his (Scindiah's) sanction and authority only; and that any attempt to demand tribute from the English, or to establish principles of that description, would be warmly resented by the government of Bengal. Writing to the resident, he continued—"You will, in the course of any conversation or correspondence which you may hold with Scindiah upon this point, take care to recall in the most forcible manner to his recollection the spirit of moderation and forbearance that has been manifested by this government during the long period in which he has been employed in extending his conquests in the northern parts of Hindustan; and that it would give us pain to be forced to depart from the neutral and pacific system that we have hitherto observed in that quarter. You will, at the same time, inform him, that it is by my particular directions that you say that we have no desire to make any new acquisitions, nor even to interfere in the internal affairs of the empire, if we can avoid it with honour and safety; but that if any of our neighbours should be rash enough to insult us by unjust demands, or in any other shape whatever, we feel ourselves both able and resolved to exact ample satisfaction."* These spirited remonstrances curbed the insolence of the great Mahratta, who assured the British resident at Delhi that the only use he wished to make of the Mogul's favour was to establish his authority over the territories which he

* Sir John Malcolm, 'Political Hist. Ind.'

* Letter of Lord Cornwallis, in ib.

held, and not to subdue or invade the territories of others. And during the three remaining years of his life Madhajee Scindiah, though he continued some of his operations in the north, left the lower provinces of Hindustan undisturbed, and treated the government of Bengal with respectful deference.

Ragojee Bonslah, another powerful Mahratta chief, who held dominion over the province of Cuttack and other extensive territories, was conciliated by the diplomacy of Cornwallis, who deputed a resident to his court.

With the debt-oppressed Nabob of the Carnatic, his lordship, as soon as he arrived in India, ratified or concluded a treaty of alliance, which was considered as a great improvement of the political relations which subsisted previously between the Company and that ruler. It vested the sole military power in the Company; and thereby gave security to our Indian empire. But it was only in this view that the treaty could be considered as beneficial; in every other, it carried the seeds of its own destruction. The sword was placed in one hand (in that of the Company), the purse in another (in that of the nabob); and to combine both, in order to produce efficient exertion, in a time of war, for the mutual safety of the two contracting parties, it became necessary, unless the nabob altered all his principles of government, to introduce a complete change into the administration of those provinces from which the resources were to be drawn during the actual existence of a war. There was another and a serious inconvenience. By the treaty the nabob was bound to contribute nine lacs of star pagodas annually towards the support of the military peace establishment, which was to be maintained in the Carnatic by the Company; and in the event of a failure on the part of the nabob, in the punctual payment of this money, the Company was to possess the right of appointing its own revenue officers, with authority to superintend and receive from the nabob's collectors, the revenue of certain specified districts; and after the amount of the deficiency should have been realized, the Company's officers were instantly to be recalled. This was for a state of peace. In the event of war, it was stipulated that the nabob should pay four-fifths of his revenue to the Company, and that, in case of his failing so to do, the Company should have the right of appointing receivers and superintendants, not to collect, but to receive from the nabob's collectors, the revenues of all the nabob's country. It was evident that the constant changes of authority to which the territories of the nabob were thus exposed, were likely to destroy every hope of improvement in the country, or of permanent comfort and prosperity to its unfortunate inhabitants. The nabob was never punctual, and while he wasted his money in extravagance, he was always pleading poverty, and requesting the Company to pay the troops which they kept in his dominions, and without which these dominions must have passed into other hands. When the war with Tippoo Sultaun broke out (in 1790), the nabob failed entirely in his part of the agreement; and thereupon Lord Cornwallis, acting precisely as Warren Hastings would have done at such a critical moment, when money must be obtained or disaster and defeat be incurred, put the treaty in abeyance, and took possession of the whole of the nabob's country, and levied the taxes directly by his own officers, only directing that the nabob might be permitted to appoint officers of his own to observe the conduct and inspect the accounts of the servants and collectors of the Company, in order that a satisfactory settlement, upon the principle prescribed by the treaty, might be made hereafter between his highness and the British government. It was not a case in which the nabob could have been left to himself: without the Company's troops the Carnatic must have been overrun by the fierce Mysoreans, and the adjacent territories of the Company must have been again devastated by Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis expressed his deep regret that the nabob had not been prevailed upon to give his assent to this temporary occupation of his country and assumption of its finances, and that he had not, by order, economy, and punctuality in his stipulated payments, ren-

dered such measures unnecessary, declaring, however, at the same time, that the British government could not gratify the nabob's private feelings by forbearing to take efficient steps to exact the performance of his engagements, without being guilty of a flagrant neglect of the attention which was due to the honour and interests of their country, and to the security of his highness's own dominions. He also told the nabob that although it was a time of war, he would soon see that, while his people were treated with justice and humanity, a liberal fund would be secured for the support of his own dignity, and that of his family; and that the remainder of the revenues "would be rescued from the hands of extortioners and usurers, and honourably applied to the defence and protection of his subjects and dominions." This entire occupation of the Carnatic greatly facilitated the operations of the war against Tippoo, as it placed the resources of the country in the hands of the British government, and gave that government the undivided power of applying those resources, and every military supply which the country possessed, to the aid of the public service. After the termination of the war against Tippoo, his lordship opened fresh negotiations with the Nabob of the Carnatic, which ended in a new treaty, on the 12th of July, 1792. The previous treaty of 1787 was annulled; and it was agreed that the defence of the territories of both states was to be intrusted entirely to the Company, who, in the event of war, were to assume the management of the Carnatic, with its revenues, &c., which were all to remain in the Company's hands as long as the war lasted, and to be returned to the nabob at its termination; unless in a few cases, which were particularly specified. It was also stipulated that, as long as the Company remained in possession of the Carnatic, they should pay to the nabob one-fifth part of its revenues, keeping the four-fifths for the expenses of the war, &c. By an article of this treaty, of 1792, the nabob agreed, as he had done before, to pay nine lacs of pagodas annually for the military peace establishment. Further he agreed to pay between six and seven lacs of pagodas annually, for the liquidation of his private debts. In the event of any failure on his part, certain specified districts, with their revenues, were to be assumed by the Company; and the nabob was to recall all his officers from the said districts, except one officer in each, who was to receive annually from the Company's servants attested statements of the gross revenue and net receipts. Lord Cornwallis entertained strong hopes of the happy operation of this treaty; but the authorities in England did not share in this impression, and they early directed efforts to be made to modify the arrangement, which they apprehended would never work advantageously. The event proved the correctness of these apprehensions.

The ruler of Oude, the nabob-vizier, had frequently represented to Warren Hastings that his finances were deranged by the heavy monthly payment of 2 lacs and 60,000 rupees to the regular brigade of the Company's troops stationed in his territories, for the defence of Oude, Corah, and Allahabad, and the annual 23 lacs of rupees paid to six battalions of sepoys, a corps of artillery, and some squadrons of regular cavalry stationed at Furruckabad; but Hastings, instructed by the Court of Directors not to remove any of the troops and not to abate any of the payments, had turned the deaf ear to the nabob's complaints. As it was evident that a compliance with the nabob-vizier's wishes would expose both his own interests and those of the Company to great danger, as he possessed no immediate means of preserving the internal tranquillity of his dominions, much less of protecting them from the invasion with which they were almost constantly threatened by the Mahrattas, Cornwallis acted exactly as Hastings had done, telling the remonstrating or petitioning nabob, that the Company's troops stationed within his territories were not more than sufficient for the defence of them; that his own subjects were retained within the bounds of duty and allegiance solely by the respect inspired by the Company's troops; and, finally, that he must pay for the valuable protection thus afforded him. His lordship, however

by a treaty concluded with Hyder Beg Khan, the nabob-vizier's minister, reduced the total of the annual payments from 80 lacs to 50 lacs.

The course of events, and absolute necessity, had forced the pacifically disposed Lord Cornwallis into the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and into a course of measures very contrary to the wishes, the policy, and the system of non-interference and non-aggrandizement of the British legislature and government. But it has been well remarked that this self-evident necessity was not followed by the conclusion that the same causes might again produce the same effects; and that a general impression was made in England, that his lordship had placed the affairs of the Company on the true footing of security and strength, which had been so long desired —that, for the future, nothing would be requisite but mild, moderate, and conciliatory councils in the governor-general and the local authorities, to secure the lasting tranquillity and prosperity of the British Empire in India. This capital mistake must indeed appear the more extraordinary if we reflect upon the actual condition and increasing power of the always restless Mahratta princes, the weakness of the rulers of Oude and the Carnatic, and of all the allies of the English, not one of whom could be left exposed to invasion and conquest without exposing either the trade or the dominions of the Company to serious loss, if not to absolute ruin. Our territories were greatly increased and our political relations much extended during Lord Cornwallis's administration. His great efforts had all been attended with extraordinary success. If some of his attempted reforms were failures, he yet left behind him, among the natives, a good name, and the enviable reputation of having always entertained the best intentions. Some great reforms and changes he certainly effected both in the military and in the civil establishments of India, being aided therein by the new acts of parliament and by the possession of that unity of power and that absolute control over the presidencies of Madras and Bombay which Hastings had never possessed; and it is asserted, by a very competent authority, that the system of internal rule which he introduced into the provinces of Bengal and Bahar will ever reflect the highest honour on his name.* That opposition party in parliament which had extolled the virtues and deplored the misfortunes of the Tiger of Mysore were not sparing of their criticism and censures: but when his lordship returned to England at the end of 1793, they did not venture to try to impeach him. The king, in acknowledgment of his important services, raised him to the rank of marquess, and he was appointed master-general of the ordnance. It is said that he was not a very brilliant man, but it is seldom that we find brilliant men doing what was achieved by his spotless integrity, his humanity, and untiring diligence.

* Malcolm.

CHAPTER II.

ADMINISTRATION OF SIR JOHN SHORE. A. D. 1793.

SIR JOHN SHORE (afterwards Lord Teignmouth), the friend of Warren Hastings, the bosom friend and afterwards biographer of Sir William Jones, and a most respectable civil servant of the Company, who had resided long in India, and had rendered important services there, was appointed to succeed Lord Cornwallis as governor-general of India.* Sir John had abundant local knowledge and industry. He was particularly skilled in the revenue system of India, and was of very pacific habits; and it appears to have been expected that all those great advantages which Lord Cornwallis had obtained would be confirmed and improved, without any risk of war or extension of political connections by a governor possessed of these qualities. It was laid down to him as a rule, that the dictates of *justice*, no less than the dictates of *economy*, prescribed to the Company a system of non-interference with the internal affairs or mutual differences of the native states; *unless* when interference should be required by the paramount duty of preserving the tranquillity and integrity of the Company's own dominions. About the same time that Shore became the real ruler of Bengal, the nominal sovereign of that country, the nabob Mubarek-ul-Dowlah, died, in the 37th year of his age, leaving behind him twelve sons and thirteen daughters. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Uzeer-ul-Dowlah, who was solemnly proclaimed at Calcutta on the 28th of September, 1793.

The situation of affairs did not promise, to those who were acquainted with the temper of the Mahrattas, any very long exemption from hostilities; but, on the

* Mr. Shore (he was knighted after accepting the governor-generalship) had gone to India early in life, and had been promoted in the service by Warren Hastings. He had made good progress in the native languages, then too much neglected by the English; he had studied the habits, customs, tenures, and laws of the natives, and had cultivated an extensive intercourse with the people. He had occupied a high post in the then united departments of *revenue* and *judicature*; and on the consolidation of the provincial boards under Warren Hastings, he had been placed at the head of that department. On Hastings's return to England, in 1785, he accompanied him; entertaining, and avowing on all occasions, a reverence for that great governor-general's integrity, good intentions, and wonderful abilities. It was to Shore that Hastings inscribed that version of the Ode of Horace which he made on shipboard during the homeward voyage. (See vol. i., p. 237.) At the end of the following year Mr. Shore was appointed member of the supreme council, and in that capacity he accompanied Lord Cornwallis to India. He opposed some of Lord Cornwallis's law reforms, as being unsuited to the country and people; and he returned again to England with a moderate fortune, and with the intention of passing the rest of his life in retirement. The invitation to become Lord Cornwallis's successor is said to have been altogether unexpected by him. The perusal of his minutes on the revenue had principally induced Pitt and Dundas to select him; but his known predilection for a pacific course of policy, his love of order, and the general excellence of his private character were also powerful recommendations. At first he steadily refused the appointment; but he soon yielded to the earnest solicitations of Mr. Charles Grant. Wilberforce, whose views in religion resembled his own, had a great regard for Shore; and he says that Shore was so reluctant to accept the splendid offer, that Grant, at Pitt's request, undertook to go down and find him out in his retirement, and to urge him to consent, in consideration of the valuable services which he might be enabled to render to his country and to the natives of India, in whose welfare he had always taken a lively interest.' Wilberforce adds that he was present when Shore was introduced to Pitt, and that he was much struck with the simplicity, repose, and dignified urbanity he displayed in his conference with the premier. (*Memoir of Lord Teignmouth*, by Rev. Samuel Charles Wilks, M.A. *Life of Lord Teignmouth*, by his Son, the present Lord.)

other hand, the Company was in every respect free from any immediate danger. The English government had at no period been so strong in actual military force and resources. Its principal enemy, Tippoo, was much reduced; its principal ally, the Nizam or Subahdar of the Decean, seemed firm to his engagements. But those jealousies which had broken out between the Nizam and the Mahrattas before Lord Cornwallis quitted the country, were now threatening wars and convulsions. Being justified in so doing by his treaty of alliance, the Nizam, threatened with invasion, applied to the new governor-general for assistance. This assistance was refused by the pacific Sir John Shore, whose wishes accorded with the neutrality system instructions he received from home, and who was loath to incur any hazard of giving offence to the Mahrattas. When this refusal was made it was notorious that the Nizam entertained the most friendly dispositions towards the British government, and rejoiced at the recent successes of Cornwallis, which had established our great ascendency in the political scale of India; while the Mahrattas viewed the success of the English with alarm, and contemplated their power with a degree of jealousy which almost amounted to hostility. The wily Mahrattas very soon concluded that Sir John Shore, in his anxiety to remain neutral, would not aid the Nizam by any other means than those of diplomacy and a mediatory negotiation; and as soon as they made this discovery they despised the diplomacy, they resolved to reject the mediation, and began to beat their kettle-drums, collect their war-horses, and sharpen their spear-heads. At this critical moment Madhajee Scindiah, who had given such growth and increase to the Mahratta power, died, and left his vast resources and territories to his nephew Doulut Rao Scindiah, a much younger and much more active and daring chief, who hastened to assemble his army from the remotest quarters of Hindustan, with the double view of strengthening his personal authority and of acquiring an ascendency in the confederacy forming against the Nizam. And while their best ally was thus threatened, the English themselves were again menaced by the snake which they had scotched, not killed. Tippoo, who had commenced intrigues with the French and with the Mahrattas before the treaty of Seringapatam was a month old, assembled an army, and threatened to come forward as an ally of the Mahrattas. This only confirmed Sir John Shore in his resolution not to aid the Nizam. It was obvious to him that the Nizam, unsupported by the English, must sink under the combined attack of the Mahrattas and Tippoo, and that the Mysorean would become more dangerous than ever to the English by this change. But he consoled himself with the reflection, that in the event of the Nizam's country being conquered by such incompatible allies as Tippoo and the Mahrattas, there was as great a probability of their quarrelling about the division of the spoils and attacking each other, as of their uniting in an invasion of British India. By the recent acts of parliament, the governor-general, in common with all the Company's servants, was prohibited from interfering in the quarrels of native princes, and of taking up arms against them, unless to oppose an actual invasion of the British territories; and these cast were of more importance in the eyes of Sir John than were the obligations of the treaty of alliance concluded with the Nizam by his predecessor. Yet we could not leave the Nizam to his fate without weakening that force of opinion which, more than arms, had made us what we were in India. Lord Cornwallis, by resenting the attack of Tippoo upon our ally the Rajah of Travancore, had gained the confidence of other allies, and had established the British reputation for good faith, justice, and firmness. Could so recent an example be overruled? Could the same power which rushed into war in 1790, for the defence of an inconsiderable ally, remain neutral in 1794, when a considerable and a faithful ally was threatened with destruction? Could our reputation for good faith towards our allies be sacrificed at the moment when it was highest? Yet Sir John Shore did not think that these considerations were to be put in competition with the evils which might attend a war with Tippoo and the Mahrattas. It is, however, doubted whe-

ther any such war would have followed a more spirited course of policy. "There indeed appears," says Sir John Malcolm, "every ground to conclude, that while the impressions which had been made on all the native powers of India, by the wise councils and military success of the Marquess Cornwallis, were yet in full force, the decided interference of the British government would have deterred both the Mahrattas and Tippoo Sultaun from an attack upon the Nizam." Events which Sir John Shore could neither control nor foresee prevented the hostile movements of Tippoo and preserved the Nizam from total annihilation. Yet the fate of the faithful ally of the English was sufficiently hard, and the effects of the Mahratta invasion of the Deccan were witnessed in the impoverishment of the people, in the decline of their trade with the Company, and in the dread which was entertained of their visit being soon repeated.

In the month of February, 1795, the advanced corps of the Mahratta army, under Doulut Rao Scindiah, marched against the Nizam; and on the 11th of March a battle was fought near the town of Beeder, the capital of a province (of the Deccan) of that name. Both armies were thrown into confusion, neither of them obtained any considerable advantage, both indeed appeared upon the point of running away at the same moment: but the Nizam ran first—he had brought his women with him, these inmates of the zenana were sadly frightened, and imparting their fears to their never courageous lord, he quitted the field, and fled by night to the small fort of Kurdlah. Here he was immediately surrounded and hemmed in by the Mahrattas, who cut him off from all supplies, and starved him into a disgraceful capitulation. After remaining for some weeks in the fort, the Nizam agreed to cede to his enemies an extensive tract of country rendering thirty-five lacs of annual revenue, and including the celebrated fortress of Dowletabad or Deoghir, the strongest place in his dominions; to pay three crores of rupees, one-third immediately, the remainder by instalments of twenty-five lacs per annum, and to give up as an hostage his prime minister Azeem-ul-Omrah, the zealous friend of the English and the decided opponent of the Mahrattas. This delivering up of an able and honest minister was almost as dishonourable to the English as it was injurious to their abandoned ally the Nizam, whose throne had been supported by his abilities. At the time there were two battalions of British troops in the Deccan: if these had been present at the battle of Beeder, the total defeat of the Mahrattas would have been certain; if they had marched to the relief of Kurdlah, the Nizam might have been extricated without signing the disgraceful treaty; but the English officer in command, obedient to the orders of the governor-general, refused to accompany him to the war, or to take any steps against the Mahrattas. After the convention of Kurdlah was settled, the Nizam returned to Hyderabad, and strongly intimated his desire that the Company would recall their two battalions. The battalions were soon recalled. In the meantime the Mahratta confederates evacuated the Deccan and marched towards their respective countries; which they had hardly reached ere two unexpected events occurred—the sudden death of the young Peishwa, Madhoo Rao, and the rebellion of Ali Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam. These two events conspired, in their effects, to revive the lost influence of the British at the court of Hyderabad, and to restore the Nizam to his former importance among the native powers. The death of Madhoo Rao introduced fierce dissensions among the Mahratta chiefs, who had been so recently leagued together. Nanah Furnavese was determined to place upon the vacant throne an infant prince, in whose name he might rule and reign. His great rival Doulut Rao Scindiah supported the claims of the son of Ragoba, who would have been the undoubted heir of the throne if the Mahrattas had recognised the European law of succession and primogeniture. Nanah Furnavese, chancing to be at Poonah, the capital or Aulic city of the Mahratta confederacy, had at first several advantages. He liberated the Nizam's minister, Azeem-ul-Omrah, opened a negotiation with him, and agreed to par-

chase the Nizam's alliance by rescinding the convention of Kurdlah, and by giving up all claims to the territory and the money which the Nizam had agreed to yield and pay. A treaty was concluded upon these conditions; but before it could take effect Scindiah marched upon Poonah with an army which his rival was unable to oppose: Nanah Furnavese was driven out of the country; and Bajee Rao, the son of Ragoba, was placed upon the Peishwa musnud. The treaty so recently concluded with Azeem-ul-Dowlah was annulled; but, in order to prevent the Nizam from forming an alliance with his rival Nanah Furnavese, Scindiah hastened to conclude a new treaty with the still powerful ruler of the Deccan, merely demanding from the Nizam one-fourth of the territory and money which had been stipulated in the convention of Kurdlah. These rapid revolutions rescued the Nizam, and in part saved the character of the English, who must have been disgraced in the eyes of the native princes if their ally had been despoiled to the full extent of the treaty of Kurdlah, or if he had been driven to extremities by another Mahratta invasion.

The rebellion of the Nizam's son had a still more favourable effect. Since the time of the gallant and adventurous M. Bussy, the ruler of the Deccan had never been without some French officers in his service. At present he had a considerable number of these officers, the chief of them being one M. Raymond, who had commenced his military career in India at an early age, under the rash and unfortunate Lally. These Frenchmen had disciplined various corps of sepoys. During the war against Tippoo Sultaun the Nizam had two battalions only; but since the peace of Seringapatam M. Raymond had raised or disciplined several other battalions. The English resident at Hyderabad stated that no fewer than twenty-three disciplined battalions, with twelve field-pieces, accompanied the Nizam in the campaign against the Mahrattas which had ended so disastrously at Kurdlah; but there were certainly not Frenchmen enough to officer so large a force, and it is probable that not one-third of this force was either properly disciplined or properly commanded. After the departure of the two British battalions the Nizam ordered new levies for these corps; and assigned an extensive territory for their regular payment and support. As the fiercest of all wars was now raging between France and England, and as it was expected that the republicans would make some desperate effort to land troops on the Coromandel coast, the British resident expressed great jealousy of M. Raymond and his battalions, and remonstrated strongly with the Nizam; but little attention was given to him, and, in spite of his remonstrances, not only were the levies continued, but a considerable part of Raymond's force was sent to occupy the districts of Kurpah and Kummum, which were immediately upon the frontier of the Company's possessions. Sir John Shore now became seriously alarmed. "This last measure," said he, "has a suspicious, not to say *criminal* appearance: and although we may acquit the Nizam of any hostile designs against the Company, I can entertain little doubt of the disposition of M. Raymond and the officers of his corps to co-operate with the French upon the northern Circars. Such an attempt may not be probable; but as it would, if carried into execution, be attended with very serious consequences to the British possessions in India, the strongest representations ought to be made, to induce the Nizam to recall the detachment of M. Raymond." The governor-general addressed a letter to the Nizam, stating in a general manner the consequences which might result from placing a force on the British frontiers, under the command of men who were the declared enemies of the British government; and requesting him to withdraw them immediately. At the same time he directed his resident at Hyderabad to make use of more decided language to that court, and to tell the Nizam that if he persisted in his determination to keep the Frenchmen and their battalions where they were, he (the governor-general) would be compelled, with whatever reluctance, to advance a body of troops towards our frontier. Resenting his abandonment by the English in the late Mahratta invasion, and complaining

that they had broken their treaty with him; the Nizam persisted in keeping his troops at Kurpah; being encouraged so to do by M. Raymond and the other French officers, who assured him that the omnipotent French republic, which was giving liberty to all the nations in Europe, would soon overthrow the tyranny of England, which kept him and other princes of India in thraldom. At the moment there was a considerable number of French officers and soldiers and sailors prisoners of war at Pondicherry. It appears that a secret correspondence was established between these men and M. Raymond; and nothing but the great vigilance of Lord Hobart, who then presided over the Madras government, prevented his being joined by these Pondicherry prisoners of war, who were apprehended at the moment in which they intended to effect their escape. Such a reinforcement would have been of immense importance; and it was probably in order to be near at hand to receive it that M. Raymond had been stationed on the frontiers. The dismissal from the Deccan of the two British battalions, the immediate increase of Raymond's corps, the apparent determination of the Nizam to brave the displeasure of the governor-general, sufficiently proved that the influence which had been established at the court of Hyderabad by Lord Cornwallis was entirely lost; and that the English not only could place no dependence upon the aid of the Nizam, but had reasons to apprehend that his resources might be early directed against the Company's possessions, either from the prevailing power of the French faction, from the complete subjection of his country to the Mahrattas, or from his throwing himself, to escape that Mahratta subjection, into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, the irreconcilable enemy of the English, who was at this moment most actively engaged in a multiplicity of intrigues. But just at this moment—on the 28th of June, 1795—the Nizam's son Ali Jah fled from Hyderabad and raised the standard of rebellion against his father the Nizam. Filled with alarm, the Nizam pressed the instant return of the English subsidiary force to his country; agreed to the recall of the detachment of Raymond's corps; and adopted every measure proposed by the English resident, and humbly and earnestly supplicated for the renewal of that friendship and alliance which he had so recently, and not without reason, slighted. Sir John Shore saw the advantages which fortune had thrown in his way. He directed the two English battalions to march back to the Nizam's territory with every possible expedition. These troops were rapidly advancing to join the Nizam's army acting against Ali Jah, when accounts were received of the defeat and capture of that undutiful prince by M. Raymond's battalions. They remained in the country, and rendered some important services in restoring tranquillity. Ali Jah died, or was murdered, soon after he was made prisoner; but in the course of a few months another rebellion broke out, headed by Darah Jah, a nephew of the Nizam, who contrived to collect a great body of troops. At this crisis the English subsidiary force did all the fighting for the bewildered Nizam. Under their able commander, Captain James Dalrymple, the two battalions gained a splendid victory, and reduced the strong fort of Rachore, of which the rebels had obtained possession. The advantages derived on these occasions from the support of the British government were fully recognised by the Nizam; but he still feared that the governor-general would not send him sufficient aid in case of his being again attacked by the Mahrattas; he still entertained an affection for M. Raymond and a reliance upon his brilliant promises, and he very naturally clung to his French disciplined battalions, which had been raised at a great expense, and which were now daily improving; and, notwithstanding the discontented countenance of the English resident, he associated more than ever with M. Raymond, he increased the numbers and appointments of that Frenchman's corps, giving him additional lands to ensure their regular payment; he established or enlarged arsenals and foundries for their equipment, and made every effort in order to add to the strength and stability of this favourite body of troops. Thus favoured and

honoured; M. Raymond, who possessed most of those qualities in which his nation most excels, rapidly improved the discipline of his battalions, and strengthened himself by forming connections with the chief officers of the Nizam's court, and by intriguing against all such as leaned towards the English interest. As a Frenchman it was his bounden duty to do all the injury he could to the most detested and most powerful of all the enemies of the One and Indivisible Republic. He took no care to conceal his hostility or the hopes he entertained of the future—he intended to play over again, and on a wider stage, the part of M. Bussy, and to revive the projects of M. Dupleix. The English, to a man, were to be expelled from the great peninsula of India, and the dominion of that country was to be wholly transferred to the French republic. His battalions carried the tri-coloured flag; and the cap of liberty was engraven on the buttons of their clothing. His officers sang the Ça Ira and danced the Carmagnole in the gilded halls of Hyderabad. He encouraged desertions from the sepoys in the English service; and, through the intrigues of his officers, who commanded the detachment of his corps which was stationed near the British frontier, a partial mutiny was excited in a battalion of sepoys on the Madras establishment; and two native commissioned officers and a number of privates deserted their colours and went over to the French party. A certain historian, who never exercises his imagination except in discovering errors in our statesmen and commanders, who never seems to doubt that he could have managed matters better than the best of them, and who nearly always seems to intimate that the English in India were most jealous and most alarmed when there was no occasion for any such feelings, and trustful and confident when there was great occasion for them, sneers at the alarm felt at the present conjuncture, and treats the jealousy as *something* superlatively ridiculous.* But those who really knew India treat the subject in a very *different* manner. The cause of jealousy and alarm was great and serious, whatever may have been the means resorted to by the governor-general for removing it. To rival the French tacticians and drill-masters, Sir John Shore encouraged a set of English adventurers to go to Hyderabad and offer their services to the Nizam. These adventurers were received at that court, and were countenanced by the English resident, but none of them possessed either the professional skill or the political address of M. Raymond; and the corps they attempted to discipline remained but as an awkward squad compared with the battalions the Frenchman had trained. But these battalions were now becoming so formidable, that the Nizam began to fear that all the actual power and resources of his government might pass rapidly into the hands of the French faction. He solicited the British government to enter into such engagements with him as would prevent the necessity of his having recourse to such dangerous means of defence against the Mahrattas. He even offered to dismiss all the French corps as soon as the British detachment in the Deccan should be increased. But Sir John Shore, though jealous of the French, was still more jealous of giving any offence to Scindiah and the great Mahratta confederacy; he conceived that to accede to the conditions proposed by the Nizam and to send an army into the Deccan would be to provoke a Mahratta war, and to depart from that neutrality system which his employers were still constantly recommending to his attention; and therefore he took no decisive steps; and Raymond and the other Frenchmen were left in the Deccan to enjoy the advantages they had obtained, and to intrigue in every direction against the English.

Nor was M. Raymond the only French general actively employed in India. The disciplined troops of Doulut Rao Scindiah, the real lord of the Mahratta confederacy, were commanded by a Frenchman named Perron, who had many European officers under him. Nearly the whole of the country which had been subdued by Scindiah or by his father was intrusted to the management of this French general, whose corps amounted

* James Mill, Hist. Brit. Ind.

already to several regular, well-disciplined brigades, which were chiefly recruited from the Company's provinces, and which were clothed and armed like English sepoys. M. Perron had also a numerous train of artillery admirably equipped, and a considerable body of regular cavalry. He and the European officers were largely and regularly paid—"They were stimulated to exertion by every motive which could awaken avarice or excite ambition."* The privates also were well paid, and were entitled, when disabled by wounds or length of service, to retire on a pension establishment. It was M. Perron and his corps that gave Scindiah his decided superiority over the other native powers; and the consolidation and extension of this system might enable the Mahratta chief to contend with the British. No effort was made during the administration of Sir John Shore to check the alarming growth of this French power.

The old Nabob of the Carnatic (or, as he was generally called in England, the Nabob of Arcot), Mohammed Ali Khan, died on the 13th of October, 1795, in the 79th year of his age, and was succeeded by his son Omdut-ul-Omrah. Lord Hobart, acting under the governor-general as governor of Madras, endeavoured to effect a modification of the treaty which Lord Cornwallis had concluded with the old nabob in 1792. His lordship proposed that Omdut-ul-Omrah, the new nabob, should make an entire cession to the Company of the districts mortgaged for the payment of the pecuniary instalments; that he should give up some of the forts in the Carnatic; and that he should yield the right of sovereignty over the Polygars, which the nabob his father had retained, though the collection of the tribute from these Polygars had been made over to the Company. His lordship urged, that the first of these conditions would be as beneficial to the nabob as to the Company, as it would relieve him for ever from a great amount of debt, and take him out of the hands of those usurers by whom his country had been ruined:—that the second of these conditions, or the surrender of certain forts to the English, was essential to place the country in a proper state of defence by securing the mountain passes or ghauts against Tippoo, whose conduct was so suspicious as to induce the belief that he intended to renew the war, and to pour again his armies through those passes into the Carnatic;—and that the other condition required the cession of a power which was but nominal on the part of the nabob, though it was essential to the Company, the exercise of whose authority over the turbulent Polygars had been much obstructed by the name of sovereignty remaining with the nabob. Lord Hobart offered to make very large sacrifices to the nabob; but Omdut-ul-Omrah gave an unqualified refusal to all his propositions, replying to every argument, that he was determined to abide by Lord Cornwallis's treaty, which he had been directed to do by the dying injunction of his father. The truth was that Omdut-ul-Omrah cared very little for the words of his dying father (if they had ever been uttered), and very little for the integrity of his states, or for the nominal sovereignty he possessed; but he was completely in the hands and under the control of a set of usurers and extortioners, some natives and some Englishmen, who had obtained from him mortgages over estates situated in the districts which Lord Hobart proposed he should cede to the Company, who would not recognise those mortgages or any such extortionate transactions. Not a few of these English usurers were servants of the Company, who had shielded themselves from the effects of the prohibitory acts of parliament, and from the indignation of their employers, by dealing with the nabob through native agents and brokers. Others of these Englishmen were free merchants, partners in the greatest houses of Madras. "It is not possible," wrote Lord Hobart, "to calculate the extent and variety of interests which are involved in this one pursuit. And, though they are subdivided in every direction of the Carnatic, yet at the call of danger they all rally round a common centre. The great houses of business, who are the principal money-lenders at

* Malcolm.

Rohillas.

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the durbar, borrow from individuals, who, though not absolutely engaged in the loan itself, are partakers of the speculation in a remote degree, and feel, with no less sensibility than their principals, the approach of danger. Similarity of interest makes a common cause. And the great body of interest which is condensed upon this principle, is uniformly exerted to support his highness in an inflexible resistance against a melioration of system, and to oppose a reformation which I consider essential to the national welfare." The nabob himself confessed to Lord Hobart that he was not insensible to the justice and expediency of what his lordship proposed, but that he had not the resolution to comply. He also told his lordship that his native ministers and European advisers so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him, that he could not venture upon these measures, notwithstanding his conviction that he ought to do so. It was found, that although Lord Cornwallis had considerably reduced the amount of money to be paid annually to the Company for the support of the army required to defend the country against the Mysoreans and the Mahrattas, upon the plea that the country-people were overtaxed, that more money had been wrung from the ryots, or cultivators, since the treaty of 1792 than at any preceding period, and that while the nabob's debts, bonds, and mortgages still kept increasing, the population of the Carnatic had been fearfully decreased by these wringing and grinding processes. And at this very moment the new nabob, as extravagant, profligate, and imbecile as his father, was encouraged in his wasteful expenditure by the same insatiable herd of usurers. When arguments and remonstrances had failed, Lord Hobart would have resorted to strong but easy measures, in order to change this horrible state of things, and rescue the poor ryots from want, famine, and extinction, by including them within the pale of the British government; but Sir John Shore and his supreme government at Calcutta declared "That their principles were fairly at issue with those of the governor of Fort St. George," and appealed to the authorities at home. Nothing was done to alter the treaty of 1792, or to better the condition of the people, or to strengthen the country against Tippoo, until the arrival of a more energetic governor-general. If that arrival had been delayed for a few years longer, the Carnatic must have been converted into an unpeopled waste.

The tranquillity of Oude was greatly disturbed during Sir John Shore's administration. In 1794, upon the death of Fyzoola Khan, the great Rohilla chief, that turbulent tribe of Afghans, whose character and habits had been so grossly misrepresented by the English persecutors of Warren Hastings, began a bloody war among themselves to settle which of the sons of Fyzoola Khan should be his successor. The eldest son, Ali Khan, was killed by his brother Gholam Khan, who, after other butcheries, got possession of the jaghire, and endeavoured to obtain the sanction of his suzerain, the nabob-vizier of Oude. The nabob-vizier would have recognised the murderer, but the English government, who had guaranteed the corner of Rohilcund to the Afghan family of Fyzoola, by whom it had been held under the nabob-vizier, resolved to punish the rebels and expel the family of Fyzoola Khan altogether. But before Sir John Shore's instructions to this effect could reach Sir Robert Abercromby in Oude, that general, after chastising the Rohilla insolence in a general battle, and reducing them to complete submission, had agreed to restore the inheritance of the family, under the guarantee of the Company, to Achmed Ali Khan, the infant son of Ali Khan, who had been slain by his brother Gholam. This settlement restored complete tranquillity to Rohilcund and Oude; and the supreme government was subsequently induced to acquiesce in the arrangement which Sir Robert Abercromby had made. In 1797, the nabob-vizier Asoph-ul-Dowlah, with whom Hastings had had so many dealings, departed this life, and was succeeded by his presumptive heir, Vizier Ali, who had been acknowledged as his son by the deceased prince. Though generally known to have been of spurious birth, though there were other claimants who pleaded

their legitimacy, Vizier Ali, was supported by a strong party at Lucknow, and his right was formally acknowledged by the British government at Calcutta, to whom Saadut Ali, the eldest surviving brother of Asoph-ul-Dowlah, had made an appeal. Sir John Shore, however, soon stated that he had decided against the claim of Saadut Ali, not without great hesitation; and that he found it impossible to divest himself of the impression, excited by universal belief and assertion, of the spurious origin of the Vizier Ali, or of the apprehension that the justice and reputation of the Company might suffer an imputation from the decision he had given in favour of that doubtful personage. It would have been better not to decide at all, than so speedily to revoke a decision. With these impressions upon his mind Sir John Shore determined to travel to Lucknow. He, however, declared that the arrangements he had in view had no reference to the alteration of the succession; though he conceived it possible that the repugnance of the people of Oude to Vizier Ali might force him to reconsider that subject. On approaching Lucknow Sir John was met by the prime minister, who assured him that Vizier Ali, as well as the other reputed sons of Asoph-ul-Dowlah, were all spurious, and that the right of succession indubitably belonged to Saadut Ali. The Oude minister further said that the great body of the people were astonished and disappointed; that it was the general opinion, that the act of raising Vizier Ali to the musnud had been hasty and inconsiderate; but that few had courage to declare their real sentiments, in opposition to the acknowledgment of his title by the English. At Lucknow the governor-general found himself involved in a scene of intrigue, perplexity, and profligacy. The old Begum, from whom Hastings had extorted her hidden treasures, had quitted Fyzabad, and reappeared at the capital, in order to take part in the scramble. The claimant whom she recommended was not Saadut Ali, but a younger brother of his. The Begum was most active in proclaiming the spuriousness of Vizier Ali's birth and the vices which stained his character.

The Mohammedan law is very lax in this respect; besides establishing an equality between the children of wives and the children of concubines, it gives such force and effect to adoption, that an adopted son has the same rights as a natural son. And under this law, or under the general practice of Mohammedan peoples, the right of succession was never strictly defined—was scarcely subjected to any fixed rule. The qualities of the man were taken more into consideration than the accidental circumstances of his birth; the right of primogeniture was not acknowledged: a brother would succeed a brother, a nephew an uncle, although the deceased prince had left sons behind him; and a younger son would supersede an elder son, if he had a better reputation or more power. Properly speaking there was no case before the governor-general, there was no Mohammedan precedent by which he could be guided, but he saw that the majority of the great men and people of Oude were disgusted with the ruler whose right he had so imprudently recognised; he was induced to believe (whether true or false) that Vizier Ali was a violent, unsteady, and sanguinary character, that he was the friend of those who were the enemies of the English, that he was already cherishing the most hostile designs against the interests of the Company; and therefore he (Sir John Shore) determined that Vizier Alli was ineligible to the musnud and ought to be deposed. As the Begum continued to show a deep hatred of the English (she still resented the treatment of her two eunuchs and the loss of her treasures), her protegé had small chance of being considered by the governor-general as the rightful successor. There were also objections to, or doubts respecting, Saadut Ali, for, during the Cheyte Sing insurrection at Benares, and the general revolt which followed it, the rebels were heard to declare that they were acting under the orders of the Begums, of Cheyte Sing, and of *Saadut Ali*.* Sir John opined for Saadut Ali; but he had not yet made up his mind, or he had

* Examination of Captain David Williams, in Trial of Warren Hastings before the Lords, 6 vols. folio.

not yet ascertained what price Saadut Ali would pay to the Company for his elevation to the musnud. Warren Hastings had been accused of holding an auction at Lucknow; but Sir John now figured more in the light of an auctioneer in that city. Saadut Ali was residing quietly at Benares, where Mr. Cherry was the Company's resident and political agent. On the 4th of January, 1798, Sir John Shore transmitted from Lucknow a treaty to Mr. Cherry, with instructions to offer it to the consideration of Saadut Ali. But from the tenor of his instructions Sir John does not appear even at this period to have finally resolved who should have the musnud, as he tells Cherry that circumstances may yet occur to frustrate his present intentions in favour of Saadut Ali. Yet he demanded that Saadut Ali should immediately acquiesce in or refuse the treaty, without qualification or reserve; and he directed Cherry to inform the nabob that the treaty had been transmitted in the form in which it was for execution; because the actual state of affairs would admit neither of delay nor of discussion. The terms were high, the whole subject demanded time for consideration, but no time was allowed, and Saadut Ali gave his immediate assent to the treaty as sent by the governor-general; assuring Mr. Cherry that, if raised to the musnud, he would fulfil all its stipulations in the most faithful manner. Before Sir John Shore at Lucknow could receive accounts of Saadut Ali's accession to the treaty, he wrote to the resident at Benares, to desire him to inform the nabob, if he had acquiesced in the arrangement, that he must instantly proceed to Cawnpoor, where measures would be taken to place him on the musnud. But in the same letter Mr. Cherry was told that, in case of the nabob having withheld his acquiescence to the treaty, he must acquaint him, that although the governor-general admitted his legitimate right to the musnud of Oude, he did not think himself bound to run the risk of hostilities in supporting his right, except under conditions, which should equally provide for the political interests of the Company. As soon as Mr. Cherry had received the governor-general's letter and had communicated its contents to Saadut Ali, that son of Sujah-ul-Dowlah set out for Cawnpoor; and from that place he was escorted by a large body of European troops to Lucknow, where he was proclaimed nabob-vizier or sovereign of Oude, upon the 21st of January, 1798. Saadut Ali had manifested great alarm as he entered the city; and to dispel his unmanly fears Sir John Shore placed him on his own elephant. As they advanced through the streets to the palace, the governor-general amused the immense multitude by showering rupees among them, "while he did not neglect the opportunity of inculcating on the nabob advice respecting his future conduct."* Not the slightest opposition was offered to this change of rulers; the troops in the country were nearly all English; Vizier Ali, whose title Sir John Shore had recognized scarcely two months before, was lying sick of the measles or small-pox; and if he had ever had a party in Oude, it had vanished as soon as the will of the governor-general was known. If he had been so disposed Sir John Shore might have turned the old Begum into nabob-vizier. As there was no higher bidding Saadut Ali was firmly seated on the musnud. The treaty was now somewhat modified.

It was finally settled that the annual subsidy to the Company should be raised to 76 lacs of rupees, and that the fort of Allahabad should be made over in perpetuity to the English; that the Company's forces stationed in Oude should never be less than 10,000 men, including infantry, cavalry, artillery, &c.; that if at any time the amount should exceed 13,000 men, the expense of all the supernumerary troops should be defrayed by the nabob. The nabob-vizier

* 'Life of Lord Teignmouth, by his Son.' We are told that Sir John Shore prayed to the Lord for guidance in this delicate business, and that he acted according to the dictates of his conscience. But the interest of the Company was clearly a part of his conscience, and his aversion to Vizier Ali's vices was certainly quickened by the prospect of profit to be derived from dethroning him and setting up his competitor. The worst part of the business was the prompt and inconsiderate recognition of Vizier Ali. The mad savage pranks which that young nabob played afterwards, may be taken as pretty good proofs of his character, and of his unfitness for the exercise of power.

further agreed to pay the sum of 12 lacs of rupees to the Company, as a reimbursement for the trouble and expense incurred in placing him upon the throne. He also pledged himself never to hold communication with any foreign state, to employ no French or other Europeans in his service, and to permit no Europeans to settle in his dominions, without the consent, in each and every case, of the Company. Finally, he agreed to allow a lac and a half of rupees per annum as a pension to the deposed Vizier Ali, who was removed to Benares; and to afford a suitable maintenance to the rest of the reputed children of his brother, the deceased nabob. The pecuniary gain to the Company was very considerable; and it was probably upon this view of the subject that the Directors declared that the governor-general, "under circumstances of much delicacy and embarrassment," had "conducted himself with great temper, *impartiality*, ability, and firmness; and finished a long course of faithful services, by planning and carrying into execution an arrangement, which not only redounded highly to his own honour, but which would also operate to the reciprocal advantage of the Company and the nabob-vizier." But it was not solely with the approbation of the Court of Directors that Sir John Shore was honoured for his performances at Lucknow and his decisions in the disputed succession: the Board of Control, and consequently the ministry, joined in praise of his conduct. If the view which was now taken of the political condition of Oude and the rights of the Company over that country and its rulers had been adopted a few years earlier, the managers of Hastings's impeachment must have been deprived of many of their pleas. And nothing had occurred to render the relative situations of Oude and the Company different from what they had been in the time of that first and greatest of governors-general. "The government of Oude," wrote Sir John Shore, "both in the opinions of the natives, as well as externally, is considered a dependency upon the English, *whatever its relations under treaties may be*. Scindiah refers the investiture of Vizier Ali by his majesty the Mogul to the governor-general; and there are many respectable families in Lucknow who live under the protection of the British influence. In the estimate of the natives of India, the kingdom of Oude is held as a gift from the Company to Sujah-ul-Dowlah, and as a dependent chief." Mr. Pitt and his government seem to have admitted this view of the case without any scruple, although by so doing they passed a censure upon some parts of the conduct they had adopted with regard to Warren Hastings.

In the year 1796, while Sir John Shore was cherishing the neutrality and non-interference system, and, in compliance with acts of parliament and the wishes of his employers, was seemingly believing that the peace of all India might be preserved without putting British armies into the field, those fierce and warlike Afghan tribes, who had so often devastated the peninsula, descended once more from Cabul and Candahar, under Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul, advanced to Lahore, and threatened to visit Delhi, from which Lahore is not more than 20 marches to a light army. The Shah announced, or was supposed to entertain, the design of restoring the fallen dignity of the imperial house of Timour, to which he was nearly allied by blood; and the bold project excited all the more turbulent Mogul Mohammedan tribes dwelling in Upper India, who prepared to welcome the bold invader. On the frontiers of Oude, the fierce Rohillas (themselves an Afghan tribe) who had been left in possession of Rampore and a corner of Rohilcund, were ready to enlist for plunder, and to join the king of Cabul on his advance. Several of these Rohilla khans were actually in arms, and were writing letters to other chiefs. On another side, the formidable Patans were on tiptoe in Furruckabad for booty and for revenge upon the English and their allies. It was doubted whether the Mahrattas who occupied Delhi and kept the Great Mogul a prisoner, would be able to defend Delhi and prevent these destructive Afghans from descending the Jumna and the Ganges into Oude; and Sir John Shore ordered the British troops in that country, in cantonments at Cawnpoor and Futtyghur, to encamp; and every arrangement was made to enable these

troops to move to the frontiers or to any quarter where their services might be required. But for internal dissensions, and a rebellion in Cabul, the British troops would, this year, have been brought into collision with the Afghans. As it was, while Zemaun Shah was advancing from Lahore to Delhi, intent on foreign conquest, his throne was shaken at home by a younger brother, who conceived that his absence afforded a favourable opportunity for seating himself upon it. This obliged the Shah to make a hasty retreat to his own dominions. "But," adds Sir John Malcolm, "the facility with which he had advanced to Lahore, showed that no confidence could be placed upon the union or resistance of the Seiks. From every account, indeed, as well as from actual occurrences, it appeared that this nation was so much distracted by the violence of its own internal divisions, as to be incapable of acting with concert; and of course, that it was no longer to be considered as a barrier against the Afghans; whose invasion of India became, from this circumstance, more probable than it ever was before."*

Sir John Shore, who made no doubt that if the Afghans had advanced, they must, at the very least, have captured Delhi, was not blind to the future danger to be apprehended from these daring and rapidly moving invaders. He concluded that, the future designs of the Afghans must always be an object of great interest to the British government. He thought it was not very probable that Zemaun Shah would undertake another expedition very soon, but he conceived that ambition, stimulated by the entreaties of the court of Delhi and the helpless Mogul, might induce the Shah to aspire to the character of the deliverer of India from the dominion of infidels, and that a desire of effacing the disgrace of his late ineffectual attempt might lead him again, and at no distant period, to carry his arms eastward. The governor-general stated that a general opinion prevailed, that Zemaun Shah, if he renewed his enterprize, would advance at once towards the heart of Hindustan, without waiting to dispossess the Seiks, or establish his authority in the Punjab and on the Indus. If he thus advanced, Sir John Shore felt confident that most of the Mohammedan chiefs would join him; that Scindiah's regular brigades, of which all the men were natives of Hindustan, and most of the officers French, instead of fighting for the Mahrattas would either disperse or take service with the Afghans; and that for resisting the invasion no dependence whatever was to be placed except in British troops and the faithful sepoys in British pay. At the same time Sir John Shore professed himself averse from the adoption of any extensive measures of preparation against the Afghans. Fortunately Zemaun Shah continued to find occupation at home, or in other quarters farther from the frontiers of Hindustan.

Though no conquests were made or attempted in Hindustan during this peaceful administration, several important conquests were effected over the Eastern settlements of the European enemies of Great Britain, by expeditions that were all fitted out from Madras under the immediate direction of Lord Hobart, the governor of that presidency. The squadron of Admiral Rainier and an inconsiderable number of land troops reduced all the old Dutch settlements in Ceylon and Malacca, and captured the valuable islands of Banda and Amboyna. More important expeditions were prepared against the French settlement of the Mauritius, and the rich Spanish possessions of Manilla. The Mauritius, in the hands of the French, was a cauldron of mischief and trouble to our Indian trade and empire: it was the resort of fast-sailing frigates and privateers, which, issuing from its ports, and scouring the Indian ocean, not unfrequently picked up a richly-laden ship of the Company, separated by storms or other accidents from her convoy; it was the resort of the agents of Tippoo Sultaun, and the place from which he could most readily be supplied with French soldiers, arms, ammunition, &c. All these and other weighty considerations ought to have given precedence to the expedition against the Mauritius; but those who directed the armaments preferred beginning with Manilla. In 1797, the first division of

* 'Political Hist. Ind.'

the armament which was to capture that rich Spanish colony had actually sailed to Penang, the port of rendezvous; when accounts received from Europe, combined with the very suspicious attitude of Tippoo Sultaun, who seemed ready to pounce upon the Carnatic, and to push forward his fleet cavalry to the very walls of Madras, induced the government of Fort St. George to recall the division, and to abandon the expedition altogether. The preparations were so formidable as to leave no doubt of success if the expedition had proceeded to Manilla; but the only fruit derived from it was the heavy expense of the equipment.

During this administration great encouragement was given to Protestant missionaries, and to the societies and individuals engaged in translating and propagating the gospel.

In the beginning of the year 1798, Sir John Shore, who had been previously raised to the Irish peerage by the title of Lord Teignmouth, resigned the government of India, and sailed for England. He was a man possessed of many merits, and a deserving servant of the Company; but it seemed strange in the eyes of the old Anglo-Indians that he should receive titles, honours, and eulogiums from a government which had suffered his great predecessor to be impeached and beggared, and which ever denied to Warren Hastings the peerage and the other distinctions upon which he had set his heart. In some respects Hastings might have quoted with a reproachful meaning the motto assumed by this new lord, "PERIMUS LICITIS. We perish by what is lawful." The period at which Lord Teignmouth left India, though a season of peace for the country, is said to have been regarded by no person in India, who had the slightest knowledge of the subject, as one of security. The British government and the Court of Directors both felt and expressed their alarm at the numerous dangers which they saw collected; and which threatened early to disturb the tranquillity of their possessions in that quarter of the globe.* Though the British strength was not diminished, the power and resources of the other states of India had increased. The confidence and attachment of our allies were much shaken, and their feelings, and the presumption and hostile disposition of the principal native powers, clearly showed—what might have been clearly foreseen—that they attributed the neutral course which had been pursued by the British, not to moderation and the desire of general good, but to weakness, or to selfish policy. Our inactive status quo system, so far from attaining its object, which was to preserve affairs upon the footing on which it had found them, had only the effect of keeping the British government in India stationary, while all around it advanced; and of exposing it to those dangers, which resulted from the revolutions of its neighbours, while it was even denied the power of adapting its policy to the change of circumstances brought about by these revolutions. A power like that of our Indian Empire can be preserved only by the means with which it was first acquired: it cannot be strictly stationary; it must advance or recede; and the moment it attempts to come to a dead stop it must fall back, or fall prostrate.° It was proved that no ground of advantage could be abandoned, without being instantly occupied by an enemy; that to cease to interfere was to cease to exercise influence; and that to resign influence was not merely to resign power, but to allow that power to pass into hands naturally hostile to the English interests. The only great act of interference by Sir John Shore, was the dethronement of Vizier Ali and the elevation of Saadut Ali; and the governor-general declared in express terms that this measure—questionable at least in justice—was forced upon him.*

On his return home, Lord Teignmouth was threatened with a parliamentary impeachment, but he was supported by the government, and the whole strength of what was called the religious world, and no proceedings were ever commenced against him.

* Malcolm.

* Malcolm, Political Hist Ind.

CHAPTER III.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY.—A.D. 1798.

Lord Teignmouth was succeeded by Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquess Wellesley. This nobleman, then in the prime of his life, had distinguished himself in the British parliament by a most able speech in defence of Warren Hastings; he had applied his brilliant abilities to the study of Indian affairs; he had energy, wonderful activity, and the faculty of imparting his energy to others. With the exception of some few of the old Anglo-Indians, who thought him too young and inexperienced, nearly every Englishman in the country or connected with Indian affairs hailed his appointment with joy and hope. All felt that a critical moment for our anomalous empire was rapidly approaching; that an energetic ruler would be required, and that the neutrality system pursued during the greater part of Lord Cornwallis's administration, and during the whole of the administration of Sir John Shore, must be abandoned. At this time the hostile designs of Tippoo Sultaun were ripe for execution; a French party under M. Raymond was paramount at the court of the Nizam, another French party, under M. Perron, were almost the absolute masters of Scindiah and his vast resources; the other members of the Mahratta confederacy seemed to be at the mercy of Scindiah or of Perron; and the powerful Rajah of Berar, whom Hastings had conciliated, was jealous of the power and adverse to the interests of the English. Saudut Ali was tottering on the musnud to which Sir John Shore had elevated him, for the people of Oude were again disaffected and turbulent. Omdut-ul-Omrah, the Nabob of the Carnatic, was engulphed in debts, and eaten up by usurers; and the people of the country, though not quite so turbulent as those of Oude, were in a condition infinitely worse, and seemed to be indifferent whether the Carnatic were or were not overrun by their neighbours the Mysoreans. The finances of the Central Government at Calcutta, and of the dependent presidencies of Madras and Bombay, were exhausted by the equipment of the armaments which had been sent to make conquests in Ceylon, Malacca, and other places; and credit had been injured by an injudicious system of loans.

The Earl of Mornington arrived in Madras roads as governor-general of India on the 22nd of May, 1798, "a day," says one of his many enthusiastic admirers, "ever to be remembered in the annals of British India, because we date from it a new and splendid æra in our history."* His lordship remained some time at Madras, in order to acquaint himself with the real condition of that presidency and of the Carnatic, and to concert measures for defending those countries against any irruption of Tippoo and his Mysorean hosts. At that moment, when there were very strong reasons for believing that Tippoo intended to make an immediate attack, and that a French armament would attempt to land on the Malabar or Coromandel coast† to co-operate with him, our

* 'Life and Services of General Lord Harris, G.C.B., during his Campaigns in America, the West Indies, and India,' by the Right Honorable S. R. Lushington, private secretary to Lord Harris, and late governor of Madras.

† In the preceding month of January, the sultaun joined his camp near Seringapatam, and published that he was going towards the port of Mangaloro, where it was rumoured several French ships were expected with troops on board. To this was added a report that the sultaun meant, on the arrival of the French, to attack the English: and this report gained force from the circumstance of all applications for leave being denied, and a mutchoika, or obligatory note, being taken from each sepoy, that his

state of preparation presented a very discouraging aspect. Our troops on that coast were scattered in distant cantonments; no bullocks had been provided for conveying their baggage and *matériel* of war; no stores had been collected at the proper points, no magazines had been formed, no corn or rice collected. The forces were also reduced in number, for, notwithstanding the imminence of the danger, Sir John Shore had taken no pains to supply the places of the troops that had been sent on the Ceylon, the Malacca, and other expeditions. General Harris, who was in the discharge of the united duties of governor and commander-in-chief at Madras, was an officer of great ability and admirable activity; but he had been only a very few months on that coast, and had been prevented by want of money from doing anything of importance. In his conferences with Lord Mornington he stated his wants, and his lordship engaged to supply him with money and bills from Calcutta. General Harris received orders to collect and concentrate the troops on the Coromandel coast with as much rapidity and as much secrecy as were possible. The secrecy was emphatically recommended: none but a few officers, and a few civilians high in authority at Fort St. George, were to be acquainted with the governor-general's intentions. At first these intentions were, to anticipate the Mysorean, to attack him immediately in his own dominions, and, if possible, to reduce Seringapatam before any aid could be received from the French. The bold plan startled some of the boldest men in the presidency. Mr. J. Webbe, the chief secretary, exclaimed with bitterness and grief, "I can anticipate nothing but a return of shocking disasters from a premature attack upon Tippoo in our present disabled condition, and the impeachment of Lord Mornington for his temerity."* But as soon as the governor-general became fully acquainted with the circumstances of the country—as soon as he was informed by General Harris and other able and experienced officers that, owing to the total want of draught and carriage bullocks, and other serious wants, the army could by no possibility be collected and brought to a head in less than four months (at the end of which the season would be unfavourable); that no posts whatever had been secured for magazines, so as to have a short and secure line of communications by which to receive supplies; that no contracts had been commenced with the brinjarries, or corn carriers; that the dilatoriness, indecision, and cowardice of the Company's allies, who had been rendered more dilatory and undecided than ever by the *laisser aller* government of his predecessor, were such as to surpass the belief of a European stranger; that it was exceedingly doubtful whether it would be practicable to subsist the army during the siege of Seringapatam without the assistance of the Nizam and Mahrattas; and that the entire force of that presidency did not exceed 3700 Europeans and 10,400 natives, including gun-Lascars and pioneers; his lordship gave up the notion of attacking Tippoo this year, and limited the instructions of General Harris to the defensive, and the preparatory.

While Harris was disposing his forces in such a manner as to cover the most fruitful parts of the country and check any invasion, the governor-general, beginning at the right end, negociated with the native powers, in order to re-establish our political influence, and to brace up the ties of alliance which had been so seriously relaxed. By this time M. Raymond's disciplined force in the Deccan rather exceeded than fell short of 14,000 men; and the French officers and their party were so powerful that they disposed of nearly all the resources of the country. Luckily their power, being accompanied by insolence, wholly estranged the Nizam. His minister Azeem-ul-Omrah, who had returned from Poonah to Hyderabad, was favourably disposed to the English government, but he had not the power of breaking up this French party without the active aid of the English; nor could he, with proper attention to the safety of his master, advise him to disband Raymond's army, until assured of the assist-

family was above the Ghauts.—*Information collected by Captain John Malcolm, and communicated to the governor-general; Wellesley Despatches.*

* The Right Hon. S. R. Lushington, 'Life and Services of General Lord Harris,' &c.

ance of a large body of the Company's troops. But the very moment that Lord Mornington opened communications with this minister at Hyderabad — and the active governor-general lost no time in so doing—Azeem-ul-Omrah confessed that the French pre-potency was no longer to be borne, and assented to a negociation for disbanding the French corps and increasing the English subsidiary force, asking no other pledge than that the British government should protect his master's dominions from any future unjust demands on the part of the Mahrattas. Captain (subsequently General Sir John) Malcolm, Major Kirkpatrick, and other officers of great courage and address, who had a new spirit put into them by this new and energetic governor-general, repaired to Hyderabad, and took charge of the negociations and of the measures necessary to expel the French and give full effect to the treaty; and while they negociated, other officers prepared to march into the country with the increased subsidiary English force which was demanded by the Nizam's minister, and without which nothing could have been done, M. Raymond being more a king of the Deccan than was the Nizam. Generous efforts were made in various directions to provide funds for equipping and marching these English battalions. At Fort St. George, when General Harris found that some of the members of the council demurred about voting money for the detachment of the army ordered by the governor-general to be sent to Hyderabad, he offered to be responsible in his private funds for the sum required to put the troops in motion.* It was indispensable that the forces should be ready to move into Oude without the knowledge of the French, and before the treaty should be concluded. At last, on the 1st of September, when all was ready, the treaty was signed. The subsidiary detachment of British troops with the Nizam was made permanent; and an addition of four battalions was made to the battalions already in the country. For the whole of this force the Nizam agreed to pay 2,417,100 rupees per annum. He also engaged to disarm and disband all the French corps in his service, and to deliver over all the French officers to the British government as soon as the whole of the English force should reach his capital. The British government pledged itself to arbitrate in the disputes between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and to protect the Nizam from any unjust or unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas. Fortunately for the Company, M. Raymond died while the negociations were pending, and was succeeded by a very inferior person named Piron, who had little influence over the troops, and no influence whatever at court, or among the great men of the Deccan. The measures directed by the governor-general for the full execution of the treaty were carried into effect with rapidity and vigour. Four battalions with their guns, which had been collected on the frontier during the negociations, immediately marched to Hyderabad, and there joined the two battalions already stationed in that capital. The force of the French corps, provided with a large train of artillery, and so greatly superior in number to the English, induced doubt and hesitation; and Azeem-ul-Omrah, as well as his master the Nizam, seemed to apprehend that a bloody struggle would take place, and that the English might be defeated and driven out of the country. The minister, a very timid man, shrunk from the fulfilment of his own plan, and expressed a desire to avoid, or at least to delay experiments. But Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, the British resident, demanded the immediate and full execution of the treaty, informing them that, under the orders of the governor-general, he could admit of no delay; that the country would be exposed to the most serious danger by allowing the French party to exist, for any period however short, after the resolution to disband it had been made public. He declared that if the Nizam should con-

* Indian Dispatches and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, &c. edited by Montgomery Martin.

"This most generous and patriotic offer," adds his lordship, "completely silenced all opposition, and orders were immediately issued for the advance of the troops to Hyderabad."

On every occasion General Harris displayed the same liberal and high mind.

tinue his wavering conduct, he would order an attack upon the French camp by the British forces; in which case the court of Hyderabad would become responsible for all the bad consequences. To give force to this threat, the British troops immediately made a movement to the ground which commanded the French lines. This determined course of proceeding put an end to all evasion and delay. A proclamation was issued in the course of a few hours, and was sent to the French camp to inform the troops there collected that their lawful sovereign the Nizam had dismissed their European officers from his service; that they were released from their obedience to those officers: and that if they attempted to support them, they would be considered and punished as traitors. It should appear that these French adventurers had not conciliated the affections of the native troops, as M. Bussy and his companions had formerly done in that country, and that they were under serious apprehensions of being massacred by their own people. "All the French officers," says a distinguished British officer, a principal agent in the transactions, "the moment their dismissal was officially given, signified to the English resident at Hyderabad their readiness to comply with the orders of the Nizam, and stated that they wished to receive the protection of the English nation, as they were convinced (although general policy had dictated their removal) they would be individually considered as having a right to our protection." * On the French officers preparing to leave the camp, a violent mutiny broke out among the troops on account of their pay, though their pay was only twenty-one days in arrear, and though every assurance had been given them that they would be retained in the service. They confined M. Piron and all the commandants of corps. Piron, however, contrived to make his escape to the English camp, though not without a scuffle, in which several were wounded. On the following morning, as it was resolved to reduce them to obedience, and as the mutiny afforded a good opportunity of disarming and disbanding the whole army at once—an operation which must otherwise have been a work of time—Kirkpatrick, the energetic resident, ordered Colonel Roberts to advance with his entire corps, to make himself master of all the heights that commanded their camp, and then to give the men one quarter of an hour to stack their arms, and march off to a cowle (or protection) flag, which was pitched by one of the Nizam's principal officers, about half a mile to the right of their camp. If the men did not comply they were immediately to be attacked. Captain John Malcolm, who was the first to reach the ground, placed himself with a strong body of the Nizam's cavalry on the right flank of the mutineers, and sent 500 men to take post on their left. Malcolm observing that they were extremely alarmed, ventured near, though cautiously, as he had with difficulty made his escape from them the day before. Four or five subahdars came out of the camp to meet him, and after he had explained the intentions and conditions, the subahdars returned to explain them to their corps, from whom they instantly brought a message that they were ready to comply with all the conditions, but that they hoped and trusted that Company's sepoys would be sent to take possession of their lines, as the Nizam's horse, if admitted, would plunder their camp. Upon this Captain Malcolm advanced to the camp, where he found that the men were completely disunited and terrified, and ready to obey any orders; and as a proof of their obedience, they forthwith released all the French officers they had confined. Malcolm then rode back to meet Colonel Roberts, and inform him of this favourable turn. The Company's sepoys presently took possession of all the heights; eight grenadier companies advanced to take possession of the grand magazine, storehouses, and cannon, and the natives of the French corps moved off in a deep column to the appointed flag. The French officers all joined the English camp, and were full of joy: "for," says Malcolm, "the fears they had experienced from the fury of their men made them view us, not as belonging to a nation who had by its

* Sir John Malcolm, 'Polit. Hist. Ind.'

policy ruined all their prospects, but as men who had exerted themselves to save their lives. At five o'clock their whole lines were in our possession, and a corps, consisting of *sixteen thousand* men in all, had been annihilated in six hours, without shedding one drop of blood."* These men had in their possession a very formidable train of artillery, and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores. "Such," adds Malcolm, "was the short history of this great political measure. The wisdom with which it was planned, and the promptness and vigour displayed in the execution, carried alarm to the enemies of the British government, and diffused joy and confidence among the subjects and allies of the English; and these impressions greatly promoted our future success." † The governor-general, and the distinguished officers who executed his orders, treated the French officers with much generosity and kindness: their property, together with such arrears of pay as were due to them, were secured; they were conveyed to Calcutta by easy journeys; they were there shipped for Europe, and on their arrival in England, through the recommendation of Lord Mornington, they were not treated as prisoners of war, but were conveyed to their own country.

But if one great nucleus of French power was thus destroyed, there still remained another in India. M. Perron continued at the head of a disciplined force in the Mahratta territories, greater than that which had been disarmed and disbanded in the Deccan; and Doulut Rao Scindiah was unwilling and perhaps unable to follow the line of conduct which his enemy the Nizam had adopted. The measures taken at Hyderabad were regularly communicated to the Peishwa of the Mahrattas; but that prince, acting under the control of Scindiah, and under other influences unfavourable to the English, withheld his consent to any acknowledgment of the right of the British government to arbitrate in the disputes existing between the Mahrattas and the government of the Deccan, rejected sundry overtures for a friendly connection with the Company, and received ambassadors from Tippoo Sultaun. The British government had therefore to proceed in its operations against the Sultaun, without any satisfactory settlement either with the Peishwa or with Scindiah; and there was good ground for suspecting that Scindiah now inclined to take an active part with our enemy, and that M. Perron, his French officers and disciplined corps, would endeavour to join the Frenchmen serving under Tippoo, and more especially if a French armament from Europe, from the Isle of France or Mauritius, or by way of Egypt, the Isthmus of Suez, and the Red Sea, should effect a landing on the coast. The provocations given to the English by the Mysorean, and the dangers to be apprehended from his position, temper, and views, were apparent to every European in the country, and were deeply felt by the government at home when it was ascertained that Bonaparte had sailed for Egypt with a large and victorious army, and with projects of colonization and conquest which were firmly believed to extend to British India, and which assuredly would have taken that direction if the French navy had not been broken up by Nelson, and vigorous measures had not been taken by Mr. Pitt and his coadjutors.

Tippoo had committed deeds which he felt the English would never forget or forgive; and he had sustained from them losses and humiliations which made him eager for revenge. At all times since the treaty of Seringapatam he had shown a sullen vindictive temper, an irreconcilable enmity, an impatience to grasp at every chance of renewing the war with some prospect of success. He could never sufficiently control his temper to listen to those who represented that the English power was now too great and too deeply rooted to be shaken by any league that he could possibly form; that his best chance of security and happiness lay in his maintaining the last treaty of peace and conciliating the English; and that his correspondence with the French, and his intrigues with the Mahrattas and other native powers, would only accelerate

* Letter from Captain John Malcolm to Lieutenant-General Harris, in Lushington's 'Life and Services of General Lord Harris.'

† 'Political Hist. India.'

his utter ruin. During the pacific administration of Sir John Shore the two young sons of Tippoo, who had been delivered up to Lord Cornwallis as hostages for his faithful performance of the treaty of Seringapatam, and who had been treated by all the English with every possible kindness, were conducted to Mysore and given back to their father, although he could scarcely be said to have fulfilled all his engagements. The Sultaun received the British officer by whom they were conducted with cold and constrained civility; giving him no encouragement to make those overtures towards a more cordial union, which the officer had been authorized to make, if he should find Tippoo disposed to cultivate the friendship of the British nation. The officer was convinced that the Sultaun continued to entertain a rancorous hostility, and that he only waited for a favourable opportunity of renewing his attack. There was hardly any intercourse with the court of Seringapatam during Sir John Shore's government. But during that administration, when Zemaun Shah and his fierce Afghans were advancing upon Delhi, Tippoo sent ambassadors to them, to urge them to continue their destructive progress, to excite them as good Mussulmans with the prospect of the imperishable glory to be derived from the conquest of Hindustan, the forcible conversion of all the nations to the law of the prophet, and the expulsion of all the Nazarenes. When the Nizam was irritated against the English by Sir John Shore's refusing to assist him in his war with the Mahrattas, Tippoo sent ambassadors and other more secret agents to work upon the anti-English feeling; and, far or near, wherever there existed enemies to the British power, Mysorean envoys made their appearance. Their voices were heard and the effects of their intrigues were felt in Cabul, in Persia, in Turkey, at Constantinople, at Paris, at the Isle of France. Much of this was known to Lord Mornington on his first arrival in India, and more became known before his lordship had been a month in that country. Early in June, 1798, his lordship received the copy of a proclamation which had been issued by the French governor of the Mauritius or Isle of France, together with information of enlistments made in that island for the service of the Mysorean Sultaun; and it was chiefly in consequence of this information that the governor-general urged General Harris to collect the scattered army on the Coromandel coast and to put it in the best possible state of equipment. The accounts his lordship received related the arrival at the Isle of France of two ambassadors whom Tippoo had dispatched at the close of 1797 to propose a close alliance with the French republic, and to request an immediate supply of troops to enable him to expel the English from every part of Hindustan. These ambassadors upon entering the harbour of Port Nordouest had hoisted Tippoo's colours; had been received publicly and formally by the French government; and had afterwards been entertained during the whole of their continuance in the island at the public expense. One of these select diplomatists appears to have been a European renegade, for he was dressed in the Turkish dress, spoke both French and English with correctness and fluency, possessed considerable knowledge and ability, and appeared to be remarkably well acquainted with India and various of its languages; and he had been known at Bussorah by the name of Abdullah; at Surat by the name of Dervish; while in the Isle of France he took the name of Talomash, under which name he had also been known in Bengal, where he had previously resided for some years. A day or two after the arrival of these ambassadors, a proclamation was circulated through the capital of the island and was placarded in the most public places. It stated that Tippoo Sultaun, the great monarch of Mysore, had, through two ambassadors dispatched for the purpose, addressed letters to the Colonial Assembly of the Isle of France, to all the generals employed there, and to the executive Directory of France; and had made the following statements.—I. That he desired to form an alliance offensive and defensive with France; and offered to maintain at his expense, during the continuance of the war in India, whatever troops should be furnished by the

French; and to supply (with the exception of certain stores) every necessary for carrying on the war. II. That he had given assurances that all his preparations were already completed; and that the generals and officers would find everything necessary for carrying on a species of war to which Europeans have not been accustomed in their contests with the native powers in India. III. That he only waited for the succour of France to declare war against the English; and that it was his ardent desire to expel the English from India.* Upon the ground of these facts the proclamation recommended a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo Sultaun; assuring all the citizens of the republic who should enlist, that Tippoo would give them excellent pay and allowances, which would be fixed beforehand by his ambassadors, who would also engage, in the name of their sovereign, that the Frenchmen enlisting in his army should never be detained in India against their will, or after they should have expressed a desire of returning to their native country. The two ambassadors published an advertisement to the same purport as this proclamation; they suffered the proclamation itself to be distributed at their own house, and they spoke in the most open and public manner of an offensive war to be commenced immediately by Tippoo against the British possessions in India. As M. Malartie, the governor of the Isle of France, was daily expecting a visit from the English, he could spare no troops; but he forwarded Tippoo's letters to Paris, and aided and assisted his two ambassadors in levying officers and privates. Few of the officers were of any experience or skill, and the privates were "the refuse of the lowest class of the democratic rabble of the island," some of whom were taken from the prisons and compelled to embark. When the moment of sailing arrived nearly one-half of these desperadoes refused to go to conquer India. Some 150 of them, however, arrived at Mangalore, and thence proceeded to Tippoo's capital, where one of their first operations was to set up a tree of liberty surmounted by the red nightcap of liberty and equality. They next organized a Jacobin club in Seringapatam, and bestowed upon the bewildered Oriental despot the republican appellation of *Citizen Tippoo.** The Seringapatam Jacobin club was distinguished by this peculiarity, that the members were required to swear hatred to tyranny, the love of liberty, and the destruction of all kings and sovereigns, *except* the good and faithful ally of the French republic, Citizen Sultaun Tippoo. On the 18th of June, or nearly at the very moment in which Lord Mornington received the copy of Malartie's proclamation and the other intelligence from the Isle of France, the secret committee of the Court of Directors wrote from London to the governor-general, that they had just received from his majesty's ministers information of a large French armament which had sailed from Toulon on the 13th of May; and that it was conceived to be not impossible that India might be the object of attack by way of the Red Sea, after the conquest of Egypt.† The secret committee further

* Marquess Wellesley, Dispatches.

* It appears that the greater portion of these soi-disants Frenchmen, who arrived in India and set up the amusing novelty of a Jacobin Club in the capital of Mysore, were Caffres and half castes. "On the 20th of June, in the evening, the long-expected French party reached camp; they consisted of about 50 Europeans, and about 100 Caffres or half-caste; one of the Europeans was in a palanquin, five on horseback, and the rest, with the Caffres and half-caste, marched on foot. They had only one tent on their march: the sultaun, however, directed an ample supply of camp equipage, and fixed their encampment about a mile from his own quarters. Next day, six of the party, who were said to be officers, paid him a visit, the major of Lally's party acting as interpreter; what passed is unknown, *as all others were excluded.* It appeared by the countenances of the French gentlemen when they came out, that they were pleased with their reception."—*Intelligence procured by Captain John Malcolm, and conveyed to the Governor-General, together with an Abstract of the present state of Tippoo's forces; Marquess Wellesley, Dispatches, &c.* A remnant of Lally's French army had long been established in Mysore.

† A letter addressed by Bonaparte to Tippoo Sultaun, and dated at Cairo, was intercepted by the English. It contained the following passages:—"You have been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea with an innumerable and invincible army full of the desire of releasing and relieving you from the iron yoke of England.

"I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testi-

said that ministers had informed them that immediate measures would be taken for a considerable augmentation of European force in British India; and that the governor-general might expect 4000 seasoned and disciplined troops within a few months after the receipt of this letter. Before this dispatch of the secret committee could reach Calcutta, the governor-general received, through the overland channel, certain information of the landing of Bonaparte and the French army in Egypt. As soon as Bonaparte had arrived in the valley of the Nile he had dispatched a letter to Tippoo, requesting him to send a confidential person to Suez or Cairo, to confer with him and concert measures for the *liberation* of India; but this epistle was intercepted, and it appears doubtful whether any duplicate ever reached the Sultaun. The arrival of the Frenchmen at Seringapatam (but not the smallness of their number); the intrigues set on foot in various parts of Hindustan; the correspondence of Tippoo with the Mahrattas; and the formidable attitude of M. Perron, who, with his numerous disciplined troops, was every day gaining strength in the Mahratta country, were all perfectly well known at this time; and all men felt that whether the French expedition should or should not reach India by way of Egypt and the Red Sea, the implacable Mysorean would have ample means of making himself dangerous, and would never cease caballing and agitating the country against the English. At the end of October Lord Mornington received intelligence of the destruction of Bonaparte's fleet by Nelson at the mouth of the Nile. But it was not upon that fleet in the Mediterranean that the French could have depended for their passage down the Red Sea and across the Indian Ocean; and, notwithstanding the decisive event, Lord Mornington did not relax any part of the naval or military preparations which had been commenced under his orders;—being still uncertain of the fate of the French army in Egypt, and ignorant whether an additional force might not have been intended to co-operate with it in India, by embarking in another fleet and taking the ordinary passage round the Cape of Good Hope. That French army, it must be remembered, kept its ground in Egypt for three whole years in spite of the loss of their fleet, and in spite of all the efforts made by the English and their allies the Turks and Mamelukes to dispossess them. It is said that Tippoo, disappointed in his expectations of immediate aid to a considerable amount from the Isle of France, had suspended his military preparations, and that his army did not at this moment exceed 60,000 fighting men. But this was force sufficient to enable him to be very mischievous.* If he had taken the field in the month of June, he might even with one half of this force have scoured the Carnatic before General Harris could have collected his weak and scattered army. General Harris's forces were not all concentrated and equipped

fying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

"I could even wish you could send some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer. May the Almighty increase your power, and destroy your enemies!

"Yours, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Though the French should not proceed from Egypt to India, they would still derive immense advantages from fomenting a war in that country against the power of Great Britain.

* According to Malcolm's abstract of the state of the Mysorean army, which was drawn up at Madras on the 16th of July, 1798, Tippoo had then—

Regular Horse	6,000
Irregular Horse	7,000
Regular Infantry	30,000
Slave Guard	4,000
Pikemen	16,000
Carnatic Peons	8,000
Pioneers	6,000

His European, or French force, as it was called, consisted of—

	Officers.	European Privates.	Half-castes & Caffres.
Lally's party	4	40	350
Lately arrived from Isle of France	6	50	100
Total	10	90	450

"I have not," adds Malcolm, "included battering-guns, field-pieces, or rockets, imagining he has at all times as many of these as he can transport, and also as many elephants, camels, and draught and carriage cattle, as he ever can require. He has with his army 100 mules, which are reported to be for his guns."—*Wellesley, Indian Dispatches.*

until the beginning of November, and until that army was ready to act it would have been an imbecile act to threaten or remonstrate with Tippoo. On the 8th of November, when Harris, by his incessant exertions, and by the judicious way in which he had disposed his troops, could answer at least for the security of the Carnatic, the governor-general addressed a letter to the Sultaun, complaining in measured and mild terms of the connection which he had formed with the French, the inveterate enemies of the Company and of the whole English nation. His lordship told Tippoo that his French allies would not only subvert the foundations of friendship between him and the Company, but would introduce in the heart of his kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion. His lordship offered to send Colonel Doveton, an officer well known at the court of Seringapatam, to enter upon explanations in a friendly spirit. Tippoo was in no hurry to answer this letter, and seemed not at all dismayed at the movements of General Harris's army. In order to be prepared for every event, to be near the scene of negociation or military operations, to avoid the evils of delay, and to give to the public service his own animated spirit, and the advantages of a prompt decision upon every question, military or political, the governor-general resolved to quit the ease and splendour of Calcutta, and repair to Madras. On the 10th of December he wrote to inform Tippoo of this resolution; and at the same time to urge that prince to reply to the communication which he had made to him under date of the 8th of November. His lordship reached Madras on the 31st of December; and there he found that a reply to his November letter had been received from the Sultaun. In this answer Tippoo professed unalterable friendship to the English, and hatred to the French; said that the reputed embassy to the Isle of France was merely a mercantile speculation of some of his subjects; that only forty persons, among whom were twelve artificers, had returned in the vessel sent thither; that to some of these men he had given service, and that the rest had already departed from his dominions. "But the French," he added, "being full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both governments." He expressed great surprise at the hostile preparations of the English, but evasively refused to receive Colonel Doveton. The governor-general wrote another letter, recapitulating all the proceedings of the embassy to the Isle of France, and the other causes of offence and jealousy which the Sultaun had given to the English; and declaring that he had by his conduct compelled the English and their allies to seek relief from the ambiguous and anxious state in which they had been kept for years past; and that they could no longer suffer those constant preparations for war, and those intrigues and hostile negociations with their enemies, which exposed them, during a period of supposed peace, to all the solicitude and hazard, and to much of the expense of actual war. His lordship again entreated the Sultaun to receive Major Doveton, and to meet with cordiality his moderate and sincere advances to an amicable explanation and adjustment of all differences. But to this letter his lordship required an instant answer, in language which admitted of no doubt as to his determination not to brook any delay or evasion. This letter was dated on the 9th of January, 1799, and it reached Tippoo about the 15th. No reply however was received to it until the 13th of February, when it came in the shape of this short note:—"Being frequently disposed to make excursions, and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton, about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written, slightly attended." But ten days before this tardy note reached him, Lord Mornington had put his army or armies in motion. The delay of the Sultaun had been considered as part of his design to procrastinate till the favourable season for the attack of his capital should be passed; and, in the interval, it had been ascertained that Tippoo had deputed another embassy to the French, consisting of two native vakeels and one of

the French officers who had so lately arrived from the Isle of France. On the 3rd of February, or ten days before he received Tippoo's note, the governor-general directed the British army under General Harris, and the Nizam's army under Meer Allum, to advance against Mysore; giving at the same time intimation to the other allies of the Company, and to the British admiral on the coast, that he now considered the war as begun. The invading forces were all in motion when, on the 22nd of February, his lordship acquainted the Sultaun by letter, that his long silence had been understood as a rejection of the proposition for an amicable arrangement, and had compelled him to the measures which he had adopted; that the sending of Major Doveton to Seringapatam could no longer be productive of any advantage; but that as the English and their allies still retained the desire of effecting a quiet settlement of differences, General Harris had been instructed to receive any embassy which the Sultaun might send, and had been empowered to enter into a new treaty of friendship with him, upon such conditions as should ensure a safe and lasting peace. These conditions had, of course, varied according to circumstances; and the terms which would have satisfied Lord Mornington some months ago were not likely to satisfy him now. Still his lordship's ultimatum was not excessive or extravagant: it scarcely went beyond what was absolutely necessary to cut off communications between the French and the Sultaun, to tranquillise the Carnatic, and remove alarm and uneasiness from the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. It demanded that Tippoo should admit of the establishment of a permanent resident at Seringapatam; that he should dismiss all the French in his service, and perpetually exclude men of that nation from his armies and dominions; and that he should agree to exchange the province of Canara—the only line of sea-coast in his possession—for an equal extent of territory in some other quarter: Lord Mornington conceiving such an adjustment to be absolutely necessary, to afford complete security against any designs which the Sultaun might have in combination with the French, whose intercourse with Mysore would be completely cut off by this arrangement. The annexation of Canara to the Company's territories was favoured by the feelings of the Nairs, and of all the Hindu population, who had suffered most cruelly from the tyranny of their Mysorean conquerors, and from the Mohammedan bigotry and persecution of Tippoo. During Colonel Fullarton's brilliant campaign, all the Hindu chiefs of the Malabar coast had declared for the English; and, after the treaty of Mangalore, vengeance had been taken upon them by the Sultaun, to whose dominion that not very honourable treaty restored them. Finally, the governor-general, in his ultimatum, demanded the payment of a considerable sum of money, as an indemnification for the heavy expense, for military preparation, &c., which the English and their allies had been forced to incur by the suspicious and hostile conduct of Tippoo. As General Harris advanced without receiving any proposals from the Sultaun, and as that prince seemed determined to trust solely to the fortune of war, and to wage that war with more than his former fierceness, Lord Mornington again raised his demands, instructing General Harris to make the terms of the treaty depend upon the stage of the war at which negociations commenced; and in the event of any decisive victory, or of our batteries being opened against Seringapatam, to demand from the Sultaun the cession of one-half of his dominions, the payment of two crore of rupees, and the surrender of four of his sons, and four of his principal officers, as hostages, for the faithful performance of the conditions.

The presence at Madras of Colonel Arthur Wellesley, a younger brother of the governor-general, and now the time-honoured Duke of Wellington, had contributed very materially to change the feelings and opinions of the leading men in that settlement, where the majority had, at first, deprecated the war, not because they thought it unjust or unnecessary, but because they doubted whether our military means were adequate to ensure success, and dreaded a repetition of the tremendous expense and fearful loss

of life which had attended Lord Cornwallis's first advance to Seringapatam in the month of May, 1791. The governor-general's spirited dispatches, the energy of all his measures, and the re-animation visible among every class of public servants in India, whether military or civil, had concurred in removing all doubt and opposition; and almost as soon as his lordship arrived at Madras, he had the satisfaction of seeing all hearts and hands united for the furtherance of his vigorous system.* With one or two exceptions, those who had been despondent became full of hope. In the preceding month of August Lord Clive, son of the hero of Plassey, and the present Earl Powis, arrived at Fort St. George, as governor of the presidency of Madras, and relieved General Harris from the political and civil duties which he had performed since the return to England of Lord Hobart. Thus Harris had been for some months enabled to devote an undivided attention to his own profession, and to the collecting and equipping of the army. When all was ready for action, this high-minded and modest officer expressed a wish that Sir Alured Clarke, then at Calcutta, and the commander-in-chief of our forces in India, should take the command of the expedition against Mysore. The retreat of Zemaun Shah and his Afghans did away with the necessity of Sir Alured Clarke's remaining in Bengal; and if he would come and take the chief command of the Madras army, Harris would find happiness and sufficient honour in serving under him. The sincerity of this rare modesty and self-denial is unquestionable. The governor-general, if not astonished, was affected by it. His lordship also thought that the officer who had given brilliant proofs of bravery and conduct in active warfare in other parts of the world, and who had displayed so much energy and ability in the excessively difficult task of collecting and equipping this Madras army, was the proper person to hold the command; and he begged General Harris to consider well before he declined this great appointment, and, after a night's rest, to return to him with his answer in the morning. When the general returned to Lord Mornington in the morning, his cheerful countenance spoke the result of his night's reflections, and before he could give utterance to them, his lordship, by anticipation, congratulated him upon his decision, "and in that frank and generous spirit, which won the hearts of all who approached him, and made them serve in all his counsels in India, as fervently as if they had been of their own suggestion."* Every remaining arrangement prospered. As money was still wanting, the governor-general subscribed 12,000*l.* to the public loan; and, animated by this example, those individuals who had rupees, native as well as European, came forward with their contributions, and thus filled up the measure of the great supplies which the important expedition demanded. As early as the end of January General Harris joined his army, which was then nearly all assembled in the vicinity of Vellore. A finer army, and one more perfect in all points, had never taken the field in India. It consisted of 4608 British infantry, 11,061 native infantry, 912 European cavalry, 1766 native cavalry, 576 European artillerymen, 2726 gun-Lascars and pioneers; forming altogether a force of 21,649 men, with 60 field pieces, 40 heavy guns for battering, 30 being 18-pounders, 8 being 12-pounders, and 2 being 24-pounders, each gun having 1200 shot and a proportionate quantity of ammunition, &c. Colonel Wellesley, who had assisted in improving the discipline of the troops, spoke highly of them all, but more especially of the cavalry. But there were other forces now in the field which were to co-operate with this army of Madras, or, as it was now called, "army of the Carnatic." General Stuart was advancing from the Malabar coast with the Bombay army, which had been very efficiently equipped, but which did not exceed 6000 fighting men, of whom about 1600 were Europeans. Another force, under Colonels Read and T. Brown,†

* The Right Hon. S. R. Lushington, 'Life and Services of Gen. Lord Harris.' Mr. Lushington, at this time son-in-law and secretary of Harris, bore an active part in most of the momentous transactions which he describes.

* Rt. Hon. S. R. Lushington, 'Life and Services of Gen. Lord Harris.'

† Afterwards General Sir Thomas Brown, and

was gathering in the productive country of the Barrahmahal,* in order to co-operate in bringing supplies to Harris's grand army through the Caverypooram pass. And in addition to these forces of the Company and king's troops, there were the British detachments serving with the Nizam of the Deccan, 6500 strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, between 6000 and 7000 of the Nizam's own infantry, including a portion of the sepoys, lately under French, but now, according to treaty, under British officers; and a large body of well-mounted cavalry from the Deccan. Captain John Malcolm, who had done so much in getting rid of M. Piron and the other Frenchmen, and in putting down the formidable mutiny at Hyderabad, now commanded these French-trained sepoys; and Captain Walker commanded the Nizam's horse. These united forces certainly justified the sanguine expectations of the governor-general. The only doubt or uneasiness of General Harris arose out of the difficulty of obtaining food sufficient for so great a force, the weakness and infirmity of the cattle, which he had procured with so much toil and expense, and the consequent difficulty of getting his heavy battering train across a rough country, and to the walls of Seringapatam before the setting in of the Malabar monsoon, which would swell all the rivers and render the siege impracticable for some months. He could not but recollect—for he had served in that disastrous campaign—that Lord Cornwallis, after having defeated Tippoo under the gates of his capital, in 1791, had been compelled to destroy his battering train, and lead back his victorious army in a state of miserable destitution. In the Carnatic, where everything was starving and perishing under the misrule of the Nabob, and the rapacity of his usurious creditors, the draught and carriage bullocks had been principally raised; and though great attention had been bestowed upon them to get them into condition, the cattle were still faint, while the whole breed was miserably inefficient and unfit for that service, compared with the fine vigorous breed which Tippoo possessed in the Mysore. It was the excellence of his cattle which enabled the Mysorean to move his army and artillery with so much rapidity; and it was this inferiority of the cattle of the Carnatic, which obliged the English generals to move so very slowly.*

General Harris began his march from Vellore on the 11th of February; and on the 18th he was joined by Dalrymple, Malcolm, and Walker, with the Nizam's army, the whole of which was nominally

famous in Indian warfare for his excellent gun-practice.

* The Barrahmahal, which lies between the Carnatic and Mysore, had been ceded to the British government by the treaty of Seringapatam, in 1792. The country was then in a most miserable state; but the good management of Colonel Read, in the course of only five years, had more than doubled the revenue to the Company, while the rents paid by the Polygars had been diminished in equal proportion. The soil was not naturally very fertile; but a settled and moderate government, by preventing the devastations of war, by diminishing taxation, and by leaving the natives to enjoy a proper share of the fruits of their labour, had encouraged industry, and had thus rendered the country productive.

* This had been the case in Lord Cornwallis's time; and Mr. Mill ought to have reflected upon the causes of these slow movements before he elevated his nostril in scorn, at marches at the rate of seven miles a day. Perhaps this metaphysical and find-fault historian would have gone to the siege of Seringapatam without battering train, ammunition, baggage, and provisions. If he or any other man had driven the bullocks beyond their strength they would have perished on the road. General Harris, on beginning his march, declared that no selfishness, no persuasion should induce him to push the cattle beyond their powers, for that would be risking everything. "On them," said this active officer, who may be supposed to have known something more of the business of war than the un-English historian of British India, who sneers at his proceedings, "we must depend for getting our noble battering train along; and we will soon make up any time supposed to be lost in this way when once we begin the siege."—*Letter to the Earl of Mornington, in Luthington's Life.* As early as the 26th of February, when he had not got beyond the Company's frontiers, Harris stated that, notwithstanding all his care, and his determination not to overwork them, his bullocks were much harassed. At the same time he mentioned that the small-pox had disabled many of his people, and that the Europeans of the 12th regiment and the Scotch brigade were falling down fast. It may be easy, but it is but paltry work, to sit down at a desk and criticise military proceedings without looking to the facts and circumstances by which they were of necessity regulated.

under the superintendence of Meer Alum Bahadur, one of the Nizam's ministers. In order to give the utmost degree of efficiency and respectability to this army of the Deccan, it was deemed proper to add one of his Majesty's regiments of infantry to the Company's battalions serving with it; and to form the whole into a separate division. Meer Alum expressed a wish that the governor-general's brother should be appointed to the command, and General Harris gladly attached to the Nizam's contingent the king's 33rd regiment, which was now commanded by Colonel Arthur Wellesley. By this arrangement Colonel Wellesley obtained, in effect, the entire command of the Nizam's forces.* This added greatly to the confidence of all those troops, and thus promised to render them essentially useful in protecting the baggage and stores of the army—an all-important and most difficult duty. On the 5th of March General Harris crossed Tippoo Sultaun's frontiers, and commenced hostilities by reducing several small hill-forts. These forts were then occupied by British troops, in order to facilitate Colonel Read's endeavours to forward supplies for the army from Barrahmahal.

Instead of advancing towards the Coromandel coast, to meet the grand army under General Harris, Tippoo and his "tigers of war" marched towards the Malabar coast to encounter the small army of Bombay under General Stuart, before they should get clear of the jungles of Coorg. To conceal his purpose the Sultaun gave out at Seringapatam that he was going to Mrddoor to fall upon Harris. He then proceeded with all possible secrecy and with admirable rapidity in the opposite direction to Perinpatam, where he arrived on the 5th of March (the very day on which the grand army crossed his south-western frontier) with the flower of his army, having made a march of 200 miles. At this moment, the van of Stuart's army, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, and consisting of only three native battalions, was at Sedaseer, close to Periapatam, while the main body under General Stuart was several miles distant at Sedapoor. Tippoo looked upon these three advanced battalions as his certain prey; and at an early hour of the following morning he stimulated his tigers of war with opium and bang, and threw them upon Montresor's detachment. But that gallant brigade of sepoys defended themselves heroically, and held the Mysoreans at bay until half past two o'clock in the afternoon. The men were then exhausted with fatigue, and their ammunition was almost expended; but at this moment General Stuart, who had, at first, believed that Tippoo was marching on the Coromandel side, reached Sedaseer with one European regiment, the 77th, and the two flank companies of the 75th, having left the remainder of his main body behind him in the plain of Karrydygood. Stuart instantly attacked a great body of troops which Tippoo had placed along the road, in the rear of Montresor's brigade, in order to prevent any relief. A severe action ensued, in which the Rajah of Coorg, a determined foe to the Sultaun, was present with some of his people.* Many of the Mysoreans were

* Colonel Gurwood, 'Wellington Dispatches.'

* The obligations of the English to this Hindu chief were very great. But for his activity and vigilance Montresor's weak brigade must have been taken completely by surprise, and have been destroyed in the jungles of Coorg. The rajah, on the 5th of March, had conducted a party of observation, including some English officers, to the top of Sedaseer, the highest hill in his country, for the purpose of looking into the Mysore territory. The opportune discovery that was made, was picturesquely described by the rajah himself, in a letter addressed to Lord Mornington.

"Myself, Capt. Mahony, and some other English sirdars, went to the hill of Sedaseer, which is within my territories. This mountain, which is exceedingly lofty, the English sirdars and myself ascended; and we remained there. Having from thence reconnoitred, we observed nothing for the first four or five hours. After this we observed one large tent in the direction of Periapatam, which is within the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, and continued to see some other white tents rising. A large green tent then appeared, and then another tent which was red, and after that five or six hundred tents. Upon this, the English sirdars and myself were satisfied that it was the army of Tippoo Sultaun. We then returned to the English army at Sedapoor, and acquainted General Stuart that Tippoo's army was at Periapatam. The army was accordingly prepared, as were also the battalions at Sedaseer,

slain and many wounded; the remainder, having thrown away their muskets, their swords, and their turbans, fled in the greatest confusion. Having withdrawn the rest of his forces Tippoo retreated to Periapatam. There he lingered for five days; but not mustering resolution enough to attack again the comparatively small Bombay army, he marched back with all possible speed, and not without confusion, to Seringapatam. His retreat would have been more disastrous if General Stuart had not apprehended a return, or a flank movement, upon the great magazine of rice which the Rajah of Coorg had collected for the use of the British at Sedapoor.

So exceedingly difficult was any passage through Tippoo's country that it was not until the 25th of March that General Harris received authentic intelligence that the Sultaun had been beaten on the 6th. On the very next day after this intelligence was received, General Floyd, who was in Harris's van, suddenly saw a large body of cavalry on his right and Tippoo's main army in front. At this moment Colonel Wellesley's column was considerably in the rear, and before it could get parallel, Harris gained some rising ground on which he had proposed that his whole army should encamp, and discovered that Tippoo had gone off in the direction of Mallavelly. Some of General Harris's impatient staff urged him to march very early the next morning against Tippoo, leaving his artillery to follow more leisurely; but to this the general gave a decided negative, telling them that his object was to sit down before Seringapatam as speedily as possible; that the pains he had taken to be ready to fight Tippoo were entirely with the hope they would enable him to avoid it: that nothing but his stopping the high road should make him seek the Sultaun.* Tippoo did endeavour to stop the high road; and on the 27th of March a battle was fought on ground of his own choosing between Sultaunpet and Mallavelly. The British army under General Harris formed our *right* wing; the Nizam's army with the 33rd regiment under Colonel Wellesley formed the left. The affair began with a hot fire of artillery from the Mysorean's numerous and well served park; and this was followed up by some very daring and obstinate charges, Tippoo having administered unusually large doses of opium to his black cavaliers, in order to excite them to madness and make them insensible to the fears of death. A select band of 300 of these excited delhis was appointed to break our line, when Tippoo intended to pour in his whole cavalry.* Our right wing deployed into line, and began to advance under a very heavy fire of artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver's guns opened upon the Mysoreans from the ridge of a hill, at the foot of which Harris had formed his line. On descending into the valley some masses of Tippoo's infantry instead of retiring advanced to meet the British, firing rapidly but irregularly. They even entertained the bold design of charging our front line with the bayonet; but, after they had come close up, their resolution failed them; and then, after giving a very feeble fire for a few minutes and receiving a tremendously heavy one from his Majesty's 12th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, they ran off much too fast for General Harris to allow his people to follow them. Besides, at the moment of their retreat several large parties of cavalry were close at hand; and a part of one of them, consisting of the 300 delhis, were so daring as to charge the Scotch brigade. "Luckily," says Harris, "I perceived their intention, and ordered the men to get ready, but not to fire till they came quite close. There was no time to call to the commanding officer, for the horse broke out from the jungle in the moment I had got the troops ready, when I gave the words 'present' and 'fire,' so opportunely, that about 40 men and horses fell within 20 yards of us. One man was bayoneted by

under the command of Colonel Montresor. Next morning, Tippoo's army advanced close to the battalions of Colonel Montresor, and there was a severe action." *Letter of the Rajah of Coorg, as given by Mr. Lushington in* Life of General Harris.

* General Harris's 'Journal,' as quoted by Lushington.

* 'Memorandum written by Harris.

the grenadier company, and another cut through that company close to me; the rest wheeling to the right, galloped along four or five regiments, and sustained their whole fire without a man falling." Both horse and infantry now ran off the field, and here the engagement with our right wing ended, although General Harris followed them with a cannonade for nearly two miles. Our troops then halted and began to search for water; but as no water could be found Harris determined to fall back to Mallavelly. While waiting to see if attempts would be made to annoy his rear, some surprise was excited by a party of infantry and some cavalry which began to appear from a jungle in front; but these forces proved to be our pickets under Colonel Sherbrooke and the 25th dragoons under Colonel Cotton,* who had worked round the left front of the enemy in a very masterly style, and who would have done great service by charging, if Tippoo's people had attempted to make a second stand. In the meanwhile our left wing under Colonel Wellesley had been equally successful. It was formed nearly opposite to the enemy's extreme right, which was strongly posted on the elevated crest of a rocky ridge. General Harris sent an aide-de-camp to Colonel Wellesley to approve of the attack he proposed, and also to General Floyd to desire him to support that attack. Wellesley advanced in echellon of battalions, supported by three regiments of horse. A column of the enemy, consisting of about 2000 infantry, moved forward in excellent order to meet the attack, and to fall upon Wellesley's own regiment, the 33rd; for here, as on the right under Harris, the Mysoreans picked out the European regiments, calculating that if they could once be broken the native regiments would not long stand their ground. The 33rd reserved its fire with the utmost steadiness, received that of the enemy at the distance of about 60 yards; then quickening its advance, with levelled bayonets, the Mysorean column gave way, and was thrown into disorder. General Floyd seizing this critical moment, ordered a charge of cavalry, led on by that best of cavalry officers Major Dallas, who destroyed great numbers of the enemy and took their six standards.* The retreat of the enemy became general; their cannon were drawn off, and at two o'clock in the afternoon the action had entirely ceased. The affair cost to the British army no greater loss than that of 66 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners; while Tippoo's loss was estimated at nearly 2000, amongst whom were many of his bravest men and best officers. The efficient state of the Mysore gun-cattle, and the miserable condition of Harris's Carnatic bullocks, precluded all idea of a successful pursuit; and it was this that had given Tippoo the confidence to risk this battle on the high land of Mallavelly, than which a finer field of battle could hardly have been found in Southern India.† The entire failure of his desperate cavalry attacks made a deep impression on the Sultaun's mind, but he nevertheless prepared to obstruct the further march of the invading army, which was now little more than 30 miles from Seringapatam. But he committed the serious mistake of believing that General Harris would take the same road which Cornwallis had taken in 1791. Harris chose a very different and much better route. The day after the battle of Mallavelly the British army marched some four miles towards the Cavery river, and halted at Angarapooram, on the usual road to Seringapatam, and the only place where they could get water from the tanks. This necessity served to cover their nearer advance to the river, without exciting any suspicion in the mind of the Sultaun, that Harris had another purpose in approaching it, or that he intended to diverge from the

* Afterwards General Viscount Combermere.

* Dallas; afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Dallas, was a cavalry hero and model—a sort of English Murat. Like that dashing, dexterous Frenchman, he was remarkable for his horsemanship, for the strength, symmetry, and beauty of his person, for his daring courage, and for his love of hand-to-hand combats. He signalized *himself*, in the view of *admiring armies*, by many daring feats, throughout the wars of Coote, Medows, Cornwallis, and Harris, and left a name that will be long remembered in India.

† General Harris's 'Letters and Memorandums' in Life by Lushington. Wellesley, 'Ind. Dispatches,' &c.

road which Cornwallis had followed. But General Harris now prepared to execute the plan he had previously formed and announced to the governor-general of crossing the Cavery near Soosilly, and of approaching Seringapatam, not on the eastern, but on the western side. By moving in this direction the Mysorean army would be left at fault, Harris's junction with General Stuart's Bombay army, which was coming up from Coorg, would be facilitated, and greater ease and security would be given to the march of Colonel Read's and Brown's detachments, which were collecting the supplies of grain that were to come through the Caverypooram pass. On the evening of the 28th of March, Major Allan, commanding the guides, and Captain Colin Macaulay were sent from Angarapooram with the pickets of the cavalry, to ascertain the distance between that halting place and the Cavery, and to reconnoitre the intervening country. They returned at ten o'clock at night to the general's tent, and reported the distance to be about nine miles, through a fine open country. General Harris determined to march down to the river in the morning; and as the secrecy of this movement was essential to its success, it was communicated to no one until the moment for marching had arrived. Through these precautions the left wing of the army was actually across the Cavery before the evening of the 29th, while Tippoo was looking for them, at a distance, on the direct road to Seringapatam. On the 30th the battering train and all the ordnance, and the remainder of the army, crossed the river, and encamped near Soosilly, where they found abundant forage, some grain, and a large supply of fine cattle and sheep. When the intelligence of this masterly movement reached the Sultaun it filled him with despair. "We have arrived at our last stage," said he to his principal officers, "what is your determination?" "To die with you," was the sad reply. Yet such was the exhausted state of his gun-cattle, that General Harris could not reach Seringapatam in less than five days, although the distance from Soosilly was only 26 miles, and although his march was wholly undisturbed by Tippoo. On the 4th of April the army, stores, battering-guns, and followers arrived within three miles of the ground selected for the siege, and the fine fortress, the white walls, the domes, and minarets of Seringapatam were once more within the view of English troops.* The commander-in-chief lost no time in publishing a general order to the troops, expressing his deep sense of the vast exertions they had made throughout a long and tedious march, with the heaviest train and largest equipment ever known to move with any army in India; and congratulating officers and men on the sight of Seringapatam. "A continuance of the same exertions," said he, "will shortly put an end to your labours, and place the British colours in triumph on those walls."

In the meantime Tippoo, by making a rapid movement, had crossed the Cavery higher up, and had taken up a position near the village of Chendgâl, believing that Harris would not make his attack on the southern side of the fort, but would cross over into the island of Seringapatam, the fords to which lay behind the village of Chendgâl. But the Sultaun was again deplorably at fault; Harris, instead of moving towards the fords and the island, made a circuit to the left, reached the ground occupied by Abercrombie in 1792, and took up his ground for the siege on the 5th of April, without any molestation from Tippoo, who was now obliged to throw himself within his lines. Many alterations and additions had been made to the works since the English last lay under them; for 6000 men had been constantly at work on the fortifications during six years.† Since the last siege a new line of entrenchments had been constructed upon a much improved principle, and within 700 yards of the walls. Between these works and the river Tippoo encamped nearly the whole of his infantry. In advance of this line of

* "The poor miserable starved bullocks made out wonderfully, but some of the carriages were not in before nine o'clock at night."—*General Harris's Private Journal in Life by Lushington.*

† Malcolm's report to the governor-general, in Wellesley, 'Ind. Dispatches.'

intrenchments there was a Tope, (called the Sultaun-Pettah Tope,) intended for rocketing. On the night of the 5th of April, the commander-in-chief had commissioned Major-General David Baird to beat up this Tope. Baird accordingly proceeded on this service with the flank companies of three and the battalion companies of one of the king's regiments. This party left the camp at ten o'clock at night, and arrived at the Tope at eleven. They traversed the whole of the Tope without discovering a single person, for the enemy had quitted it on their approach, and not a soul was heard or seen. A great part of the night having elapsed, General Baird determined not to remain in possession of the Tope, but to return to camp. In so doing he missed his way, and was marching with his small party right upon the fort of Seringapatam, when Lieutenant Lambton, a young officer well skilled in astronomy, convinced Baird, from his observation of the stars, that he was going north instead of south, and that he must face about in order to regain the British camp.* The party were accordingly halted, faced about, and on their return they fell in with a small detachment of Tippoo's looties, some of whom they took prisoners, dispersing the rest. It was four o'clock in the morning when General Baird reached the camp.

When the day dawned, a great number of the enemy were again seen going into the Tope; and as it lay right between the camp and the fort, General Harris determined both to get and to keep possession of it. There was also a post occupied by the enemy on a nullah or watercourse, the embankment of which ran between the British camp and the fort; and General Harris deemed it necessary to gain possession of this post likewise, and ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe to attack it, with the 12th regiment and two battalions of sepoys. He ordered the attack on the Tope to be made by Colonel Wellesley with his 33rd regiment and one native battalion. On receiving these orders Wellesley wrote the following letter—the first of the many hundreds of letters, written at moments of crisis, which show his perspicacity, his energy, and love of brevity.

"My dear Sir,

"I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

"Upon looking at the Tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the Tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

"I am, my dear Sir,

"Your most faithful servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

"Lieut.-General Harris." *

General Harris did not consider it expedient to alter the plan he had formed; and according to which both attacks were made under cover of night, by the two parties, the one under Shawe and the other under Wellesley. At nine a heavy fire of musketry was heard everywhere in front; and information was brought to camp that the two sepoy battalions had got separated from Colonel Shawe and the 12th regiment. The darkness of the night proved very unfavourable to the advance; and the ground was difficult and rough. General Harris remained in great anxiety, fearing that the two detachments had fired upon one another by mistake. Colonel Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post of the nullah or watercourse; but a second heavy firing commenced in that direction, and as Harris knew that the two sepoy battalions had separated from the king's regiment, he dreaded more than ever that there was some fatal mistake. It afterwards appeared that one of these sepoy battalions got into confusion, and paid no regard to orders; that Major Campbell, the commanding officer, was killed while

* This lieutenant, who at this time was serving on Baird's staff, became afterwards Lieut.-Colonel Lambton, and a distinguished surveyor and astronomer.

Wellington Dispatches.

endeavouring to rally them; that Colonel Shawe, going in search of the battalion, found it in this mad confusion, firing in every direction, but refusing to march forward to the nullah; and that Shawe, with the utmost difficulty and danger, at last found his way back to his own regiment the 12th, which was sustaining a heavy but blind fire from the enemy. The other missing sepoy battalion had moved more forward, to a part of the watercourse; but the fire of the Mysoreans coming thick upon them, they fell back on the left of the 12th regiment, and there, by Colonel Shawe's orders, remained until daylight, sheltered under some mud walls. About the hour of midnight Colonel Wellesley returned to camp, and entered General Harris's tent, in some agitation, to say that he had not carried the Tope.* The same darkness was attended with the same confusion in Wellesley's detachment as in Shawe's. Nearly all night attacks are and must be mere games of chance.† Colonel Wellesley had entered the Tope with the flank companies of the 33rd regiment, supported by the battalion companies under Major Shee. He had been immediately assailed by a hot fire both in front and flank from the enemy, and in the unevenness of the ground and the darkness of the night, the advanced party had got separated from the regiment, and Lieutenant Fitzgerald and several of the men had been killed. A few of the grenadiers had arrived at the main picket at about ten o'clock. Major Shee, who was to have supported the foremost or attacking party with the five battalion companies of the 33rd, had lost his way, and had fallen in with Colonel Shawe, and had taken shelter far away from the Tope, under the embankments of the watercourse, where he remained till daylight. On reaching Shawe Major Shee could give no other information than that they had separated in the dark, and that Colonel Wellesley and one company were missing. Isolated, assailed in the Tope by rockets and by musketry, and then groping about in the dark, without a knowledge of the ground, and without a guide, the career of our great captain was near being interrupted and closed most prematurely. It may be doubted whether in all his campaigns he was ever exposed to more danger than during this unlucky night of the 5th of April, 1799. Besides the killed, twelve of his grenadiers were taken prisoners.*

At daylight the next morning large bodies of Tippoo's infantry came out from the fort and from his lines to support those in the Tope and on part of the watercourse. These masses of infantry were followed by a considerable number of cavalry, who also took post in the rear of the Tope. These and other movements manifested the Sultaun's determination to drive Colonel Shawe from the post which he had gained during the night, and which he continued to hold with only the 12th regiment and one sepoy battalion, as Major Shee with the five companies of the 33rd, who had passed the night at that point, had returned to camp at daylight. General Harris made the dispositions he thought necessary to support Shawe and to execute successfully his intention—which

* Letters, &c. in Life of General Lord Harris.

† In speaking of General Baird's losing his way, "in the darkness of the preceding night, General Harris says, "No wonder night attacks so often fail!"—*Private Journal.*

* On the authority of General Harris's Private Journal, and of Colonel Gurwood's Wellington Dispatches, we omit, as altogether fabulous, two or three circumstances related by the late Mr. Theodore Hook, in his Life of General Sir David Baird. In the course of the 6th of April and the following day Colonel Wellesley wrote no fewer than eight letters about his duties and the operations in progress to his commander-in-chief, and in none of these letters is there any allusion to the startling scene which Mr. Hook relates as having taken place on parade early on the morning of the 6th. If such a scene had really taken place, Colonel Wellesley must have alluded to it in the course of this correspondence with General Harris. But it appears that this particular story was never heard of until years after the siege of Seringapatam; and that it was first promulgated when the deservedly rapid advancement of General Sir Arthur Wellesley was exciting feelings of astonishment and of envy. These stories are all cast in an old type. Something of the same sort is related of the early career of nearly every brilliantly successful general. We have seen in French books, and have heard from French lips, stories about young Bonaparte's skulking at the siege of Toulon, during which he first made his name known to the world.

had failed in the two preceding nights—of driving the enemy entirely out of the Tope, and maintaining possession of it. The Scotch brigade and two battalions of sepoys were ordered for this service, under the command of Colonel Wellesley. But as Tippoo continued to send out more and more cavalry, the assaulting party was strengthened with four 12-pounders, covered by four companies of sepoys; and was followed and supported by the 25th light dragoons under Colonel Cotton, and a regiment of native cavalry under Colonel Pater, who were ordered to move towards the right flank; and the grenadier company of the 74th regiment, and four companies of sepoys, were thrown forward to occupy a rock above the watercourse on Colonel Shawe's left, so as to prevent the enemy galling the troops on that flank. The rugged scene was now illuminated by the bright sun of the east—there was no groping in the dark, and consequently there were no mistakes. The twelve-pounders opened, and threw in a heavy fire wherever the enemy showed themselves among the trees; the head of the column of attack soon approached, formed and entered the Tope, advancing in line with their guns. The enemy made but a feeble resistance: in less than twenty minutes Colonel Wellesley had complete possession of the post which had caused so much perplexity during the two preceding nights, first to General Baird and then to himself. Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, who had accompanied Wellesley on this service, soon returned, and entering General Harris's tent, said joyously—"It has been done in high style, and without loss." As soon as the Tope was carried, Colonel Shawe moved out the 12th regiment, which had been under a hot fire ever since nine o'clock of the preceding night, and which, up to this moment, had not returned a single shot. But now, with Shawe at their head, the impatient 12th rushed forward, and, at the point of the bayonet, drove the Mysoreans from every part of the nullah or watercourse, killed a considerable number of them, and put to rapid flight some of the troops which, after being driven from the Tope by Wellesley, were attempting to make a stand near the nullah.* By these successful operations (the posts evacuated by the enemy being instantly occupied by British troops) General Harris secured complete possession of a strong and well connected advanced line, extending from the Cavery to the Sultaun-Pettah, a distance of nearly two miles, forming an excellent parallel or line of contravallation, well covered from the fire of the fort, within a mile from the fort, and at the same time at a convenient distance from the encampment of the besiegers.†

On the following day General Harris walked down to the advanced post, and found it very strong against such an enemy as he had to deal with, and capable of being made, with little work, very strong against any enemy whatsoever. "How fortunate," said he, "thus to find a good parallel prepared to our hands!"‡ It has been properly remarked by the gallant editor of the Wellington Dispatches, that the notes and letters written at this moment by Colonel Wellesley to his commander-in-chief, show the friendly terms on which he was living with his general; and at the same time substantiate the fact, not sufficiently known, that General Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded.§ Harris had in fact abundant energy, and

* General Harris, himself as brave a soldier as ever led a charge, paid a tribute of admiration to the gallantry displayed on this day by Colonel Shawe, who was his old comrade, and who had shared with him in many honours and dangers during the unfortunate American war.

"Colonel Shawe's post had been much fired on all the time the preparations for Colonel Wellesley's attack were making. I had been obliged to advance a six-pounder and three companies of sepoys to cover his rear, and thought it advisable to strengthen them by the grenadier companies of the 74th and four companies of sepoys, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, with the intention he should turn the flank of the people opposed to Colonel Shawe when Colonel Wellesley's attack commenced. The effect of this attack was very fine; and Shawe advanced several yards on the bank the enemy had annoyed him from, leading on the grenadiers, which placed him in a most glorious point of view."—*General Harris's Private Journal in Life.*

† Right Hon. S. R. Lushington, Life of Gen. Lord Harris; Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Dispatches; Theodore Hook, Life of General Sir David Baird.

‡ Private Journal.

§ Colonel Gurwood.

activity, and many of the resources, and much of the genius, of a great general. What he most wanted was the habit of handling large armies, and of operating on a wide field; and this was equally wanting to every British officer of that day who had not been trained in India.

There was still much fatigue to undergo, and many privations to suffer; but the chances of miscarriage and disaster almost vanished on the morning of the 6th of April, or as soon as the Tope and the posts on the nullah were secured. Stuart and the army of Bombay, which had arrived in the meantime, had brought scarcely any provisions with them. They had lost nearly 4,000 of their bullocks, and had thus no means of conveying the grain and rice which the Rajah of Coorg had collected in magazine. "This," said Harris, "is one of the accidents of war which cannot be provided against." Owing to the like causes, Colonels Read and Brown had not yet succeeded in bringing up the supplies through the Caverypooram pass. On the 16th of April, when he had been twelve days before Seringapatam, on measuring the rice of his own army, in order to ascertain the exact quantity, the commander-in-chief had the mortification to discover that through loss or fraud, the bags were so deficient, that only eighteen days' rice, at half allowance, was in camp for the fighting men; and that unless Colonel Read's supplies should arrive before the 6th of May, the army would be without provision. "There is plenty," said he, "in the Coorg country, but we have no means to convey it hither. But I hope to be in Seringapatam before the end of April." On the next day he visited General Stuart, and was much afraid he had not sixteen days' rice in his camp. "Anxious times!" On the same day he found the enemy very busy at work on a post he meant to seize for a battery. This determined him to make the attack on that post as soon as possible. The attack was accordingly made that very day, and was attended with complete success; as was also another attack made on the embankments of a stream called the little Cavery, which ran about five hundred yards in advance of Colonel Shawe's post on the nullah. "Success in all our attempts, and with very little loss." But no account was received of Colonel Read, and none of Colonel Brown; and on the 19th, Stuart sent his commissary to acquaint Harris that he had but two days' provisions in camp for his Europeans. The commander-in-chief was obliged to supply Stuart from his own diminutive stock. On the 20th, rice began to arrive. On the 22nd there was rice enough collected to subsist the fighting-men to the middle of May. On the 25th "the appearance of the weather was very monsoonish." There had been a violent storm of wind and rain in the night. If this had lasted it would have been next to impossible to get the guns into some of the unfinished batteries: if the monsoon had come on thus prematurely, the Cavery and its tributaries must all have been swollen, the siege must have been interrupted at the very moment when success was certain, and a great part of the army must have been exposed to destruction by famine and disease and the sword of the enemy. But the indications of the coming monsoon blew over; and every nerve was exerted to do the work before that season should set in.*

As early as the 9th of April, Tippoo, perceiving that the besiegers were firmly established in the excellent parallel, or line of contravallation, which he had in a manner made for them, addressed a concise and very Oriental letter to their commander-in-chief:—"The governor-general, Lord Mornington, sent me a letter, the copy of which is enclosed—you will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties. What, then, is the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me. What need I say more?"—To this epistle General Harris replied on the 10th:—"Your letter, enclosing copy of the governor-general's letter, has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, and for the occurrence of hostilities, I refer you to the several letters of the governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory of the sub-

* General Harris, Private Diary, as quoted by Mr. Lushington.

ject. What need I say more?"—The Sultaun remained silent for ten days, during which various batteries were erected, and various important posts carried by the besiegers. On the 20th of April he wrote again, saying:—"In the letter of Lord Mornington it is written that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, and that, therefore, you having been empowered for the purpose will appoint such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference, and renewing the business of a treaty. You are the well-wisher of both powers. In this matter, what is your pleasure? Inform me, that a conference may take place. What can I say more?" On the 22nd General Harris replied. He told the Sultaun that the governor-general, in his letter of the 8th of November, had told him that the British government and its allies wished to live in peace with all their neighbours, entertaining no projects of ambition, and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions: that the governor-general in that letter had expressed his desire of communicating to his highness a plan calculated to promote the security and welfare of all parties, and had proposed to depute Major Doveton for that purpose: that he, the Sultaun, had rejected the pacific advances of the governor-general, and had refused to receive Major Doveton, until the lateness of the season had compelled the governor-general to order the armies to advance: that he, General Harris, being vested with full powers for concluding a treaty, enclosed the draft of a preliminary treaty, upon which alone any negociation could be founded, &c. "And I have further to acquaint you," added the general, "that unless these demands are agreed to, and your acquiescence signified to me under your seal and signature, within twenty-four hours of your receiving them, and the hostages and specie delivered within twenty-four hours more, the allies reserve to themselves the right of extending these demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, till a definitive treaty can be arranged, and its stipulations carried into effect.... What need I say more?" As Tippoo had made no overtures until the campaign was well advanced, and as nothing but some great accident of nature could prevent Harris from capturing Seringapatam, the terms of the preliminary treaty were very high. In addition to the proposed conditions, which have been already mentioned, the Sultaun was to send every Frenchman in his service into the British camp within eight and forty hours; was to relinquish all claims to anything he had ever disputed with the English or their allies; was to pay two crores of rupees, one crore immediately, and the other in six months, &c. Although utter ruin stared him in the face, Tippoo would not agree to these conditions. The apathy of the fatalist could not render him insensible to the rapid approach of the last moment. "The religion which he revered, as well as that which he had cruelly persecuted, were equally invoked. The Moollah and the Brahmin were equally bribed to interpose their prayers for his deliverance; his own attendance at the mosque was frequent, and he entreated the fervent *Amen* of his attendants to his earnest and reiterated prayers; the vain science of every sect was put in requisition, to examine the influence of the planets, and interpret their imaginary decision." * He appeared less frequently on the ramparts. When he was not praying in the mosques, he was taking counsel of rash inexperienced favorites.

On Friday the 26th of April, Harris ordered his men an extra dram; and that evening the enemy's post in his front and right were gallantly attacked and carried, though not without an unusual loss to the assailants. Colonel Wellesley, who was commanding in the trenches, drew up the order for the attack. The projection of fire-balls had not yet superseded in Seringapatam the ancient practice of India, and the assailants were favoured more than the defenders by Tippoo's rocket-people burning blue lights on the ramparts. A general and beautiful illumination of the whole fort was followed by a furious random discharge of artillery. The sight was at once sublime and beau-

* Colonel Wilks, 'Historical Sketches, South Ind.'

tiful. Colonel Wellesley, who had drawn up the order for the attack, and who was charged with the direction of it, sent Colonel Moneypenny and Major S. Kelly with two columns to fall upon the enemy's right and centre. Both succeeded, and the united columns turning to their right, pursued the Mysoreans, who continued firing as they retreated. The assailants, being severely galled by the near fire of the body of the fort, were obliged to post themselves in a watercourse, which had formed a ditch of the enemy's entrenchment, and which was now destined to be the third parallel of the besiegers. A circular work, still occupied on the enemy's left, was found to have greater command than was expected over this watercourse. Our troops were much exposed, and could scarcely be expected to hold their ground unless that circular work were carried. At this moment Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, of the 74th, chancing to come near with part of the relief for the trenches, determined to make a dash at the circular work; and, proceeding with only 120 men, he not only dislodged some thousands, but, favoured by the night, pursued them across the Periapatam bridge, entered the right of the enemy's camp on the island, spiked some of their guns, and returned in perfect order under cover of the confusion he had created. During the night, the circular work was lost by the British, and again carried: was lost again, and again recovered. The ground which was gained was to serve for the *emplacement* of the breaching batteries. On the morning of the 27th the Mysoreans made a violent attack upon this ground by means of the guns of the fort, and other heavy guns in battery on a stone bridge. The fire was so hot that Colonel Sherbrooke, the commanding officer, was afraid he should not be able to sustain his right flank; but he was ordered to keep the ground to the last extremity, and he succeeded in keeping it until British batteries were erected, and a heavy fire of grape was opened upon the Mysoreans. Under cover of this fire the British soldiers moved out, and were followed by some of the sepoys. This advancing column was assailed by a fire of musketry and artillery from behind some breastworks, and from some ruined buildings, and by guns from almost every part of the great fort. But part of the 73rd regiment and the Scotch brigade carried all the outworks in their front, and with red bayonets killed or scattered those who had attempted to defend them. Even the stone bridge and a post beyond it were carried, though defended by a formidable redoubt. During the night, and then again from the dawn of day until ten o'clock in the forenoon, the enemy continued firing grape and musketry, and making desperate efforts to regain what had been lost; but the determined bravery of our troops baffled all their endeavours, and by ten o'clock entrenchments were thrown up, and all our people were put well under cover. Our loss however was great: two officers and 60 men were killed; ten officers and 216 men were wounded; and 19 men were missing. It was the last effort of any vigour made by Tippoo. A close breaching battery mounting six heavy guns was opened on the morning of the 30th; and in the course of that day it demolished part of the outer wall of the fort, and shook the masonry of the bastion within. The Sultaun, driven from his last exterior line of defence, made another attempt to negociate, being apparently ready to yield to nearly every demand; but General Harris, who had received fresh instructions from the governor-general under date of the 23rd of April, told the Sultaun that he had allowed the time to expire which he had mentioned for treating; that he could no longer receive any ambassadors unless they came fully prepared to agree to all the conditions of the preliminary treaty, and accompanied by the hostages and money; and that after three o'clock in the afternoon of that day no letter or messenger of the Sultaun would be received.* After three o'clock the firing was renewed from the breaching-battery. On the 2nd of May a second breaching-battery began to

* In his letter of the 22nd, General Harris had specified by name the four sons and the four principal officers of the Sultaun, that were to be delivered up to the English as hostages, conformably to the previous order of the governor-general.

hammer at the fort. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of May, Colonel Wellesley, who continued to command in the trenches, reported that the work was all finished except filling the sand-bags —that the breach was practicable. Upon this General Harris determined to make the assault on the following day. The sand-bags were filled, and all preparations were completed. On the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the attack were got into the trenches before daylight, and without being perceived by the besieged. The experience of former wars had proved that the enemy was always more alert at night than in the heat of the day. Midday was chosen for the hour of assault. Tippoo adhered obstinately to his opinion that the English would assault only at night. There was serving with the Sultaun one Seyed Ghoffar, an officer of a provincial corps of the Company's sepoys, who had been taken prisoner with Colonel Braithwaite. This man had accepted Tippoo's liberal offers, and had become a zealous and able servant of his new master. Upon finding that Tippoo rejected his advice, Seyed Ghoffar was heard to exclaim:— "He is surrounded with boys and flatterers, who will not even let him see with his own eyes. I do not wish to survive the result. I am going about in search of death, and cannot find it!" He had exposed himself on every side, and had been wounded early in the siege. Other experienced men found their advice thrown away. "It will be a night attack," said the Sultaun; and his flatterers repeated that it must be a night attack. The selected storming-party consisted of 2500 British and 1900 native infantry. Major-General Baird, who had solicited the command, divided this force into two separate columns, which, on mounting the breach, were to file off, the one to the right, the other to the left. Colonel Sherbrooke commanded the right column; Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop the left. Colonel Wellesley was to remain in the advanced trenches in command of the reserve, to support the two attacking columns in case it should be necessary. A little before the appointed time, Captain John Malcolm entered the tent of the commander-in-chief, and seeing him full of thought, exclaimed cheerily—"Why, my Lord, so thoughtful?" "Malcolm," said Harris, rather sternly, "this is no time for compliments. We have serious work on hand. Don't you see that the European sentry over my tent is so weak from want of food and exhaustion, that a sepoy could push him down? We must take this fort, or perish in the attempt. I have ordered Baird to persevere in his attack to the last extremity: if he is beat off, Wellesley is to proceed with the troops from the trenches: if he also should not succeed, I shall put myself at the head of the remainder of the army, for success is necessary to our existence."* Baird, who had been wounded and left for dead in one of the battles against Hyder Ali (in that disastrous affair in which Colonel Baillie was sacrificed), who had been marched to Seringapatam, and there loaded with irons and thrown into a hideous prison, together with other British officers, and a good many British soldiers—Baird, who had suffered many horrors at the hands both of Hyder and his son Tippoo, and who knew too truly the unspeakable monstrosities which had been perpetrated on many of his countrymen, recognised in the two columns of attack some of his fellow-sufferers in his captivity at the capital of Mysore, over the breached walls of which they were now to climb; and he told them to recollect that they would presently have an opportunity of "paying off old scores." When every arrangement was completed, Baird stepped out of the trenches, and, drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Now, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers!" Away went the excited columns, and dashed across the bed of the river. That channel of the Cavery which intervened between them and the breach, though it contained but little water, was wide and rocky, and was fully exposed to the fire of the fortress: the breach was imperfect and had been partially re-

* 'Life and Services of General Lord Harris.' The biographer adds—"This anecdote was told to me in 1813 by Sir J. Malcolm."

paired; the strength of the works beyond it was appalling; the garrison was ten times more numerous than the assaulting party, and instead of being at their mid-day repast or buried in sleep, many thousands of them were on the alert, and as soon as our troops descended into the bed of the river, they opened a tremendous fire upon them. The bullets and cannon-balls fell round Baird in every direction like hail: some of the troops, galled by the fire, were swerving from the line of marks which had been made during the preceding night in order to direct their passage, and were getting into deep water; but Baird dashed forward by the shortest and most exposed passage, gained the bank at the foot of the breach, cheered the men, showed them the right way, and then rushed onward close to the forlorn hope. Tippoo, contrary to the advice of his best officers, had neglected to cut a trench, so as to insulate the angle of the fort in which the breach had been made. The storming-parties, still under a heavy fire, dashed across the glacis and ditch, and ascended the fausse-braye and rampart of the fort. In less than ten minutes from their issuing from the trenches, the British colours were planted on the summit of the breach. Then the men divided into the two parties, one rushing to the right, the other to the left, in order to clear the ramparts. Colonel Sherbrooke led one of the divisions, but Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, who was appointed to head the other, got wounded and disabled in the breach: both corps, however, did their work well, and were equally and completely successful, although both were strongly opposed. In a very brief space of time another British flag was hoisted on the bastions, and then another. As the left column proceeded along the north rampart, they found traverses and various other defences. These were maintained for a short time with a great show of spirit, and it was here that Tippoo had placed himself. He was seen firing upon the English with his own hand, his attendants loading the firelocks and handing them to him. It is said that he was the last man to quit the traverses, as they were successively carried; and that, being wounded, he endeavoured to return with his people through the sally-port into the interior of the fort. Part of the 12th regiment, instead of proceeding with the rest of the left column along the ramparts, had pressed forward into the body of the town, and having kept along the inside of the rampart, they found themselves opposite to the sally-port through which the Sultaun was endeavouring to retreat. These men of the 12th instantly halted, and commenced firing from the inner side of the gate, while the rest of the column were firing from the outside. Tippoo was thus literally placed between two fires. His people fell around him in heaps, but his enemies could not see whether he himself fell or escaped. Meanwhile, General Baird, who had accompanied the right division, commanded by Sherbrooke, along the south rampart, had halted at a cavalier to give the men breathing time after the fatigue they had undergone, before they entered the town to summon the palace. While the men were thus resting and sheltering themselves from the glare and scorching heat of the meridian sun, Colonel Close came to General Baird, and told him that a native Mussulman officer who accompanied him had positively assured him that the Sultaun had caused the twelve grenadiers of Wellesley's regiment (the 33rd), who had been taken prisoners on the night of the 5th of April at the Tope, to be barbarously murdered. Baird was extremely particular in his inquiries; but the Mussulman officer did not prevaricate. As the column was about to march through the town to the palace, Baird, whose own sad experience had enabled him to judge of the extent of the Mysoreans' barbarity, told Colonel Wallace that if this story were true, he would, the instant he laid hands on Tippoo, deliver him over to the grenadiers of the 33rd regiment, to be by them tried for the cold-blooded, atrocious murder of their comrades. Though all firing had ceased from the works, resistance continued to be made from the palace, wherein the utmost confusion prevailed; for the family of the Sultaun knew not what had befallen him since he left them. A report had indeed

been brought to the palace that he was slain; but the tyrant was nowhere more dreaded than in his own family, and whilst uncertain as to his fate, none dared to open the gates of the palace. Moreover, his sons and all within that strong edifice feared a dreadful retaliation from the British soldiers, for, what was doubtful to General Baird was not so to them—they knew that the grenadiers of the 33rd regiment had been murdered. The 33rd regiment was now drawn up opposite to the gate of the palace, prepared either to storm the walls or to take peaceful possession. General Baird deputed Major Allan, a brave and humane officer, to parley with those within, and to offer them their lives provided they did not make any further resistance. Major Allan fastened a white cloth on a serjeant's pike, and proceeded to the palace, where he found several of Tippoo's people collected in a balcony, apparently in the greatest consternation. He delivered General Baird's message, and in a short time an officer of consequence and a confidential servant came over the terrace of the front building, and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They were greatly embarrassed, and appeared inclined to create delays, probably with a view of effecting their escape as soon as the darkness of night should offer them a chance. Major Allan pointed out the danger of their situation, and the necessity of coming to an immediate determination: he pledged himself for their protection, and proposed that they should allow him to go into the palace with them, that he might in person give these assurances to the Sultaun. They were very averse to this proposal, but the Major positively insisted on going into the palace with them, and they yielded. The Major took with him only Captain Scobey, who spoke the native languages with great fluency, and Captain Hastings Fraser. They ascended by the broken wall, and lowered themselves down on a terrace, where a large body of armed men was assembled. Major Allan explained to them that the flag, or the white cloth at the head of the pike, which he held in his hand was a pledge of truce and security, provided they made no resistance; and the stronger to impress them with this notion, he took off his sword, and insisted on their receiving it. The killedar and many others affirmed that the princes and the family of Tippoo were in the palace, but not the Sultaun. They were all greatly alarmed, but they seemed averse to come to any decision, being still uncertain whether their master were dead or alive. The Major told them that delay might be attended with dreadful consequences; that he could not answer for the conduct of the troops by whom the palace was surrounded, and whose fury was with difficulty restrained. They then left him, and shortly after he observed people moving hastily backwards and forwards in the interior of the palace. Major Allan and his two companions now began to think their situation rather critical. The Major was advised to take back his sword, "but," adds this modest and gallant officer, "such an act on my part, by exciting their distrust, might have kindled a flame which, in the present temper of the troops, might have been attended with the most dreadful consequences—probably the massacre of every soul within the palace walls." The armed people that remained on the terrace begged him to hold up his flag of truce in a conspicuous position, in order to give confidence to those in the palace, and prevent our troops from forcing the gates. Growing impatient at these delays, Major Allan sent another message to the princes, warning them that their situation was critical, and that his time was limited. Tippoo's sons answered that they would receive him as soon as a carpet could be spread; and presently the killedar came and conducted the Major to two of the princes, whom he found seated on a carpet surrounded by a great many attendants. They desired him to sit down on the carpet, which he did, in front of them. "The recollection of Moize-ud-Deen," says the kind-hearted Major, "whom, on a former occasion, I had seen delivered up with his brother, hostages to Marquess Cornwallis, the sad reverse of their fortunes, their fear, which, notwithstanding their struggles to conceal, was but too evident, excited the strongest emotions of compassion in my mind. I took Moize-

ud-Deen by the hand, and endeavoured by every mode in my power to remove his fears, and to persuade him that no violence should be offered to him or his brother, or to any person in the palace. I then entreated him, as the only means to preserve his father's life, whose escape was impracticable, to inform me of the spot where he was concealed." Major Allan evidently believed that Tippoo was hidden in some part of the palace. Moize-ud-Deen, after some conversation apart with his attendants, solemnly assured him that the Padishah was not in the palace. The Major then requested him to allow the gates to be opened. All were in an agony of alarm at this proposal; the princes were reluctant to take such a step without the authority of their father, to whom they desired to send some messenger or messengers. Allan, who well knew that if the gates were not opened soon the palace would be stormed and a scene of carnage ensue, reasoned calmly and kindly with them; and at last, upon his promising that he would post a guard of their own Mysorean sepoys within, and a party of Europeans on the outside, that no person should enter the palace but by his authority, and that he would return and remain at the gate until General Baird arrived, they assented, and seemed to rely with confidence on the Major's good faith. On opening the gate of the palace, Major Allan found General Baird and several superior officers already there, with the large body of troops which had assembled in front of the gate. The Major returned into the interior of the palace with Colonel Close for the purpose of bringing the princes to the general. "We had," he says, "some difficulty in conquering the alarms and objections which they raised to quitting the palace; but they at length permitted us to conduct them to the gate. The indignation of General Baird was justly excited by a report which had reached him soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege; this was heightened probably by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings during more than three years' imprisonment in this very place: he was, nevertheless, sensibly affected by the sight of the princes, and his gallantry on the assault was not more conspicuous than the moderation and humanity which he displayed on this occasion." Having received the sons of Tippoo with every mark of respect, and having repeatedly assured them that no violence or insult should be offered to them, Baird gave them in charge to Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew and Captain Marriott, by whom they were conducted to head-quarters in camp, escorted by the light company of the 33rd regiment.*

General Baird now determined to search the most retired parts of the palace, in the hope of finding Tippoo. He ordered the light company of the 74th regiment, followed by others, to enter the palace-yard. Tippoo's troops within the palace were immediately disarmed; and the English proceeded to make the search through many of the apartments. Major Allan now entreated the killedar, if he had any regard for his own life or for the life of his Sultaun, to inform him where he was concealed. The killedar put his hand upon the hilt of the Major's sword, and in the most solemn manner protested that the Sultaun was not in the palace; that he had been wounded during the storm, and was lying in a gateway on the north face of the fort. Thither he offered to conduct the English, declaring that if it should be found that he had deceived them, the general might inflict on him what punishment he pleased. Upon hearing this report, General Baird, and Colonel Wellesley, who had come up from the trenches some time before, proceeded to the gateway, guided by the killedar, and followed by many officers and soldiers. The gateway was the identical sallyport through which Tippoo had been seen attempting to pass into the fort, and in which he had sustained the double fire. The shots which had laid him low had proceeded from that part of the 12th regiment which, by disobeying orders, had found themselves on the inner side of the gate, and in a condition to head him back.

* As the princes passed, the troops were ordered to pay them the compliment of presenting arms.

The gateway, arched overhead, was long and dark, and was obstructed with many hundreds of dead bodies. "The number of the dead, and the darkness of the place," says Major Allan, "made it difficult to distinguish one person from another, and the scene was altogether shocking. But, aware of the great political importance of ascertaining, beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the bodies were ordered to be dragged out, and the killedar and two other persons were desired to examine them one after another. This, however, appeared endless; and as it was now becoming dark, a light was procured, and I accompanied the killedar into the gateway. During the search we discovered a wounded person lying under the Sultaun's palanquin: this man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah Khan, one of Tippoo's confidential servants. He had attended his master during the whole of the day, and on being made acquainted with the object of our search, pointed out the spot where the Sultaun had fallen. By a faint glimmering light it was difficult for the killedar to recognise the features, but the body being brought out, and satisfactorily proved to be that of the Sultaun, was conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where it was again recognised by the eunuchs and other servants of the family. When Tippoo was first brought from under the gateway, his eyes were open, and the body was so warm, that for a few moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive. On feeling his pulse and heart, that doubt was removed. He had four wounds, three in the body, and one in the temple." *

When the assault commenced, Tippoo was closeted with his priests, conjurors, and astrologers. "I will go," said Seyed Ghoffar, "and drag him to the breach, and make him see by what a set of wretches he is surrounded. I will compel him to exert himself at this last moment!" He was going to the Sultaun, when a cannon-ball killed him. The storm was now too loud to admit of any doubt as to the English attacking by daylight, and while Tippoo was finishing his midday repast he received intelligence that Seyed Ghoffar was killed, and the enemy coming through the breach. He then hurried to the ramparts, to retreat thence and to find his end. At the sight of the dead body of his father, Tippoo's eldest son, who possibly expected to be raised to the musnud in his stead, displayed a brutal apathy, but two of his younger sons showed very affecting indications of grief. The Sultaun was born in 1753, and was therefore in his 47th year when he died.

The loss sustained during the storm was found to be greater than had been anticipated. During the whole of the siege and assault, from the 4th of April to the 4th of May inclusive, 22 officers were killed and 45 wounded; 181 British soldiers were killed and 622 wounded; while the loss of the native soldiers was 119 killed and 420 wounded. On the 4th of May, when the storm was made, Tippoo's forces consisted of 48,000 men, of whom about 22,000 were either in the fort or in the dependent entrenchments of Seringapatam. Counting natives and all classes of troops, General Harris had never more than 20,000 men actually occupied in the siege; and the two divisions which carried the place did not count many more than 4000 men.

As soon as the fact of Tippoo's death had been fully ascertained, General Baird directed Major Beatson to communicate to the commander-in-chief, General Harris, that himself and the storming-party might be relieved that night, as they were much

* Major Allan's own account, as given by Colonel Beatson, in Narrative of the Operations of the Army under Lieutenant-General Harris, and of the siege of Seringapatam.

"His dress," says Allan, "consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, with a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist; a handsome pouch, with a red and green silk belt hung across his shoulder; his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of his fall. He had an amulet on his arm, but no ornament whatever.

"Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders, and a short thick neck; but his feet and hands were remarkably small. His complexion was rather dark, his eyes large and prominent, with small arched eyebrows, and his nose aquiline. He had an appearance of dignity, or perhaps of sternness, in his countenance, which distinguished him above the common order of people."

fatigued with the labours of that important day. It is usual to relieve storming-parties as soon as possible after a place has been taken; and among several important reasons for this usage is the consideration that fresh troops, who have not been exposed to the horrors of assault, and whose blood has not been inflamed by seeing their comrades fall by their sides, are less likely to commit excesses in the town than the men who have been so exposed. When Major Beatson repaired to head-quarters, General Harris directed the deputy adjutant-general, who was sitting in his tent, to put the officer next for duty under orders to relieve Major-General Baird. Colonel Wellesley, being next on the roster, was accordingly ordered on the same night to take the command within the fort and town. The troops, however, were not relieved until the evening of the 5th or the morning of the 6th of May; and the storming-party, in possession, committed many excesses, plundering some of the houses of the rich natives and setting fire to others.

The body of Tippoo Sultaun was buried, with military honours, on the 5th of May, the day after his death, in the superb mausoleum of Lall Bang, which he had erected to his father, Hyder Ali. A violent storm of thunder and lightning, which killed several Europeans and natives, gave an awful interest to these last and solemn rites.* A cauzee, or ulema, chanted some verses from the Koran, which were repeated by the attendants. The British Grenadiers formed a street, and presented arms. The burial service having been performed, a keenaut, or charitable gift of 5000 rupees, was distributed by the cauzee to the fakeers and the poor who attended the funeral.† This was all strictly conformable to the Mohammedan religion; and, monster though he had been, Tippoo had ever professed himself a devout Mussulman, and had ever been most scrupulous in outward observances. No doubt was left as to his having inhumanly murdered the English prisoners taken on the night of the unfortunate Sultaun-Pettah Tope affair. A peon having undertaken to show where those poor fellows were buried, Colonel Wellesley sent some of the officers of his regiment to the spot; and upon the exhumation of one of the bodies, it was identified by these officers as that of one of the grenadiers of the 33rd. It appeared that these unfortunate captives had been murdered at night in parties of two or three; and that the mode of killing them had been by twisting their heads round their shoulders, and thus breaking their necks. Black as was the deed, it was merciful in comparison with some which he had committed on the English fifteen years ago. Everywhere within and about the palace evidence met the eye or ear of his depraved and sanguinary tastes. His name meant tiger; he called his soldiers his tigers of war; and the tigers of the Indian jungles were his pets, and often his executioners—for the attendant that offended him, or the prisoner that was brought into his presence, was not unfrequently turned into a barred room, or large cage, where the savage animals were let loose upon him. Near the door of his treasury an enormous tiger had been found chained. There were other tigers in the edifice, and so numerous as to give some trouble to Colonel Wellesley.* The history and character of the son of Hyder were, in a manner, told by the barbarous big toy which was invented for his amusement, which was found in his palace, and which may now be seen in the library of the East India House, Leadenhall Street. This rude automaton is a tiger killing and about to devour a European, who lies prostrate under the savage beast. In the interior of the tiger there is a rude kind of organ, played upon by turning a handle, like our street hand-organs; and the notes produced are intended to represent the growls of the

* Lushington; Colonel Beatson.
† Beatson.

* They became the subject of a postscript to the first letter written by Colonel Wellesley to his commander-in-chief after succeeding Baird in the command within the town and fort.

"There are some tigers here," says the Colonel, "which I wish Meer Alum would send for; or else I must give orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, and they are getting violent."—*Wellington Dispatches.*

tiger and the moans of the dying man.* Other toys indicative of the same tastes were found in Tippoo's dwelling; and in nearly every ornament the figure of the tiger was repeated. Upon his harem being counted, it was found to contain no fewer than 600 women!

There needed no such evidence, the facts being all notorious and previously authenticated; but there were found in his cabinets copies of the correspondence which had passed between him and the French Directory; his intended plan of co-operation with Bonaparte and the French army in Egypt; copies of his correspondence with Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul, with the Mahrattas, and with other Indian powers, for the avowed purpose of forming a league strong enough to drive the English out of every part of India. This active correspondence had been set on foot during the pacific administration of Sir John Shore, and during the prevalence of the notion that our Indian empire might be preserved as it was by a forbearing and non-interfering policy. Nearly every line of these papers, and nearly every fact that was known of the character of Tippoo, went to confirm the conviction that his political existence was incompatible with the tranquillity and safety not only of our possessions, but also of the greater part of the rest of India; and the arguments which have been urged to show that the English ought not to have invaded his dominions or to interfere in his concerns, go to prove the corollary that the English must have been compelled to quit and lose for ever their empire in the East. The treasure discovered amounted, in specie and in jewels, to about 1,000,000*l.* sterling, the whole of which was, by order of the governor-general and council, distributed to the army. The whole of Tippoo's family was soon in the hands of the conquerors. On the day after the capture of Seringapatam, Abdul Khalif, the elder of the princes formerly hostages with Lord Cornwallis, surrendered at our outposts, supplicating for protection. Kereen Saheb, the brother of Tippoo, had before this sought refuge with our ally, Meer Alum. A passport was despatched to Futteh Hyder, the eldest of all Tippoo's sons; and he was invited to join his brothers. Most of the Sultaun's principal officers came in voluntarily in the course of a few days, and submitted to the English without any other condition than that they should be preserved in their titles and estates. This was the case with Meer Cummur-ud-Deen Khan, who had four thousand horse under his command. M. Chapuis and most of the other Frenchmen were made prisoners. They had regular commissions from the French government.*

In the meanwhile Colonel Wellesley, who had been sent to relieve General Baird, had exerted himself to the utmost to put an end to those excesses which had commenced as soon as Seringapatam was taken, and which almost invariably and unavoidably attend the capture of a place by storm. He caused cowle flags to be hoisted in different parts of the town, and public notice to be given that severe examples would be made of any soldiers or other persons detected in the act of plundering the houses or molesting the inhabitants; he called upon General Harris to send him the provost-marshal. "Until some of the plunderers are hanged," said he on the afternoon of the 5th, "it is vain to expect to stop the plunder." Four marauders were brought to a drumhead trial, and handed over to the provost-marshal; and after they had been executed within view of the whole city, the plundering ceased, and tranquillity began to be restored. These examples, and the personal activity of Colonel Wellesley, who went to the houses of the principal inhabitants with safeguards, soon inspired a general confidence. The inhabitants, who had quitted the town during the storm, or during the perilous night which followed it, and who had slept in the open fields, returned to their houses and ordinary occupations. The bazaars were soon

* By the frequent grinding of the curious, this Mysorean instrument has been sadly deranged and almost worn out. The tiger no longer growls as it used to do, and the man moans but very feebly, as the paw of the beast is alternately placed on his mouth and removed from it.

* Letters, Memoranda, &c. of General Harris, in Life by Lushington; Marquess Wellesley, 'Dispatches,' &c.

stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which the native traders found a ready and profitable sale, as the conquering army was in want of almost everything. Three days after the capture of the fortress, the main streets of Seringapatam were so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited rather the appearance of a fair than that of a town just taken by assault. On the 6th Colonel Wellesley represented to the commander-in-chief that it was absolutely necessary that he should immediately appoint a permanent garrison and a commanding-officer to the place; as, until that was done, the people could have no confidence, and everything must be in confusion. "That which I arrange this day," said he, "my successor may alter to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which should be likely to remain here would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in; but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants."* General Harris lost no time in carrying into effect this wise recommendation. He forthwith directed a regular permanent garrison for Seringapatam, and appointed Colonel Wellesley to the command of it. The wise plan was Wellesley's own, and not the plan of General Baird, who had begged to be relieved; and General Harris besides felt satisfied that he could not intrust the complicated and delicate duties of a civil and political, as well as of a military nature, to any officer better qualified than Wellesley, whose business talents had become conspicuous the moment he arrived in India. The sudden and complete dissolution of Tippoo's government, and the dispersion of all the public functionaries, required that the governor of Seringapatam should be a good administrator, and as much a statesman as soldier. Whether the appointment of this young colonel to be governor of Serigapatam, and afterwards of the whole of Mysore, was a departure from the strict line of military routine, or an act of favour to him, and of injustice to Major-General Baird, is still warmly disputed; but no one, either now, or even at the time when the appointment took place, seems to doubt that of all the officers in General Harris's army Wellesley was the best qualified to do all the difficult offices of the situation.

Even before the reduction of Tippoo's capital and stronghold, the greater part of his inferior fortresses were taken by the corps under Colonels Read and Brown. It should appear that the tardiness with which the supplies were sent up to the grand army through the Caverypooram pass, was in part owing to the anxiety of these two active and able officers to make conquests, and to leave nothing in their rear. Colonel Read began by reducing the country north of Rayacottah; Colonel Brown began with the siege of Caroor, which he took on the 5th of April; and he was proposing to carry all the remaining fortresses in Coimbatoor, when he was earnestly summoned to join Read, and when both were made sensible of the necessity of advancing, without loss of time, to the Caverypooram pass. The fort which guarded that pass surrendered to Read on the 22nd of April; but it was the 6th of May, or two days after Seringapatam had been stormed, ere the brinjarries, or corn-carriers, and the other supplies, could be got through the steep pass, where some of Tippoo's people had collected. On the open country, beyond the ghaut, Colonel Read met General Floyd, who had been detached from the siege, with nearly all the cavalry of the allies, to cover the march of the convoy. At the same point Colonel Brown came up and formed his junction. The mass of Tippoo's cavalry had followed General Floyd from the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and were close upon him and the convoy on the 7th of May; but they did not hazard any attack, probably because they knew that their capital-city was taken and that their Sultaun was no more.

* *Wellington Dispatches.* In the same letter to his commander-in-chief—dated on the 6th of May, or the second day after the storm—Colonel Wellesley says, "Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers."

As soon as the departing monsoon permitted our troops to take the field again, the reduction of other fortresses in Tippoo's kingdom was commenced with great spirit. On the coast of Malabar, where the nairs and all the Hindu natives co-operated heart and hand with the English, and reeked their vengeance on the Mohammedan Mysoreans,* hardly any difficulties were encountered. The important fortress of Chitteldroog, where General Mathews and other English prisoners had been confined and barbarously treated in 1783, surrendered early in July to a small detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple. In every part of Mysore, or of the country which had been united into one kingdom by Hyder Ali, the Hindu population was very numerous and exceedingly well affected to the English, under whose rule they well knew they would be allowed the free exercise of their religion. Even the Mohammedan portion of the inhabitants submitted tranquilly to their destiny and to the conquerors, and no obstacle remained to the general tranquillity except some disturbances excited in Bednore by a celebrated robber-chief named Dhoondiah Waugh. This man, a Patan, or of Mahratta origin, had served in the armies of Hyder and Tippoo. He had deserted during the war with Lord Cornwallis, and had placed himself at the head of a fierce body of banditti in the wild country near the Toombudra river. Tippoo had induced him by fine promises to give up his predatory occupations and return to his service, and had then immured him in a dungeon at Seringapatam. On the day of the assault of that city he was imprudently released by some of our soldiers, together with other prisoners who might claim a better right to their liberty. Shaking the dust of Seringapatam from his sandals, Dhoondiah immediately returned to his old avocations of plunder and murder. He was joined by some of his old associates and by some of Tippoo's disbanded cavalry: and some of the civil and military servants of the sultaun's overthrown government put a few of the principal places of Bednore into the possession of the robber, before General Harris could send a sufficient force into that fertile country. But as soon as the commander-in-chief could leave Seringapatam he went to Chitteldroog, and detached Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple and Colonel Stevenson into Bednore with some light infantry and some light horse. By the middle of August the banditti were cut up or were driven from the country, in which they had committed every atrocity. Dhoondiah escaped in a boat, and took shelter in the Mahratta territory, the frontier of which the governor-general would not at present allow to be violated. Dhoondiah therefore re-appeared in the field of carnage a short time afterwards. Colonel Stevenson occupied the towns and forts of Bednore, Droog, and all the other important stations; and the whole country began speedily to recover from the effects of the late atrocities and devastations. On leaving the command of all the troops serving in Mysore and its dependencies, and on hastening back to Madras to meet the governor-general, who had remained at that presidency to be near at

* The Hindu chiefs had been driven frantic by the intolerance of Tippoo, and by the means to which he had resorted for converting them all to his own religion. They had not all waited for the return of the English to gratify their vengeance. Even women had inflicted awful blows. At a later period the widow of a nair, who had been destroyed by Tippoo, waited upon Colonel Wilks, and among other adventures and acts of revenge related the following: — "Tippoo's aumil, who polluted the mansion of my lost husband and son, wanted iron, and determined to supply himself from the Rut" (a temple of carved wood fixed on wheels, drawn in procession on public occasions, and requiring many thousand persons to effect its movement). "It was too much trouble to take it to pieces, and the wretch burned it in the square of the great temple, for the sake of the iron. On hearing of this abomination I secretly collected my men; I entered the town by night; I seized him and tied him to a stake, and" (bursting into tears and an agony of exultation) "I burned the monster on the spot where he had wantonly insulted and consumed the sacred emblems of my religion."—*Sketches of the South of India.*

This country had never been tranquil under Tippoo. In one of his compositions the Sultaun said:—"As the rainy season lasts six months, and mud continues throughout the year, the roads are excessively difficult, and the inhabitants prone to resistance, dividing their time between agriculture and arms. Such is the excess of infidelity, that if a Mussulman touch the exterior wall of a house, the dwelling can only be purified by setting it on fire."—*Id.*

hand as long as the war lasted, General Harris wrote to a friend:—"In seven months' absence from Madras, we not only took the capital of that enemy, who, as you observe, should never have been left the power of being troublesome, but marched to the northern extent of his empire, and left it in so settled a state that I journeyed from the banks of the Toombudra, 300 miles across, in my palanquin, without a single soldier as escort, except, indeed, at many places, the polygars and peons of the country, who insisted on being my guard through their respective districts. This was a kind of triumphal journey I did not dream of when setting off. A conquest so complete in all its effects has seldom been known."*

The Earl of Mornington had resolved that what had been gained should be kept; that no portion of the sovereignty conquered from Tippoo should be restored to any member of his family or to any chief of his race. With the concurrence of the British government the splendid conquest was divided between the Company, their now confirmed and obedient ally the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Mahrattas, a small portion being reserved for the direct male descendants of the ancient Hindu Rajahs of Mysore, who had been conquered and dispossessed by Hyder Ali. The portion taken by the English was such as would give strength to their frontiers, security and continuity to their communications, and a barrier against French invasion on the Malabar coast. The annexation gave an entirely new form and consistency to our empire in the south of India. All the territory which had been possessed by the Mysorean sultauns on the Malabar coast, the district of Coimbatoor, with the populous town of Daraporam, the whole of the country, at the southern end of the vast peninsula, which intervened between the Company's territories on the eastern or Coromandel coast and their territories on the western or Malabar coast, yielding an uninterrupted dominion from sea to sea; the forts and posts on the ghauts or principal passes leading to the high table-land of Mysore, the district of Wynaad above the ghauts, and the fortress, city, and island of Seringapatam were assumed by the Company. The possession of Seringapatam was deemed essential to secure fully the communication between the two coasts, and to connect the different lines of defence. There were sixty ghauts or passes through the mountains, several of which were practicable for armies, and two-thirds of which were sufficiently open to allow the incursions of cavalry.* By holding possession of them, all the Carnatic was secured against those ruinous irruptions from which it had so often suffered, and the low country on the Malabar coast was equally secured. The districts of Gurrumcondah, Gooty, and others contiguous to his dominions were assigned to the Nizam; and the revenue of these territories nearly equalled that of the country which the English took for themselves; but the line of partition was so drawn as to leave all the principal fortresses and posts to the Company. The Peishwa of the Mahrattas had engaged in the governor-general's alliance against Tippoo, but had neither taken the field nor sent any assistance. It entered, however, into the present policy of Lord Mornington to be liberal in the distribution of the spoils, and to conciliate the Peishwa by overlooking his breach of agreement and giving him a part of those spoils. And accordingly Harpounelly, Soondah, Annagoondy, and other districts contiguous to the possessions of the Peishwa, including part of the territory, but not the fortresses of Chitteldroog and Bednore, were ceded to that prince. All these districts were considered worth rather more than one-half of the portion allotted to the Company, or the portion allotted to the Nizam. But as the cession could only be considered as a favour, the Peishwa having done nothing to earn it, Lord Mornington did not make it unconditionally; he made it form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire; and in the event of the Peishwa not acceding to the treaty, the territories reserved for him were to be divided between the

* Letter to Sir W. Medows, as quoted by Mr. Lushington, Life of Gen. Lord Harris.

* Colonel Beatson.

Nizam and the Company. The governor-general stated in his despatches the many and urgent reasons which led him to determine upon the restoration of the ancient Hindu dynasty of Mysore to a portion of the dismembered empire of Tippoo. Strong considerations of policy forbade the re-elevation of the family of Hyder Ali. They had all been brought up in hereditary hatred of the English; and they could not, under any arrangement, be expected to forget the great powers and independence from which they had fallen. "Nor does it seem unreasonable to suppose," wrote his lordship, "that the heir of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the implacable spirit of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire, which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic and the terror of this quarter of India." On the other hand, the indignities which the family of the ancient Hindu rajahs of the country had suffered, especially during the cruel and tyrannical reign of Tippoo, and the state of degradation and misery to which they had been reduced, might naturally be expected to excite a sentiment of gratitude and attachment in their minds towards that power which should not only deliver them from oppression, but also raise them to a state of considerable affluence and distinction. Between the British government and this family an intercourse of friendship and kindness had once subsisted; and in the most desperate crisis of their fortune they had formed no connection with the French or with any of our enemies. Under the pacific, the friendly, and dependent representative of the old Hindu line of princes, the interest and resources of the country might be absolutely identified with our own; and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity or alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier for our defence and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies. Maha Raja Krishna Udiaver, a boy only six years old, was the lineal descendant of the ancient family, whose power Hyder Ali had usurped in the year 1761. He was now raised to the throne of his ancestors; and Purneah, a Brahmin of great ability, who had been chief finance minister to Tippoo, was appointed dewan or chief minister to the young prince. The territory ceded to Krishna yielded thirteen lacs of pagodas, a revenue greater than that of the ancient rajahship of Mysore. It was completely surrounded by the districts and fortresses which the English took to themselves, and which were garrisoned by British troops and by sepoys in the pay of the Company. One strong line of forts protected the rajahship from the Mahrattas, whose incursions were most to be apprehended. But in matter of fact the sovereignty of the rajahship, equally with its defence, was vested in the Company. It was provided by treaty that the whole of the military force in the country should be English; that the rajah should pay annually seven lacs of pagodas; that in case of war any larger sum might be exacted which should be deemed proportionate to the resources of the rajah or of the country; and that, in case of any misgovernment by the rajah, the British government might interfere. The city of Mysore, the ancient capital of the country, which Tippoo had dismantled in order to give strength, extension, and magnificence to Seringapatam, was fixed upon for the residence of the infant rajah and his court. A curious example was given of the vicissitude in human affairs. Tippoo, in 1784, had levelled with the ground an ancient fort at Mysore, and had carried away the materials to build a new fort, which he named "Nezerbar," or "The place visited by the eye of the Almighty:" now this fort was destroyed in its turn, and the materials were carried back to the town of Mysore, to rebuild the old fort.*

The family of Tippoo Sultaun became state prisoners, but they had enjoyed little liberty under the jealous tyrant, and never were state prisoners treated more

* Colonel Wilks.

kindly than they now were by the English. They were conveyed from Seringapatam to Vellore in the Carnatic; where excellent accommodations were prepared for them, liberal pensions assigned for their support (their allowance was more liberal than that which they had received from Tippoo), and every attention and indulgence shown which could be rendered compatible with the object of preventing their escape from that fortress. Every step was taken by Lord Mornington that might tend to reconcile the family, adherents, and servants of the late sultaun to the new political arrangement.

The territory conquered from Tippoo, and annexed, covertly or openly, to the Company, exceeded in dimension 20,000 square miles. The revenue immediately obtained by the Company was very large, and was chiefly drawn from countries which wanted nothing but tranquillity and security to be enabled to pay, with perfect ease, taxes far more considerable than those they now paid. When all the great business was completed, the governor-general, who had animated all the agents employed in it, returned from Madras to Calcutta.*

* Marquess Wellesley, 'Dispatches,' &c.

CHAPTER IV.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUESS WELLESLEY CONTINUED.

Among the important services rendered by General Wellesley to the people of Mysore and of the neighbouring countries, were the destruction of the famed robber Dhoondiah Waugh, and the dispersion of his band. These operations cost to the General more trouble and exertion and more personal danger than many of his campaigns against regular armies. It has been mentioned how that chief of banditti was released from prison at the capture of Seringapatam, and how, after committing terrible depredations and atrocities in Bednore, he had effected his escape into the Mahratta territory. He kept his band together, and was soon heard of again in Mysore. In February, 1800, a fellow waited upon General Wellesley at Seringapatam, and informed him that he had come from the Mahratta country as far as Toomkoor, with a gang employed by Dhoondiah to carry him off when he should go out hunting. The fellow further said that Dhoondiah was proposing to collect a large gang of robbers in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and to join them himself. In order to prove to the robber how little he feared his gang, the General went out hunting as usual on the morrow; but he desired his friend, the Minion of the Moon, to join his gang again, and promised him a good reward if he would enable him to lay his hands upon them. On the following morning the robber waited upon Mr. Barclay, an English officer at Seringapatam, and repeated his story, with solemn assurances of its truth. He added, what he had only hinted at to General Wellesley, that Dhoondiah and his gang had some designs upon the city of Mysore, the ancient capital of the country, to which the partially restored Rajah and his family had been removed. As nothing could be more unpleasant than any accident to this ancient family, which was now living under British protection, Wellesley apprised the officer in command at that city of the intelligence which he had received, desiring him, at the same time, to be cautious to do nothing which could in the smallest degree alarm the Rajah and his relatives.* While he was hunting this morning, one of Wellesley's aides-de-camp thought that he saw some twenty men on horseback lurking about the jungles. Wellesley did not see anything of them, but he thought if they were really there, and his friend the informer proved true to him, that he would have them all that night. On the following day he heard from the officer at Mysore that there had been for some days a bazaar report of a vagabond party of cavalry belonging to Dhoondiah being in the country; but nothing further was heard of these robbers until three days had past. Then, on the 8th of February, 1800, the informer came again to Wellesley, and gave information that a party was at Coorghelly, about three coss, or six miles, beyond Nunjuncode, and that other parties were in different villages, and in the jungles between Nunjuncode and Coorghelly; that four sirdars were with their followers and baggage, and he believed the treasure, at Nunjuncode, in a large house in the fort, inhabited by a Mussulman whose brother was one of the banditti; that the Mussulman owner of the house was the man who had charge of Dhoondiah when he was Tippoo Sultaun's prisoner; that, besides these parties, there was another at a village near the town of Mysore, and another small party upon the island of Seringapatam, near the

* Wellington Dispatches.

Chendgal fort. It was supposed that other small bands were lurking in different villages, and that all the parties were regulated by Dhoondiah, or by some friend of his living in Seringapatam. Captain Robertson, who was detached by night with fifty men, captured the four sirdars and their people at Nunjuncode; and the party on the island of Seringapatam was seized on the same night. They all denied the truth of the charge which had been brought against them, and declared that they had been living peaceably in the villages where they had been arrested ever since the fall of Seringapatam. Two other parties were also taken, who persisted in telling the same story. The native witnesses prevaricated as usual, some of them swearing one thing on one day and another on the next. But as the informer persisted in his story, identified the persons of most of the people arrested, repeated the charge before them, gave a clear and consistent narrative, and went well through the ordeal of cross-examination, it was deemed prudent to detain the people for some time. In the end, some of the men arrested were soundly flogged, and all of them were sent about their business, it not being found easy to identify them with Dhoondiah, and that chief not being heard of anywhere in the country. Of other bands of robbers and murderers there was no lack in Mysore. It seems to be generally admitted that the monstrous system of the Thugs took a rapid growth at this period, and that it attained to its greatest height between the year 1799, when the kingdom of Tippoo was broken up, and the year 1825. Against an association so mysterious, so persevering, and hellish as that of the Thugs, neither troops nor police could do much; but the other bands of open and avowed robbers were hunted down by some of the Mysoreans, supported by detachments of the Company's infantry. Of the men caught, some were hanged, and some severely punished. In the month of April (1800), when Wellesley was absent on the Malabar coast, and thinking of very different business, Dhoondiah raised his head again, appeared on the frontier of Mysore, stormed and took two or three towns, and began to settle the country as if it were a permanent conquest. He had taken to himself the title of "King of the Two Worlds," and he considered himself as good as de facto king of a large part of the Indian world. Numerous bands must have joined him, for he threatened Mysore and the Malabar country at one and the same time. He was kept in check by the rapid advance of some British detachments; but in the month of May he excited considerable alarm by means of his intrigues with the discontented remnant of Tippoo's party, with the Polygars and Nairs of the Malabar country, and with all the Company's most turbulent subjects. Everywhere his name was made use of to create disturbances. It thus became the more incumbent upon our government to get the better of him, to destroy him and his gangs, or to drive him far from our frontiers. Colonel Stevenson discovered that Dhoondiah was endeavouring to raise men at Chitteldroog, a very populous town in the Mysore Rajah's dominions, many of the inhabitants of which had been heretofore sepoys and peons in the service of Tippoo; and another English officer discovered that the robbers were raising horse and enrolling men in other parts of the country, and attempting to seduce the Company's sepoys. At the end of May, when Wellesley had collected his troops, he wrote to his brother the governor-general, —"Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy, but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country, and of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be given up to us; and I doubt not that before now you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's government; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favourable to their views.

The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Mahrattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this one object."* It was clear that if these robbers crossed the Toombudra river, such an injury would be inflicted on Mysore as would require years to remedy it. Wellesley therefore declined the popularity and the profit of an expedition to the island of Batavia, which the governor-general proposed to him in company with Admiral Rainier and the fleet, declaring that, if Dhoondiah were not previously disposed of, no prospect of advantage or of credit to be gained should induce him to quit Mysore.† Dhoondiah had an asylum in the Mahratta country, and might be reckoned a part of the Mahratta state; but Wellesley recommended that the English should go through with the business until that man was given up, even though it were found necessary to cross the Mahratta frontier in pursuit of him, which could scarcely be done without risking a quarrel with the Peishwa or the court of Poonah. His brother, the governor-general, authorized him to enter the Mahratta territory, it being evident that the Peishwa was either unable or unwilling to put down the great depredator. Our troops had been already collected on the Toombudra, there being nothing effectual to be done towards destroying Dhoondiah or dispersing his force without crossing that frontier river. Towards the end of June, Wellesley joined the troops, crossed the river, and proceeded in person against the freebooter. Some of the Mahratta chiefs, instead of resenting the infringement of their frontier, now took the field to cooperate with the English commander. But Dhoondiah and his light-footed bands moved from place to place with great rapidity, taking and plundering several towns, and distancing the British sepoys. On the 30th of June, the robbers defeated one of the Mahratta chiefs in a pitched battle. Goklah, the Mahratta chief, was killed in the affair; but the majority of his troops kept together, and seemed to be determined to continue their co-operation with the English. Proposals were made not only at the Nizam's court at Hyderabad, but also to Wellesley, to take off Dhoondiah by means of a plot and assassination. "Such an arrangement," said the British commander, "may suit very well at Hyderabad, but I think it unbecoming an officer at the head of a body of troops, and I, therefore, declined to have anything more to do with the business than to hold out a general encouragement. . . . . Government have authorized me to offer a reward for him, and I propose to avail myself of this authority as soon as he is at all pressed, and I find that his people begin to drop off from him. This will be, in my opinion, the fittest period. To offer a public reward by proclamation for a man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things: the one is to be done, the other, in my opinion, cannot, by an officer at the head of the troops."* Throwing a bridge over the river Werdah, and constructing a redoubt for its security, Wellesley stretched forward towards Hoondgul and Budnaghur, being joined on his route by a good many Mahrattas who had suffered severely from Dhoondiah's rapacious and cruel banditti. That robber, however, was deemed so strong and so confident, that it was reported on the 11th of July, that he was coming down to meet the English force. "If he does come," said Wellesley, "I shall certainly dash at him immediately." And on the 13th, Dhoondiah came down with his whole army and his guns to within two coss of Wellesley's camp, then at Savanore. He examined the camp for some time from a hill, and then retired. On the morning of the 14th Wellesley threw his baggage into Savanore, and marched with five days' provisions, as light as possible, to Hoondgul. But Dhoondiah had flitted away to the jungles behind Dummul. He had, however, left a garrison of about

* Wellington Dispatches.

† Id.

* Wellington Dispatches.

600 men in Hoondgul, which was surrounded and stormed on the evening of the 14th, with but trifling loss to the Company's troops. On the 15th Wellesley marched about 17 miles to the eastward, to another Mahratta town which had been seized by the robbers, but which was evacuated. On the next day the British made another long march to another town, which Dhoondiah's bands had been besieging for some weeks in the country manner. The siege was raised, and the besiegers fled towards the hills and forests. For want of sufficient cavalry Wellesley could not pursue the fugitives; but Dhoondiah's people now began to desert him in numbers, and the government proclamation offering a reward of 30,000 rupees for his head was now issued. Moreover, another corps under Colonel Bowser was coming up in another direction, and Colonel Stevenson was marching against the robbers from another quarter. On the night of the 19th of July Wellesley was joined by Goklak's Mahratta cavalry, about 1000 strong; but unluckily the draught and carriage bullocks fell sick, and his progress was delayed by losing one half of them. The British commander was employed for some days in getting fresh cattle and arranging them in departments for the service of the army. Several times Dhoondiah was very near him, though he could not be seen. As soon as Wellesley was enabled to resume his march, he pressed forward for Dummul. This was a strong stone fort, well built, with a dry ditch. A garrison which Dhoondiah had left in it seemed disposed to offer a stout resistance, but on the morning of the 26th of July Wellesley stormed the fort in three places, and carried it with a trifling loss, which was chiefly attributable to the breaking of the scaling ladders. After this success he made three forced marches; and on the evening of the 30th of July he surprised an encampment and the main division of Dhoondiah's forces (which was then preparing to cross over the Malpoorba river), drove into the river or destroyed everybody that was in the camp, took an elephant, several camels, bullocks, horses innumerable, families, women, children, &c. The robber's guns were gone over. Wellesley made an attempt to dismount them by a fire from the opposite bank, but it was getting dark, the infantry were fatigued by the length and rapidity of their march,* and seeing that he could not succeed, he quietly withdrew his guns and men into the captured camp. Dhoondiah was believed not to have been with this part of his army; but Bubber Jung, one of his chief men, was in the camp, put on his armour of mail to fight, mounted his horse, and rode him into the river, where he was drowned. Great numbers met with the same fate. In all 5000 men were driven into the river or otherwise destroyed. On the next morning some English soldiers swam across the river, which was both broad and rapid, seized a boat, and got possession of the six guns on the opposite bank. Both boat and artillery were given to the Mahrattas to keep them in good humour. After this catastrophe Dhoondiah, with the whole of his remaining force, fled along the banks of the Malpoorba towards the jungles of Kittoor and Soonda. He could not cross the river for want of boats, and was thus ascending to its source. He was closely followed by the corps of Bowser and Stevenson, which had now come up; and Wellesley and his Mahratta allies moved on the flank of these corps, so as to sweep the whole country to the distance of 15 miles from the river, and prevent Dhoondiah from doubling on any of his pursuers or from gliding between them. "If he goes into the jungles," wrote Wellesley on the 3rd of August, "we will easily come up with his rear; if he takes to the plain I shall cross upon him with my detachment." The robbers moved so rapidly, that though Colonel Stevenson got close upon their tail, he could never cut it off: they went quite into the jungles, and beyond the sources of the Malpoorba, and then took to the country on the right bank of that river, and between it and the Gutpoorba. The transport of the guns and stores of a regular army by such a route

* The troops had been making forced marches every day since the 22nd of July; and on the 30th, the day on which they surprised the camp, they had marched twenty-six miles.

as Dhoondiah had taken must have been attended with great difficulties. Wellesley therefore preferred waiting till boats could be constructed, by which he could cross the river many miles below its source. A detachment from Colonel Stevenson's corps, however, still followed Dhoondiah's track, and found the road covered with dead camels, dead bullocks, and people. Colonel Bowser got across the Malpoorba, and advanced to Shahpoor, where he found sad evidence of the atrocities which had been committed by the flying robbers. Wellesley crossed the river on the 16th, "to give Dhoondiah one more run between the Gutpoorba and the Malpoorba." "I think," added he, "that I shall have a chance of picking up some baggage, &c.; but it is clear that I shall never catch him." Dhoondiah was now in a bad way, his people were starving and leaving him, and reproaching him with their misfortunes. He was retorting and telling them to give up their wives and daughters to the Europeans, whom they were afraid to fight. Even the Patans, the men of his own fierce race and tribe, and the hardiest and most brutal of all the adventurers in India, were leaving him fast. At this moment Wellesley had finished his arrangements so as to be able to press upon him in a few days, upon all points at once. Several forts were reduced along the banks of the Malpoorba, and the passes of the river most likely to be fordable were guarded by the Mahrattas. But in spite of every precaution Dhoondiah and his followers returned suddenly to the bank, crossed the Malpoorba, which had fallen earlier in the season than was usual, at a ford a little above its junction with the Kistna, and made off with all speed to throw themselves into the Deccan and ravage that country of our ally and dependant. The Mahrattas who had been placed at the ford would neither face nor follow the marauders, who left behind them a great quantity of provisions, arms, ammunition, &c. Ten thousand brinjarrees were also taken by Wellesley, who must have caught Dhoondiah on the bank of the river, if the Mahrattas at the ford had done their duty. These brinjarrees gave a curious account of Dhoondiah's system. They told the English commander, that the robber still had about 40,000 of their class in his interest, that nearly all the brinjarrees of this part of India and many on the Deccan were devoted to his service. Dhoondiah employed them and gave them the means of living and of making good profits in the following manner. When he approached a village or a town which was unprotected by a fort, he sent a body of horse and of brinjarrees to levy a contribution. He took to himself all the money he could get, and gave them at a certain low price all the grain and all the cattle they could find; and they afterwards re-sold the grain and cattle at such profits as his camp would afford. With a trade so profitable to themselves the brinjarrees shut their eyes to the devastations which Dhoondiah committed.

No time was lost in following the marauders. Crossing the Malpoorba at Jellahaul on the 3rd of September, Wellesley entered the Nizam's territory on the 5th. Colonel Stevenson and some Mahratta and Mogul cavalry followed, and stretched across the country in order to prevent a repetition of Dhoondiah's successful movement. On the 9th of September the robber moved from a camp which he had occupied for some days towards the Kistna; but on his road he discovered Colonel Stevenson's camp, which he could not hope to pass without fighting. He therefore returned by the way he had come, and encamped about nine miles in Wellesley's front, not knowing that that part of the pursuing army was so near him.* On the evening of the 10th of

* Dhoondiah had been misled by one of his own friends and spies. Of these he had many in the Nizam's country, the native country of thousands of the brinjarrees who had been following his camp. Not a few of the Nizam's own officers betrayed him, conveying information to the marauders, and doing all they could to mislead the English who were pursuing them. The killadar of Chinnoor, a place fifteen miles from the field of battle, wrote to the King of the Two Worlds, by a regular tappal established for the purpose of giving him intelligence, that Wellesley would be at Chinnoor on the 9th. "His majesty," adds Wellesley, "was misled by this information, and got nearer me than he expected. The honest killadar did all he could to detain me at Chinnoor; but I was not to be prevailed upon to stop, and even went so far as to threaten to hang a

September, Wellesley moved forward, and met Dhoondiah and his army at a place called Conahgul. Dhoondiah was then on his march and to the westward, apparently with the design of passing between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry, and the detachments under Wellesley, which last he supposed to be 15 miles off. Almost as soon as he was seen he was attacked by the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regiments of native cavalry. His entire force consisted of cavalry, apparently about 5000 strong: he was strongly posted with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgul. His people stood for some time with apparent firmness; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by our four regiments that all of them soon gave way, and were pursued across the country for many miles. In order to equalize the length of their line Wellesley had resorted to the bold expedient of forming his four regiments and charging in one line. Many of the marauders and Dhoondiah himself were killed: all the rest were dispersed and scattered in small parties over the face of the country.* Part of the baggage had been left in the camp in the rear, from which Dhoondiah had moved only an hour before the battle began. All this, with elephants, camels, &c., was captured by the English cavalry.† Among the baggage was found a son of Dhoondiah, a boy about four years old. He was conveyed to Wellesley's tent, where every care was taken of him. When Sir Arthur left India he placed in the hands of Colonel Symmonds, the judge and collector at Seringapatam, some hundred pounds for the use of the boy. When Colonel Symmonds retired from service the Honourable Arthur Cole, the resident at the court of Mysore, took charge of him, and placed him in the rajah's service. Salabut Khan, as he was named, grew up a fine, handsome, intelligent youth.*

Thus ended the dominion and career of the King of the Two Worlds. If he had not been checked in time he might have proved another Hyder Ali. In India as in Persia more than one dynasty had been founded by a robber chief. "Had you and your regicide army been out of the way," wrote Sir Thomas Munro to Wellesley, "Dhoondiah would undoubtedly have become an independent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new dynasty of cruel and treacherous Sultauns."†

The remnant of Dhoondiah's army was entirely cut up by Colonel Stevenson, as it was attempting to pass the Kistna river. Tranquillity was soon restored to Mysore, and to the whole of the Malabar country: mutiny and insurrection ceased, and no more robberies and murders were heard of, except such as were committed by the inscrutable Thugs.‡

It was the flourishing state of Mysore, and the ease with which its supplies and resources were brought forward for the use of the British armies, that enabled

great man who was sent to show me the road, and who manifested an inclination to show me a good road to a different place."—*Letter to Major Munro, written the day after the battle, in Wellington Dispatches.*

* Dhoondiah's body was found and recognised, and was brought to the camp on one of the guns attached to the 19th dragoons.

† Wellington Dispatches.

* He died of cholera in 1822. Wellington Dispatches.

† Gleig, Life of Sir Thomas Munro.

‡ During the war against Scindiah there sprang up a Perkin Warbeck or impostor Dhoondiah. This was a Mahratta freebooter, who assumed the character of a Fakir and the name of the dead robber, giving out that Dhoondiah had never been killed, or that he had come to life again in his person. Such characters were always sure of obtaining disciples. While the English troops were engaged in fighting or pursuing Scindiah, the new Dhoondiah grew very strong. He collected about 10,000 horse and Peon plunderers; crossed the Kistna in December, 1803, and proceeded towards the Toombudra and the Company's frontier, plundering, devastating, and murdering as he advanced. On the 28th of December Major-General Campbell went in pursuit of him with the cavalry and flank companies of the infantry of his division. After forced marches and a rapid and silent night march, Campbell caught the robber napping, in an encampment between Doodyhall and Moodianoor, dashed into the heart of the camp with the cavalry, killed 2000 on the spot, and wounded and took more than 1000. The rest threw down their arms, abandoned their booty, and fled. It was only to be regretted that 3000 of their horse, under Jittim Kakar, a well-known marauder, had gone off the day before on a plundering excursion towards Gajinder Ghur.—*Letter of Major-General Campbell in the Marquess Wellesley's Ind. Dispatches.*

Lake and Wellesley to carry on the war against Scindiah with so much spirit and success. The province of Bullum had never been effectually conquered, either by the English, or by the Mysorean Sultauns: the authority of Hyder Ali and of Tippoo had been extremely precarious, and the presence of an army had always been necessary to enforce the payment of the revenue. But in the course of the year 1801, military roads were opened through the forest towns by General Wellesley, and from that time no part of Mysore has been more tranquil than Bullum.

Soon after the annihilation of the 'King of the Two Worlds,' Colonel Wellesley was removed from Mysore, and sent with an expedition to the island of Ceylon. The object of this expedition was wholly different, and its destination strictly defined by his superiors in command, when a duplicate of a dispatch from London reached him at Trincomalee; announcing the bold plan of the British ministry to send an expedition from India, by the Red Sea, to support the expedition sent out from England under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, against Bonaparte and the French in Egypt. No sooner had Wellesley read this dispatch than he made up his mind, and knowing that his was the only disposable force, without orders or instructions, which it was impossible to obtain in time, but for acting without which he might, in the strictness of military discipline, have been cashiered, he proceeded to act on his own responsibility, and to remove the expedition under his command at once from Ceylon to Bombay, where it would be some thousand miles nearer to the Red Sea and Egypt. The whole of these operations afford honourable proofs of the Duke of Wellington's early abilities and decision of character. He fully expected to have the command of this Indian expedition to Egypt; but when he arrived at Bombay he found it was confided to his senior, Major-General Sir David Baird. This was apparently a severe disappointment. He says, however, and we have no inclination to call his word in doubt, that he would have accompanied Baird in a subordinate capacity but for an illness which obliged him to remain behind in India. In the event, all this, we think, proved to be part of his good luck. The great merit of the novel expedition from India to Egypt was in the conception, and that belonged neither to Wellesley nor to Baird. Before it reached Egypt the French were pretty well disposed of; and though admirably conducted and abounding in interest and instruction, it had no opportunity of striking a great blow. If Wellesley had gone with it he would have lost the much more instructive and decisive campaigns against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and the glory of the battle of Assaye, which first connected a *prestige* with his name, would (if indeed it had been fought at all) have belonged to another. Though he did not accompany General Baird, he gave him a copy of memoranda, which he had drawn up on the operations to be pursued on the Red Sea and in Egypt. This remarkable document shows what diligent attention he had paid to the subject—what exact information about Egypt—the policy of the Mameluke beys—the real situation and prospects of the French, &c. &c.—he had managed to obtain even while acting on such a remote and different field as India; and it proves beyond a doubt that he had already within him the foresight, sagacity, and every other quality of a great general.*

It was honourable to the administration of Lord Mornington, that he should be enabled so soon after two expensive wars, and with the almost immediate prospect of another expensive war in India, to send such an armament to the Red Sea. Major-General Baird, who sailed from Bombay on the 7th of April, took with him 2800 British troops, 2000 sepoys, and 450 of the Company's best artillerymen; and this force was well supplied from the Company's arsenals and magazines. The expedition contributed greatly to raise our reputation, wherever it was heard of and understood; and to impress the nations of Europe with a sense of the military power and energy of England.†

* Wellington Dispatches, and Indian Dispatches of Marquess Wellesley.

† Sir David Baird reached Jeddah, on the Red Sea, on the 17th of May, 1801, and was there

The governor-general found the means of sending other troops to Ceylon, where they were very soon wanted; as the Cingalese who dwelt in the interior, and who were in fact masters of all the island, except some strips along the coast, proved desperate, and for a time dangerous, enemies to the British. The settlements which had been torn from the Portuguese by the Dutch, were taken from the Dutch by the English, during the time that Lord Hobart was governor of Madras. For a time they were allowed to form an appendage to the Madras presidency, and the Company considered that they were to enjoy the same sovereignty in Ceylon as they enjoyed in India; but Mr. Pitt's government very soon placed the Ceylon settlements under the direct administration of the Crown, and appointed a governor who was to be altogether independent of the authority of the Company. As Ceylon is divided from the Coromandel coast only by a narrow strait; as the Company's troops and money had been employed in making the conquests in the island; and as a close intercourse and connection must exist between the island and the presidency of Madras; great discontent was felt and expressed by the Anglo-Indians, or by nearly all of them that were in the Company's service. It was felt also by others, that the annexation of Ceylon to the crown, while the government of the continent was left to the Company, rendered our Indian system more and more confused; dividing and confounding powers which were already too much divided and confounded. Lord Mornington himself best expressed the evils of this system, and best explained how it ought to be superseded. "Whatever," said he, "may be the nature of the government, which the wisdom of Parliament may permanently establish for India, I hold two principles to be indispensable for its permanent efficiency and vigour: First, that every part of the empire in India, *insular* as well as continental, shall be subject to the general control of one undivided authority which shall possess energy, *in peace*, to maintain order, connection and harmony between all the dispersed branches of our dominions, and to extend equal benefits of good government to every class of our numerous and various subjects; and, *in war*, to direct every spring of action to similar and corresponding movements, to concentrate every resource in a united effort, and by systematic subordination to diffuse such a spirit of alacrity and promptitude to the remotest extremities of the empire as shall secure the co-operation of every part in any exigency which may demand the collective strength of the whole. Secondly, that the constitution of every branch of the empire should be similar and uniform, and, above all, that no subordinate part should be so constituted as in any respect to hold a rivalry of dignity, even in form, with the supreme power." *

His lordship afterwards urged that as the legislature had vested in the governor-general in council, subject to the Board of Control in England, the sole power of making war against any native state on the continent of India, the same principle required that the governor-general in council should possess similar powers with regard to war in Ceylon, which could scarcely be considered in any other light than as a dependency on our continental empire: that the wisdom of the legislature had certainly contemplated a unity of executive power as the most effectual security for the British empire

joined by an English division from the Cape of Good Hope, consisting of the 61st regiment, some squadrons of light horse, and a strong detachment of artillery. On the 8th of June Baird reached Cosseir, and began landing his troops; but it was the month of July before his van division began to cross the burning deserts which lie between the Red Sea and Egypt; and, before he could unite his forces at Cairo, Menou, the French general, capitulated to Lord Hutchinson. (Sir Robert Wilson, 'History of the British Expedition to Egypt,' &c. Æneas Anderson, Lieut. 40th regiment, 'Journal of the Forces, &c., and of the Transactions of the Army under the command of General Sir Ralph Abercromby.' Le Comte de Noé, 'Mémoires relatifs à l'Expédition Anglaise partie du Bengale en 1800, &c.')

The Comte de Noé, then a royalist emigrant and an officer in the British 10th regiment of the line, went with Sir David Baird on this expedition, his account of which contains some interesting details not to be found elsewhere.

* Wellesley, Ind. Dispatches, &c. Letter to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, dated May 10th, 1801.

on the continent of India; and had determined that the authority which held the sole power of disposing of the resources necessary for the prosecution of war should also possess the sole power of making war; and that no provincial, local, or subordinate authority should be enabled to involve the general interests of the empire in the expense and hazard of hostilities: that under the constitution or regulation which had been made for the island of Ceylon, the order and system established for the general government of India were absolutely reversed; the king's governor of Ceylon exercising the authority of concluding treaties, of making wars, and of conducting military operations in the island, without having the power of furnishing supplies either of men or money beyond the fixed establishment of the island; while the governor-general in council was required to furnish supplies of men and money for the prosecution of war in Ceylon, without possessing any power of controlling the origin, conduct or progress of the war, which war might, however, deeply affect the security, interests, and honour of the general government of India. His lordship also showed that Ceylon had been properly termed the outwork and bulwark of our empire in India; that it was an essential part of our strength, and that the proper management of its civil and military government was of the utmost importance to the defence of our continental dominions. "Nor," said he, "can an argument be adduced to prove the importance of Ceylon which will not also demonstrate that its interests are inseparably blended with those of the empire on the continent, and that its government cannot be separated from the general control without hazard to the safety both of that empire and the island of Ceylon. The entire military establishment of India ought to be applicable to the general defence of the whole empire. The sub-division of that establishment, and the separation of our general strength into detachments, subjected to independent commands, and appropriated to exclusive provincial and local services, must impair the general efficiency of our army by destroying the unity of our military power . . . . . The independence of the government and military command of Ceylon would considerably embarrass the government-general in the prosecution of operations against the remaining possessions of the French and Dutch to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, or against Egypt, or against various places in these seas, or even in any transfer of troops from the several maritime garrisons in India. Your lordship is intimately acquainted with the advantages which the ports of Ceylon offer for assembling troops and ships, and for completing every necessary depôt in the preparation of such services. The government-general repeatedly derived important advantages from the full command of those ports during the last war. In the present state of the island, it would not be possible to use its ports and resources with similar effect. A considerable portion of the value of Ceylon, in time of war, is therefore actually suspended by the existing constitution of the government of that island."*

His lordship's sentiments varied upon this particular point; but at last he declared himself to be thoroughly convinced that the most effectual mode of rendering Ceylon a valuable addition to the British possessions in India, and an efficient augmentation of our military and political power, would be to annex it as a province to the supreme government of Bengal. His representations, however, were overlooked by the home government, which was not likely to give up the sovereignty of Ceylon when it *doubted*, at least, whether it ought not to assume the sovereignty of all the dominions the Company had in India; and thus the additional anomaly was allowed to exist, not without mischievous effects to the public interests. Dispassionate men may question whether the entire sovereignty of the crown was or was not preferable to the mixed authority of the crown and Company; but few could doubt that the island of Ceylon and

* Wellesley, Indian Dispatches, &c. Letter to Lord Hobart, then President of the Board of Control, dated Nov. 30th, 1803.

the continental dominions ought to be governed by one and the same system. The wars with the Cingalese, and other affairs of Ceylon, will occupy another chapter of our book. Here, we need only state that sundry grave errors were committed by the king's governors and the king's officers commanding in the island, and that some shameful reverses were sustained by the English troops in Ceylon during the war which the governor-general waged on the continent with the Mahrattas and their allies.

CHAPTER V.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUESS WELLESLEY CONTINUED.

THE conduct of the late governor-general, Sir John Shore, was not calculated to give permanent tranquillity to the dominions of Oude, or to elevate the character of the British government in the eyes of the inhabitants. However good and honest his intentions may have been —and Sir John was assuredly an honest, good, and conscientious man — his recognising the title of Vizier Ali in one month and dethroning him in the next, had certainly produced a very bad effect. The people believed it all to have been jobbery and a trick; the prince, expelled from Lucknow, was incensed to the utmost degree of fury; and Saadut Ali, who had been placed upon the musnud, seemed to be not very grateful to those to whom he owed his elevation. Saadut had allowed his payments to the Company to fall in arrears, and he was owing more than eighteen lacs of rupees, when Lord Mornington first took into his hands the government of India. The Court of Directors became clamorous for payment, and the governor-general was compelled to resort to measures which were likely to cool the little gratitude which remained in the nabob vizier's heart. At the same time intelligence was received that the terrible king of Cabul was preparing for another invasion of Upper India; that the fierce Afghans were again descending from their mountains, and pointing their spears towards Lahore and Delhi, and the frontiers of Oude. It was known that Tippoo Sultaun was corresponding with Zemaun Shah, and that the Mohammedan army of the Mysoreans would be joined to the Afghans, if the latter could make good their descent. This seemed to oblige the governor-general to raise the number of the British troops in Oude to the highest point allowed by the treaty which Sir John Shore had concluded with Saadut Ali. Two regiments of native infantry were added to the army; five companies of native invalids were stationed on the famed rock of Chunar, to which Warren Hastings had fled after the revolt of Cheyte Sing; five other companies of native invalids were sent to Allahabad; a considerable force was united to cover the holy and rich city of Benares; and troops were cantoned in the upper provinces to oppose the Afghans on the frontiers of the British possessions, in case Zemaun Shah should come. The shah actually advanced again as far as Lahore, while Lord Mornington was at Madras, busied in the preparations which ended in the total overthrow of Tippoo; but again was the Afghan sovereign recalled to his own states by rebellion and civil war—a war waged by his own brother, Mahmood, who had collected an army in the neighbourhood of Herat. As these inroads caused great alarm and confusion, and great expense, and as it was apprehended that the Afghans would repeat their visit in the following year, the governor-general determined to find them occupation which would keep them at home for some time to come, and diminish their capability of being mischievous in India.* The Persians and the Afghans were old foes. Baba Khan, the present king of Persia, had espoused the cause of Zemaun Shah's brother, and had made an inroad into the province of Khorassan, on the western part of Afghanistan. An intercourse was opened with the Persian court by means of one or two Mohammedan merchants; and on the 29th of December, 1799, Captain John Mal-

* Dispatches, Malcolm.

colm, who had done such good service at Hyderabad, was dispatched from Bombay on an embassy to Baba Khan, the Persian Shah. The embassy was "in a style of splendour corresponding to the character of the monarch and the manners of the nation to whom it was sent, and to the wealth and power of that state from which it proceeded."* It was completely successful in all its objects. The King of Persia not only agreed to renew his attack upon Khorassan, which had the effect of withdrawing Zemaun Shah from his designs upon India, but also entered into treaties of political and commercial alliance with the British Government. The ability of the British negotiator was seconded by circumstances: the news of Nelson's conquest at the mouth of the Nile had spread rapidly through Syria, Asia Minor, Persia, and had produced an impression highly advantageous to England, the sovereign of which was thus designated in the treaty—"The sublime quarter of the high in power, seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory, lord of the countries of England and India—may God strengthen his territories, and establish his glory and commands upon the seas!" &c. The fame of Nelson obscured the talents and defeated the intrigues of the French agents at Teherau, where, as in other countries of the East, they had been busily, and not unsuccessfully, occupied; and by the treaty concluded with Malcolm, the shah completely excluded the French from Persia, and gave to the English nearly every benefit for which the French had been contending. In a firman issued to the governors of provinces, &c., the Persian shah ordered them to expel and extirpate all persons of the French nation that should attempt to enter their ports or pass their boundaries; never to allow them to obtain a footing in any place in Persia, but to disgrace, and, if necessary, slay them. On their part the English were bound, in case the King of the Afghans, or any person of the French, should make war upon the Shah of Persia, to send as many cannon and warlike stores as possible, with necessary apparatus, attendants and inspectors, and deliver them at one of the sea-ports of Persia. In the following year (1800) Zemaun Shah, instead of repeating his visit to Lahore, was obliged to march to the west, to meet a Persian army, which was threatening his own dominions with invasion. In the year 1801 Zemaun Shah was defeated in battle, and made prisoner, by his rebellions brother Mahmood, who found it so difficult to retain his seat on the dangerous throne of Cabul, that he had neither time nor means to bestow on plans of Indian conquest.

During the time of the Afghan's second visit to Lahore, Saadut Ali was suspected by the English of not being entirely ignorant of his movements and plans; but these suspicions fell much more strongly upon Vizier Ali, the deposed Nabob of Oude, who increased the number of his armed retainers, and engaged some of the principal people of Benares to join him in an insurrection as soon as the army of Zemaun Shah should approach the frontiers of Oude. Sir John Shore and those who acted with him had committed a serious and very obvious error in fixing the residence of the prince they themselves deposed at Benares; for that city was geographically within the limits of Oude, over the whole of which he had once held sway; that city always abounded with desperate adventurers, collected from all parts of Hindustan; and the settled inhabitants of the neighbouring country had that vigour and fire, and proneness to insurrection, which had so well nigh proved fatal to Warren Hastings, and, in him, to the British empire in India. But the first great imprudence, in the choice of a residence, was followed by other imprudencies. The deposed nabob was allowed to make his palace like a fortress; to maintain, without control or limitation, guards, both horse and foot, and to keep up the style and bearing of a sovereign prince. He never issued from his palace without being attended by a numerous armed train, many of whom were old adherents who had followed him from Lucknow

* Malcolm. 'Political Hist. Ind.'

after his deposition; and whenever he went from home, the nackára, or kettle-drum, was carried before him. While he avoided all the English as much as possible, he cultivated a close friendship with the Mohammedan chiefs, who were greatly excited by the advance of their co-religionists, the Afghans, and who considered Zemaun Shah both as the nearest and noblest representative of the house of Timour, and as the servant of the prophet engaged in a holy war for the propagation of the Koran. Mr. Cherry, who had concluded the preliminary treaty with Saadut Ali, and who had packed off that prince to Sir John Shore at Lucknow, was still resident at Benares. With him Vizier Ali was obliged to interchange occasional visits, and to wear a friendly mask; and so great was the dethroned nabob's power of simulation, or so great the dulness or credulity of the resident, that Mr. Cherry could never be induced to believe that Vizier Ali entertained any dangerous designs. Mr. Davis, head of the civil government of Benares, as judge and magistrate of the district and city court, was more discerning; and he repeatedly warned Mr. Cherry, as well as the supreme government at Calcutta, of the consequences that might be expected. He earnestly recommended that the armed followers of Vizier Ali, and the Mohammedan lords residing in Benares, should be reduced; and that their cannon and other warlike implements should be deposited in the arsenal of government. But, unhappily for himself, Mr. Cherry continued in his blind confidence; and measures of precaution were neglected by the supreme government. When, however, it was ascertained by Lord Mornington that Vizier Ali had sent a vakeel or agent to Zemaun Shah, and was giving countenance to all those who sighed for the arrival of the Afghans and thirsted for the blood of the English, instructions were sent to Mr. Cherry to remove the dangerous dethroned man from Benares to Calcutta. As soon as this order became known to Vizier Ali, he gave way to the evil counsels of two rash young men, Izzut Ali and Waris Ali, and to his own savage and impetuous disposition. Pretending to yield obedience to the governor-general's order—though with regret and grief—he determined to murder Mr. Cherry, who had communicated that order, and then to fall with the sharp edge of the sword on all the English resident in, or near to, Benares. On the morning of the 13th of January (1799), the native superintendent of police waited upon Mr. Davis, to report that Vizier Ali was enrolling a number of armed men, and was making no preparations for his departure for Calcutta. This startling intelligence was instantly communicated to Mr. Cherry, who heard it incredulously, and did nothing. On the night of the 13th, a messenger went from the palace of the nabob to Mr. Cherry's house, and announced that his master would pay the judge a visit on the following morning at breakfast. At the same time it was given out by the nabob's people that he intended to take his departure for Calcutta in a day or two.

On the morning of the 14th, Vizier Ali's kettle-drum was heard, and he was seen approaching the house of the English resident, with a train of horse and foot, consisting in all of 200 men.* In numbers this did not much exceed the nabob's ordinary retinue; but a jemmadar of Mr. Cherry reported to his master that this party came not in their usual manner, but were all

* While these pages were preparing for the press, there appeared a very small but a very interesting volume, entitled 'Vizier Ali Khan; or, the Massacre of Benares, a Chapter in British Indian History.' It is the production of J. F. Davis, Esq., the son of Mr. Davis, the judge of Benares, the author of the best book in any language upon China ('The Chinese: a general description of the Empire of China and its Inhabitants'), and the able public servant who is now on his way to take the chief charge of the British interests in the Celestial Empire, as Governor of Hong-Kong.

At the time of the murders at Benares and the attack on his father's house, Mr. Davis was a child; but for his narrative he obtained, besides papers, the personal information and assistance of a senior who was on the spot—of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, the author of the best book upon Cabul and the Afghan tribes, late Governor of Bombay, and one of the best of the many distinguished men who have acquired reputation in India. Few narratives can have higher claims to implicit credit. We have followed Mr. Davis's account in our text.

armed, and with matches lighted. The infatuated resident told the man that he was a fool for his fears. Mr. Cherry's house was not in the town, but at a short distance from it. On the nabob's arrival at the door, the host, according to custom, met and handed him in. He was accompanied by his two young friends, Izzut Ali and Waris Ali, and by a third person more advanced in years. The party of four were attended into the breakfast-room by four followers, armed with swords, shields, and pistols. Mr. Evans, a youth acting as private secretary to Mr. Cherry, was also present in the room. Tea having been brought in, Mr. Cherry handed a cup to Vizier Ali, who would not touch it; but, addressing himself to his host, said that he had something of great consequence to communicate. Then raising his voice, he began to complain of the treatment he had received from Sir John Shore, saying that that governor-general had promised him six lacs of rupees per annum, and had afterwards reduced the sum. He then reproached Mr. Cherry with never having taken care of his interests or attended to his representations. "This," said he, "you have never done. On the contrary, at the suggestion of Saadut Ali, you now wish me to go to Calcutta: but Lord Mornington is absent; what should I do there? Saadut Ali wishes for my death, and the English are in league with him. They listen to him; but neither you nor any one else attends to me. I shall therefore not proceed to Calcutta, but go where I please." While the nabob was speaking thus wrathfully, Waris Ali quitted his seat, and got behind Mr. Cherry. This seemed to be a concerted signal, for the nabob, rising from his seat, seized Mr. Cherry by the collar, while the other held him behind; and as he expostulated, the nabob struck at him with his drawn sword. The rest of the conspirators joined in the dastardly deed. The unfortunate resident, though wounded, threw off the nabob's grip, got free from Waris Ali, and escaped through the verandah into the garden; but six or seven of them followed him in a body, and cut him down before he had gone many yards from the house. In the meanwhile Izzut Ali had seized Mr. Evans, and grasped his dagger to stab him; but the young Englishman held the assassin's hands; a servant of Mr. Cherry ran into the room, and made a cut at Izzut Ali, who let go his hold of Mr. Evans. The young secretary fled into an adjoining field, but he was seen by some of the horsemen of the nabob's train, who had all remained outside the house; two or three shots were fired at him, and being brought to the ground, some others of the conspirators ran up and dispatched him. At this moment Captain Conway, who was living with Mr. Cherry, happened to ride up to the house, and he also was killed. Mr. Davis, in returning from his morning ride on an elephant, had passed Vizier Ali and his whole train, as they were proceeding towards Mr. Cherry's residence; and on reaching home the judge was informed by the head of the police that he had fully ascertained the facts that Vizier Ali had sent emissaries into the neighbouring districts to summon armed men, and that some mischief might be apprehended from his present visit to Mr. Cherry. The judge immediately dispatched a hasty note to the resident (their houses were little more than a quarter of a mile apart), and being anxious for the return of his messenger, kept a look out in that direction. Presently Mr. Davis observed that Vizier Ali and his train were coming towards his own house with unusual haste; and that some of the nabob's horse, instead of keeping the road, were breaking into his grounds, and beginning to fire at the house. A single sentry, stationed about fifty yards from the door, was shot down. There was now no time to lose. The judge sent Mrs. Davis, her two children, and their attendants, to the terrace on the top of the house, and then ran for his fire-arms, which were below. But the insurgents were already in possession of the lower part of the house, and the only weapon which Mr. Davis could reach was an Indian pike or spear which chanced to be up stairs.* With this weapon, and

* "The pike was one of those used by running-footmen in India. It was of iron, plated with

single-handed against many, the judge defended himself like a valiant soldier; and saved his own life, the lives of his wife and children, and of many others. Taking his station on the terrace, on one knee, over the trap-door of the stair, he waited for the assault. He was favoured by the steepness and narrowness of the staircase, which allowed only a single armed man to ascend at a time. It opened at once to the terrace, like a hatchway on board ship, but it had only a light cover of painted canvas stretched on a wooden frame. This opening he allowed to remain uncovered, that he might see what approached from below. The first to approach was Izzut Ali, who shook his sword, and made use of very abusive language. The judge replied with saying, "The English troops are coming from camp," and by thrusting his pike into Izzut Ali's arm. The coward disappeared immediately: another succeeded; but being wounded in the hand, he ducked under, like his predecessor. No further attempt was made on that staircase, but the 200 cowards kept firing up at the terrace, which had a parapet, or went round the house and the verandah in search of some easier means of getting to the house-top. The judge could not quit his post at the head of the staircase for a moment to look out; and one of the women servants, venturing to look over the parapet walls, was shot through the arm. They could now only remain where they were, casting anxious looks for the cavalry from General Erskine's camp, which was within a short march of the city of Benares.* Though Mr. Davis well knew that the cavalry could not arrive for some time (not more than an hour having elapsed since the attack began), he maintained that it must be close at hand, for the sake of encouraging his wife and servants. In about half an hour from this time, he again heard the noise of many persons ascending the stair in haste: he grasped his pike, but the new comers were friends, not enemies. After breaking the furniture in the apartments, and ascertaining that there was no way of getting to the house-top except by going up the narrow, winding staircase, the insurgents had gone off to attack other English houses, and had thus allowed the native officer of police and some fifteen sepoys, with their muskets, to enter the house of the judge. Finding that he could muster fifteen, with their firelocks, bayonets, and fifteen rounds each, Mr. Davis now considered his danger as over.

In a short time the sound of Vizier Ali's drum was heard from the town, and parties were seen in motion about the suburbs, where some places belonging to Europeans were on fire. Intelligence was brought that numbers of the inhabitants were joining the insurgents, but none of them approached the house. About eleven o'clock a small advanced party of the cavalry from General Erskine's camp appeared in view. It had been brought on with admirable celerity by Major Pigot and Captain Shubrick. At first they drew rein at Mr. Cherry's house, but finding that all was over there, they galloped to the assistance of Mr. Davis. It was there agreed, that until some infantry arrived from the camp, this small force would be best employed by taking post in front of the house, within view of which a vast multitude was now beginning to assemble. In a short time some of these people came nearer, and declared their hostility by setting fire to a building attached to the police department. General Erskine, who now joined with the rest of his cavalry, sent out a few troopers to drive off these rioters, who appear to have been nearly all armed. One of the troopers falling from his horse, was set upon and left for dead by a part of the fierce mob. The cavalry were soon afterwards fired at by some who came near enough for their shot to reach the house; but a column of infantry now came up, and covered the small party of horse. While the troops were falling in line, some of them were wounded by matchlock or musket shot from a wood in their front. Vizier Ali was said to be there in person;

silver, in rings, to give a firmer grasp, rather more than six feet in length, and had a long triangular blade of more than twenty inches, with sharp edges."—*J. F. Davis*, 'Massacre of Benares.'

* The main army of Oude was far away to the westward, under the command of General Sir James Craig.

but on the first fire from an English field-piece, he retired with his adherents towards his fortified palace and strongly-walled garden, where it was thought a desperate resistance might be attempted. General Erskine pursued in column. The troops marched through one of the suburbs, where they suffered considerably by the fire from the houses. Both of General Erskine's orderlies were shot at his side. On reaching the nabob's palace some field-pieces were directed against it; the gate was presently blown open, and the troops got admission to the principal court. But it was vain to seek for the dastardly assassin there: Vizier Ali had fled northwards towards Betaul, accompanied by all his well-mounted horsemen. The business was finished just as the sun set. It was thought that if the contest had lasted until dark, the city of Benares would have been pillaged by the banditti and adventurers assembled within its precincts. The English inhabitants of the neighbourhood acknowledged that the hour and half during which the stout-hearted judge had kept the assassins at bay, had been the means of their salvation, by enabling some of them to conceal themselves, and others to fly for refuge in General Erskine's camp. Five British subjects, however (besides the soldiers), fell victims to the second insurrection of Benares; for, in addition to Mr. Cherry, Captain Conway, and Mr. Evans, the insurgents had butchered Mr. Robert Graham, a young civilian, and Mr. Hill, who kept a shop in the city.* For some days great alarm was kept up among the English and their friends, by ignorance of the extent of the plot, and by the recollection of the violence and long duration of the former insurrection under Cheyte Sing; but when some few hundred vagabonds had followed on foot the flying horsemen of the nabob, the commotion subsided, and by the 18th of January the public tranquillity seemed perfectly re-established. On the day following the insurrection twenty elephants, some horses, silver howdahs, and other articles of less value, were seized on the road and brought back to Benares by the troops and police. Some of the adventurers who had joined in the affray merely for the sake of plunder, succeeded in carrying off the spoils they had made in the English houses; but Vizier Ali either left, nearly everything that was his behind him in his palace, or lost it on the road during his rapid journey. As he fled through the country he must have received the news of the retreat of the Afghans from Lahore. Early in his flight he halted to address a letter to the Rajah of Benares, urging him to rise against the English; but instead of being conveyed to the rajah, this epistle was delivered to Mr. Davis. The wife and other females of the fugitive's family, amounting, with their attendants, to nearly one hundred persons, were all left behind in the palace. The women were treated with every possible respect. The vice-president in council at Calcutta expressed his satisfaction at the gallant exertions made by the judge; and he authorized Mr. Davis to offer a reward of 20,000 rupees for the apprehension of Vizier Ali, alive or dead. Saadut Ali, the reigning sovereign of Oude, was thrown into the greatest consternation when he heard that his rival and mortal enemy had broken loose. He regarded the insurrection of Benares as a conspiracy, in which many of his own subjects had been concerned. Not knowing how far the conspiracy had extended, he apprehended that many persons in Lucknow had been involved in it, and suspecting everybody, and putting no trust in his own troops, he requested Mr. Lumsden, the British resident at Lucknow, to call up an English battalion from Cawnpoor for the protection of his capital and person. The resident not only called up the brigade, but suggested to General Sir James Craig the propriety of either returning without delay to that neighbourhood, or of detaching such part of the army under his command as might be sufficient to keep

* "Some of the English made the best of their way to the camp; and others, especially those with families, concealed themselves as they could, and must probably have been discovered and massacred, if the attention of the insurgents had not been occupied by Mr. Davis's defence. One large party retired into a tall field of maize, or Indian corn, and were completely hidden for the time, though but a short distance from the residence of one of their number."—*J. F. Davis.*

the whole country in order. As General Craig had received the certain intelligence of the retreat of the Afghans from Lahore, he soon withdrew from the western frontiers of Oude towards the capital. Saadut Ali is described, by one who knew him well in the early part of his reign at Lucknow, as a man of sense, who kept up a degree of dignity and decorum in his court to which it had long been a stranger, and who, in his regular habits and application to business, was more like an English gentleman than most natives. His vice was hard drinking, but he indulged only at night. "He had good reason to be apprehensive of revolt, for his reign was new, and his natural parsimony, with the strict order and economy which he endeavoured to introduce into his provinces, were unfavourably contrasted with the profusion of his predecessors."* It appears that he was timid as well as parsimonious; and that when called upon to join the British army with his own forces for the pursuit and chastisement of Vizier Ali and his partisans, he earnestly implored to be excused, upon the grounds that he could not trust his own soldiers, who were little better than an undisciplined rabble. He merely issued circular orders to his officers to be on their guard, and seize the person of Vizier Ali if he should attempt to enter the territory of Oude: and for all the rest he trusted to the English and their large subsidiary force, which had been first established by Mr. Hastings in 1775, and which had been augmented by Sir John Shore in 1798. Ever since the time of Lord Clive, it had been made evident that no king or nabob-vizier of Oude could defend his frontiers or preserve common tranquillity in the interior of the country without the aid of our disciplined battalions.

In the course of the inquiries instituted by Mr. Davis and other servants of the Company, it was very clearly proved that not only a good number of Mohammedan chiefs, but also a considerable number of Hindu baboos or nobles had promised assistance to Vizier Ali previously to his outbreak. From the evidence adduced there was also ground to suspect that some of the baboos distantly related to the Rajah of Benares had entered into the views of the dethroned nabob, and that a zemindar in the neighbourhood of Benares had actually collected armed men to second that nabob's operations. "It is well known," wrote Mr. Davis to General Erskine, "that this city abounds with armed adventurers, who are ever ready to enter into any service at a moment's notice. There are in the district persons of rank who live and maintain their own guards, without any limitation from government, and who are not under the same subordination to the laws as the other inhabitants." At last the supreme government of Calcutta resolved to put an end to this system, and sent instructions to Mr. Davis to secure the persons of some of the nobles known to have been concerned with Vizier Ali. It was not very easy to execute this last order. One of the baboos occupied a house capable of defence, on the outskirts of the town; three others usually resided together in the fort of Pinderah, distant fourteen miles from Benares, on the Jaunpoor road; two more resided in the small fort of Chetaypoor on the Chunar side; and a seventh baboo occupied a strong house in the town, with a few of the bravos well known in Benares by the name of bankas.* The best mode of proceeding seemed to be to seize all the baboos by surprise, at the same hour, lest the proceedings against one of them might give the alarm and enable the others to escape. It was also highly important to secure possession of the two forts, and especially that of Pinderah, which was surrounded by the estates and old retain-

* The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, as quoted by Mr. J. F. Davis, in the 'Massacre of Benares,' &c.

* "These bankas are men of all castes; they affect a peculiar way of dressing, half bully and half dandy, strut and swagger about the streets, and are always ready to pick a quarrel or engage in any crime. . . . The term *banka*, by which this sect is distinguished, is derived from the peculiar movement of their swords, in the exercise of which they are proficients. This class of people formerly abounded in Benares, and were the terror of the wealthy and timid, on whose contributions, to avert enmity or secure regard, they were supposed chiefly to subsist."—*J. F. Davis.*

ers of the baboos, and might serve as a point of junction to their adherents. Mr. Davis concerted all the necessary measures with General Erskine. The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who has since risen to such high distinction in the Indian service, but who was then a very young man, and assistant to the judge of Benares, was furnished with four companies of infantry and twenty-four troopers to assist him in capturing the baboos in the fort of Pinderah. At the dawn of day Elphinstone reached the fort, and surrounded it so as to prevent any escape. The fort was then entered, and every part of it searched except the zenana, or women's apartments. The retainers declared that the baboos went out hunting two days before, and had not yet returned. A guard was placed over the zenana, but it ultimately proved that the baboos were not there. A seizure was made of fifty matchlocks, forty swords, and some powder and ball. The fort had lately been strengthened; and some new walls with loopholes had been erected. Mr. Elphinstone also discovered a large quantity of papers, and a chest said to contain money; and upon these he put his seal. At the same hour Mr. Sealey, another gentleman of the civil service, supported by two companies of infantry, went to the house of the baboo Juggut Sing, which was the one, capable of defence, on the outskirts of the town. Juggut Sing retired to his zenana, and refused to come forth, though served with a summons of the judge and assured that no personal violence or disgrace was intended. That sanctuary was not to be forced; but his papers were seized, and the house was surrounded with troops to cut off the means of escape. A brahmin, who had served Vizier Ali in the capacity of astrologer, had told Mr. Cherry, four months before the insurrection, that Juggut Sing had pledged himself to restore the dethroned nabob to the musnud of Oude, to make war against the English, to extend his dominions as far as Calcutta, to assemble troops and raise money from the bankers for the purpose of expelling and exterminating the English; that he had received presents and honours from Vizier Ali, had declared that he had ready a list of sixty of his friends, who would join and take an oath of fidelity to the cause; that he had requested and obtained a secret interview with Vizier Ali, being conveyed by night to a private door adjoining the women's apartments; that at a subsequent meeting the baboo engaged to bring a force of some thousand men well armed, and others undertook to do the same; and that when some one objected to the plot as hazardous, Juggut Sing exclaimed, "I cannot live for ever: how can I lose my life better than in the service of Vizier Ali?" This astrologer, who betrayed his employer, may have invented or exaggerated facts, but the papers found in Juggut Sing's house, and in the residences of the other baboos, proved that a conspiracy had existed for several months, and that Juggut Sing was one of the most active and most influential of the conspirators. The baboo Sheonaut, who occupied the strong house in the town with his bankas, or bravos, was visited at the same moment, and received his visitors with a much more hostile and determined feeling. He was the only one that made a resistance. With five bankas—men as desperate as himself—and with fire-arms and other weapons, he resisted the police. When one of the native police had been killed and another wounded with fire-arms from the windows and other apertures, a party of infantry surrounded the house and stopped their supply of food and water. The baboo and his bravos held out a whole day and night, during which time they received repeated assurances, both verbal and written, that no personal violence or disgrace would be inflicted if they quietly surrendered. They at length rushed out and attacked the soldiers with fury, apparently hoping to take them by surprise and cut their way through them. In the fierce conflict the baboo and one of his bankas were killed, but not before they had killed or wounded several of the soldiers.

Two of the baboos—Juggut Sing and Bowannee Sunker—were tried by a commission with unusual solemnity, and condemned to death. The last named was executed; but Juggut Sing's sentence was commuted for transportation

He was sent down the Ganges to be embarked, but when he approached the sea he took poison and died, and thus escaped the loss of caste and the other degradations which he had expected to suffer.* Several others of the baboos fled the country; and effectual measures were taken to break up the feudal-like bands of retainers, and to scatter those desperate bravos the bankas.

In the meanwhile Vizier Ali, pursued too closely to be able to make a stand anywhere in the British possessions or in the territories of Oude, sought refuge among the forests on the first range of the Himalaya mountains. There he was joined by freebooters and adventurers of all kinds, so that in a short time he was at the head of several thousand men. With this lawless band he descended into the plains of Goruckpoor, the eastern district of Oude, and threw the reigning nabob-vizier and the whole of that kingdom into alarm. But a British force was soon assembled to oppose the desperate band. They suffered severely in some partial rencounters, and finding themselves girded in, and unable to obtain either subsistence or plunder, they lost heart, and fled back towards the mountain forests. Abandoned by most of his people, Vizier Ali fled into Rajpootana, and took refuge with the rajah of Jypoor. The laws of hospitality are held as sacred among the Rajpoots. However disgusted the rajah of Jypoor might be at the crimes of his guest, and however much he might wish to conciliate the British government, he could not venture to surrender Vizier Ali openly, as such a deed would dishonour him in the eyes of his proud and punctilious countrymen; but upon his being given up to Colonel Collins, he attempted to throw the blame of that breach of hospitality on his chief minister; and he actually imprisoned that functionary for some time, for having, as he said, delivered up his guest to the English without his consent or knowledge. It is not said, however, that the rajah was influenced by any offers of reward, or by any other base motive, to give up the man who had claimed his protection. He stipulated with Colonel Collins that the life of Vizier Ali should be sacred, and that he should not be confined in irons or fetters. Vizier Ali was carried through the city of Benares as a prisoner, on the first anniversary of his insurrection and murders. Being carried down to Calcutta, he was lodged in Fort Willam, in a bomb-proof chamber, divided by strong iron gratings into three parts. The largest part in the centre was occupied by the nabob, and the other two parts were occupied by sentries, one English and one native. At length after many years of captivity in this dull cage, he was transferred to a more comfortable prison in the palace built for Tippoo Sultaun's family in the fort of Vellore. There the females of his family subsequently joined him, and there he died a few years ago.

The Earl of Mornington, upon his return to the seat of the supreme government, expressed in warm and hearty terms his admiration of the conduct of the stout-hearted and active judge, attributing the safety of the English residents, and the salvation of the city of Benares from pillage, to the "successful issue of that arduous trial of his prudence, activity, and resolution." Mr. Davis was soon removed to Calcutta, to fill offices of higher trust and importance; and the personal friendship which grew up between him and the governor-general lasted for life.*

The occurrences at Benares and in Oude, Saadut Ali's confession of his own

* "Juggut Sing," says Mr. Davis, "was a man of some talent, but of inordinate vanity. He possessed an excellent Persian library, and was proud of his poetical compositions in that language, which Mussulmans only could appreciate. This was not unlikely to have influenced him in relying on a chief of that religion for his aggrandizement. His delight was to repeat a compliment that had been paid him by a former nabob, who called him 'the nightingale of India.'"

* 'Vizier Ali Khan, or the Massacre of Benares, a chapter in British Indian History,' by J. F. Davis, Esq.

Mr. Davis, by publishing this little volume or tract, has discharged a duty of filial piety, and has done honour to his father's memory. We wish that other sons would follow his example, instead of destroying or altogether neglecting documents and family papers.

helplessness and entire want of confidence in his troops, the invasion and partial devastation of Goruckpoor, by his rival and the mountain robbers, all concurred in fixing the resolution of the governor-general to reduce a part of the mutinous and useless military establishment of the nabob-vizier; and at the same time to increase the efficient force which the Company maintained for the defence of that prince's dominions. Saadut Ali, fully sensible of the dangers to which he was exposed from internal insurrection and from foreign attack, would gladly have received the additional troops of the Company, but the additional pay which was demanded greatly distressed him; and he shuffled and equivocated, in the hope of delaying or frustrating a measure which must go to prevent his accumulating and hoarding up money. By the treaty concluded with Sir John Shore the Company were at liberty to increase the number of their forces serving in Oude, if they deemed it necessary to the security of the two states, or the territories of Oude and those of the Company. After what had happened it was difficult to deny the necessity. The nabob-vizier had himself admitted it: but now he pretended that he could trust his own troops, and that no increase of the subsidiary force was called for. He spoke of abdicating the musnud rather than submit to the governor-general's wishes; he talked about a pilgrimage to Mecca; and it appears that he would gladly have retired if he had been allowed to carry his treasure with him. Lord *Mornington* ordered the additional force to march into the country, and sent his brother the Honourable Mr. Henry Wellesley* to Lucknow to conclude a treaty by which a territorial cession should be made to the Company, equal to the payment of the increased subsidiary force. Unable any longer to evade compliance, Saadut Ali signed the treaty, allotted some fertile districts, welcomed the new battalions, and disbanded the rabble rout which had been called his army. By this cession, the territories of the Company were interposed as a barrier between the dominions of the vizier and his foreign enemies; and, although the Company may, by an improved system of management and a better secured tranquillity, have raised the value of the districts ceded, the actual net receipts of that prince's treasury from these districts was not more than the amount which he had before paid to the Company as a fixed subsidy, and much less than he had become liable to pay under the treaty concluded with Sir John Shore. In the present treaty, negotiated by the governor-general's brother, and dated in November, 1801, Saadut Ali agreed to introduce, by means of his own officers, into the extensive territories which remained to him, such a system of administration as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and to the security of the lives and property of all the inhabitants. This treaty was final as an arrangement, and productive of great good to both contracting parties. It closed all irritating questions between them; and it fully provided, under every contingency, for the defence of the territories of Oude, for, with fourteen or fifteen thousand disciplined troops, there was little to fear from any enemy that could approach the frontiers, and nothing to apprehend from internal plots or tumults. The country advanced rapidly in prosperity, and, gratified in his love of money by an increase of revenue, the nabob-vizier became contented and grateful, proving by actions, as well as by professions, his attachment to the British government. When the war with the Mahrattas commenced, the governor-general had the satisfaction of receiving the voluntary aid of this prince. Saadut Ali sent as a present a number of fine horses from his stud, sufficient to mount a regiment of dragoons, and contributed, by large loans from his treasury, to the general success of that expensive and extensive war.

Mr. Henry Wellesley, after concluding this treaty of Lucknow, proceeded to take charge of the ceded provinces, as lieutenant-governor, in order to effect a settlement of their boundaries and revenues; an arduous labour which he is said to have performed in a manner as honourable to his own character as it was advantageous to the public interest. The gross

* Now Lord Cowley.

revenue, estimated at one crore and thirty-five lacs of rupees in the treaty of Lucknow, was soon raised considerably, and by means which relieved rather than distressed the people.*

In the Carnatic, as in Oude, affairs could not possibly remain on the footing on which they had been left by Sir John Shore. After various and fruitless representations to the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah, Lord Mornington proceeded to act with him in the same decided manner with which he acted with Saadut Ali, feeling and expressing his conviction that some new arrangement must be made to save the Company from loss, the nabob from ruin, and the inhabitants from misery and starvation. Omdut-ul-Omrah's negligent, and at times equivocal, conduct during the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and the last siege of Seringapatam, was not calculated to conciliate the governor-general. Soon after the capture of Seringapatam certain documents were discovered among the secret records of the Sultaun, containing conclusive evidence of a secret correspondence having been carried on between Omdut-ul-Omrah and Tippoo, with objects very hostile to the English. These documents were carefully examined by Mr. Edmonstone, the Persian translator. Among them were found a cipher and a key to it, which the nabob had transmitted to the Sultaun.† The papers proved that the nabob had manifested his marked disapprobation of the triple alliance (of the English, Nizam, and Mahrattas) which had reduced the power of the Sultaun; and that he had stigmatized the Nizam as having acted contrary to the dictates of religion, which required that all true Mohammedans should join in support of that cause of which Tippoo Sultaun was the chief pillar; and that his correspondence with the Mysorean had been continued through a series of years. All this was not only in violation of the spirit of Lord Cornwallis's treaty of 1792, but in direct violation of the letter of one of its most important articles, which stipulated "that the nabob shall not enter into any negotiations or political correspondence with any European or native Power whatever, without the consent of the Company." Lord Clive,* the son of the real founder of our Indian empire, had succeeded Lord Hobart as governor of Madras, and had been authorized by the Earl of Mornington to institute these inquiries, the result of which was a decided conviction in Lord Clive's mind that Omdut-ul-Omrah ought to be deposed, and that his territories, or the civil and military government of them, ought to be henceforward placed in the hands of the Company. Lord Clive wrote to the governor-general,—

"With this strong evidence of internal treachery, and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty, it is my deliberate opinion, that a further adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah has been, and now is, perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the Company, would be as inconsistent with the true principles of public faith, as it would be obviously incompatible with the preservation of our just rights and interests.

"On these grounds, I have no hesitation in recommending to your Lordship the immediate assumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such provisions as your lordship may be pleased to authorize for his highness the nabob, his highness's family, and the principal officers of his government."

Upon the receipt of this dispatch, the governor-general, whose activity was prodigious, resolved to proceed to Madras, if not to Arcot, as soon as the season permitted, for the purpose of settling in person an arrangement in the Carnatic. Finding, however, that the state of affairs in Oude and other business would prevent his quitting Bengal, he, in the month of March, 1801, directed Lord Clive to send Mr. Webbe, the chief executive officer of the Madras government, to Calcutta, in

* Malcolm, 'Polit. Hist.;' Marquess Wellesley, 'Ind. Dispatches.'

† It was discovered by the key to the cipher that the English were designated by the name of *Taza Wareeds*, or *new comers*; the Nizam by that of *Fleech*, or *nothing*; and the Mahrattas by that of *Pooch*, or *contemptible*.

* The present Earl Powis.

order that he might have the fullest communication with that very able and experienced officer, previously to issuing his final instructions for the settlement of the Carnatic. Mr. Webbe had scarcely reached Fort William when the alarming state of Omdut-ul-Omrah induced Lord Clive to address a letter to the governor-general, stating the conduct he intended to pursue if the nabob should die before his final instructions reached him. Lord Clive's plan was to assume the civil and military power of the Carnatic in the name of the Company, until the Earl of Mornington's plan for its government should be finally arranged. By this time the governor-general was in possession of letters and instructions from home, authorizing the proceedings he had contemplated. The president of the Board of Control coincided in the conclusions which his lordship had drawn from the documents found in Seringapatam, and in the measures which he intended to adopt; the secret committee of the Court of Directors expressed their entire approbation of the resolution which the governor-general had taken, of demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of the nabob of the Carnatic than the Company then possessed. Many months before this, and at a period antecedent to the war with Tippoo Sultaun and the discovery of the nabob's treacherous correspondence with that inveterate enemy of the English, the secret committee of the Court of Directors had written to the governor-general: —"In the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, the respective countries of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore will of course come under the Company's management; and we direct, that they be not relinquished without special orders from us, or from the Court of Directors, for that purpose, in order to afford sufficient time for the formation of arrangements for relieving those respective princes from all encumbrances on their revenues." This clearly proves that previously to the discovery of Omdut-ul-Omrah's treachery, the Indian government in England contemplated a departure from the stipulation of the treaty of 1792, of which the restoration of the nabob's country *at the conclusion of the war*, unless in certain cases (which had not occurred at the date of the secret committee's order), was an express condition. This instruction indeed was conclusive as to the principle upon which the Court of Directors desired that all transactions with the nabob should be regulated. Lord Mornington determined to act upon this principle without any delay; and delay must have been the more dangerous, as most of the territories under Fort St. George were in a disturbed or very uneasy state. In the first instance, however, he merely wrote to Lord Clive to prosecute the inquiry into the nabob's conduct, by a personal examination of his vakeels or agents, and of some officers of the late Tippoo Sultaun, who knew the secrets of the intrigue. He had already directed that the Governor of Madras should take no decisive step unless the nabob died; but, in case of that event, Lord Clive was instructed to raise to the musnud either Hoossein Ali, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah, or Azeem-ul-Dowlah, the acknowledged son of Ameer-ul-Omrah, under the previous condition that the nabob elect should resign to the Company the entire civil and military administration of the Carnatic, and rest satisfied with the titles and honours of sovereignty, and an annual stipend to be paid by the Company out of the revenues of the country. But the elevation of either of these two princes was to be considered as a measure of expediency, not of right; the governor-general considering the right of the whole family as forfeited by the conduct of Omdut-ul-Omrah. The government of Madras was directed to make the first offer to the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah: if he refused to subscribe to the conditions, the musnud was to be offered to Azeem-ul-Dowlah; and if this prince rejected the offer, the Madras government was to refer for further orders to the governor-general.

Omdut-ul-Omrah continued very sick, but did not die quite so soon as was expected. In the meanwhile the condition of the Carnatic became worse and worse, the nabob's officials and usurers grinding the faces of the poor inhabitants. To

have left the country in this condition would have been equally cruel and impolitic. On the 28th of May, Lord Mornington sent more decisive instructions to Lord Clive. After stating that his highness the nabob was reduced by his own bad conduct to the condition of a public enemy, that he had forfeited every claim to the confidence of the Company, and that he could no longer be permitted, either in justice or in policy, to retain the possession of resources greater than were requisite for the support of the rank which it should be judged proper to permit him to hold, the governor-general directed Lord Clive to stipulate with his highness for the complete resignation of the civil and military government, upon condition of his receiving a stipend not exceeding three, and not under two, lacs of pagodas annually, independent of a provision for the other branches of his family, his principal officers, &c. Lord Clive was instructed to make the nabob acquainted with the proofs of his treachery which were in the possession of the British government, and to show him that he had no claim to either forbearance or generosity. In case of the nabob's refusing this treaty, Lord Clive was commanded to assume the country under a proclamation, which accompanied the letter of instructions, and which exhibited the causes of that measure. But in every case, Lord Clive was to provide in a liberal manner for the nabob's support, as well as for that of his family, state officers, &c. When the governor-general's instructions reached Madras, the state of the nabob's health was so bad as to prevent Lord Clive taking any immediate measures. During this period of inaction on the part of the English, different branches of the nabob's family, quite certain of his speedy dissolution, commenced intrigues for the succession, which convulsed the palace and disturbed the whole country; and a body of men were secretly introduced into the palace by the dying nabob's brother, Hissam-ul-Mulk, who was loud in asserting his claim to the musnud. All this obliged Lord Clive to send a detachment of the Company's troops to occupy the chief entrance into the palace, to preserve order and tranquillity, and to guard against the seizure of any treasure or property belonging to the nabob. That dying prince expressed his satisfaction at this step. On the 15th of July, 1801, the nabob expired. A few hours after he heard the news, Lord Clive deputed Mr. Webbe and Lieutenant-Colonel Close to confer with the principal officers of the court, and the two advisers of Hoossein Ali, the reputed son of the deceased ruler. These khans refused to enter into any treaty which was grounded on the basis of the civil and military government of the country being vested in the Company. The two commissioners then desired to have a personal interview and conference with Hoossein Ali himself, who was not a child, but a youth of eighteen years of age—an age at which the moral and physical powers of man are fully developed in India, and at which many nabobs had ascended the musnud and governed for themselves. The khans pleaded that the youth was inexperienced and incapable of deciding on high state interests; but the commissioners insisted upon seeing him, and at length the khans reluctantly consented. The conference took place on the 19th of July. The young man, acting or speaking as he was prompted by the khans, expressed an aversion to the proposed treaty, and declared that he must be guided by the advice of the two khans who had been appointed his guardians by the late nabob. Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe then informed the nobles that Lord Clive himself was coming to have an interview with Hoossein Ali, and that his lordship would soon be in the tent of the British officer commanding the troops stationed at the palace. The khans raised many objections to this visit and endeavoured to delay it; but finding their arguments of no avail, they went away to prepare Hoossein Ali's equipage and retinue. As soon as they were gone, the young man whispered to the two commissioners that he had been deceived by his guardians, and that he was ready to go to the tent and meet Lord Clive, without attending to the khans. In a very short time his lordship and the young nabob met in the tent, from which all the khans were presently ordered to withdraw. As those nobles disappeared, all objections

disappeared. The only anxiety displayed by the young man was about the provision for his personal expenses, and his power over the treasure of the late nabob, which he seemed to consider as large. He agreed that a treaty should be made out upon the basis proposed by the governor-general; declaring his conviction that such a treaty would prove beneficial to himself and his family. But, at another conference which took place on the following day, in the presence of the khans, the young man entirely changed his tone, and declared his fixed resolution to be guided by his guardians. It was thought that this extraordinary change might have proceeded from fear. The khans and the attendants were therefore dismissed, and Hoossein Ali was left in the tent tête-à-tête with Lord Clive. Contrary to expectation, his lordship found the youth firm and sullen. He declared that he would face every danger rather than submit to the conditions proposed. After trying a variety of arguments, Lord Clive, finding that he remained unmoved, informed him that he had forfeited all claims to consideration, and must abide the consequences.

The musnud was now offered, under the same conditions, to Azeem-ul-Dowlah. Difficulties of a serious nature occurred: this prince was kept in a most rigorous confinement by the khans; the commissioners could not get at him; and it was feared that, should his intended elevation be known, it might prove dangerous to his life. These difficulties were removed by the bold proceedings of the khans, which evinced a contempt of the Company's authority, and which required active and instant measures. These nobles privately placed Hoossein Ali on the musnud, and prepared to proclaim him publicly. Upon this Lord Clive gave immediate orders to the Company's troops to take possession of the palace, and remove all the nabob's guards. No resistance was offered: every part of the palace was occupied; the nabob's guards quietly withdrew; Azeem-ul-Dowlah was liberated from his prison, and had a guard of honour allotted to him. The liberated prince was grateful and submissive; on the 25th of July he concluded the treaty with Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, upon the basis laid down by the governor-general; and on the 26th he was introduced to Lord Clive, and conducted to the palace of Ameer Bagh, which had formerly been the residence of his father. By this treaty all the powers of government were delivered over in perpetuity to the Honourable East India Company, and were totally and for ever renounced by the nabob. Including all his allowances, nearly one-fifth of the revenues of the Carnatic was made over to the nabob; and he was relieved from the crushing weight of debt which had been created by his predecessors, which had encumbered the revenues of the country, and which was rapidly destroying all classes of the inhabitants. The Company engaged to liquidate, by degrees, all such portions of this great debt as should be proved to be just.* An end was thus put to that divided rule which had proved so great a curse; and the nabob was limited to that only sort of life for which nabobs were fit—a life of form and ceremony, of ease and magnificence. Ever since the conquests of the first and great Lord Clive, the rulers of the Carnatic, like those of Bengal and other countries, were virtually nothing but vassals and dependants on the English, without whose aid not one of them could have kept his seat on the musnud, or could have defended his country either from intestine troubles or from foreign invasion. In this light, and in none other, were they considered by their own subjects, and by all their neighbours. Their territories were substantially territories conquered by the sword and by policy, although the English chose to exercise the rights of conquest with gentleness and forbearance, and to cover over the real condition of the nabobs with strange metaphysical distinctions and refinements. Out of these quibbles sprang innumerable difficulties and embarrassments to our governors-general, to our judges of the supreme court at Calcutta, and to other functionaries; as well as many woes and long-

* Treaties published by the East India Company. 'Marquess Wellesley's Dispatches.' 'Sir John Malcolm's Political Hist. Ind.'

sufferings to the oppressed and distracted natives, who were often driven to despair by their mock rulers or nabobs, while the real sovereign power merely looked on. If the rights of sovereignty had been assumed—if the Company or nation had frankly proclaimed themselves, what they were *de facto*, the lords and rulers of the Carnatic, Oude, &c.—many evils might have been avoided: if when, by arms or by policy, the English first obtained dominion over these principalities and powers, they had assumed their proper style and title, instead of calling themselves protectors, allies, auxiliaries, and the like (with a false moderation of language which deceived no one, either in Europe or in Asia), the great Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, and the Marquess Wellesley would have been relieved from many a false position, and actions not always warranted by their *nominal* relations with the native princes would have been reconcilable to the Law of Nations.

The Rajah of Tanjore, the neighbour of the late Nabob of the Carnatic, was quite as dependent as that prince upon the Company, and had been quite as unfaithful to his treaties. On a more limited scale his government was equally destructive of industry and prosperity. He behaved so badly during Lord Cornwallis's war with Tippoo Sultaun, that the English deliberated even then upon the propriety of taking the government out of his hands. During Lord Harris's campaign and the siege of Seringapatam, he corresponded with the enemy, withheld the assistance he was bound to give to the English, and committed other offences. There was a claimant to the musnud who pleaded a more legitimate right to it, and who was ready to purchase his elevation by complying with the will of the Company; and as early as the end of October, 1799, Ameer Sing was dethroned, and Serfogee was put in his place, but not until he had resigned for ever all the powers of government to the English, and accepted a pension of one lac of star pagodas, with a fifth of the revenues.

In another and distant quarter a dependent and almost fictitious government was broken up. The nabob of Surat had long owed his political existence to the presidency of Bombay, who had garrisoned and held the castle of Surat, and had otherwise supported and defended him at a great expense. In 1797 the Court of Directors and the Bombay government expressed their impatience at the unliquidated and increasing debt, and called upon the nabob to reform his system, to disband his own undisciplined and mutinous soldiery, and assign to the Company funds sufficient to maintain three battalions of sepoys. After long pressing, the nabob agreed to pay one lac and thirty thousand rupees per annum to the Company; but before the treaty was finished he died, leaving only an infant son, who followed him to the grave in a very few weeks. The succession was claimed by the nabob's brother, who had no chance of success except through the countenance and assistance of the English. The government of Bombay refused to establish him on the musnud unless he agreed to pay the troops and the arrears due for them, and to admit a regular court of judicature. The claimant hesitated, equivocated; and thereupon, on the 10th of March, 1800, the governor-general ordered him to be set aside, and the government and revenues of Surat to be assumed by the English. A liberal allowance was made to the claimant. However distasteful this arrangement may have been to the helpless nabob, it was acceptable and highly beneficial to the people, who had repeatedly applied to the government of Bombay for protection against their native rulers, and for security to their property and trade. It was the English, and the English alone, that had preserved the city from the destructive conquests of the Mahrattas; and it was at the invitation of the inhabitants that the English had first taken possession of the castle of Surat. This was not a place to be left to the misrule and confusion which inseparably accompany a double or divided rule. Though declined from its ancient prosperity and magnificence, Surat, the capital of Guzerat, was still one of the most populous cities in all India, and being advantageously situated on the south bank of the Tuptee river, at the distance of only twenty miles

from the sea, its commerce was still considerable. It was inhabited by Mussulmans, Hindus, Parsees, and Borahs, and was frequented for the purposes of trade by people of other religions; and to preserve tranquillity in the city by checking the fanatical ebullitions of the followers of so many hostile faiths was a task which had far exceeded the power and faculties of the nabobs. Surat had been for many years the head-quarters of anarchy and assassination. In 1795 the Mohammedan and Hindu inhabitants waged a ferocious war upon one another in the streets, and committed atrocities which scared away many of the more pacific denizens and visitors, upon whose industry and trade the prosperity of the city mainly depended. There was no police, no law, no regularity in the collection of the taxes and port duties, no redress for any grievances, except occasionally by appeal to the British resident or to the presidency of Bombay; and Lord Mornington appears to have been justified in saying that the nabobs had proved themselves as incompetent to conduct the internal affairs of this populous city as to provide for its external defence. Here, as in Tanjore and in the Carnatic, the assumption of all the powers of government by the Company was felt as a blessing by the people; and if the ancient prosperity of Surat has not been restored, the cause is to be sought for, not in the mismanagement of the Company, but in natural circumstances over which government can exercise very little control. But now, at least, the reign of law and a good police are established, and the Mohammedan prays in his mosque, the Hindu performs his religious rites, and the Parsee, the disciple of Zoroaster, worships the Almighty power in the rising and the setting sun, without shedding each other's blood.

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CHAPTER VI.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUESS WELLESLEY CONTINUED.

It was highly necessary that the British power in India should be consolidated, and its command of resources extended, for when the governor-general had effected his settlements in Oude, the Carnatic, Tanjore, and Surat, he found himself on the verge of a long and most costly war. Tippoo was in his grave; but a new and formidable enemy to the English had started up in the Mahratta confederacy; and a clever Frenchman was lending the aid of his military knowledge and genius to these warlike Hindus. This Frenchman was M. Perron, of whom some mention has been already made. He had first come to the country as a petty officer of a ship with Admiral Suffrein, in the year 1782, when the government of Louis XVI. was making a desperate struggle with the genius and resources of Warren Hastings for the supremacy in Hindustan. After a variety of adventures he became quartermaster-sergeant to a corps containing some Frenchmen in the service of Scindiah. He fought for this chief in more than one great battle, and was gradually raised to the rank of a general, and to the command in chief of Scindiah's forces, the best and select portion of which owed to him the good discipline it had attained. A wide territory in the Jumna region was assigned to him by his thankful employer: he displayed much of the pomp and exercised much of the sovereignty of an Oriental potentate; and when, in 1793, that flitting phantom the Mogul emperor, Shah Alum, became the prisoner of Scindiah, it was to this once poor and lowly Frenchman, this ci-devant petty officer in Suffrein's squadron, that the custody of his person was confided. His honours, his wealth, and his authority excited the envy and malice of many of the Mahratta chiefs. In 1802, when Scindiah made war upon the Peishwa, or Mahratta sovereign of Poonah, and expelled him from his dominions, Perron lent his valuable assistance. The dispossessed Peishwa applied for assistance to the English, who had long conceived apprehensions of the turbulent spirit, the ambition, and power of Scindiah; and on the 31st of December, 1802, a subsidiary treaty was concluded at Bassein. The Nizam of the Deccan joined with the English and the Peishwa, while the powerful Rajah of Berar united his forces to those of Scindiah. The governor-general had three great objects in view—to restore the comparatively pacific and friendly Peishwa, to destroy or dissipate the formidable disciplined forces which Perron had raised, and which contained several other French officers, and to defeat Scindiah's vast plans of encroachment and aggrandizement, which were threatening to convulse the whole of India from the Himalaya Mountains to Cape Comorin. Hordes of banditti had been for some time daily pouring in from Malwa and Hindustan, to enrol themselves at Poonah under the banners of Scindiah, who promised them plunder as well as pay. It was impossible that these devouring armies should limit their operations to the Mahratta states, or to the contest for the sovereignty of those countries: they must be early forced by want, if not invited by policy, to invade the richer territories of the British government or the territories of its allies. The scene too was open to French intrigue. The governor-general had received intelligence of the peace of Amiens, which would allow the French to revisit India as friends, and then to renew their correspondence with all the enemies of the English. If Scindiah were allowed to

establish a complete ascendency over the Mahratta empire, from the banks of the Ganges to the Sea of Malabar, there could be little doubt in the mind of any man acquainted with the constitution of the army of that chief, and the influence and authority of the French officers by whom it was commanded, that the French nation might in a very few years aid him to the consolidation of a military power which would have struck at the very existence of the British government in India. Scindiah, and his father before him, had owed their power to French officers, to French arms, and to French *conseils*. The present ruler was so familiarized to their systems, manners, and feelings, as to be almost half a Frenchman himself. The Peishwa, in imploring for English assistance, had engaged to receive a subsidiary English force, and to cede, for its subsistence and pay, territories rendering an annual revenue of twenty-six lacs of rupees. The Peishwa at the same time engaged to identify his interests with those of the Company, and to conclude a defensive alliance on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad, which Lord Mornington had concluded with the Nizam of the Deccan. In the treaty of Bassein as finally concluded, on the 31st of December, 1802, these conditions were inserted. Moreover the Peishwa renounced all claims to Surat and to the other districts in Guzerat which had recently been assumed by the Company; he agreed to abide by the arbitration of the Company in all his unsettled disputes with the Nizam; and he also engaged to discharge from his service any Europeans that belonged to nations hostile to the English, or that were discovered meditating injury or carrying on intrigues injurious to the interests of the English. In return, the English government bound itself to furnish to the Peishwa a subsidiary force of six battalions of native infantry, with a complement of field-pieces and European artillerymen. The treaty of Bassein was confirmed by the governor-general on the 11th of February, 1803.

By the treaty of Amiens, Pondicherry and their other factories had been restored to the French. The Court of Directors conceived that this peace would be lasting, and therefore strongly recommended economy and retrenchment to their governor-general. But Lord Mornington and his brother never thought that there was any chance of remaining at peace with Bonaparte, and his lordship therefore wisely abstained from making any sudden reduction in the Indian army. In taking repossession of Pondicherry, the French officers acted with consummate imprudence, betraying the intentions of their master to make that city the centre of political intrigue, to sap the power of the Company while the peace lasted, and on the renewal of war to contend once more with the English for dominion over the East. The views of the French government in resuming these Indian possessions under the treaty of Amiens, were fully developed in a memoir drawn up by Monsieur Lefebvre, an officer attached to the staff that was formed for Pondicherry. It pointed out the possibility of a French army reaching India by way of Egypt and the Red Sea. While the English would be directing all their attention to defeat the advance of this armament from the west, one secret expedition could be prepared to proceed from Spain by way of Mexico to Manilla, and another secret expedition, to be provided by the Dutch, could proceed by the Cape of Good Hope to the Spanish islands in the Indian Ocean, and from thence to Trincomalee in Ceylon, a port of the greatest importance to the English navy. It was calculated that these three joint expeditions, aided by the Mahrattas and other native powers inimical to the English, must inflict an irreparable blow on the interests of Great Britain in India, and that, if those interests were once destroyed, the invasion and conquest of England would be easy achievements. According to M. Lefebvre's *projet*, the French and their auxiliaries, on arriving in Hindustan, were to declare that they came to give liberty and independence to the native princes, to liberate the Great Mogul from thraldom, and to reconstruct the once magnificent empire of Timour.

If Bonaparte (without doing anything else) could have forwarded encouragement, money, and support to that adventurer, Perron had abilities, and occupied

a position, which might long have proved very dangerous to the British power in India; although it does not appear that Perron had either much regard for Bonaparte or much nationality. It was thought that his leading passion was a love of money; and Lord Wellesley seems to have calculated on that passion as affording the means of detaching him from his old Indian master, and bringing him into the pay of the Company. When General Lake took the field with an army of 10,500 men, to co-operate with which force 3500 men were assembled near Allahabad, and about 2000 at Mirzapoor, the governor-general, who had previously instructed him to make every possible effort to destroy and scatter or win over Perron's brigades, wrote to Lake:—"It would be highly desirable to detach M. Perron from Scindiah's service, by *pacific negotiation*. M. Perron's inclination certainly is to dispose of his power to a French purchaser; but I should not be surprised if he were to be found ready to enter into terms with us; *provided he could obtain sufficient security for his personal interests*. I empower your excellency to conclude any agreement for the security of M. Perron's personal interests and property, accompanied by any *reasonable remuneration* from the British government, which shall induce him *to deliver up the whole of his military resources and power, together with his territorial possessions and the person of the Mogul, and of the heir-apparent, into your excellency's hands*. The same principle applies generally to M. Perron's European officers. And the proclamations with which I have furnished your excellency will enable you to avail yourself of the first opportunity of offering propositions to those officers, or to the several corps under M. Perron's command." It appears, however, that these ingenious proclamations and the correspondence opened did not produce the expected effect. That adventurer took the field with 16,000 or 17,000 infantry disciplined in the European manner, a large body of irregular infantry, from 15,000 to 20,000 Mahratta horse, and a numerous and well-appointed train of artillery. But in the meantime the younger brother of the governor-general, now Major-General Wellesley, had made a dash upon Poonah, had balked and driven out the Mahratta troops of Holkar, had saved, by a most rapid and brilliant movement,* that capital of the Peishwa from being burned by Holkar's people, and had reinstated that prince in his dominions. The Peishwa re-entered his capital early in the month of May. No opposition was offered to him; on the contrary, he was received by his subjects with demonstrations of joy and affection, and all the principal chiefs of the southern part of the Mahratta empire renewed their allegiance to him, and gave their approbation and sanction to the treaty which he had concluded with the English. Several of these great chiefs, whose power resembled that of the great English barons in the time of the feudal system, and who had not made their appearance at court for many years, now hastened to Poonah, with their mail-clad and lance-bearing followers. At first it was thought that the war would end here, and that Scindiah, awed by the strength and popularity of the restored Peishwa, and by the energy of the English generals, would endeavour to conclude a treaty of peace. But Scindiah gave ear to the confident assurance of M. Perron, and counted upon the number and efficiency of his disciplined corps. His great ally Holkar, too, was all for war. Holkar, who fled before General Wellesley without fighting, joined his forces to those of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. These allies

* It was in this beginning of the campaign, and through means which will presently be explained, that General Wellesley made a new era in our Indian warfare. To use his own words:

"We marched to Poonah from Seringapatam, the distance being nearly 600 miles, in the worst season of the year, through a country which had been destroyed by Holkar's army, with heavy guns, at the rate, upon an average, of thirteen and a half miles a day, and if the twelve days which we halted on the Toombudra for orders be excluded, we arrived at Poonah in two months from the time we marched. On this march we lost no draught-cattle. I remained in the neighbourhood of Poonah, in a country which deserves the name of a desert, for six weeks; and then marched again with the train in the same state as to numbers as when it left Seringapatam, and the troops and cattle were in the field during the monsoon."
—*Wellington Dispatches.*

assumed a very high tone. Their confederacy seemed the more dangerous as Scindiah possessed several convenient seaports through which he might receive assistance, if any should be sent him, from France, and as, conformably to the treaty of Amiens, the French had just now taken possession of their Indian factories. The energetic governor-general, whose plans were worked out by men as energetic as *himself*, resolved to allow the confederates no time. As in the days of Warren Hastings, immense marches were undertaken, and were performed with a much more astonishing precision and rapidity.

While General Lake marched towards Delhi, taking by storm, as he passed it, the important fortress of Ali-Ghur, General Wellesley kept the chief command of all the British and allied troops serving in the territories of the Peishwa and the Nizam of the Deccan, having full powers to direct all the political affairs of the British government in those countries.* After some fruitless negotiations with Scindiah, Wellesley marched from Poonah to the north, and, after sustaining a great loss in carriage-cattle, he reached Ahmednughur, a strong place garrisoned by Scindiah's troops, which he forthwith took by escalade. On the 24th of August he crossed the Godavery river, and on the 29th of that month he entered Aurungabad. On the same day that he crossed the Godavery, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, having avoided a corps under Colonel Stevenson, rushed with an immense army of cavalry, and of cavalry alone, into the Nizam's territory, by the Adjuntee ghaut or pass, intending to plunder and ravage, to cross the Godavery, and to march upon Hyderabad. "I hope," said Wellesley on the 30th, "to be able to strike a blow against their myriads of horse in a few days, if I should not be so unlucky as to have the Godavery become fordable about six weeks sooner than usual." He accordingly returned to that river and moved eastward along its northern bank to intercept the enemy and place himself between them and the very important city of Hyderabad. Scindiah and the Rajah immediately altered their course, striking away in the direction of Julnapoor; but Colonel Stevenson got there before them with the Nizam's auxiliary force, and made sure of that town. On the 12th of September Wellesley was encamped about twenty miles to the north of the Godavery, Colonel Stevenson being at some distance from him. From the rapidity of their movement it was no easy matter to come up with the Mahratta cavalry, who were committing terrible depredations; but Stevenson once or twice beat up their camp by making night marches. About the middle of September, Wellesley received information that Scindiah had been reinforced by sixteen battalions of infantry, commanded by French officers, and a large train of artillery; and that the whole of his and the Rajah's forces were now assembled near the banks of the Kaitna. On the 21st he drew nearer to Colonel Stevenson's corps, and held a conference with that distinguished officer, in which a general plan of attack was concerted. On the 22nd Colonel Stevenson took the western route, and Wellesley the eastern, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna. They expected to join forces and attack the enemy early on the morning of the 24th. But on the 23rd the general received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off that morning with their myriads of horse, and that their infantry were about to follow, but were as yet in camp at the distance of about six miles from him. General Wellesley therefore determined to march upon the infantry and engage it at once. He sent a messenger to Colonel Stevenson, who was at the moment about eight miles off on his left, to acquaint him with his intention and to direct his advance with all possible rapidity; he then moved forward with the 19th light dragoons and three regiments of native cavalry to reconnoitre. His infantry, consisting of only two British and five sepoy battalions, followed with all their speed. After he had ridden about four miles Wellesley, from an elevated plain, saw not only the infantry, but the whole Mahratta force, consisting of about 50,000

* Wellington Dispatches.

Fortress of Alli Ghur.

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men, encamped on the north side of the Kaitna, where the banks of that river were very steep and rocky. Their right, consisting of cavalry, extended to Bokerdon; their left, consisting of infantry, with 90 pieces of artillery, lay near the fortified village of Assaye, which has given its name to the memorable battle. No thought of retreat was entertained. Wellesley resolved to attack the infantry on its left and rear, and for that purpose he moved his little army to a ford a little beyond the enemy's left, leaving the Mysore and other irregular cavalry to watch the Mahratta cavalry, and crossing the river only with his regular horse and infantry. He passed the ford, ascended the steep bank, and formed his men in three lines, two of infantry and the third of horse. This was effected under a brisk cannonade from the enemy's artillery. Scindiah, or the European officer who directed his movements, promptly made a corresponding change in his line, giving a new front to his infantry, which was now made to rest its right on the river and its left upon the village of Assaye and the Juah stream, which flowed in a parallel direction with the Kaitna. Scindiah's numerous and well-served cannon did terrible execution among Wellesley's advancing lines, killing men and bullocks, and drowning the weak sound of his scanty artillery. At one moment such a gap was made by cannon-ball in the English right, that some of the Mahratta cavalry attempted to charge through it; but the British cavalry in the third line came up and drove the Mahrattas back with great slaughter. Finding his artillery of little or no use (the guns could not be brought up for lack of bullocks), General Wellesley gave orders to leave it in the rear, and bade the infantry charge with the bayonet. His steady, resolute advance in the teeth of their guns had already awed the Mahrattas, who would not stand to meet the collision of the bright English steel: their infantry gave way, and abandoned their terrible guns. One body of them formed again, and presented a bold front; but Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell charged them with the British cavalry, broke and dispersed them, and was killed in the moment of victory. Wellesley's sepoys having proceeded too far in pursuit, many of Scindiah's artillerymen, who had thrown themselves down among the carriages of their guns as though they were dead, got to their feet again and turned their pieces against the rear of the advancing sepoys; and at the same time the Mahratta cavalry, which had been hovering round throughout the battle, were still near. But Maxwell's exploit speedily led to the silencing of this straggling artillery fire, and to the headlong flight of Scindiah's disciplined infantry, who went off, and left 90 pieces of cannon, nearly all brass and of the proper calibres, in the hands of the conqueror. General Wellesley led the 78th British infantry in person against the village of Assaye, which was not cleared without a desperate combat. It was near dark night when the firing ceased. The splendid victory cost General Wellesley 22 officers and 386 men killed, and 57 officers and 1526 men wounded: excluding the irregular cavalry, which remained on the other side of the river, and had not been engaged, the total number of killed and wounded amounted to nearly one-third of his force. The general himself had two horses killed under him, one shot and the other piked; every one of his staff officers had one or two horses killed, and his orderly's head was knocked off by a cannon-ball as he rode close by his side. The enemy, who fled towards the Adjuntee Ghaut, through which they had passed into the Deccan, left 1200 dead, and a great number badly wounded, on the field of battle.*

> Shout, Britain, for the battle of Assaye,
> For that was a day
> When we stood in our array,
> Like a lion turn'd to bay,
> And the battle-word was conquer or die!†

The native cavalry of Fort St. George emulated the bravery and stamina of that splendid regiment the 19th light dragoons. At the most critical moment of the battle, which still ranks amongst the hardest fought of those that have been

* General Wellesley's own Dispatches and Letters, as printed in Colonel Gurwood's invaluable collection. Major Thorn, 'Memoir of the War in India,' &c.

† Indian War-Song.

gained by the illustrious Wellington, the British dragoons, when making their extremest efforts, saw their Asiatic fellow-soldiers "keep pace for pace and blow for every blow."*

Colonel Stevenson, who had encountered some unexpected obstacles, arrived at Assaye on the 24th, and was immediately dispatched after the flying enemy, whose infantry was, as usual, left behind and abandoned by the cavalry.

While these things were doing in the south, General Lake continued both his advance upon Delhi and his correspondence with Perron. This Frenchman now found great difficulty in keeping his army together and in preserving any discipline; a large portion of his cavalry left his camp and turned their horses' heads homewards, declaring their inability to oppose the English; and, what was still more fatal, his own French officers began to intrigue and plot against him. After making a spiritless demonstration near Ali-Ghur, he retreated without fighting, and with about 15,000 men, on the 29th of August. The town of Coel threw open its gates at Lake's approach; but the garrison of Ali-Ghur, the ordinary residence of Perron, and his principal military depôt, made a desperate resistance. On the 4th of September storming-parties, headed by Colonel Monson and Major Macleod, carried the place: 2000 of the garrison perished, the rest surrendered or fled out of the fort. On the very same day, however, five companies of Lake's sepoys, who had been left with only one gun to occupy a detached position commanding the road through which provisions must be brought up, found themselves under the necessity of surrendering to the enemy. They had been attacked on the 2nd by a cloud of cavalry commanded by a Frenchman of the name of Fleury. This time the sepoys beat off their numerous assailants; but on the 4th the Frenchman led the Mahrattas back to the attack, and the sepoys, having consumed nearly all their ammunition, were compelled to capitulate. Before the reinforcements sent by General Lake could reach the spot, Fleury and his flying horse had disappeared in the wide country behind the Jumna. Some days before the capture of Ali-Ghur and his depôt, Perron wrote to Lake, expressing a desire to effect some arrangement which might preclude the necessity of any actual contest between the English and the troops he commanded; and, even previously to this, he had applied for leave to pass through the Company's territories, intending, he said, to quit the service of Scindiah and return to Europe. These applications were followed up by the Frenchman sending a confidential agent to the English camp. This agent had a long private interview with General Lake, and is generally believed to have returned to his principal with a large sum of money in specie or in drafts upon the treasury at Calcutta. On the 7th of September (three days after the storming of Ali-Ghur), Lake received a letter from Perron, stating that he had quitted the service of Scindiah, and now requested permission to pass with his family, his effects, and the officers of his suite, through the Company's dominions to Lucknow. He stated as reasons for his retiring, that he had received intelligence that his successor had been appointed, and was already on his way to take his command from him; and that the treachery and ingratitude of his European officers had convinced him that further resistance to the British arms was useless. The permission demanded was readily granted by General Lake, who, as well as the governor-general, attached great importance to the withdrawing of the very able French adventurer. As Perron began his journey for Lucknow, General Lake, starting from Ali-Ghur, resumed his march upon Delhi. On the 11th of September the English general received intelligence that the army which had belonged to Perron, and which was now commanded by another Frenchman, had crossed the Jumna from Delhi, under cover of night, with the intention of fighting a battle for the defence of the ancient capital of the Great Moguls, but which was now the prison of the feeble representative of Timour. Lake's troops were fatigued with a long march, and oppressed by the

* Quarterly Review, No. xxxvi.

heat of the day, when they reached their ground of encampment, about six miles from Delhi; and they had scarcely pitched their tents before their outposts were attacked by some of the Frenchman's squadrons. This officer, named Louis Bourquien, had 19,000 men under his command; and he had posted his main body on a rising ground, with swamps on either flank, so that it was only their front that could be attacked, and that front was defended by a line of entrenchments, and a great number of cannon—almost as many as were turned against General Wellesley at Assaye. Lake had only 4500 men; but there was some admirable British infantry among them. By some ingenious movements, he tempted the enemy from their heights and entrenchments down to the plain; and, when they thought he was about to fly from the field, he turned upon them with one short volley, and then with the bayonet. They could not stand the charge—they ran towards their guns, which they had brought down to the plain, and which opened a tremendous fire of round, grape, and chain shot. But another volley and another bayonet charge drove them from their now exposed pieces; a charge of Lake's cavalry, and some rounds from his flying artillery, completed the *debâcle;* and the enemy fled to the banks of the Jumna, and beyond that river, leaving behind them 3000 or 4000 of their number killed, wounded, or prisoners, sixty-eight cannon—the whole of their artillery, a great quantity of ammunition, and their military chest. While it lasted, the affair had been very hot: General Lake had his horse shot under him, and three or four hundred of his people were laid low by the grape and chain shot. On the following morning Lake encamped opposite to the city of Delhi, which, together with the fort, was evacuated by those who held the Mogul in thraldom. On the 14th of September, Louis Bourquien and four other French officers who had fought in the late action surrendered as prisoners of war in the British camp; on the 16th General Lake paid a visit to Shah Alum, who had long before expressed his anxious wish to avail himself of the protection of the British government, and this visit was accompanied with processions and pomps of an extraordinary kind. The Mogul, who was now old and blind, and miserably poor, received General Lake as a deliverer, and gave him—which was about all he could give—a series of sounding Oriental titles, as "The Sword of the State, the Hero of the Land, the Lord of the Age, and the Victorious in War." [The aged descendant of the great Timour had some reason to rejoice at being received into British protection; Scindiah had tyrannized over him in the most barbarous fashion, and, before Scindiah had gotten possession of his person and of his dominions, a chief named Gholaum Khadur had struck out one of his eyes with his own dagger, had ordered a domestic of the palace to deprive the emperor of his remaining eye, and, meeting a refusal, had struck off the servant's head with one stroke of his scymitar.] Another of the French adventurers surrendered; and now no military man of any note or ability, of that nation, remained in this part of India. From Delhi General Lake proceeded to Agra, where he arrived on the 4th of October. The garrison in the fort returned no answer to his summons to surrender; but some outposts were easily carried, some of the defeated troops deserted to General Lake, and on the 17th, when breaching-batteries began to open their fire, the garrison capitulated.

So vast were the resources of Scindiah, that he had been enabled to send seventeen regular disciplined battalions, and from 4000 to 5000 horse, to endeavour to regain possession of Delhi, while General Lake was engaged in the siege of Agra. On the 27th of October, when he had garrisoned and secured his last conquest, Lake started in search of this new enemy. The rains were falling heavily, the roads were in a wretched state, and at some points they were inundated by the enemy, who had cut the embankments of reservoirs; but speed was necessary, and, leaving the rest of his forces behind him, Lake pushed forward with his cavalry alone, marching from midnight on the 31st of October till seven o'clock the next morning, when he found the enemy well posted, with their right

upon a stream, their left on the village of Laswaree, and with their front provided with seventy-two pieces of artillery. Lake's foremost brigade came in contact with the Mahrattas' left, and drove it in and penetrated into the village of Laswaree, which has given its name to the battle;* but here they were exposed to a terrible fire of cannon and musketry; Colonel Vandeleur fell, and Lake thought it prudent to draw off the brigade. Other brigades who had attacked at other points were also obliged to fall back; but they carried away with them several of the enemy's guns. The infantry and artillery which Lake had left behind had started on their march at three o'clock, and had continued to march with such spirit, that they performed twenty-five miles in somewhat less than eight hours, and joined him and his cavalry a little before eleven o'clock. At their apparition the enemy offered upon certain conditions to surrender their guns and retire. Lake, anxious to stop the effusion of blood, granted the conditions proposed, but, seeing that they hesitated, he gave them one hour to decide whether they would accept the terms or fight. The hour expired, and then the real battle began. On the side of the British the brunt was borne by the King's 76th regiment, which, with a battalion and five companies of sepoys, had to sustain a tremendous fire of canister-shot and a massive charge of cavalry. "This handful of heroes," as Lake called them, though thinned by the enemy's artillery, stood firm, and repulsed the horse. Then Major Griffiths was sent at the head of the 29th dragoons to sweep away that numerous cavalry, a duty which he performed completely, though not without losing his own life, being struck by a cannon-ball. Then followed the terrible bayonet charge of the British infantry, the right wing of which was led by Major-General Ware, who was killed by another cannon-shot.† For a time the enemy seemed determined to defend their position to the last, disputing every point inch by inch, and only giving way when the bayonets were at their breast, and their own artillery turned against them. Even when their situation had become altogether desperate, they continued to manifest the same dogged courage: their left wing endeavoured to effect a retreat in good order; but this attempt was frustrated by a brilliant charge, made by the 27th regiment of dragoons and a regiment of native cavalry. But presently the mass of the enemy either fled from the field, or cried for quarter, and surrendered; and all the artillery, all the baggage, and nearly everything belonging to them, fell into the hands of the victors. With the exception of 2000 who surrendered, the whole of their 17 battalions were destroyed. It was calculated that the dead alone on the field could hardly have been less than 7000. Though some of their cavalry were enabled, by the fleetness of their horses and local knowledge, to escape destruction, the rest, excepting those who had the good fortune to conceal themselves among the bazaar people, were numbered with the slain. The English loss amounted to 172 killed and 652 wounded. General Lake, who had personally led the charge of cavalry in the morning, who had afterwards led on the 76th, and who had conducted nearly every operation of the day, had two horses shot under him, and saw his son, who was acting as his aide-de-camp, badly wounded by his side. But the battle of Laswaree most honourably terminated the mission which had been intrusted to this active and gallant officer.*

* At first this affair was called the Battle of Cassowly. *Wellington Dispatches.*

† "Major-General Ware fell dead, his head being carried off by a cannon-shot. He was an excellent officer, and his loss was severely felt and deeply lamented by the whole army. After his death the command of the column devolved upon Colonel Macdonald, who, though wounded, continued in the exercise of the important trust with the utmost activity, judgment, and intrepidity, till the close of the action."—*Memoirs of the War in India, conducted by General Lord Lake, Commander in-Chief, and Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley (Duke of Wellington), from its commencement in 1803 to its termination in 1806, on the banks of the Hyphasis, &c. By Major William Thorn, Captain 25th Light Dragoons.*

* "The seventeen battalions annihilated at Laswaree were called the Deccan Invincibles, and were considered as the flower of Scindiah's army, which altogether had made immense and rapid strides towards the point of perfection of the best of European troops. Throughout this event-

Lake had defeated, routed, annihilated that army of Perron which had caused the governor-general such great and reasonable alarm, and had placed in the hands of the English all the extensive territory watered by the Jumna; and, between him and General Wellesley, the power of Scindiah and all the most perilous part of the Mahratta confederacy was utterly shattered before the end of the year. Scindiah asked for and obtained a truce from Wellesley at the beginning of November; but his ally the Rajah of Berar still kept the field; and when the English commander came up with this rajah in the plains of Argaum, about twenty miles north of the Poorna river, he found Scindiah's cavalry drawn up with him—no uncommon instance of the faith with which these Indian chiefs observed truces and treaties. On the 29th of November, Wellesley attacked and defeated the whole host, who fled in the greatest disorder, leaving thirty-eight cannon and all their ammunition to the conquerors; whose cavalry moreover pursued them by bright moonlight for several miles, taking many elephants, camels, and much baggage.*

After the battle of Argaum, General Wellesley determined to lose no time in commencing the siege of Gawil-Ghur, one of the strongest fortresses in India, situated on a lofty rock, in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, and consisting of one complete inner fort fronting the south, where the rock is steepest; of an outer fort, covering the inner one to the north-west and north; and of a third wall, covering the approach to the rock from the north by the village of Labada. All the walls were strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers. The communications with the fort were through three gates. The ascent to the first gate was very long and steep, and practicable only for men; that to the second was by a road used by the garrison, but it wound round the west side of the fort, and was exposed for a great distance to its fire, the road being at the same time very narrow, so as to render a regular approach impracticable, and the rock being scarped on each side; the road to the third, or northern gate, was broad, and over ground level with the fort, to which it led directly from the village of Labada; but, to get at that village, it was necessary to take a road which ran thirty miles through the mountains, and it was obvious that the difficulty and labour of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great.* This last route was, however, adopted. The chief management of the siege was intrusted to Colonel Stevenson, General Wellesley covering his operations with his own division and with all the cavalry, and intending, if possible, to assist by making attacks from the southward and westward, while the colonel attacked from the north. It took Stevenson from the 7th of December to the 12th to reach Labada; and during those five days the troops in his division went through a series of laborious services, such as nobody with the army had ever witnessed before, and that too with the utmost cheerfulness as well as perseverance. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains, and through ravines, for nearly the whole distance, by roads which it had been previously necessary for the soldiers to make for themselves. By the 12th, at night, however, Colonel Stevenson had broken ground, and erected two batteries in front of the north face of the fort of Gawil-Ghur; and on the same night General Wellesley's division constructed one battery on the mountain under the southern gate, with the view to breach the wall

ful Mahratta war every conflict gave evidence of this improvement, which was attributable to the connection of the natives with the French, whose energies, address, and abilities were exerted to the utmost in exasperating the chiefs against the English, and in forming their subjects into hardy and disciplined soldiers, with the view of thereby overthrowing our dominion in the East."—*Major Thorn, Memoir of the War in India, &c.*

* "From unavoidable circumstances," says the general, "we did not begin the action till late in the day, and not more than twenty minutes' sun remained when I led on the British cavalry to the charge. But they made up for it by continuing the pursuit by moonlight; and all the troops were under arms till a very late hour in the night."—*Private letter to the Hon. H. Wellesley, in Colonel Gurwood's Wellington Dispatches.*

* Wellington Dispatches, Dispatch from General Wellesley to the Governor-General.

near that gate, or, at all events, to distract the enemy by drawing their attention to that quarter. The enemy's garrison was numerous: it consisted of Rajpoots, and of a great body of regular infantry, who had escaped from the battle of Argaum, and who were all well armed with English muskets and bayonets; but on the 25th, some breaches being made, and the outer walls carried by storm, the light infantry of the 94th regiment, headed by Captain Campbell, fixed their ladders against the inner fort, in which no breach whatever had been made, gallantly escaladed the high wall, and opened the gate for the storming-party, who, in a trice, were entire masters of every part of the fortress. Vast numbers of the garrison were killed, particularly at the different gateways: their general or commander, Beny Sing, and his killadar, were found buried, like Tippoo at Seringapatam, amidst a heap of slain near a gateway; and some of the Rajpoot chiefs, according to the custom of their country, had put their wives and daughters to death before going out to meet their own.* On the 17th of December, or two days after the fall of Gawil-Ghur, the Rajah of Berar signed the conditions of peace which Wellesley dictated, ceding to the Company the important province of Cuttack, with the district of Balasore, and dismissing all the French or other European officers in his service. Before the Rajah ratified the treaty, General Wellesley had made three marches towards Nagpoor, "in order to keep alive the impression under which it was evident that the treaty had been concluded." As soon as Scindiah found that the Rajah had made peace, he began to be alarmed, and to implore to be allowed to negotiate; and on the 30th of December he signed a treaty of peace, by which he yielded to the Company all the country between the Jumna and the Ganges, besides numerous forts, territories, rights, and interests; engaging to conform to the treaties which the Company had made with the Peishwa, to recognise the right of the Peishwa to the territories which the Company had put him in possession of, and, in case of any difference afterwards between him and the Peishwa, to admit the mediation, arbitration, and final decision of the Company. Scindiah also agreed to dismiss such European officers as he yet had, and (as the Rajah of Berar had also done) "never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power the government of which may be at war with the British government; or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British government."*

In the course of these campaigns an immense extent of country had been traversed, separate co-operating corps had been moved with a rare regularity and intelligence, and had, when necessary, been brought to a junction with admirable precision as to time and place; the staff officers had surveyed the country with a much improved skill; the army made no blunders through that want of proper intelligence which had so often been felt elsewhere; the marches had been more rapid, as well as more certain; and, altogether, there was visible an immense improvement, which few or none will dispute was mainly due to the practice and example of Arthur Wellesley. In a private letter to one of his brothers, the great and accomplished soldier said at the time—"The operations of this war have afforded numerous instances of improvement in our means of communication, of obtaining intelligence, and, above all, of movement. Marches such as I have made in this war were never known or thought of before. In the last eight days of the month of October, I marched above 120 miles, and passed through two ghauts with heavy guns and all the equipments of the troops, and this without injury to the efficiency of the army; and in the few days previous to this battle (Argaum), when I had determined to go into Berar, I never moved less than between seventeen and twenty miles, and I marched twenty-six miles on

* Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Dispatches; and Journal of Major-General Sir Jasper Nicolls, as quoted by Colonel Gurwood.

* Treaties of the E. Ind. Comp. with Native Powers, &c.

Gawil-Ghur.

No. 29.

the day on which it was fought."* It was in this great field of India, where alone a British officer could now have the handling of great masses of men, that Arthur Wellesley prepared himself for the duties which he had afterwards to perform in Portugal and Spain, and that he laid the groundwork of the lofty and enduring edifice of the fame of the Duke of Wellington.

Nearly everything had depended upon the rapidity of movement, and the facility of moving the matériel of the army. The great danger in Indian warfare is that of not being able to bring the enemy to action. Hyder Ali well knew the advantages of this Parthian mode. When an English commander, weary of pursuing him, reproached him for flying before so small a force, Hyder replied, "You will understand my mode of war in time. Shall I risk my cavalry, which costs 1000 rupees a horse, against your cannon-balls that cost two pice? No; I will march your troops till their legs shall become the size of their bodies. You shall not have a blade of grass or a drop of water. I shall hear you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a month. I will give your army battle; but it must be when I please, and not when you desire it."† Hyder Ali kept his word; and Scindiah's army, abounding in cavalry and in transport cattle, seemed disposed to act upon this system. But the active mind of the English general had long been intent on the means of improving the cattle of his army, without which there could be no rapid movements. Fastidious and inferior intellects had despised such subjects; but his talk and his thoughts had long been of oxen. Like his then commander-in-chief, General Harris, he had grieved over the miserably slow marches of the army in the last campaign against Tippoo. This slow progress was entirely owing to the bad system then in force for the draught and carriage departments. This defect in the organization of our Indian army had been seriously felt and complained of by every succeeding commander-in-chief from the time of Sir Eyre Coote* to that of Lord Cornwallis; but nothing had been done to remedy it. With every new war the wild and small cattle of the Carnatic were to be purchased, at whatever price, and attached to the guns without previous training or experienced drivers; and it was chiefly owing to this wretched system, and to the great superiority of the Mysore cattle, that Hyder and his son had defeated every attempt made by our commanders to overtake them in the field. This most serious defect was effectually removed after the capture of Seringapatam, for General Harris immediately recommended the use and protection of Tippoo's admirable establishment of cattle, which was unequalled in India; and General Wellesley joined in making urgent representations to his brother the governor-general, and in making every possible effort to keep up and increase the breed, and to give the animals proper training and proper drivers. "'It was this establishment which enabled Hyder Ali to march 100 miles in two days and a half to the relief of Chillumbrum, and, after every defeat, to draw off his guns in face of his enemies; which enabled Tippoo Sultaun to cross the Peninsula in one month for the recovery of Bednore, and to march 63 miles in two days before General Medows. . . . It was also this establishment which enabled General Wellesley to effect those movements of unexampled rapidity which are the admiration of every military man."† When the war was over, and when General Wellesley was about to return to England, he most earnestly recommended the breeding establishment in Mysore to the commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Stuart; and from this time the breed of cattle began

* Letter to the Hon. H. Wellesley, Wellington Dispatches.

† Southey, in Quarterly Review, No. XXV.

* Sir Eyre Coote had said after the battle of Cuddalore, "If Hyder Ali, buoyed up with former success, had not come to seek us, I could not have moved the army to follow him; and this is a situation so trying to the responsible military commander, that an officer of character shudders at the idea of being placed in such a predicament."

† Memorandum on the Establishment of Draught Bullocks and the Breeding Establishment in Mysore, by Col. M. Cubbon, in Appendix to Life and Services of General Lord Harris, by the Right Hon. S. R. Lushington.

to be not only prodigiously increased, but greatly improved. "The cattle of this establishment are as different from all other Indian cattle, as the Arab is from the country horse; and as superior to them not merely in their blood and configuration, but their strength and energy, their quick step, power of endurance, and of keeping their condition under great privation. Heavier and larger cattle may be found, perhaps, better calculated for the slow movement of heavy ordnance, but none that can be compared to them in spirit and activity, that, like them, would make forced marches with troops, withstand all changes of weather, or be so fresh at the end of a campaign. This breed is peculiar to Mysore, and takes its name from the village of Hagglewaddy. Its origin is beyond tradition, but it has ever been in the hands of the ruling power, on account of its superior qualities."* These cattle, by the regulations of the Indian government, are at the disposal of the commander-in-chief for the time being, and their distribution rests with him. The advantage of possessing such an establishment, in time of war, is beyond all calculation, and has often been felt at critical moments. It was owing to the superb bullocks furnished by it, that Major-General Pritzler was in a condition to march 346 miles in 25 days, in pursuit of the Mahrattas, in the war of 1817; and that Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell was enabled, after the failure of his Bengal equipments, to advance upon Ava in 1825, and bring that very trying war to a favourable termination. Equal care was bestowed by General Wellesley on the commissariat departments, which had been managed better than they had ever been before by an English army, whether in Europe, Asia, or America, since the days of the great Marlborough, whose letters and dispatches, like those of his great successor, abound in minute details, which prove the incessant attention paid to this important subject. The agreeable picture which Bishop Heber has drawn of the Brinjarrees seems to be correct only with reference to that class of men as improved by the kind and considerate treatment they received in the course of this campaign against Scindiah, and by the wise system which was adopted by Lake and Wellesley, and which has since been followed by all our commanders in the field.* On his first acquaintance with them, General Wellesley found them shy of approaching his army, apt to quarrel with his sepoys, much given to plunder, and still more to trickery and cheating, and often very slow in bringing up their bad corn and rice. One of the most serious annoyances he suffered in his advance from Poonah to the field of Assaye arose out of the great disinclination of the Poonah brinjarrees to come forward at all in the service of the British army. On that march his brinjarrees "played tricks, as usual," and left him with only one-third of the rice which he ought to have had. They deserted Colonel Murray's corps altogether, leaving the soldiers for some days to the chance of starvation. They were found unmanageable unless their profits were enormous; and, unless they attended the camps as dealers on their own account, their dishonesty and rascality were prodigious. To effect a change in their character and habits, General Wellesley had recourse to those excellent means which have since been adopted as a system. One of his officers, who shared in the difficulty, danger, and glory of this campaign, says, "General Wellesley has always made it a point to encourage these people, by promises, kindnesses, presents, indeed, by every kind of liberality of which he possesses the means, to attend

* Memorandum, &c. by Col. Cubbon.

* "The brinjarries, or carriers of grain, are a singular wandering race, who pass their whole time in transporting this article from one part of the country to another, seldom on their own account, but as agents for more wealthy dealers. They move about in large bodies, with their wives, children, dogs, and loaded bullocks. The men are all armed, as a protection against petty thieves. From the sovereigns and armies of Hindostan they have no apprehensions. Even contending armies allow them to pass and repass safely, never taking their goods without purchase, or even preventing them, if they choose, from victualling their enemy's camp. Both sides wisely agree to respect and encourage a branch of industry, the interruption of which might be attended with fatal consequences to both."—*Bishop Heber, Indian Journal.*

our camp, and collect grain for the army. He advances them money; takes their grain when not immediately wanted; gets the duties on its transport remitted; procures permits to collect it in our allies' territories; gives or orders escorts; provides guards in camp, or wherever required: whenever they meet extraordinary losses, he balances them by the price; and not seldom has he ordered two or three rupees a head, as a reward for each bullock brought."* The fame of these proceedings soon spread throughout the country, and gradually produced the desired effect. A few days after the battle of Assaye, when provisions were much wanted, from 2000 to 3000 bullocks loaded with grain approached the camp. They belonged to a brinjarree tribe, who had collected the grain to the eastward and southward, and who were looking out for one of the armies, where they would be sure of a market. This was their own account; but it was most likely that they were going to Scindiah, or to his ally, the Rajah of Berar. The Cutwahl, or head native civil magistrate in camp, heard of their approach when at a distance, and by his dexterity induced them to go to the British army—a step which it might not have been convenient or politic (considering the effects likely to be produced upon other brinjarree communities) to have *forced* them to take. General Wellesley was very generous to these brinjarrees, and to the cutwahl who had induced them to carry their grain to his market, instead of taking it to his enemies. To the cutwahl he gave a heavy pair of gold bangles, enhancing considerably the value of the gift by putting them on the man's wrists with his own hands. "Marks of favour are highly esteemed by inferiors in all countries, but in none more than in India: this simple attention of General Wellesley, no doubt, raised the cutwahl very much in his little city, the camp bazaar."† On other occasions he gave handsome dresses and turbans to the brinjarree chiefs. After this the brinjarrees began to flock to the camp, and to follow the army without the necessity of any solicitation; and thus one of the most important obstacles to the progress of war, and the greatest of all calamities to the chances of which our troops were exposed, were effectually removed.* Even the proneness to trickery and cheating was diminished when the brinjarrees found that they could make a surer profit by being honest.

In the course of this same year the enterprising Governor-General of India had set in motion a third and a fourth army against the Mahratta confederacy, the existence of which, formidable in itself, might have become in the highest degree dangerous, if Bonaparte could have succeeded in throwing any considerable force into Hindustan. As elsewhere, the progress of British arms was favoured by intestine dissensions, disputed successions, and furious jealousies among the Mahratta chiefs. Colonel Powell, starting from Allahabad, with troops belonging to the Bengal establishment, overran the often-disputed province of Bundelcund,

* Journal of Major-General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., written in the field, 5th October, 1803, as quoted by Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Dispatches.

† Id. id.

* Colonel Gurwood, 'Wellington Dispatches.' It should appear, too, that some changes were introduced into the old system, in order to render the brinjarrees more extensively useful to armies in the field. After this Scindiah war—in November, 1804—we find General Wellesley thus describing these indispensable attendants on an Indian army:—

"*Brinjarrees.* These are a class of carriers who gain a livelihood by transporting grain or other commodities from one part of the country to another. They attend armies, and trade nearly in the same manner as they do in common times of peace. They either purchase grain themselves in the country with their own money, or with money advanced to them by the Company, and sell it in the bazaar, at the rates of the day, on their own account; or they take grain at the Company's stores at certain reduced rates, and sell it on their own account in the bazaars; or they take up grain in the Company's stores, and carry it with the army, and receive a sum of money for every march they make, and the grain is sold in the bazaars on account of the Company; or they hire their cattle by the month to the Company, and take up grain from the public stores and carry it with the army, where it is sold in the bazaars on the account of the Company.

"It is the business of the superintendent of supplies to settle all these various accounts, and to see that the brinjarrees get fresh loads as fast as they empty them; and to know always, as nearly as possible, the quantity of grain which this description of people have got."

reducing the forts, and establishing the authority of the Company. Powell fought one pitched battle near Capsah, in which, as usual, the enemy made good use of their artillery, but were routed with loss. Fort Calpee, on the south-western side of the Jumna, and Gualior, which commands an important pass and defends the frontiers of Gohud, were the most important of the fortresses taken. Gualior, which had once been in our possession (having been gallantly stormed and taken in 1780, by Major—afterwards General—Popham, one of Warren Hastings's best fighting men), but which had been ceded by treaty to a faithless ally, had ever been considered a military post of the greatest importance: the fort, in strength and situation, resembled Gawil-Ghur, standing on a very steep hill, which was long and narrow at the top, and dipped almost perpendicularly at the sides. To block up some other passes through which the Mahrattas might make inroads, as soon as Powell had secured his footing in Bundelcund, Lieut.-Colonel Broughton was detached to the eastern provinces of Berar, to seize the fortress of Sumbulpoor, to drive out some freebooting bands, and to destroy or scatter the only Mahratta force which was left anywhere in the country between Bundelcund, Berar, and Cuttack. Cutting a road for his artillery across a deep and extensive forest, and overcoming every obstacle, Broughton executed every part of the task intrusted to him. Colonel Harcourt, with a division of the Madras army which had been stationed in the Northern Circars, marched from Ganjam on the 8th of September, to drive the Mahratta chiefs out of Cuttack, a province of which the best part was actually in our possession before the Rajah of Berar formally ceded it by treaty. The Mahrattas on the frontier fled, the Bramins of Juggernaut placed their pagoda and idol under British protection, which in itself was a very important advantage; and, after some delay, occasioned by the rains, Harcourt continued his advance, entered the city of Cuttack, and laid siege to the fort, a place of considerable strength, having only one entrance by a narrow bridge over a wet ditch of enormous dimensions. But a co-operating force, detached from the Bengal army, and which might be called a sixth army, or corps d'armée, had landed at Balasore on the 21st of September, and, after getting possession of all the country on the coast, sent forward reinforcements to Cuttack to assist in the siege of the fortress. That place was stormed and taken on the 14th of October, and the fall of the fort left Harcourt undisputed master of the whole of the province.* In Harcourt's operations, as in all the rest of this far-extending, extraordinary campaign, there was a plan of co-operation and mutual assistance: as soon as he had captured the great fortress of Cuttack, he detached Major Forbes to occupy the defile of Bermuth, which formed the only entrance into the province of Cuttack through the chain of mountains which separated it from the states of the Rajah of Berar. Forbes performed his duty admirably; several of the neighbouring Rajahs fled from the tyranny of the great Rajah of Berar, and threw themselves under the protection of the British; the pass of Bermuth was secured; and in a few weeks Colonel Harcourt and the troops that had conquered Cuttack defiled through it, and co-operated with General Wellesley, distracting the attention of the enemy while he advanced and captured Gawil-Ghur. In all these combined movements of different corps, from such opposite points and over so extensive a range of country, scarcely one error of any consequence appears to have been committed, the different detachments meeting at the very time and place appointed, and, whether close together or far asunder, moving like different wheels of one great machine, set in motion by one master power.

The seat of war had extended nearly all over the continent of India, and had exhibited, in the short space of four months, four general and well-contested battles, and eight regular sieges and stormings of

* The British troops in Cuttack appear to have suffered more from wild beasts than from the spear of the Mahrattas. The country abounded with forests, the forests swarmed with leopards, and other beasts of prey, and these devoured a good many of our drowsy or negligent sentinels.

fortresses. British valour and military genius (for even the high word genius is applicable here) had triumphed over accumulated obstacles, the combination of truly formidable powers, and over every advantage arising to the enemy from local position, military means (especially in their immense and well-served trains of artillery), and numerical strength, which had been so improved by French training and discipline. The armies which Wellington had fought at Assaye and Argaum, and which Lake had fought at Delhi and Laswaree, were not what Indian armies had been in the days of Clive and Coote, but admirably officered, and capable of contending with most of the armies of Europe. And, should any attempt be made to diminish the reputation of our two commanders by quoting the native superiority of British and Irish-bred soldiers, it ought to be remembered that the number of Europeans either in Lake's or Wellesley's army was comparatively small; that the mass of their materials were of native growth, were Indians like those that were serving in the armies of Scindiah; and that the disparity of numbers was so great that, if every European under Lake or Wellesley, or in the separate corps operating with them, should be counted as worth five well armed and disciplined natives, the British force would still be greatly inferior.*

The signal successes of the year 1803 gave to the British empire other advantages besides the acquisition of the Mahratta dominions between the Jumna and the Ganges: they secured, by the possession of Delhi, Agra, and Calpee, the mastery and free navigation of the Jumna, with an important tract of country along the right bank of that river; they gave us the greater part of the rich province of Bundelcund, the whole of Cuttack in Orissa, and the most valuable territory in Guzerat, with valuable ports which were before accessible to the enemy—our mortal enemy, France—thereby securing the navigation along that immense coast, from the mouths of the Ganges to the mouths of the Indus; and, furthermore, they gave to the Company a stronger frontier in the Deccan, and to our allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa, an important accession of strength.* A metaphysician and utilitarian writing after the fact, and far removed from the danger, splitting fine straws in a quiet suburb of that great capital which has not heard the sound of real war, nor in reality ever been exposed to the risk of hearing it, for so many ages, may undervalue the services performed by Lake and the two illustrious brothers, and may underrate and split, or shave down to nothing, the danger with which we were threatened by French intrigue and the Mahratta confederacy, emboldened by hopes of important succours from France, which were actually on their way before the *coup-de-grace* was struck, and which might, by the unsteady chances of wind and weather and the casualties of the ocean, have been allowed to reach their destination; but the British subjects who were living in India, whose lives or property, or both, were at stake, who knew the animus and the means of Scindiah and his allies, and who saw all the danger from a near point, certainly entertained notions very different from those of the not very national historian of British India. Some of these ideas were well and honestly expressed, at the termination of the war, in an address presented by the British inhabitants of Calcutta to the Governor-General, Lord Wellesley. These Englishmen stated that, at a moment when the renewal of war in Europe was certain, the menacing attitude of the armies assembled by the Mahratta princes and the uncontrolled authority exercised by French adventurers over the disciplined troops of Scindiah, could not have been viewed without extreme anxiety, nor have been suffered to continue without endangering the whole of our Eastern empire; and, after a proper tribute paid to the army and its gallant and skilful commanders,

* Major Thorn calculates the numerous Mahratta armies brought into the field in the whole course of the campaign at 250,000 men; and the corps organized by their French auxiliaries at 40,000 more, at the least.

* Major Thorn's Memoir of the War in India.—In all, upwards of 1000 pieces of cannon had been captured by Lake, Wellesley, and their subordinates, together with ammunition, treasure, and stores in proportion.

they said that the British power in India had been raised to the proudest pre-eminence; that, "by this auspicious conclusion of a rapid and glorious war, the enemies of the British empire were humbled, French influence was annihilated, our allies were encouraged, our resources enlarged and solidly established, and the British dominions in India rendered at once more secure of enjoying the advantages of peace, and more capable of repelling the dangers of war." The British residing in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay were not behind those residing in Bengal, in expressing their sense of the great danger they had been exposed to, and in testifying their gratitude for the services which had rescued the whole of our Eastern settlements from a state of jeopardy, and fixed them upon a basis of better and more permanent security.

Many brilliant achievements at sea have been omitted for the sake of brevity, but the following exploit was attended with too important consequences, and the honour of it belongs too exclusively to the officers of the East India Company, to be passed over in silence.

The French admiral Linois, who had reached Pondicherry, and who had been enabled to escape from that roadstead, finding he could do no good in the Mahratta war, hoped to do some mischief to the English by picking up a few of their stray Indiamen. He had captured several of these ships, and had plundered the English factory at Bencoolen, when, on the 14th of February, 1804, he fell in with a rich fleet of East Indiamen and country ships that were coming from China, and on the point of entering the straits of Malacca. As Linois had with him a ship of the line, three frigates, and a brig, and as our merchant vessels had no men-of-war to convoy them, he made quite sure of an easy swoop and of an immense prize. But, by this time, the Company's ships were generally armed and well officered; and Captain (afterwards, by grace of this action, Sir N.) Dance, who was acting as commodore to the fleet of traders, was both an able and a brave sailor. At sunset, Linois was close up with the English rear, and Dance was in momentary expectation of an attack; but the French hauled to windward; and the India ships lay-to in line of battle all night, the men being at their quarters, and ready to engage at any moment. At daybreak of the 15th, Dance saw his enemy lying about three miles to windward; and, at the sight, he gallantly hoisted his colours, and offered him battle, if he chose to come down. Linois's ship of the line and his three frigates showed French colours, the brig Dutch colours. At nine o'clock, seeing that the French would not come down, Dance formed in order of sailing, and steered his course under an easy sail. Linois then filled his sails and edged towards him. At one P.M., Dance, finding that the enemy were proposing to cut off his rear, made the signal to tack, and bear down on them, and engage in succession. This manœuvre was correctly performed by three of the Indiamen; and the rest stood towards Linois under a press of sail. The French then formed in very close line, and opened their fire on Dance's headmost ships, which did not return their fire until they got to closer quarters. The 'Royal George' bore the brunt of the action, getting very near the enemy, engaging for about forty minutes, and firing eight or nine broadsides. She was ably seconded, as they came up, by the 'Ganges,' 'Earl Camden,' 'Warley,' and 'Alfred;' the 'Ganges' being in action about thirty-five minutes, and firing seven or eight broadsides; the 'Earl Camden' being in action about twenty-five minutes, and the two other named ships about a quarter of an hour. Before any more of the Indiamen could come up and engage, the enemy hauled their wind, and stood away to the eastward, under all the sail they could set. At two P.M., Dance made the signal for a general chace, and pursued Linois until four P.M.; when, considering the immense property at stake, and fearing that a longer pursuit would carry him too far from the mouth of the Straits of Malacca, the gallant commodore of this well-conducted merchant fleet made the signal to tack; and, the signal being well obeyed, by eight in the evening they all anchored safely in a situation to enter the Strait the next morning.

Nothing more was seen of Linois, who, according to his own account, had run away through fear of being surrounded. The 'Royal George' had one man killed, and another wounded, many shot in her hull, and more in her sails. Not a man was hurt in any of the other ships: only a few shots touched the 'Ganges' and 'Earl Camden;' for the fire of the enemy seemed to be but ill directed, his shot either falling short or passing over head. Dance rendered a proper tribute to the captains and crews, who had not been trained to fight, and whose ships, after all, were indifferently armed, and, like all merchant vessels, in very imperfect fighting order.* "Captain Timms," said Dance, in his letter to the Court of Directors, "carried the 'Royal George' into action in the most gallant manner. In justice to my brother commanders, I must state, that every ship was cleared and prepared for action; and, as I had communication with almost all of them during the two days we were in presence of the enemy, I found them unanimous in the determined resolution to defend the valuable property entrusted to their charge to the last extremity, with a full conviction of the successful event of their exertions; and this spirit was fully seconded by the gallant ardour of all our officers and ships' companies." According to the calmest, the most correct, and best of our naval historians, "the promptitude and firmness of Commodore Dance and his brave associates undoubtedly saved from capture a rich and valuable fleet. The slightest indecision in him or them would have encouraged the French admiral to persevere in his attack; and, had he done so, no efforts, however gallant and judicious, could have prevented a part of the fleet at least from falling into his hands."* In this case merit was properly rewarded, and thereby an incentive was given to other seamen not in the national service. The commanders, officers, and crews were liberally rewarded by the East India Company; Dance received the honour of knighthood from the king; and among the sums of money voted to him were 5000*l.* by the Bombay Insurance Company. Other liberal sums were given to him and to the officers and crews by the committee of the "Patriotic Fund."

Early in the spring of the year 1804 General Wellesley crossed the Godavery to put down the independent freebooting parties, fragments of Scindiah's armies, and gangs of banditti from nearly all parts of India, who were plundering and devastating the whole of the Western Deccan. He offered terms to the chiefs of these freebooters, and allowed them five days to dismiss their troops and come into his camp. But at the expiration of that time, on the 4th of February, he endeavoured to cut them off by making forced marches over eighty miles of the roughest country, to the spot where they were encamped. His secret was betrayed by some of the natives following his own army, or he would have taken them by surprise in their camp. As they fled, he followed them with the British cavalry in one column acting upon the right of their rear, while the Mysore cavalry and the cavalry of the re-established Peishwa pursued the centre and left. The marauders, for the most part cavalry, were greatly superior in numbers to their pursuers, and were furnished with field-pieces. In one small affair the British cavalry and the Mysore

* Of the French men of war, Linois's ship carried 84 guns, the 'Belle Poule' and 'Sémillante' were heavy frigates, the 'Berceau' carried 22 long eights, and two English twelve-pounder carronades, and the large Dutch brig had 18 guns; but a still greater advantage on this side was the perfect war-trim of the ships. Of the Indiamen and country ships (the latter being inferior to the former) there were sixteen drawn up in the line of battle, and they carried from 30 to 36 guns each. Some of them carried upon the main deck 26 medium eighteen pounders, or "carronades," weighing about 28 cwt., and of very little use: guns of this description, indeed, have long since been exploded. Ten 18-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck made up the 36 guns. Others of the ships, and those among the largest, mounted long 12 and 6 pounders. No one of the crews, we believe, exceeded 140 men, and that number included Chinese, Lascars, &c. Moreover, in fitting the ships, so much more attention had been paid to stowage than to the means of attack and defence, that one and sometimes two butts of water were lashed between the guns, and the decks in general greatly lumbered.—*James.*

* James, 'Naval History of Great Britain.'

cavalry killed a great number of them, and captured some of their guns. Wellesley then followed them with astonishing rapidity from hill to hill, nor ceased his pursuit until he had entirely destroyed or dispersed them, and captured all their artillery, ammunition, baggage, and bazaars.* The fatigue was excessive; not a few of Wellesley's horses and men died of it: he himself describes the marches made as being "terrible," and after the lapse of many years, and many other arduous services, he still spoke of this as the most laborious service in which he had ever been engaged.† There was more ignorance than insolence in the notion which suggested to Napoleon Bonaparte and his echoes the contemptuous expression of "Sepoy General."

As General Wellesley took little or no part in the war which followed with Holkar and a new but much weaker confederacy than that whose spear had been broken by himself and General Lake, and as this flying campaign beyond the Godavery concluded his important military service in India, we may briefly allude in this place to his equally important civil services. In the month of July (1804) having, in pursuance of orders from his brother the governor-general, broken up the army in the Deccan, and returned to Seringapatam, General Wellesley received an address from the native inhabitants, which, in simple, unaffected, sincere, and truthful words, expressed the gratitude of the people of Mysore for the tranquillity and happiness they had enjoyed under his government.‡

The whole of the Mysore had been well administered under his vigilant superintendence; numerous abuses, on the part of the civil as well as the military servants of the Company, had been checked, and agriculture and trade had flourished, while the storm of war was raging in other parts of India. Deserted villages, of which the tigers, the jackals, and the wild dogs of the ghauts had taken possession, were again occupied by industrious and thriving people; and, while there was a security for the great and the wealthy, such as had never been known under Hyder Ali or his son Tippoo, there was also protection and safety for the poorest. Against all who put in practice any foul money-getting trick, or assisted in any act of peculation, corruption, or oppression, the general was ruthless, driving such men, whatever might be their patronage or their connections, from their rank, stations, and employment. During the five years of General Wellesley's government, the whole country had, in fact, acquired a higher degree of prosperity than could possibly have been expected in so short a time; and through this prosperity it had been enabled in some degree to repay—by the efficacy of its assistance in the hour of emergency, when Scindiah's confederacy and Perron's disciplined army showed their formidable front—the benefits which it had derived from British influence, protection, and power. And yet, during all this time, large sums had been annually appropriated to the construction or repair of tanks, watercourses, roads, bridges, and other works, which tended to the further improvement and increase

* "These numerous and formidable bands of freebooters, who were the terror of the country, were daily increasing in numbers, and had already defeated a body of the Soubah's troops, and had taken from them the guns which I have retaken."—*Letter to the Governor-General, in Wellington Dispatches.*

† Colonel Gurwood's Wellington Dispatches; André Vioussenx's Military Life of the Duke of Wellington; Major William Thorn, Memoirs of the War in India.

‡ The address, which was presented on the 6th of July, 1804, was to this effect:—

"We, the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, have reposed for five auspicious years under the shadow of your protection.

"We have felt even during your absence, in the midst of battle and of victory, that your care for our prosperity had been extended to us in as ample a manner as if no other object had occupied your mind.

"We are preparing to perform, in our several castes, the duties of thanksgiving and of sacrifice to the preserving God, who has brought you back in safety; and we present ourselves in person to express our joy.

"As your labours have been crowned with victory, so may your repose be graced with honours. May you long continue personally to dispense to us that full stream of security and happiness, which we first received with wonder, and continue to enjoy with gratitude; and, when greater affairs shall call you from us, may the God of all castes and all nations deign to hear with favour our humble and constant prayers for your health, your glory, and your happiness."—*Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Dispatches.*

of the agriculture, trade, and other resources of the country. The best attestation to the merits of the system is to be found in the fact that great numbers of strangers from other parts of Hindustan came and settled in Mysore, and materially aided in improving the agriculture and the entire aspect of the country. An admirable police was organized, and a military plan arranged, by which, between standing troops well disciplined and a sort of militia, Mysore could at any time, on a few days' notice, bring 40,000 men into the field, without confusion, without any great expense, and without oppression or violence of any kind; and with a force like this the Mysoreans could not only defend their own territories, but also spare troops to the Company for operations far beyond their own frontiers. The Mysore cavalry, which had been serving under Wellesley in the Scindiah campaign and in pursuit of the freebooters, had behaved admirably well.

In March, 1805, when he was on the point of leaving the East for ever, the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, Hindus and Mussulmans, presented another address to the Major-General, expressing again their gratitude for the tranquillity, security, and happiness they had enjoyed under his auspicious protection; their respect for the brilliant exploits he had achieved in the field of battle, and their reverence for his affability and benevolence; concluding with a prayer to God to grant him health and a safe and pleasant voyage to Europe, but with the expression of an earnest hope for his speedy return to the country, once more to extend and uphold that protection over them, which his extensive local knowledge of their customs and manners was so capable of affording.*

And in the Deccan and at Poonah the conduct of this great man was equally admirable, and equally productive of important advantages, whether we consider the natives, or the mere interests of the Company or of the British nation. In particular, he curbed the vindictive hand of the expelled Peishwa, whom our arms had restored, and who, like the generality of Indian princes, knew nothing of forgiveness, being, in Wellesley's own words, "callous to everything but money and revenge," and as treacherous as he was vindictive and rapacious. He interposed in many cases where the Peishwa would have deluged the country with blood; he saved many chiefs who would otherwise have been put to death or driven out of the country for the aid they had given Scindiah in expelling the Peishwa. He concluded one of his dispatches with these remarkable words: "The war will be eternal if nobody is ever to be forgiven; and I certainly think that the British government cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of the Peishwa's revenge." He also found it necessary, on more than one occasion, to teach forgiveness, or calmness and moderation, to the civil government residing at Calcutta. "When," said he, "the power of the Company is so great, little dirty passions must not be suffered to guide its measures."*

* The European officers who had been serving under General Wellesley, in their address, presented on the same occasion, warmly expressed their admiration of his exalted talents and splendid achievements, of his consideration and justice in command, which had made obedience a pleasure; and of that frank condescension in the private intercourse of life, which it was their pride individually to acknowledge. They regretted his departure, they too hoped for his speedy return to India, and they ended with the words, "But in whatever quarter of the globe further honours and distinctions shall await you, our sincerest good wishes will constantly follow your career; and we now beg you to accept our most respectful, but most cordial, farewell." The good wishes of these officers in India were realized, and perhaps beyond the expectation even of those who were most sanguine, or who best knew all that was in him, in the Peninsular war, and on the field of Waterloo.

* Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Dispatches.

CHAPTER VII.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUESS WELLESLEY CONTINUED.

NOTWITHSTANDING the decisive victories and the conquests achieved by Generals Lake and Arthur Wellesley in 1802-3, a fresh Mahratta war broke out in 1804. The conduct pursued by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, during the late war between the British government, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, was in conformity with the most characteristic features of the policy of a Mahratta chieftain. He had not only promised to join the confederacy against the British, but had actually concluded, through the medium of the Rajah of Berar, a treaty with Scindiah, who made great cessions of territory, &c. to induce him to enter the league and to be true to his engagements. But truth never abided in the palace or under the tent of a Mahratta chief. Although Holkar promised everything, he showed no inclination, after hostilities were commenced, to assist the confederates. There was, indeed, ground to believe that he rejoiced in the first reverses which his great rival Scindiah sustained; and that if this sentiment underwent a change when he saw the unprecedented rapidity and success of the two English generals, who, in the short space of five months, had annihilated two immense armies, and captured a number of fortresses hitherto deemed impregnable, the course of action was too rapid and decisive to give him time for interference; although, before the treaties of peace were concluded, he had put his forces in motion, and advanced as far as the frontier of the Rajah of Jypoor, who was then under the protection of the British government.* Having thus remained inactive during the progress of the war against Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and having greatly strengthened himself while they had been rushing to their ruin, Holkar suddenly assumed an attitude which excited alarm or suspicion. He continued to declare that he wished to remain at peace, he even professed a great friendship for the British government, but his conduct indicated other designs, and he kept his marauding army close on the frontiers to which he had brought it. The governor-general instructed General Lake to enter into any negotiation that might lead to an early explanation of his views, and relieve the Company from the expense and alarm to which its provinces must be subjected, while such a horde of freebooters as the army of Holkar continued to be assembled on its frontiers or on the frontiers of its allies. On the 29th of January, 1804, Lake addressed a letter to the formidable chieftain, stating generally the terms on which the British government was disposed to conclude a friendly treaty with him; but requiring, as a proof of the sincerity of his amicable professions, that he should withdraw his army from the threatening position it then occupied, retire quietly within his own territories, and abstain from exacting choulte (tribute or blackmail) from the allies of the British. Instead of replying immediately to this letter, Holkar allowed some time to pass, and during this time more flying and marauding troops of horse joined his standard. At last he sent his vakeels to the British commander-in-chief to make extravagant demands, and to claim the very right of levying choulte, which he had been called upon to renounce. The very first proposition advanced by his vakeel was that he should be permitted to collect the choulte "agreeably to the custom of his ancestors," which ancestorial custom closely resembled that of the most

* Malcolm, Polit. Hist. Ind.

predatory of our Highland clans in the olden times. The second proposition was that twelve of the finest districts in the Duab, a district in Bundelcund, and the country of Hurriana, which were said to have been in ancient times in the possession of his family or tribe, should be given up to Holkar. And the vakeels finally demanded in his name that all his territories should be guaranteed to him by the English, and that a treaty should be concluded with him on the same terms as that recently concluded by the Company with Scindiah, who had purchased it by making so many sacrifices to the English. These extravagant demands were of course rejected; and their nature, as well as the manner in which they were made, satisfied the commander-in-chief of the Mahratta's real designs. These were more fully developed in the course of a few weeks by the contents of several letters, which he wrote to the tributaries and dependants of the British government in order to excite them to revolt against the English, whose territories, he informed the rajahs, it was his intention to ravage and destroy. Holkar also wrote a most arrogant and insulting letter to General Wellesley, demanding the immediate cession of whole provinces of the Deccan, of some of the best of the possessions of our ally the Nizam, upon the plea that, at some distant period of time, they had been the property of the Holkar family. This letter to Wellesley concluded with a loud boast: "Countries of many hundred coss," said Holkar, "shall be overrun and plundered. General Lake shall not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and calamities will fall on lacs of human beings, in continual war, by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea."

If numbers alone could have constituted strength, Holkar had some reason to be confident: he had, at this moment, from 40,000 to 50,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry, and upwards of 100 pieces of cannon. His fortresses also were numerous, and Chandore and Gaulnah, the ancient strongholds of his family, ranked among the strongest places in all India.

Holkar's menaces were soon followed by acts. He sent a vakeel to the camp of Scindiah, to urge that humbled chief to throw his recent treaty to the winds, and join him in an attack upon the British possessions; and at the same time he began to plunder the territories of the Rajah of Jypoor. General Lake (by virtue of his achievements in the late war, Lord Lake) and General Fraser were presently sent against him. Holkar retreated from the advanced position which he had occupied, and was pursued to some distance by part of the British forces. His first savage act was the murder of three British officers, Vickers, Todd, and Ryan, who had entered his service when he was in amity with the English, and who bore the rank of captains in his army. These unfortunate men, having signified their intention of retiring, in obedience to a proclamation of the governor-general, were placed under confinement; and afterwards, on the pretext that Captain Todd had carried on a secret correspondence with Lord Lake, they were brought out and publicly decapitated. Their heads were exposed on pikes, their bodies were denied the ordinary rites of sepulture. For some time, the most serious difficulty encountered by the advancing British troops was from the stealthy attacks and depredations of the Mewattees, a tribe inhabiting the hills, who were robbers by profession, and who lived chiefly by cattle lifting. They carried off many camels, elephants, and horses from the English picquets, in spite of the vigilance and precaution that were adopted to guard against their sudden and desperate attacks. Many of these sons of the mist were exceedingly well mounted, and all were armed with matchlocks, spears, or tolwars. They often attacked our foraging parties, and were constantly hovering about the camp in large parties. Whenever they could surprise an officer or a soldier, they murdered him first and robbed him afterwards. Nearly the whole of the hilly territory from Agra to Delhi was at this time the nursery of thieves and robbers: it exhibited little or no cultivation, though very susceptible of it, owing to the savageness of its inhabitants. By the 20th of February, 1804, the main body of the army under Lake was ad-

vanced as far as the neighbourhood of Hindoun, a large and populous village, situated in a very fertile and highly cultivated country. The greatest care was taken for the preservation of the crops; and, although forage had been for some time scarce, no standing corn was allowed to be cut down or to be in any way injured. The strict discipline under which the troops and the camp-followers were kept presented an advantageous contrast to the visitations of a Mahratta army, and greatly surprised the inhabitants, who expressed their gratitude in strong terms. While encamped on this ground, Lord Lake received letters from Holkar, who again pretended to be pacifically disposed. "While the flame of contention can be extinguished by the water of reconciliation," said the wily Mahratta, "it is unfit to bring matters to the extremity of war." He protested that before receiving Lord Lake's last letter he had resolved to march quietly homewards, which design he had now begun to accomplish. At this very moment a khan in the service of Holkar was hovering with a large body of horse on the frontiers of Bundelcund, evidently with the design of invading that province and the countries belonging to the allies of the English to the north of the Betwa. This khan actually entered the territories of Jansee; but he fled beyond the mountains at the approach of the detachment of Colonel Powell, and left that officer to complete the conquest of the interior of Bundelcund by the reduction of those fortified places which had not yet submitted to the British government, though bound so to do by the recent treaty concluded with Scindiah. While Lord Lake was advancing from Hindustan towards the very heart of Holkar's dominions, General Wellesley sent instructions to Colonel John Murray, commanding the troops in Guzerat, to enter the province of Malwa, and to advance in the direction of Indore, the residence of Holkar's family, while part of the troops stationed above the Ghauts directed their operations against his possessions on the side of the Deccan, and especially against his strong fortress of Chandore. Holkar kept retreating before the main army of Lord Lake, and none of his allies or detached troops or forts made anything like a bold resistance. The chief difficulty of the English lay in the great length of the marches they were obliged to make, and in the burning, maddening heat of the sun. By the beginning of May, however, Lord Lake had traversed the central parts of Rajpootana, had captured Tonk Rampoora, a strongly fortified town, and had driven Holkar from the only footing he had in Hindustan north of the Chumbul. He hastily fled across that river, but he continued to be followed on one side by a detachment under Colonel Monson, while on the other side Colonel Murray with the troops from Guzerat was moving against him. Considering that these two detachments would give full employment to the Mahratta until the cooler season should set in, Lord Lake, in an unlucky moment, thought it advisable to march the main army back into quarters at Cawnpoor and places in that neighbourhood, as the men were suffering dreadfully in their health from the hot winds, and the cattle were perishing fast through want of forage, the ground being parched up like an Arabian desert. But to go back was as bad as to go forward. The sufferings of the retiring troops continued to be excessive. The roads were exceedingly bad, and the country was everywhere swept by a burning wind, called by the natives the "Devil's breath," which, after passing over the great sandy desert, imparts to the atmosphere of these regions an intensity of heat which astonished even those who had long been seasoned to the fury of a vertical sun. Westward of the Jumna, this pestiferous current, this fiery blast, finds no rivers and lakes to temper its severity. One of the officers, who was scorched and withered by it, compares it to the extreme glow of an iron foundry in the height of summer; "though even that is but a feeble comparison, since no idea can be formed of the causticity of the sandy particles which were borne along with the wind like hot embers, peeling off the skin, and raising blisters wherever they chanced to fall."* The European

* Major Thorn.

a firebrand in the Supreme Council at Calcutta.] In July Lieutenant-Colonel Monson who, after reducing some fortresses, had encamped near Kotta on the banks of the Chumbul to guard the frontier, advanced his position about 50 miles from the Mokundra pass, at which place he had been led to expect supplies, and the means of communicating with Colonel Murray, then on his march from Guzerat towards Indore. The corps under Colonel Monson consisted of five battalions of sepoys, a proportion of artillery, and two bodies of irregular horse, the last being commanded by Lieutenant Lucan and a Mahratta chief (Baboojee), who belonged to the family of Scindiah, and who had professed an entire devotion to the cause of the English. The whole amounted to about 3000 men. On the 7th of July, Monson received intelligence that Holkar had swept through Malwa, and had recrossed the Chumbul with the whole of his army. The Colonel expressed contempt for the superiority of the enemy's numbers, and an eagerness for coming to action with him. He made a movement for that purpose; but soon relinquished his design, in consequence of the deficiency of grain in his camp, the absence of one detachment employed to bring up a supply, and of another that was on its march to join him from one of the forts he had captured. Colonel Monson was also expecting the arrival of an escort with money for his troops; but it is said that what most influenced his conduct was the reception of intelligence that Colonel Murray, instead of pressing forwards towards Indore, had an intention to fall back. Although it was dangerous to retreat in the presence of Holkar's numerous cavalry, Monson determined to retire to the Mokundra pass.* Accordingly, the baggage and stores were sent off at four in the morning on the 8th of July, while the troops, in order of battle, remained on the ground of encampment till half-past nine. As no enemy came up, the troops were then put in motion after the baggage and stores, with the exception of the irregular cavalry under Lieutenant Lucan and Baboojee Scindiah, who were ordered to follow in half an hour, and to apprise Colonel Monson of Holkar's motions. The detachment had marched about twelve miles towards the Mokundra

* Monson's conduct has been very severely censured; but it depended upon the movements of others, and there were some capital defects, if not in the plan itself, in the whole execution of the plan of this campaign. Even Lord Lake had not yet learned with what ease and rapidity the Mahrattas could recruit their armies, change retreat and actual flight into an advance, and repeat their blows. If Lake had continued in pursuit of Holkar, instead of retiring to Cawnpoor with the main body of the army, the campaign would have been a short one, and the disasters which befel Monson in his retreat would not have happened. This was foreseen by General Wellesley as early as the month of April. "If," said he, "General Lake would make a good dash at Holkar, the war could not last a fortnight; but if he should stand upon the defensive in Hindustan, it will last for a length of time." But Holkar's rapid retreat had deceived Lake into the belief that he was far weaker than he really was, and that the corps of Colonels Murray and Monson would be more than enough to drive him beyond Indore, if not into the Punjab; and no necessary preparations had been made for the continued advance of the main body of the army serving with Lake.

No one doubted Colonel Monson's courage; Lake, even in mourning over his retreat, described him as being as brave as a lion. If Monson had stopped at first, instead of retiring, his infantry would have been unable to bring the fleet Mahratta cavalry to action; and every day's delay would have increased the famine in his camp. Retreats had always been disastrous in India. General Wellesley thought that some important lessons were to be learned from this campaign—

"First, We should never employ a corps on a service to which it is not fully equal.

"Secondly, We should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions.

"Thirdly, Experience has shown that British troops can never depend upon rajahs or any allies for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them; and if we should employ a native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we expose our troops in the situation in which we may want them.

"Fourthly, When we have a fort which can support our operations, we should immediately adopt effectual means to fill it with provisions and stores in case of need.

"Fifthly, When we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poonah.

"In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, *they must be decided and quick*; and in all retreats it must be recollected that *they are safe and easy in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps.* But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent the necessity of a British corps retreating."—*Dispatches.*

pass, when Monson received intelligence that Lucan had been attacked by the whole of Holkar's cavalry. Upon this, orders were given for the troops to halt and form, with the view of supporting the party in the rear. At this moment Baboojee Scindiah, who traitorously joined the enemy soon after, galloped up and declared that the irregular cavalry was entirely defeated, and that Lucan was wounded and a prisoner. The Mahratta was a liar and traitor, but this time the news he brought was too true: Lieutenant Lucan, who had greatly distinguished himself both in this campaign and in the preceding war against Scindiah, was indeed in the hands of a merciless enemy, and he died shortly afterwards of his wounds, or of poison administered to him at Kotta. As it was useless to return, Colonel Monson continued his march; and on the noon of the following day he reached the Mokundra pass without any molestation. On the morning of the 10th of July the enemy showed a large body of cavalry in front of the pass, and this continued to increase in numbers till noon the next day, when Holkar sent a letter to the English commander demanding the surrender of his guns and small arms. This demand being spiritedly refused, Holkar made a vigorous attack on Monson's front and flanks. The Mahrattas, however, could make no impression upon our steady native infantry, and after repeated attacks, and some loss, Holkar drew off his cavalry to the distance of four miles, where he was joined by his infantry and artillery. Colonel Monson, apprehending that the Mahrattas might get upon his rear and cut off his communication with the town of Kotta, through which he expected supplies, began immediately to retire to that town, which he reached after two forced and most fatiguing marches, through torrents of rain and across a country completely inundated. The Rajah of Kotta, believing that Holkar must be victorious, refused to admit Monson's troops into his town, on the plea that he could not furnish them with provisions. The retreat now became very disastrous, the rivers and rivulets were all swollen by the monsoon rains, and the troops were almost reduced to starvation. The guns could not be dragged on: the Colonel was obliged to leave them behind him after rendering them unserviceable and destroying their ammunition. The Mahratta cavalry hung close on the rear, and several times attacked fiercely. After one of these attacks, in which our sepoys suffered severely, Monson was under the necessity of abandoning his baggage. On the night of the 25th of August, after defeating several charges made by the enemy's cavalry, he reached the town of Kooshalghur, where he found Capt. Nicholl with a detachment of sepoys and a company of the 12th regiment. Before Monson's arrival Capt. Nicholl had been attacked in the town by one of our precious allies, a Mahratta chief of the Scindiah party, who had insisted upon levying a contribution, although the town and fort of Kooshalghur were the property of our ally the Rajah of Jypoor. And, not satisfied with this demand of choulte, our said Mahratta ally required the surrender of the elephants, treasure, and baggage, belonging to this British detachment. To this demand no reply was made; and the Mahratta opened his guns on the town, and then attempted to storm the place. Captain Nicholl's force was very small, and there were many gates and openings into the fort; yet he had succeeded in repulsing the assailants. On the morning after his arrival at Kooshalghur, Monson found himself surrounded by the whole of Holkar's cavalry, and detected a correspondence between Holkar and some of the native officers belonging to his own corps. Notwithstanding the efforts he made, nearly two entire companies deserted from one sepoy regiment, and a large proportion of his Hindustanee cavalry fled or went over to the enemy. In the evening the Colonel retreated from Kooshalghur, his troops marching in a compact oblong square. During that night and the greater part of the following day, the Mahratta horse, supported by some artillery, attempted to penetrate, but could make no impression upon that compact body of infantry. On clearing the ravines near the now ruined fort of Hindoun, Monson had to sustain a desperate charge of the enemy's horse in three divisions;

soldiers died by tens and by fifteens daily. Young men who set out in the morning full of spirits, and in all the vigour of health, dropped dead immediately on reaching the encampment ground, and many were smitten on the road by the noon-day sun, whose rays darted downwards like a torrent of fire. Many brave and athletic veterans fell, without the possibility of receiving any relief. It was the worst of all *coups de soleil*, except that death was almost instantaneous. They who were thus struck, suddenly turned giddy, foamed at the mouth, dropped on the road, and instantly became lifeless. Even when encamped, the sufferings of the poor soldiers were excruciating; for the tents in general were but ill adapted to such a climate, and the thermometer in the shade frequently exceeded 130° of Fahrenheit. The misery was further increased by the scarcity of water, owing to the debility and mortality that prevailed among the camp-followers employed in procuring that inestimable beverage. Numbers of these water-carriers perished through the fatigue which they underwent in this fiery climate, where the natives suffered more than even Europeans, when called to make any extraordinary exertion. On one day as many as nineteen Europeans were buried: "melancholy indeed it was to see the route of the army traced by heaps of earth giving cover to the remains of so many gallant soldiers, who, after escaping the dangers incident to the fire and steel of war, fell pitiable victims to the climate."* On one day, the 1st of June, 250 natives were reported to have died in the bazaar attached to the camp. On the 3rd of June, as the troops were encamping near Karowley, the wind suddenly shifted, impetuous whirlwinds advanced over the sandy plains in vast columns of sand and dust, increasing in magnitude, and ascending into the air to a height beyond the reach of the eye. These objects were only the precursors of the still more tremendous demon of the storm—the typhoon, which came like chaos on the wings of the tempest, rolling before it immense torrents of burning sand, and giving such a density to the atmosphere, that the sun, which had hitherto appeared as red as blood, became totally eclipsed. Night in the midst of day—night with tenfold terror—darkened all the scene, and the awfulness was heightened by the howlings of the tempest, which resembled the roar of thunder. This lasted about half an hour, during which the army and all the affrighted multitude in its train lay prostrate and silent on the ground, as if anticipating the day of doom. The trees were torn up by the roots, the tents were carried away and scattered about in every direction; the bullocks threw off their burdens and ran wild among the bazaar people; the horses broke loose from the picquets, and galloped about the camp in a phrenzy of fear. Providentially, however, the fearful phenomenon was succeeded by a little rain, which cooled the air, and rendered it so very refreshing that the mortality ceased. On the 4th of June, the army rested all day in honour of George III.'s birth-day. On the 5th, they passed the Jumna at a ford near the city of Agra, the guns and baggage being conveyed in beautiful style across the river in boats. On the 20th, or just after the commencement of the monsoon or rainy season, they reached their comfortable quarters at Cawnpoor. They had marched above 1000 miles.

In the mean time there had been some hard fighting in Bundelcund, and in the country beyond Jypoor. Colonel Powell, who was charged with the reduction of the fortresses in Bundelcund, fell sick and died. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, who sent a detachment of seven companies of sepoys, with some artillery, to take a small fort near Kooch. The officer in command, Captain Smith, was not sufficiently aware of the craft of the natives, and of the danger of relying upon their faith. Whilst preparations were carrying on in the trenches, the killadar sent out an offer to surrender the place the next morning, provided Captain Smith would suspend his firing. This proposition was agreed to; but, in the interval, the treacherous killadar applied to Meer Khan, who had retreated before Colonel Powell, but who

* Major Thorn.

had again returned to the neighbourhood with a large body of horse in the pay of Holkar. And on the following morning, the 22nd of May, the khan, with 7000 or 8000 of his cavalry, fell most unexpectedly on two companies of sepoys and about fifty artillerymen in the trenches. With savages like these it was vain to mention the truce or to plead for mercy: every man in the trenches, whether officer or private, was cruelly murdered. Meer Khan seized and carried off all the artillery, consisting of 2 twelves and 1 six-pounder, 2 howitzers, and the tumbrils belonging to the park. Captain Smith, however, succeeded in making good his retreat with the remaining five companies of sepoys, protected by a troop of the 5th regiment of native cavalry and a galloper six-pounder, which single gun kept off the enemy. Emboldened by their success, Meer Khan and his predatory horde made an attack upon Calpee, and attempted to force the passage of the Jumna. They were repulsed by Captain Jones at the head of only two companies of sepoys; and shortly afterwards they were completely defeated and scattered by a small force under Colonel Shepherd.

Captain Gardiner, an officer in the service of the Rajah of Jypoor, and Lieutenant Lucan of his majesty's 74th regiment, who had been detached by Lake to watch the motions of Holkar with two divisions of irregulars, came up on the 29th of May with a chieftain in the interest of Holkar, named Tantia, as he lay encamped with three battalions of infantry, two hundred Mewattees or hill robbers, 3000 horse and 11 guns. Tantia retreated to a difficult mountain pass, about six miles distant from Coterah. Here his battalions took post with their rear to the pass, having a rising ground on their right, and their front and flanks completely encompassed by deep ravines. The only road across these ravines was scarcely broad enough to admit a common country cart, and it was defended by three guns. The khan's people showed a good face until the guns attached to Lieutenant Lucan's division were brought up, after a march of 35 miles. One of the native chiefs then demanded a parley, and offered to surrender, on condition that his party should be escorted in safety to the camp of Baboojee Scindiah, pledging himself that they would not serve any more against the English. These terms were assented to, and were punctually performed, the khan's battalions, amounting in the whole, with 200 Mewattees, to 2099 men, being conducted, as agreed upon, by our cavalry, and leaving in our possession all their ordnance and stores. But Tantia himself had effected his retreat at the head of the cavalry on the first appearance of Captain Gardiner's force.

During this first campaign of the year 1804, Lake's army and the corps dependant upon it captured 450 pieces of the finest ordnance, 182 wall pieces, 5000 stands of arms, 180 tumbrils and ammunition-carriages, and a vast quantity of military stores of every description.

In order to render the possession of a part of Bundelcund of any value, it was necessary to subdue or dispossess a formidable sanguinary banditti of the Naga race. This singular race of hill people abounds in India east of the Ganges. Their rapacity and sanguinary habits had depopulated the hills inhabited by less martial tribes. In person the Nagas somewhat resembled the Chinese, but little was or is known of their origin, history, or religion. Their villages were perched like eagles' nests on the most inaccessible peaks of the mountains. In Bundelcund a community of them occupied a strong position near Mohobah, surrounded by ranges of high rocks, which, on occasion, they lined with matchlock-men and rocket-boys. They interrupted communications, and made predatory incursions far and near. Towards the end of June Lieutenant-Colonel Martindell marched against them in their stronghold with the Bundelcund division, beat them from their rocks, drove them from that range of mountains, captured nearly all their baggage, plunder, camels, horses and stores, and took the religious standard of the tribe. But disaster and defeat and even disgrace attended the operations of another corps, commanded by an officer of an ill-omened name for India. [This Colonel Monson was related to the Colonel Monson of Warren Hastings's time, the dupe of Francis, and

but the sepoys reserved their fire till the Mahrattas came within reach of the bayonet, and then compelled them to retreat in every direction. After this affair the Mahrattas never charged again. Monson reached the city of Agra at the end of August, with his detachment fearfully thinned, disordered, and demoralized. The loss of officers had been very great, amounting to 13 killed, 7 wounded, and 2 drowned.

The turn of affairs produced by this disastrous retreat compelled the commander-in-chief with his army to take the field without delay, in order to check Holkar, who was now strengthened by the Jauts and the Bhurtpoor Rajah, who had broken the treaty of alliance concluded with General Lake in the preceding year, and were now threatening to seize our newly acquired possessions.* Accordingly, the several corps of Lord Lake's army received orders to repair immediately to the general rendezvous at Agra, in order to commence a second campaign. By the beginning of September all the corps were in motion, although the country continued in a state of inundation, and the rain still poured down in torrents.

The straggling sepoys of Colonel Monson's unfortunate division hailed Lord Lake's arrival with transport. They soon recovered their discipline and gallantry; and the barbarity of the enemy helped to root out the partial disaffection which had existed among them. Numbers came daily into camp shockingly mutilated, with their noses and right hands cut off in consequence of their having refused to enter Holkar's service. Those who had enrolled with the Mahratta sent word to the English officers that they would escape at the first opportunity. The barbarians had reached the banks of the Jumna, had taken possession of Mutra, and had spread consternation over the country. A detachment of them had even crossed the Jumna, but they all fled precipitately as Lake advanced. By the 3rd of October Mutra was recovered, and was occupied by our reserve under Lieut.-Colonel Don. The rapid Mahrattas, however, succeeded in seizing and carrying off some of our supplies, and some invalid sepoys in charge of 100 camels loaded with grain. Before daybreak on the 7th an attempt was made to surprise Holkar in his camp; but the Mahratta and his men were already mounted, and they galloped off with such rapidity as to render it impossible to effect a charge. A few of them, however, were brought down in their flight by Lake's galloper guns. Other attempts to surprise them in their encampments and to bring them to action failed completely, for they were exceedingly vigilant, throwing out posts in all directions, who, by firing signals, and burning blue-lights, gave the alarm. Now and then these posts were surprised, and made prisoners. The men expected vengeance and retaliation, but Lord Lake gave them a rupee each, and then dismissed them with a message to their chief, telling him that none but cowards treated their prisoners with cruelty. The army continued steadily to advance, the cavalry leading, followed by the infantry, and the baggage and bazaars moving along between the inner flank and the river Jumna. The road they were following was the high road to Delhi, which capital was besieged by Holkar's regular brigade of infantry, with a large train of artillery. The siege was pressed with all possible vigour, it being a vital object with Holkar

* The warlike tribe of the Jauts first attracted notice in Hindustan about the year 1700, when, having migrated from the banks of the Indus, they obtained settlements in several districts on the Ganges and Jumna. Their subsequent progress was very rapid. During the civil wars carried on by the successors of Aurungzebe, they secured to themselves a large tract of country, in which they built forts. To the Hindu title of Rajah their chief had no more real right than his ancestors had to the contents of the Mogul's caravans, which they were in the habit of plundering. Their great power was first broken by intestine feuds. One Rajah was killed in battle by a competitor; another was secretly murdered. The Jaut dominions, which had extended from the neighbourhood of Agra to within a few miles of Delhi, were gradually clipped and reduced; and since the year 1780 they had comprised merely Bhurtpoor, and a small district, of about seven lacs of rupees per annum. In September, 1803, a treaty of *perpetual* friendship was concluded by General Lake with the Bhurtpoor Rajah, the British government making over to him some new districts yielding 754,000 rupees per annum. The reverses of Colonel Monson had induced the Rajah to believe that the fortunes of the English were declining.

to get possession of the person of the poor Mogul before Lord Lake could get to his rescue. Despising, and leaving in his rear, some forts of which Holkar had obtained possession, Lake continued his march, and reached Delhi on the 17th of October. The besieging Mahrattas fled at his approach. Colonel Ochterlony, the British resident at the Mogul's court, and Colonel Burn, the commandant of the garrison, had successfully defended the wide and crumbling walls of Agra with a very few men, and for several weeks. It was easy for the Mahrattas to make breaches, for they had some heavy artillery, and the works were rotten; but they could not storm through the breaches when they had made them, and all their endeavours to take the place by surprise and escalade were defeated by the vigilance of the garrison. As there were but few regular troops in the place, and as the garrison was principally composed of a motley rabble, collected in haste from various quarters, and armed only with matchlocks, Ochterlony, Burn, and the few British officers serving under them, must have made very extraordinary efforts, and have given proof of very extraordinary ability. In some respects their defence of Delhi might be compared with Clive's ingenious and heroic defence of Arcot.

On the 25th of October Lord Lake's army was kept on the alert by continued reports of attacks being made on the foraging parties. They had also repeated night alarms during their short stay in the Mogul's capital, occasioned by the numerous robbers and thieves that infested the hills and ruins about Delhi, and that made their way into the bazaars of the army.

Having been foiled in his attempt upon the capital of the empire, Holkar determined to perplex and harass his pursuer in the true Mahratta style of predatory warfare. Moving secretly and rapidly to the northward, he crossed the Jumna near Panipat, threatening to lay waste the British territories in the Doab. But Lake and Fraser were soon after him. On the 31st of October the British crossed the Jumna at a ford about three miles from Delhi. Orders were issued to march as light as possible; no private wheel-carriages were allowed; the number of tents and the quantity of baggage were greatly reduced; and six pounds of flour were issued to every fighting man and public servant, which was to last them six days, and to be carried by themselves. As the troops advanced, they encountered some fierce hostile bands of Seiks, who occupied nearly the whole northern quarter of the Delhi province, and who were a proud and irascible race, half Mussulman, half Hindu, and very fanatic in their complex faith: but Colonel Burn, who led the van, easily cleared the road with grape-shot, and got into the small mud fort of Shamlee. Here he was surrounded by a countless host, but it fled and disappeared on seeing the clouds of dust raised by the march of the main army. On the 6th of November Lake's army marched about twenty-four miles on the road to Soldana, or Sirdhana, the residence of the Begum Somroo, the widow of that European adventurer Sombre, who had shed so much good English blood in the days of Warren Hastings.* No woman has attained so much celebrity in the modern history of Hindustan. On the death of her husband, she kept the troops together which he had raised and disciplined, and by their means preserved her authority over a small but fertile district, extending about thirty-six miles from north to south, and about twenty-four from east to west. The country was highly cultivated, producing grain of all kind, tobacco, cotton, sugar-canes, &c., and rendering about ten lacs of rupees annual revenue. The principal town was pleasantly situated, and of considerable extent. Near the town was a fort, containing a good arsenal, with a foundry for cannon. The military force consisted at this period of five battalions of well-disciplined sepoys, commanded by European officers, with about forty pieces of artillery. The Begum had on several occasions rendered important services to Shah Alum, who had gratefully bestowed upon her the title of "Ornament of the Sex." She had a very masculine mind, and she had ma-

* For Sombre's or Samroo's butcheries, see vol. i., p. 101.



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naged her affairs so well since the death of her husband, as not only to keep, but also to enlarge and improve her principality. Though descended from the Mogul race, and bred in the Mohammedan faith, she openly professed Christianity, and encouraged it in her territories. "When I saw her at Delhi in 1806," says Major Thorn, "she appeared to be about fifty-three years of age, of middling size, and fair complexion. She was then a constant attendant at head-quarters, dressed in the European style, with a hat and veil, sometimes riding out in a palankeen, at others on a horse or an elephant."* Her husband, the aspiring and fortunate sergeant, had been a bloody enemy to the English, a fact not calculated to conciliate the confidence of Lord Lake. It had been reported during the late war with Scindiah that she intended to join her disciplined battalions to the army of that chief; but she had wisely remained neutral during the whole of that war, and she seemed disposed to follow the same line of conduct now.

On the 7th of November Lake's foremost column got sight of a body of Mahrattta horse, who took instantly to flight. Closely pursued by the English, the Mahrattas fled past the town of Meerut *without* stopping to plunder it. Having left at Meerut Colonel Burn, with three battalions of infantry and some irregular cavalry, for the protection of the northern parts of the Doab, Lord Lake marched after the marauders, who ravaged and burned the defenceless villages as they swept along, making no attempts upon towns surrounded with walls or capable of the least defence. On the 16th of November Lake reached Alligunge, which village was still burning when the English arrived. Holkar was encamped near Furruckabad, thirty-six miles ahead; but Lake resolved to make another attempt to surprise him by a forced night-march. The distance was great, but it was likely to add to the Mahratta's security. At nine o'clock in the evening the General, with the British cavalry, moved on without tent or baggage of any kind. Just as they were mounting their horses they received the agreeable news of the victory gained over Holkar's brigade at Deeg. This made them doubly eager to come up with the chief himself and all his boasted cavalry, in order to give the finishing stroke. The moon was up, and the night mild and pleasant. As they spurred along the road they were cheered

* Memoir of the War in India, conducted by General Lord Lake, Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. London, 1818.

"Of late years," adds the Major, "the Begum Sumroo has resided principally at Delhi, where she built a splendid house, passing the remainder of her days in peace, under the protection of the British government."

Bishop Heber, who saw the Begum some years later, gives rather a less favourable account of her. She was then living, not at Delhi, but in her own capital.

"She is a very little, queer-looking old woman, with brilliant but wicked eyes, and the remains of beauty in her features. She is possessed of considerable talent and readiness in conversation, but only speaks Hindustanee. Her soldiers and people, and the generality of the inhabitants of this neighbourhood, pay her much respect, on account both of her supposed wisdom and her courage; she having, during the Mahratta wars, led, after her husband's death, his regiment very gallantly into action, herself riding at their head into a heavy fire of the enemy. She is, however, a sad tyrauness; and having the power of life and death within her own little territory, several stories are told of her cruelty, and the noses and ears which she orders to be cut off. One relation of this kind, according to native reports, on which reliance, however, can rarely be placed, is very horrid. One of her dancing-girls had offended her—how I have not heard. The Begum ordered the poor creature to be immured alive in a small vault prepared for the purpose, under the pavement of the saloon where the nutch was then celebrating; and being aware that her fate excited much sympathy and horror in the minds of the servants and soldiers of her palace, and apprehensive that they would open the tomb and rescue the victim as soon as her back was turned, she saw the vault bricked up before her own eyes, then ordered her bed to be placed directly over it, and lay there for several nights, till the last faint moans had ceased to be heard, and she was convinced that hunger and despair had done their work. This woman calls herself a Christian, of the Roman Catholic faith, which was that of her husband Sombre. . . . . She has a Roman Catholic priest as her chaplain, and has lately begun to build a very large and handsome church at Sirdhana, which will rival, if not excel, that of Meerut in size and architectural beauty."—*Indian Journal*.

It is from this strange woman that Mr. Dyce Sombre, whose unhappy eccentricities occupy so much of the public attention, is descended. The Begum's wit appears to have been very nearly allied to madness.

by intelligence that their foe was motionless in his encampment, and wholly ignorant of their coming. The day was just beginning to dawn on the 17th, when the head of their column reached the skirts of the Mahratta camp. Their horses were at picquet, and by the side of them the men lay sleeping. Several rounds of grape fired from our gallopers into the thickest of their camp was the first intimation they received of Lake's arrival. The fire awakened them, but made the sleep of many an everlasting sleep. The king's 8th light dragoons got first in among them, charging and cutting them down in all directions: our other regiments did the same as fast as they came up, so that in a short time the whole camp was covered with the bodies of the killed and wounded. Holkar himself escaped, being the first to fly. He was followed by a small party of cavalry, the only men that could mount and escape and keep together; and he never drew rein until he had recrossed the Calini river, at a ford eighteen miles distant. By this one blow the cavalry of Holkar was ruined or dispersed, as his infantry and artillery had been at Deeg. When he first crossed the Jumna he had 60,000 horse; after recrossing the Calini he could not collect 10,000. Three thousand had fallen in the surprised camp; the rest deserted and dispersed, and never joined him again. Lake continued the pursuit for upwards of ten miles; and as his march during the preceding day and night was fifty-eight miles, the distance to which the enemy were pursued and the space passed over before he took up his encampment ground considerably exceeded seventy miles in twenty-four hours; an effort scarcely paralleled in military history, for it was made after a long and harassing march of three hundred and fifty miles in the space of a fortnight. Great was the fatigue, but small the loss: he had only two British dragoons killed, and about twenty men, Europeans and natives, wounded; and of the seventy-five horses that perished or became useless, the far greater part seem to have been foundered on the forced night march. The Mahrattas left plenty of good horses behind them. With his infantry following him almost at the charging pace, Lake pushed on to the city of Furruckabad, whose flourishing condition had enticed Holkar thither, the Mahratta expecting to make a rich prize before the English could come up with him. His lordship arrived just at the nick of time, for the unruly Patans of the town and neighbourhood had not only engaged to co-operate with the Mahrattas, but had risen upon the English residents, and had driven the Company's weak detachment of sepoys into the fort of Futtyghur. If he had been a few hours later, he would probably have found nothing but smoking ruins and the disfigured bodies of the murdered English; for the Patans had already set fire to the cavalry's stables and officers' bungalows, and were besieging the fort. Having first knocked a good many of these Patans on the head, Lake's army fired three royal salutes; one in honour of the victory obtained by Major-General Fraser at Deeg, another for the capture of Chandore by Colonel Wallace, and another for his own action in the Mahratta camp.

While Lake with the cavalry was in pursuit of Holkar's horse, part of the British infantry and artillery, under Major-General Fraser, was marching in search of his disciplined brigades and his guns, which were known to be somewhere within the Bhurtpoor Rajah's territories. On the 12th of November, four days before Lake began his rapid night march, Fraser from some surrounding heights discovered his enemy encamped between a large deep tank and an extensive morass, their right being covered by a fortified village, and their left resting on the fort of Deeg. Every preparation was made for the attack the next morning. Major-General Fraser's force consisted only of the king's 76th regiment, two of the Company's European regiments, and six battalions of sepoys, two of which must necessarily be left for the protection of the baggage, together with a small body of irregular horse. The force opposed to him amounted to twenty-four disciplined battalions, with a tremendous artillery; and their position, in the midst of tanks, topes, forts, and morasses, was

exceedingly formidable. Nevertheless two European regiments and four battalions of sepoys marched gaily and confidently to the attack at three o'clock on the morning of the 13th of November. This gallant little column had to make a considerable detour to avoid the morass, so that it was daybreak ere it reached the fortified village on a hill which covered the enemy's right. Here the troops immediately wheeled into line; the 76th regiment and two battalions forming the first, and the remaining troops the second line. The 76th with charged bayonets drove the Mahrattas out of the village, and then running down the hill charged the first range of guns, under a tremendous storm of round, grape, and chain shot. The enemy abandoned their guns as our men came up to them, and retired to fresh batteries. When the second line arrived at the fortified village which the 76th had carried, the Company's European regiment, seeing the brave 76th regiment so far ahead in the thickest of the multitudinous enemy, ran to its support, and was followed by some of the sepoys, who again kept pace with the British and emulated their daring. Having entirely carried the first range of guns, the assailants were exposed to a still more destructive fire from the enemy's second range. Here a cannon-ball took off General Fraser's leg. The general was carried from the field, and the command devolved upon Colonel Monson, who had been very unfortunate, but who had never failed in courage or in soldierly bearing. He promptly executed the whole of Fraser's plan of attack. The British and sepoy bayonets soon drove the Mahrattas from their second range; one battery was charged and carried after another to the distance of two miles, till coming close under the walls of the town of Deeg, our troops were compelled to halt and fall back. In the meantime a body of the enemy's horse coming suddenly round, retook the first range of guns, and turned them against our troops; but Captain Henry Norford, of the 76th, with only twenty-eight men, charged them with the bayonet, drove them off, and took the guns again. It was a brilliant exploit, but Captain Norford was unfortunately killed in the performance of it. At the lower end of the morass was a dense body of infantry, with a number of heavy guns from 12- to 18-pounders. With only two battalions of sepoys and three 6-pounders, Major Hammond had kept this corps in check during the whole of the action, and had maintained his position in spite of the terrible fire of the artillery. Now Colonel Monson ordered up some more 6-pounders, placed them in Major Hammond's front, and under cover of their fire moved round upon the enemy's left flank. These Mahrattas made a precipitate retreat into the morass, where great numbers perished, and amongst them two of the principal officers of Holkar's army. There was no more fighting. The field was fairly and gloriously won, though not without a very heavy loss for so small a force. The number of our killed and wounded amounted to 643, among whom were 22 British officers. Major-General Fraser died of his wound a few days after the battle. But from 2000 to 3000 of the enemy lay dead on the field; 87 fine pieces of artillery, of European fabric, well mounted on field carriages, and furnished with every requisite apparatus, were captured; and the best disciplined part, the flower of Holkar's army, twenty-four well-trained and disciplined battalions, were broken up and dispersed.*

The reduction of Chandore, the strongest place Holkar held on the side of the Deccan, was planned by General Sir Arthur Wellesley, before he resigned the political and military powers which he exercised in the country. The troops appointed to the service consisted of detachments from the Company's subsidiary forces serving with the Nizam and the Peishwa and of some contingents furnished by those two princes. They were commanded by Colonels Haliburton and Wallace; and through the care of General

* Major Thorn, Memoir of the War. Colonel Monson, Dispatches. All appeared to have done well; but Colonel Monson, in his dispatch to the governor-general, particularly noticed as deserving of praise, Colonel Horsford of the artillery, Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Browne, Brigade-Major Menzies, Captains Fraser and MacKnight, Brigade-Major Carr, and Ensign Bowyer.

Wellesley they were well supplied with money and provisions.* Early in October Colonel Wallace, after a long march, succeeded in capturing the dependent port of Lasselgong, about twelve miles from Chandore. An easy march then brought him to the famed stronghold. The town of Chandore threw open its gates, but not so the fort on the hill behind the town. This hill or rock actually forms the fort, being quite inaccessible everywhere but at the gateway, where alone it is fortified by art. There was thus but one entrance of any kind, and the narrow road which led to it could be swept by the tremendous batteries of the fortress. A vigorous resistance was expected: but as soon as Colonel Wallace had established a battery, Holkar's commandant held out the white flag, and surrendered, upon condition that private property should be respected, and the garrison be allowed to retire unmolested with their baggage, &c. The fall of Chandore induced the surrender of a number of small forts, and completely deprived Holkar of all his possessions south of the Taptee river. In the meanwhile Colonel Murray with the force from Guzerat had done good service. He had been condemned to the necessity of a temporary retreat, but he had soon resumed his onward march, and had reduced Holkar's capital, Indore, without difficulty, and by the end of November he had occupied or reduced all the country that Holkar possessed to the west of the Chumbul. In other directions the allies of the Mahratta were either beaten or detached from him. The war would have been finished by the great battle of Deeg and by his other reverses, if it had not been for the alliance which Holkar had contracted with the warlike Jauts and their ruler the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, Runjeet Sing. This chief had sent his cavalry to fight with the troops of Holkar at Deeg; and when the Mahrattas fled from the English to his town and fortress of Deeg, the garrison, composed entirely of the Rajah's forces, opened a heavy fire of musketry and cannon on the pursuers, thus occasioning a severe loss on our side in officers and men, and enabling our enemies to carry off many pieces of artillery, which must otherwise have been captured. From this time Holkar and the Rajah were open confederates; and the Mahratta depended almost entirely upon the Jaut for supplies of money and military stores. Down to the time of the great battle of Deeg, this Rajah of Bhurtpoor had professed friendship and gratitude to the English; and General Lake had treated him as a friend: but now the most effectual way of extinguishing the remnant of Holkar's power, and of affording a salutary example to other Indian princes our allies, was to carry the war immediately into Runjeet Sing's territories. Accordingly, on the 20th of November, the cavalry and flying artillery marched back from Furruckabad to Delhi, to cross the Jumna near that city, and leaving the reserve to follow in a few days. During their march the cavalry and flying artillery passed under the strong walls of Hatrass, the principal fortress of the Rajah Dyaram Thakoor. This chief, who was of the Jaut race, and related to the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, had once been the subject and zemindar of Scindiah, but since the decline of that chieftain's power he had made himself completely

* Colonel Wallace, who particularly distinguished himself during this campaign, had been selected for the service by General Sir Arthur Wellesley, who well knew the stuff the Colonel was made of, and who rarely chose amiss. Wallace, of the 74th regiment, had fought by Wellesley's side at the battle of Assaye. In a letter to Colonel Close, who was *then doing* diplomatic duty, Wellesley described Wallace as "a brave soldier and an honourable gentleman," but one "little accustomed to transact political business." On the latter account he endeavoured to place about Wallace such officers as could be useful to him, taking care, at the same time, to consult the Colonel's own inclinations. A good anecdote is told in illustration of Wallace's devoted zeal and implicit obedience to orders. At the siege of Gawilghur he had been charged with the execution of certain details. A heavy gun had been directed to be conveyed by night to an important point; and its transportation over a most rugged mountain so long baffled all endeavours, that the artillery officer, in despair, reported the accomplishment of it to be impossible. "Impossible, sir!" exclaimed Colonel Wallace, "impossible! Let us see!" He called for a light, pulled the instructions from his pocket, and, having read them, said, "O no! not impossible; the order is positive!" The gun, of course, was carried to its point. — *Note in Colonel Gurwood, Wellington Dispatches*

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independent, and had assumed, like his relative Runjeet Sing, the title of Rajah. His fortress and country lay within the limits of the territories which Scindiah had ceded to the English in his treaty with Lord Lake in 1803; but Rajah Dyaram had kept everything as his own; and since Holkar's arrival on the banks of the Jumna, and alliance with the Jauts of Bhurtpoor, his conduct had been almost openly hostile to the Company. He had expended immense sums in fortifying Hatrass, and in entertaining troops in his service, who were exercised in the European manner. When Lake's foremost column approached the town, he fully expected an attack; but the troops marched quietly past the place hearing his drums and fifes, and seeing numbers of his soldiers, both horse and foot, encamped on the glacis. A little beyond the town, at a small village in a jungle, the English cavalry discovered a cavalry picquet which Dyaram had stationed to guard against a surprise; and about eight miles farther on they passed another strong fortress, occupied by another independent chief and close ally of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor. On the 1st of October, 1804, Lord Lake, having come up, and having resolved to reduce all the forts within the Bhurtpoor territory, joined, near Deeg, his cavalry and artillery to the infantry which General Fraser had brought into the country, and which were now commanded by Colonel Monson. Thus, after a month's separation, during which the cavalry had marched upwards of five hundred miles, the two branches of the army reunited with mutual congratulations, for the cavalry acting by itself had gained the great battle over the Mahratta cavalry in the camp near Furruckabad, and the infantry acting by itself had won the victory of Deeg.*

The fortress of Deeg was now garrisoned by troops of Holkar, in conjunction with the troops of his ally the Rajah of Bhurtpoor; it was well furnished with artillery before, and since the battle of Deeg all the Mahratta pieces which Fraser's army had not taken had been carried within the walls and placed in battery. Holkar himself had fled to the town from the disastrous camp by Furruckabad. On one occasion, when Lake was encamped within sight of the fortress of Deeg making preparations for the siege, Holkar came up in person with a great body of horse, hovered round the English for some time, and charged the rear of a division which had been out reconnoitring. He was, however, beaten off with loss; and he never charged again. Having been joined by the reserve under Colonel Don with the battering train, &c., from Agra, Lake marched on the 11th of December, in two columns parallel to each other towards his final position in front of the fortress of Deeg. As the army and its accessaries moved leisurely across the country in form of an oblong square, the spectacle was imposing; for the native bazaar people and other camp followers were not less than 60,000, and there were 200 elephants, 2000 camels, and 100,000 bullocks for carrying grain, equipage, baggage, &c. The fortified village where the 76th had made their memorable charge, the tank, and the topes were seized without firing a shot, and the place was completely invested by the morning of the 14th of December. The British were in possession of the town and all the outworks by the morning of the 24th of December; and on the morning of Christmas-day, 1804, the Mahrattas evacuated the citadel, flying in a panic, and leaving everything behind them. Deeg was a town of considerable size and importance, and had been considered as almost inaccessible to an enemy during the greater part of the year, from its being nearly surrounded by lakes and marshes. It had been a royal dwelling: it had massy gateways and tall towers surmounted by very heavy artillery. But the importance of this place was far inferior to that of the celebrated maiden fortress of Bhurtpoor, which stood amidst jungles and water at the distance of about thirty English miles from Agra. On the 1st of January, 1805, Lord Lake and Colonel Monson moved from Deeg to this well-defended capital of the rajah; and on the third the British took up their en-

* Major Thorn, Memoir of the War in India, &c.

campment-ground for the prosecution of a siege which has scarcely a parallel in the history of modern India, and which witnessed minings and explosions of unprecedented magnitude. Lake found that report had not exaggerated the strength of this place: Bhurtpoor was amazingly strong, both naturally and artificially, and its garrison was a numerous and resolute army. When breaches were made, several assaults were most successfully repelled by the Indians. In one of these affairs Lake lost nearly 300 Europeans and 200 sepoys: the enemy butchered in cold blood all the wounded who fell in the ditch or beyond the outer wall; and several of Lake's best officers were slain. With great alacrity strong stockades were formed behind the breaches. No progress was made until the 18th of January, when Major-General Smith arrived at camp with three battalions of sepoys belonging to the garrison of Agra, and 100 convalescent Europeans, who had performed a march of fifty miles, by a circuitous route, in twenty-four hours; and when Ismael Beg deserted from Holkar and joined the English with 500 native horse. Better advances were then made, and the batteries of the besiegers renewed their fire with greater vigour. By the 21st of January a very wide breach was effected; but the enemy, fearful that their guns would be dismounted, if they were at all exposed, drew them behind their parapets, and kept them in reserve to pour destruction upon the English, whenever they should advance again to storm the place; and, lured by the present of six lacs of rupees, and by the tempting prospect of plunder, Meer Khan, who was then in Bundelcund, marched with all his forces towards Bhurtpoor to assist the rajah. On the morning of the 21st, before daybreak, dispositions were made by Lake for trying another storm. Portable bridges had been made for traversing the ditch; but the head of our storming column found that the enemy had dammed up the ditch below the breach, and caused a great body of water that had been kept above it to be poured in, by which means the ditch was widened and deepened almost instantaneously. As the portable bridges were now too short, and as there was eight feet water in the ditch, Colonel Macrae, who commanded the column, ordered an instant retreat, although some of his people had swum across the water and had even mounted the breach. This was another murderous affair, for during the whole time that Colonel Macrae was advancing towards the walls, or hesitating at the brink of the ditch, or retreating across open ground towards Lord Lake's trenches, the enemy kept up a heavy fire of grape, round shot, and musketry, and nearly six hundred men and eighteen officers fell at different points killed or wounded. And when this was over Meer Khan from Bundelcund appeared in the rear of the besiegers' encampment with clouds of cavalry, partly his own and partly the well armed and mounted people of Holkar. The British cavalry, however, held these forces in check, and towards night-fall the English artillery dispersed them, and killed some fifty of them with the galloper guns. Lake had commenced the campaign with gigantic *materiel* and supplies; but he was already in want of provisions and stores, and a convoy of 12,000 bullocks, loaded with provisions, was anxiously expected. As this convoy was guarded only by a small body of matchlock-men, a regiment of native cavalry and a battalion of a European regiment were detached, under the command of Captain Walsh, to meet it on its way and escort it from Mutra to the camp. Walsh joined the convoy without any difficulty; but on the morning of the 23rd of January, when only a few miles from the camp, he was beset and attacked by Meer Khan at the head of 8000 horse. Captain Walsh retreated into a large open village with the greater part of the convoy intact; but some of the bullocks were of necessity abandoned. Though assailed on all sides, his musketry and field-pieces repeatedly beat off the assailants, but, two of his guns getting disabled, the enemy made a desperate push on that point, and gained possession of part of the village. Walsh's guns were heard in the English camp, and forthwith Colonel Need sounded boot and saddle, and, with an English regiment of dragoons and a regiment of native cavalry, galloped to-

wards the spot. The sepoys in the village, on perceiving the clouds of dust which marked Need's advance across the plain, set up a loud and joyous shout, and, sallying forth upon Meer Khan's guns, they carried them at the point of the bayonet just as Need arrived with his two regiments of horse, who then dashed among the Mahrattas, and put them to flight. Six hundred of the Khan's people were left dead on the field, and he himself escaped with the utmost difficulty, leaving behind him forty flags, all his artillery and tumbrils, his own palanquin, arms, armour, and splendid attire, and flying in the disguise of a common soldier. On the 24th another detachment was sent from the camp for the protection of another and greater convoy coming from Agra, with many thousand bullocks carrying grain, and about 800 hackeries laden with stores, ammunition, 18-pound shot for the battering guns, and six lacs of rupees. On the 29th Holkar, the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, and Meer Khan, having united for the purpose all the forces they could collect, threatened an attack on this rich convoy; but Lake had sent out a second detachment to meet the other on the road; and, although the convoy was repeatedly surrounded, it was brought into camp without the loss of a single bullock, for the rajah's infantry fled on the first appearance of the second English detachment, and the cavalry would not venture near enough for a real attack. A good many of the latter were killed in the jungle by grape-shot and the swords of our dragoons.

As the number of the enemy within the walls of Bhurtpoor was increased rather than diminished, and as the two attempted assaults had cost so great a sacrifice of life, Lake resolved to proceed with more caution. On the 6th of February his army changed ground, and, after clearing the vicinity of the enemy's cavalry, which still came round about in clouds, he established a strong chain of posts, and then leisurely made his preparations for pressing the siege. Boats, or coracles, made of wicker-work and covered with hides, such as are described by Cæsar as used by the ancient Britons, and such as are still seen paddling on the river Wye and other Welsh waters, were constructed to serve as pontoons; and, as an additional means of crossing the broad deep moat, a portable raft was made about 40 feet long and 16 feet broad, which was to be buoyed up by inflated oilskins and casks. But while this was doing in front of Bhurtpoor, Meer Khan wheeled round with his flying horse, rushed into the Doab, and invaded the Company's own territories, being accompanied or followed by clouds of Pindarrees, the freebooters and moss-troopers of India, who made war solely for the purpose of plunder. The Rajah of Bhurtpoor had calculated that this unexpected invasion would induce Lord Lake to raise the siege; but his lordship merely detached Major-General Smith with a part of his cavalry, and with the horse artillery, and continued his operations as before. Smith executed the duty intrusted to him with spirit and rapidity, and with complete success, crossing and recrossing the Jumna and the Ganges, and plunging through other streams which intersected the country, climbing lofty mountains, the offshoots of the stupendous Himalaya chain, and making marches which were never surpassed by any army. The burning villages and the wasted country showed him the way which Meer Khan had taken. He came up with that chieftain on the afternoon of the 1st of March, near the town of Afzulghur, and routed him with great loss. The Khan's principal officers were killed or captured, and a band of stout, hardy, and brave Patans, the pride of his army, were literally cut to pieces on the field of battle, for they would neither fly nor surrender. Meer Khan went off like the wind, evacuating the Company's territories, and recrossing the Ganges with a very diminutive force. General Smith, after restoring order to the country, returned to Bhurtpoor, the point from which he had started. His chace had lasted him a month, during which he had ridden over 700 miles of the roughest country.*

* Major Thorn, who had accompanied General Smith on these flying marches, says, "The detachment after this expedition was somewhat the worse for wear; but, though many of the horses were completely knocked up, the state of the

If the energy and activity of our Indian armies had been infused into the armies of Europe that were contending with the French, or if the British Government had learned from them the reliance which might be placed on the English soldier, and had thrown at once upon one proper part of the European continent a force deserving of the name of an army, the career of Bonaparte might have been checked as early as 1805 or 1806.

During the absence of General Smith, Lord Lake had been joined by a division of the Bombay army, under Major-General Jones. This division, consisting only of four battalions of sepoys, one entire British regiment, and eight companies of another, a troop of Bombay cavalry, 500 native irregular horse, and a few field-pieces, had made another dashing and extraordinary march, having traversed the whole of Malwa, and having penetrated through the very heart of the Mahratta empire, including the hereditary dominions of Holkar and Scindiah. Notwithstanding this reinforcement, however, Lord Lake found that to take Bhurtpoor by storm or by siege was no easy work. When wider breaches were made, and when arrangements were being made for a fresh assault, the rajah's people unexpectedly sallied out in great force, and slew a heap of the besiegers with their long pikes and tolwars: when the assault was made by several storming-parties who were to rush simultaneously on different parts of the works, some fatal mistakes were committed, the sepoys lost heart, and, after being enfiladed right and left by the enemy's guns, and witnessing the terrible effects of a mine which was sprung, the attacking columns retreated with a terrible loss, nearly 1000 Europeans and sepoys being killed or wounded. One of the attacking columns, however, gained possession of eleven of the enemy's guns, and succeeded in carrying them all off to the camp. But the army was now suffering greatly by the want of supplies of every description; the cannon-ball and powder were nearly all spent; and, therefore, on the very next day Lake ordered a fresh assault. This time he threw the whole of his European force and several battalions of native infantry against those obstinate and fatal walls. Some of the English soldiers were seen driving their bayonets into the wall, one over another, and endeavouring by these steps to reach the top; but they were knocked down by logs of wood, large shot, and other missiles from above. Others attempted to get up by the shot-holes which the battering guns had made here and there; but, as only two at the most could advance together in this perilous climbing, those who ventured were easily killed, and when one man fell he brought down with him those who were immediately beneath. Some few got to the top. Lieutenant Templeton, who headed the storming-parties, was killed just as he had planted the colours near the summit; and Major Menzies, who had followed him, and had actually gained the dangerous eminence, was slain as he was cheering on his men. And all the while the enemy, who appear to have been aided by some French artillerymen, and by men who had studied the art of war under M. Perron, kept up an incessant fire of grape-shot, and the people on the walls continually threw down upon the heads of their assailants heavy pieces of timber, great stones, flaming bales of cotton, previously dipped in oil, and pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles. At last Colonel Monson gave up the case as hopeless, recalled the storming-parties, and returned to the trenches. This time the loss in killed and wounded seems to have exceeded

whole was far better than what might have been reasonably expected. It merits remark, that the Bengal cavalry throughout the campaign endured trials and hardships almost surpassing conception. Independent of their previous long marches up to Delhi, they had pursued Holkar closely for above five hundred miles, till they overtook him and completed his overthrow at the battle of Furruckabad; shortly after which they were called off unexpectedly to the chace of Meer Khan, whom they followed through all his doublings and windings, over rivers of great magnitude, and to the mountains of Kemaon, from whence he was forced back, discomfited, and abandoned by the hardiest of his followers. In this fatiguing course the most harassing part which we had to undergo consisted in our nocturnal marches, which, continuing night after night through the whole month, proved exceedingly distressing to man and beast, in depriving them of that natural rest which they sought in vain during the heat of the day."—*Memoir of the War in India, conducted by General Lord Lake, &c.*

1000: of English officers alone five were killed and twelve wounded. In Lake's several attempts to carry the fortress of Bhurtpoor by storm, 3100 men, and a very great number of officers, had been killed or wounded. His lordship now converted his siege into a blockade. His guns, which were nearly all blown at the touch-hole, were withdrawn (there appears to have been a want of artillery and engineering skill and science), detachments were sent off for supplies and for fresh guns, and parts of the army were moved to other positions to block up the roads leading into the town—a difficult undertaking, for the cavalry of the enemy was still very numerous, and Lake's cavalry was absent with General Smith, who had not yet returned from pursuing Meer Khan. But when the Rajah of Bhurtpoor saw that convoys, with supplies of all kinds from different parts, and battering guns and ammunition from Futtyghur and Alighur, were arriving daily in camp; that the old guns which had been blown were repaired and rendered efficient; that he had little or no assistance to expect from his allies, Holkar and Meer Khan; that new batteries were erecting, and that nothing seemed likely to shake the determination or interrupt the perseverance of the British, he lost faith in his lucky star, and sent vakeels to negotiate for a peace. But these negotiations were suspended by the re-appearance of Holkar in great force about eight miles to the westward of Bhurtpoor. Fortunately, however, at this moment, the British cavalry, which had been pursuing Meer Khan, arrived at the camp; and after resting a few days it marched silently out by night, headed by Lord Lake himself, who intended to beat up the quarters of Holkar. But the Mahratta got information of this intended visit, and was in full flight before his lordship could reach the spot. Some 200 of the fugitives were overtaken and slain, their camp was destroyed, and some elephants, horses, and camels were captured. Still, however, Holkar lingered in the neighbourhood, and was joined by Meer Khan with the fragment of his force, as well as by some predatory bands of Pindarrees, who rarely lost many men in action, because they never stayed to fight when they could gallop away. This accession of force seems to have made Holkar careless; for on the 2nd of April he was charged in front and on both his flanks by Lake's cavalry, and put to the rout with a terrible loss. He fled across the Chumbul river with about 8000 horse, 5000 foot, and 20 or 30 guns, the miserable remains of the great army with which he had opened the campaign, threatening to annihilate the British dominion in Hindustan. Some troops that were advancing to his succour were beaten and scattered by a British detachment which marched out of Agra. Holkar then fled to join Scindiah, who, notwithstanding the dreadful chastisement he had received at the hands of General Wellesley, and the treaty he had concluded in December, 1803, was contemplating a renewal of the war with the English. But the Rajah of Bhurtpoor was in no condition to wait the effects of a new confederacy; and on the 10th of April he repaired in person to Lake's camp and implored for peace. This was granted by Lord Lake upon the following terms:—1. The fortress of Deeg was to remain in the hands of the English till they should be assured of the rajah's fidelity, who pledged himself never to have any connection with the enemies of Great Britain, and never to entertain, without the sanction of the Company, any Europeans in his service. 2. He was to pay the Company by instalments twenty lacs of Furruckabad rupees, and to give up some territories which the Company had formerly annexed to his dominions. 3. As a security for the due execution of these terms, he was to deliver up one of his sons as a hostage, to reside with the British officers at Delhi or Agra. Having received the first instalment of the money, and the hostage required, the British forces broke up from before Bhurtpoor, after lying there three months and twenty days. They began their march on the 21st of April, Lake going at once in search of Scindiah, who had expected that his lordship's army would be utterly ruined before Bhurtpoor, for the losses which it had sustained in that siege had been reported, with due exaggeration,

throughout the whole of the Mahratta territory. Scindiah and Holkar retreated with great precipitation towards Ajmeer; and several of the Mahratta chiefs came and joined Lord Lake, who found more reliable reinforcements in the arrival of some divisions of British troops and sepoys from Bundelcund and other quarters.

At this juncture the Marquess Cornwallis arrived to succeed the Marquess Wellesley as governor-general, and began his second and brief career in India by pronouncing sentence of condemnation on the policy of his active and energetic predecessor. But Cornwallis was now falling into the second childhood, and his attention had been too exclusively devoted to those who were murmuring about the expenses of a necessary war, and sighing for the easy happy days of peace and of full treasuries at Calcutta. Moreover, he had come out shackled by injunctions, and he was apparently restrained from following his own judgment, for, although neither Pitt, the prime minister, nor Dundas, the president of the Board of Control, could be called a timid statesman, they had been argued into the persuasion that the Marquess Wellesley's schemes were overbold.

As the rainy monsoon approached, one part of Lake's army found shelter in the splendid but decayed palaces of the great Akbar at Futtypoor Sicree; another part quartered itself in the remains of the palaces of the ancient Mogul chiefs in and about Agra and Mutra; and two regiments of British dragoons found comfortable lodgings in the immense mausoleum of the emperor Akbar, which is situated about seven miles from Agra, tethering their horses in the once splendid garden, and eating and sleeping and pursuing their troopers' sports among the white marble tombs of Akbar and his family, and of the Mogul Omrahs, those mighty men of old, who, could they have started from the sound sleep of the grave, would have heard sounds and beheld sights most strange and marvellous to their ears and eyes. The men were rough dragooners, without the slightest pretensions to taste, or to reverence for works of art and antiquity; but they had the English feeling of respect for the dead, and they offered no violence to the sanctity of the tombs, and left the marble slabs and the ornamented Saracenic arches, the sculpture and carving, and the mosaic pavements, the cupolas and minarets, in as good a state as they found them.

It is scarcely necessary to interrupt the narrative of the war, or to make a separate chapter for the second and very short administration of the Marquess Cornwallis. We shall therefore proceed with the campaign, which did not terminate until it had extended to "the fabulous streams" of Horace and Milton.

As soon as the weather permitted, the marquess quitted Calcutta to travel to the upper provinces and there confer with Lord Lake and others on the best means of terminating the war; but at his advanced age he could ill bear the fatigues of such a journey: he fell sick on the road, and died at Gazipoor, near Benares, within three months after his return to India. According to his own wish and command, that "where the tree fell, there it should lie," the marquess, who had seen so many vicissitudes in the west and in the east, and who had narrowly escaped death at York-town in America, and a grave on the bank of the Chesapeake, was buried at Gazipoor, on the banks of the Ganges. At his age it was, perhaps, cruel in the home government to send him back to such a country and to such arduous labours; but Cornwallis never murmured when he considered himself called upon to serve his country, and he died as he had lived—a contented, happy man.

The government then devolved provisionally upon Sir George Barlow, senior member of the Supreme Council, who was equally anxious for peace, although he differed from Cornwallis as to the best means of obtaining it. Lord Lake, who had had ample experience of the faithlessness of all Indian treaties, was of opinion that the British possessions in Hindustan would never be secured until Scindiah and Holkar were driven beyond the Indus and the Mahratta power annihilated. The knowledge which he had of the character of the Mahrattas, and of the hollowness of all their treaties, made

him sensible that neither the British territories in India nor those of any of the minor states could ever be safe without the constant presence of a strong protecting force, if Scindiah should form an overwhelming power, by uniting all the dispossessed and desperate Mahratta chiefs. Lake felt that either Holkar or Scindiah, or both of them combined, would renew the war before many years were over. But at this time, what was termed the pacific spirit was again dominant in the English councils, and large and impolitic concessions to a faithless chief were contemplated, including the important fortress of Gualior, which was ours by a second capture, and a part of Gohud, the Hindu ruler of which had been true to his treaty with the Company, and had rendered important assistance to Lord Lake during his campaign in Bhurtpoor. We never were pacific in India without being unjust to some of our friends and allies. Nor could it be otherwise. Scindiah, who received some information of the pacific disposition manifested at Calcutta, separated his forces from those of Holkar, and entered into negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm, the political agent of the governor-general in the British camp. Holkar thereupon, declaring that he had no other estate or property left than what he carried upon the saddle of his horse, spurred away to the banks of the Indus to seek fresh allies and instruments among the chiefs of the Seiks, giving out that he expected to be joined by the hardy and warlike tribes of Afghanistan, and by the king of Cabul himself. He had still with him a few pieces of light artillery, and some rabble; and in the country to the north-west of Delhi he found many adventurers quite ready to join him. He eluded Major-General Jones and Colonel Ball, who marched from different points to intercept him on his line of route. This induced Lord Lake to follow him himself with the cavalry of the British army and some of the best of his infantry, for it was imperative to prevent his calling the Seiks to arms. Saluting that poor shadow of a Grand Mogul, the aged and blind Shah Alum, as he passed through Delhi, Lake in an astonishing short time got into the country of the Seiks, driving Holkar before him, and obliging him to cross the Sutledge. The force which made this extraordinary march consisted of his majesty's 24th and 25th dragoons, and the 6th native cavalry, under Brigadier-General Need; of his majesty's 8th dragoons and 3rd native cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General Wood; of his majesty's 22nd foot, the Company's European regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, under Brigadier-General Mercer; and of a park and horse artillery, commanded by Captains Pennington and Brown. They saw many strange sights in the terra incognita, but few stranger than the capital of the late Rajah George Thomas.

This man was an Irishman, a native of Tipperary, and had come to India in the year 1782 (about the same time as M. Perron, the French petty-officer, who had attained to so much greatness), in the capacity of boatswain, or quarter-master, or, as some say, common sailor, on board of a man-of-war. Having the Oriental twist in his imagination, he deserted from his ship, and threw himself among the Polygars, or Hindu chiefs on the Malabar coast—or, as his biographer says, with more solemnity and rhetoric, "Shortly after landing in the vicinity of Madras, the activity of his mind overcoming the lowliness of his situation, he determined to quit the ship and embrace a life more suitable to his ardent disposition." He had not a rupee in the world, and his friends were all to make. But his personal advantages were very considerable. He was young (being only in his twenty-seventh year), more than six feet high, proportionately robust, erect, alert, and of a merry, well-favoured countenance. Possibly, before he became a boatswain, or quarter-master, or common sailor on board of a man-of-war, he had deserted from some foot regiment, for he understood drilling and other matters connected with the art military. After residing for some years in the country of the Polygars, he quitted their service, and traversed nearly the whole peninsula of India in search of adventures or employment. Such a man could not fail of finding both. About the year 1787 he

arrived at Delhi, and then and there received a commission in the service of the Begum Somroo or Sombre. It appears that this widow was not insensible to the personal merits of the tall and well-built Tipperary lad, and that George Thomas figured in the double capacity of pro tempore husband to the Begum and commander or instructor in chief to her army. He disciplined troops for her, and fought and won many battles for her, particularly over the Seiks, who had never ceased troubling her since the death of M. Sombre, her first husband. After five or six years of faithful and very active service, George Thomas found himself supplanted in the Begum's good graces by a European rival, a Monsieur or Signor Levasso, who was, we believe, a Neapolitan. [Adventurers of this kind abounded in Upper India; they were to be found in nearly every independent native court, every man acting for himself, without much regard to country or to laws.] Nothing disheartened by the success of his Italian rival, the light-hearted and adventurous Irishman betook himself to Anopsheher, a walled town in the province of Agra, on the west side of the Ganges, and there waited in the confident hope of obtaining overtures for employment from some of the native powers. A body of cavalry of his own raising quitted the Begum Somroo to follow his fortunes: in all they counted but 250, but they were picked men and of tried valour, having often fought under the command of George Thomas against the Seiks. With such a band, it could not be difficult to pick up a livelihood in those parts. Captain and men seem to have lived at free quarters for some months, or until the beginning of the year 1793, when George Thomas received letters from Appakanda Rao, a Mahratta chief, who promised high pay and a comfortable provision. This Appakanda had formerly been in the service of Mahajee Scindiah, who had intrusted to him the command or management of the districts of Gualior and Gohud; but he had made an unsuccessful expedition into Bundelcund in 1790, had lost many of his troopers, had gotten deeply into debt, and had been rather ignominiously dismissed by Scindiah. Appakanda had therefore determined to throw off all allegiance, and to carve out an independent state for himself. He was in this humour when he was joined by George Thomas, who undertook to fight for him as bravely and as incessantly as he had fought for the ungrateful Begum Somroo, and to raise and discipline for him forthwith a battalion of infantry and a good squadron of horse. For the maintenance of this force three pergunnahs or jaghires, all in the Mewattee district to the south-west of Delhi, were assigned to him by Appakanda Rao, whose right to them appears to have been but doubtful, and whose authority over them was infinitesimally small. The Mewattee inhabitants were a terrible set — the greatest cattle-lifters, thieves, and cut-throats in all India! When a large force was sent against them to collect the revenue, or to make them give up their plunder, or to chastise them for their offences, they packed up their goods and chattels, and, driving their cattle before them, and leaving nothing behind them, they retired into their inaccessible mountains and forests. When a small force was sent against them, they fell upon it and cut it to pieces, never giving quarter. With their cavalry they committed depredations in every direction. Appakanda would have given their country to the Begum or to the Devil, if she or he could and would only have prevented these Mewattees from plundering and harrowing the industrious peaceful peasants, who would have paid their taxes quietly if the robbers had left them in possession of the means. The Mahratta chief had never been able to do anything with them; but our Irish hero undertook to bring them to reason, and to turn the pergunnahs into profitable estates. George Thomas was going to take possession when he received accounts, dispatched to him by M. Perron, of the death of Mahajee Scindiah and the accession of his nephew Doulut Rao Scindiah. As there was no enmity between Appakanda and the new ruler, that chieftain went to Delhi to congratulate Doulut Rao, and he took with him General George Thomas. Our Irishman was well received at the court of the Great

Mogul, where Doulut Rao Scindiah and M. Perron gave the law: he was presented with a khelat, or dress of honour, and was allowed to recruit for the service of Appakanda. During his stay at Delhi he raised 700 men. He was going to his Mewattees when his newly raised troops became mutinous, and began to plunder for want of pay. Appakanda Rao was obliged to remonstrate, and high words followed, our Irishman being a very irascible man. "Your people must not steal among friends," said the Mahratta chieftain. "They must not starve," said the Tipperary man; "pay what is due to them!" The business ended in a compromise, Appakanda giving George Thomas 14,000 rupees in hand, and more in promises—which were not kept.

On his march towards his Mewattees, George retaliated upon the Begum Somroo, laying under contribution all that part of her country which came within his route. At Goorath, a large and populous village, he made good booty in money and bullocks. But the very first night he came among his Mewattee subjects or tenants, instead of being the plunderer, he was plundered, and that too in the very centre and heart of his own camp. Among other things, he lost a fine horse. The next morning he detached a party to discover the village to which his horse had been conveyed. Like all small bodies, this party got well beaten by the robbers. George Thomas then threw forward all his cavalry, and advanced in person at the head of his infantry. He soon carried the Mewattee village, and set fire to it; but more robbers came down from the hills, a panic seized some of his raw recruits, and presently the whole of his little army broke and fled, leaving all their wounded to be made into mince-meat. George himself ran for it, with none by him except about a dozen foot and a few horse; but he succeeded in turning a nine-pounder gun, which had been left behind from its having stuck in the mud or in the bed of a nullah. Luckily for him, this gun was well loaded with grape-shot; one whiff of it was enough for the Mewattees, who turned and fled. George administered a few more rounds, during which his scattered forces rallied, and came up valorously to challenge the robbers to another hand-to-hand fight. But the Mewattees preferred treating, and even *paying*, to fighting any more. They actually paid to their Irish zemindar a whole year's rent, restored his horse and whatever else they had stolen from him, and gave some securities for their good behaviour in future. The chastisement bestowed on this place, the strongest of all, awed the rest of the Mewattee villages, which submitted, though not until he had burned some of them also. How Zemindar Thomas managed his zemindarry, and kept the thieves in order, and kept his own property and his own throat out of their reach, we are not informed; but it should appear that he ruled with a strong hand, that he had some battle or skirmish almost as regularly as dinner, that he thrived among the Mewattees, among whom no zemindar had ever thriven before, that he protected the industrious peasantry of the neighbouring districts, and that he accumulated money, and raised a good many more troops. His late mistress the Begum sent troops to watch him, but nothing came of it. After he had received sundry other important services from him, Appakanda Rao adopted George Thomas as his son, conferred the jaghires upon him in perpetuity, and presented him with 3000 gold rupees "to purchase an elephant and palanquin suitable to the dignity of his new station."

The Begum, becoming more and more wroth, bribed some Mahrattas to assassinate or ruin our zemindar. But the Tipperary man was not to be caught sleeping; and his cook was good and true, and so would not put poison in his meat. At one moment Appakanda was, by some intrigue or other, so incensed against his adopted son that he meant to have him dispatched during a visit at his own house; but when the stalwart Irishman presented himself, Appakanda was awed and terrified, and gave up his foul intent. George Thomas might expect retaliations for those which he had made upon the Begum by levying such contributions in her country; but he conceived that the princess's resentment and

fury arose chiefly out of jealousy and the insinuations of Siguor Levasso, who not only commanded her troops, but who had lately received her hand in marriage. "That Levasso," said our Tipperary zemindar, "was on every occasion the declared and inveterate enemy of George Thomas." At last the Begum resolved to march herself against him with her whole army. The Begum's force consisted of four disciplined battalions of infantry, 20 pieces of artillery, and 400 cavalry. George Thomas faced her with 2000 disciplined infantry, 10 guns, 500 irregulars, and 200 cavalry. But our Irishman's gallantry was not put to the test of fighting with a woman. Terrible dissensions broke out in the Begum's camp. Signor Levasso conceived a violent jealousy of another of the Begum's European officers—of an adventurer from Belgium, who had found it convenient to drop his own name, and to call himself, or to get himself called, the Liege man (Liegeois), after the place of his birth. At the instigation of Levasso, the Begum degraded the Liegeois, who had been for some years a great friend of George Thomas, and gave his place and appointments to a junior officer. Upon this the greater part of the Begum's troops mutiny, and join the Liegeois in inviting to the musnud Zuffur yab Khan, a son of M. Sombre or Somroo by another wife. The Begum attempts to fly, but is intercepted and stopped. She is called upon to lay down her arms, and deliver up her husband Levasso. In the confusion that arises a few shots are fired by the Begum's adherents. Upon this the mutinous troops wax furious: the infantry surround her palankeen; the cavalry surround her husband, who is on horseback at a little distance from her. Rising in her palankeen, the Begum draws a poniard, flourishes it, runs the point of it across her breast, and draws a little blood, without the least intention of killing herself. Signor Levasso hearing the tumult and the cries of her attendants for assistance, demands to know what has happened. He is answered that the Begum has killed herself. Twice he puts the same question, and receiving the same answer, he puts a pistol to his mouth, pulls the trigger, and falls dead from his horse. The soldiery, who the day before had styled themselves his slaves, now commit every act of insult and indignity upon his body. For three days it lies exposed to the brutality of the rabble, and is then thrown into a ditch.

The Begum was conducted to a strong prison in Sirdhana, and her step-son was put upon the musnud. These events gave George Thomas an opportunity to display his magnanimity, and to make a round sum of money at one and the same time. In the extremity of her distress the Begum thought of the bold and fortunate Irishman, and of the bygone days; and in the most abject manner she addressed herself to George Thomas, telling him that she dreaded being poisoned or otherwise murdered; that she had no dependence but on him, &c.; imploring him to go to her aid, and making him immense offers of money, to be paid upon her enlargement and restoration. Our zemindar promised part of this promised money to Baboojee Scindiah, and thus obtained high Mahratta sanction for his doings. Having first set on foot some secret negotiations with the Begum's revolted troops, George Thomas marches in full force, and encamps near Sirdhana. Here he issues a proclamation, stating that unless the Begum be instantly reinstated, no mercy will be shown to the mutineers and rebels; that he is acting under orders of the great Mahrattas, and must be obeyed. Part of the troops in Sirdhana forthwith make an émeute, take the Begum out of the prison, and clap her undutiful step-son in it. But anon comes another revolution, the other part of the Begum's army proclaiming Zuffur yab again. Hereupon George Thomas marches from his camp into the town with a small part of his force, settles the business in a trice, salutes the restored Begum, and packs off Somroo's son a prisoner to Delhi, that pretender having been antecedently "plundered of his effects."

Mahratta friendships were never lasting, even though sanctified by paternal adoption. Appakanda Rao instigated the Ghosseins to attack his adopted son secretly in his camp, and there dispatch him. These Ghosseins were expert as-

sassins and daring fellows in the field; they were excited by the reward of 10,000 rupees, which the Mahratta chieftain had promised them if they did the deed well; yet our Tipperary zemindar seems to have cared no more for them than he would have cared for so many gossoons in the old country, with no other arms than shillelahs. He beat them all, nor let them hurt so much as a hair of his own head. George Thomas made up matters with his chief and adopted father, and they were great friends again when Appakanda contracted a cruel and incurable disorder, and determined, in the Hindu fashion, to devote himself to heaven, and to escape the pains and woes of this world by drowning himself in one of the sacred rivers. He by letter imparted his hard case and this resolution to his loving adopted son, begging that he might see him and embrace him before he died. The river he had selected for his final immersion was the holiest of all —the Ganges. George was hastening to pay the last offices, when he learned that Appakanda Rao, being impatient of his pains, or incapable of bearing the fatigue of the long journey to the Ganges, had drowned himself in the Jumna, which river was nearer at hand. His nephew and successor was no friend to our Irish zemindar. But what of that? George Thomas knew how to befriend himself, and enmity had never yet been able to find him off his guard or unprepared to fight. Without caring for his feudal superior, he went and made war on some of the Seiks who had ravaged and plundered one of his pergunnahs. These fellows, who never cut their beards or their hair, when mounted on horseback, with their jet-black locks and beards streaming in the wind, their half-naked bodies, stout athletic limbs, and glittering arms, presented a most wild and terrific appearance. And, though not quite, they were almost as terrible as they looked. Their horses were large and swift, their arms were spears, matchlocks, and scymetars, all of which they used with much dexterity. The Mahratta cavalry had rarely been able to make any stand against them; but George Thomas, with his disciplined infantry and cavalry, beat them wherever he met them, and surprised them at times and places in which the Seiks thought surprise impossible. As he was happiest when fighting hardest, our adventurer continued these wars against the marauding Seiks; and in consequence of these campaigns, the Mahrattas, considering him as their bulwark on the side of the Seik country, gave him the wide districts of Suniput, Paniput, and Carnaul, yielding a revenue of ten lacs of rupees, for the support of 2000 disciplined infantry and 16 pieces of cannon.

The Irishman's ambition rose with his luck. Having obtained the distinctions of a chieftain, George Thomas aspired to be the founder of an independent sovereignty upon an extensive scale, in the country of Hurrianja, a vast tract of the Delhi province, bounded on the north by the Bhatty country (a land of robbers), and by the domains of numerous Seik chieftains. This country of Hurrianna had been for many years without any ruler or fixed authority: sometimes the Seiks held it, sometimes the Mahrattas, while at other times the Bhatties drove their flocks to pasture in the plains, and levied contributions on the road and in the villages. To a son of old Erin there was something dear and attractive in the name, for Hurrianna or Hurrianneh signifies "The Green Country," and although situated on the verge of the sandy desert of Ajmeer, it is celebrated for its verdure. The country was chiefly inhabited by Jauts and Rungurs, the Rungurs being only Mohammedanized Jauts. They were very riotous and uncivilized, and in a state of perpetual hostility, town against town, village against village. The Irishman had qualities which endeared him to these people, and they left off fighting one another and joined him in fighting the Seiks and the Bhatties. After an arduous contest with the Rajah of Pattiallah and other chiefs of the Seiks — after fighting a battle about every week, and besieging or storming some town or fort about once a month — Rajah George Thomas succeeded in his object, established his power as far as the river Cuggur, in the Bhatty country, and fixed his residence at Hansi, about 90 miles north-west of Delhi. Intending this place for the capi-

tal of his newly acquired dominions, of which it was about the centre, he repaired the fortifications, and gave encouragement to strangers to come and settle in it. Like other reigning rajahs and sovereigns, he set up a mint and coined his own money. He also established an arsenal and a manufactory for muskets and matchlocks, and a powder-mill for making gunpowder.* Like other rajahs, too, he had a zenana, or harem, and some of the neighbouring regions produce handsome women as well as handsome horses. He had his little court, and held his durbar in state. At the same time he had plenty of fighting to keep his hand in good practice, for the Seiks and Bhatties, though beaten, often attempted to make incursions; and when taxes were to be paid, his own subjects were occasionally very turbulent. For a season his authority seemed to be firmly fixed all over the Green Land. But his views extended far beyond Hurrianna—he wished to conquer the whole of the Punjab, and to plant his standard on the banks of the Attock. "I explored all the country," says our Rajah, "I formed alliances, and was, in short, dictator of all the countries belonging to the Seiks south of the river Sutledge." But for untoward accidents and treacherous combinations among his own officers and people, he would, in all probability, have extended his conquests to the mouths of the Indus. His plan was to construct a fleet of boats, with timber cut in the forests near the town of Ferozepoor, or the "City of Victory," on the banks of the Sutledge; to proceed down the river with his army, settling the countries he might subdue on his route, and making sure of each successive conquest before attempting a new one. It was on the happy conclusion of this design that it was his intention to turn his arms against the Punjab, which he expected to be able to reduce in the course of a couple of years. When his enemies were prevailing against him, he contrived to open a correspondence with Captain H. V. White, of the Company's service. His letter was "in a patriotic and truly loyal strain;" but the patriotism and the loyalty seem to have been produced only by his misfortunes. What he offered to give, he clearly had no longer the power to keep. So long as he was an enthroned powerful and victorious ruler, the deserter from our man-of-war evidently thought very little of his king or country. This was quite natural to one in his situation, as was also the instinct which led him to keep for himself what he had gained with his own sword. Now, however, he wrote to Captain White that he had nothing in view but the welfare of his king and country; that he should be grieved to see his conquests fall to the Mahrattas; that the wish of his heart was to give them to his king, and to serve his gracious majesty (whose faithful and loving subject he had never ceased to be) all the remaining days of his life, as a soldier. After maintaining his little sovereignty in Hurrianna from the year 1798 to the close of 1801, without any assistance from the Mahrattas or from any other power, and in the teeth of a vigorous opposition, his musnud at Hansi was turned topsy-turvy by the treachery of his own officers, instigated by the Frenchmen in the service of Scindiah. His subjects rebelled, the Seiks fell upon him, and he was obliged to flee and seek an asylum in the territories of his natural sovereign King George. He got safely across our frontiers about the middle of January, 1802. He travelled to the city of Benares, where the governor-general then chanced to be. In the rigour of the law he was liable to be arrested and shot or hanged as a deserter. But, after a lapse of twenty years, and such an illustration as he had obtained, there was very little likelihood of any such cata-

* "Here, at Hansi," says our Irish rajah, "I established my capital, rebuilt the walls of the city, long since fallen into decay, and repaired the fortifications. As the place had been long deserted, I at first found a difficulty in procuring inhabitants; but by degrees, *and by gentle treatment*, I selected between 5000 and 6000 persons, *to whom I allowed every lawful indulgence*. Here I established a mint, and coined my own rupees, which I made current *in* my army and country. As from the commencement of my career in these parts I had resolved to establish an *independency*, I employed workmen and artificers of all kinds; and as I now judged that nothing but force of arms could maintain me in my authority, I commenced making muskets, matchlocks, and powder.

strophe—under such a governor-general as the Marquess Wellesley, who sympathized with every one that was bold, or great, or adventurous, there was no chance of George Thomas's meeting with anything but welcome and kindness. The Marquess could not enter into his schemes for carrying our Indian frontier beyond the banks of the Indus to the regions watered by the Attock (though coming fast, the time for that gigantic enterprise had not yet come); but he gladly availed himself of our deposed Rajah's offer to afford every information within his power as to the state of those western countries, which were then so very little known. His lordship appointed Captain William Francklin (afterwards Colonel Francklin) to take down this information, and to construct some maps of the countries from George Thomas's rough notes and sketches. In nautical matters, for surveys made along both sides of the vast American continents, and in the Pacific Ocean, we had been previously indebted to those freebooting adventurers the Buccaneers; and now, for a map and a description of a large portion of the north-west of India we were indebted to this adventurer, George Thomas, who was but a sort of land buccaneer. Captain Francklin, though a sensible and judicious man, and very capable of performing the duty to which the governor-general had appointed him, was evidently not the person to seize and portray the real character of our Irish Rajah. He puts on bright colours and varnish when he ought to be drawing strong lines; and he has an unfortunate habit of comparing the dashing volatile Tipperaryman to the ancient Roman conquerors. Some traces of resemblance will, however, be found even in an indifferent portrait. George Thomas at this time was about forty-six years old; stout and strong; his countenance bold, his figure very erect; but he had contracted an elevation of the head which gave him some appearance of stiffness.* Although uncultivated by any European education, he had acquired the languages of the country in a rare degree of perfection. When he first sat down with Captain Francklin at Benares to impart his geographical information, he proposed to deliver it in the Persian language, adding, that from constant use it was become more familiar to him than his native tongue. And his biographer, Captain Francklin (apparently a very competent judge), declares that he spoke, read, and wrote the Hindustanee and Persian languages with uncommon fluency and precision. He had a natural politeness of manner, and appeared to be frank, lighthearted, generous in the use of his money, and humane. But, at the same time, he was given to drink, and was very quarrelsome and savage when in his cups; for, as Captain Francklin saith, with more of the biographical rhetoric and stateliness, "a quickness of temper, liable to frequent agitations and the ebullitions of hasty wrath, not unfrequently rendered his appearance ferocious; yet this only occurred in instances where the conviviality of his temper obscured his reason."

Upon inspecting his affairs and collecting the wreck of a fortune acquired by so much toil and turmoil, our ex-Rajah found himself possessed of a sum which he judged sufficient to procure him the comforts of life in his native Tipperary. Continuing in the solemn rhetorical style, his biographer says that "he determined to retire from public life to the enjoyment of domestic ease and quiet." In simpler language, public life had retired from him, and he resolved to go home to Ireland, and there live upon what he had got. In this intent he was proceeding down to Calcutta, when death arrested his progress. It appears from Major Thorn's narrative of the Rajah, that he considered himself in the light of a lawful sovereign who had been dispossessed of his dominions by rebellion, treachery, and treason; and that before he died, he bequeathed his dominions and conquests to his majesty George III.* He died on the 22nd of August, 1802, and

* There is a portrait of 'General George Thomas' as a frontispiece to Captain Francklin's very curious and interesting volume. He is there depicted with mustachios of a portentous length, and in a general's uniform; but the thing is a poor profile, without character or spirit, apparently the production of some native artist.

* Memoir of the War in India, &c.

found that ease and quiet—which such a man could have found only in the grave—in the English burying-ground at Berhampoor, where a monument was afterwards erected to his memory.* His death is said to have been much regretted by the English who made his acquaintance during his seven months' residence in the Company's territories. We have called him George Thomas, as he is so called by his biographer, and as he called himself during the latter years of his life; but it is very doubtful whether this was his real name. From this curious episode in Indian history, which was probably floating in the mind of our great romance-writer when he wrote his East Indian story,† we return to the triumphant and romantic march of Lake and his small army, whom we left in the Seik country. The ameers or chiefs of the Seiks assured his lordship that their intentions were pacific: and so they were; but so they would not have been if Lake had allowed Holkar any rest or time.

Our little army halted for a day at Paniput, which had so recently been included in the Irish Rajah's possessions, and which was famous for the number of terrible battles which had been fought in its neighbourhood. The last of these terrible battles was fought in the year 1761, between the Afghans, under Achmed Shah, the sovereign of Cabul, and the combined Mahrattas. It ended, after a most obstinate conflict, in the total defeat of the Mahrattas, who lost their whole army, with 200 pieces of artillery and everything else they had brought into the field. It is said that of 500,000 souls, including women and children and camp-followers of all descriptions, who were in the field with the Mahrattas, very few escaped alive. The bigoted Afghans murdered their helpless prisoners in cold blood; alleging that, on leaving their own country, their dear mothers, sisters, and wives begged them, whenever they should defeat the unbelievers, to kill a few of them on their account, that they also might obtain merit in the sight of God and his prophet Mohammed. As the Afghans cut off the heads of the Mahrattas, they piled them up before the doors of their tents. The son of the Peishwa of that day fell in the battle. His body was found and carried to the tent of the King of Cabul. The Afghans cried out—"This is the body of the King of the Unbelievers! We will have it dried and stuffed, that it may be carried home with us to Cabul!" His Afghan Majesty was, however, induced to prevent this barbarity, and to order the body to be burned. From Paniput Lord Lake proceeded to Carnaul, and from Carnaul to Ameerghur, on the skirts of the great Sandy Desert. On his left there now appeared sandhills in endless succession, like the waves of the ocean, desolate and dreary to an immense extent; while to the front and right of these wastes, the eye was deceived by all the illusions of the mirage.* "These optical deceptions," says the historian of the march, who himself suffered what he described, "exhibited to us the representations of spacious lakes and rivers, with trees and other objects, in such a lively manner as almost to cheat the senses of persons familiarly acquainted with the phenomenon; while they who were oppressed by

* Captain Francklin's curious book, from which the above particulars are almost exclusively extracted, was printed at Calcutta in 1803, in 1 vol. 4to. The title-page is very long, but we will copy it, as it conveys a notion of the amount of the geographical information which was imparted by the Irish adventurer. It is "Military Memoirs of Mr. George Thomas; who, by extraordinary talents and enterprise, rose from an obscure situation to the rank of a General in the service of the native powers in the north-west of India. Through the work are interspersed geographical and statistical accounts of several of the states composing the interior of the Peninsula, especially the countries of Jypoor, Joudpoor, and Oudipoor, by geographers denominated Rajpootaneh, the Seiks of Punjab, the territory of Boykaneer, and the country adjoining the Great Desert to the westward of Hurrianeh. Compiled and arranged from Mr. Thomas's original documents, by William Francklin, Captain of Infantry, Member of the Asiatic Society, author of a Tour in Persia, and the History of Shah Aulum."

† Walter Scott. 'The Surgeon's Daughter.'

* The Persians call this phenomenon *serab*, or *sir-ab* (miraculous water). In these western deserts of India it is known by the name of *tchiltram* (picture). It is a pity that we should continue to employ a not very good French word.

excessive heat and parched with thirst cheered themselves in the hope of being soon refreshed with water from the friendly *tank* or cooling stream, of which they thought they had so clear a prospect. Often were we thus agitated between expectancy and disappointment, flattering our imaginations with a speedy indulgence; when just as the delightful vision appeared on the point of being realized, like the cup of Tantalus, the whole vanished, and left us nothing to rest upon but arid plains of *glittering* and burning sands."*

Still pressing forward in what had once been the track of the greatest general of the gigantic conqueror Timour or Tamerlane, Lake crossed the Sutledge, and, skirting the great sandy desert which stretches from the left bank of the Indus to within 100 miles of Delhi, he plunged into the Punjab, or the country of the five rivers. On his way he was joined by Colonel Burn, who had brought up a detachment from Paniput by an entirely new route, and by one of those admirable marches which so often challenge admiration in these far extended campaigns. And then, still pressing onwards, and pointing the heads of his columns towards the spot where the Macedonian conqueror stayed his advance and turned back from the inauspicious gods of India, Lake reached the banks of the Hyphasis—now the Beeah or Beas—the boundary of Alexander the Great's conquest, where his Greeks had erected twelve massive altars as a memorial. The British standard waved majestically over those waters, and the British troops eyed themselves in the same clear mirror which had reflected the Macedonian phalanges more than two thousand one hundred years ago. The scenery around was as sublime as the recollections. In the extreme distance, from north to east, towered the snowy ridge of old Imaus—a part of the Himalaya—whose loftiest peak exceeds the highest of the Andes by thousands of feet. The fleecy softness of this most faint and irregular outline rested upon immense masses of nearer mountains; still nearer were rugged eminences and pine-clad hills sloping down to a fine undulating country of hill and dale, covered with luxuriant vegetation, enlivened by numerous villages, dotted with temples, pagodas, tombs, and ruins, and bounded by the noble river which flowed immediately before the English army on its way to join the Indus and the ocean. Many thousands of the native inhabitants collected on the opposite bank of the Hyphasis to gaze upon our troops; but as here, as during the whole march, the strictest discipline had been observed, and no wrongs offered to the people, these astonished spectators soon drew nearer, and, mixing with the bazaar of the army, agreed to bring in supplies of fruits, vegetables, and other commodities.*

Holkar at this time lay encamped at a place about midway between Lord Lake's camp on the Hyphasis, and Lahore, the capital of the Seiks on the Ravee or Hydraotes (another of Alexander's rivers). In two days and nights of his forced marches Lake could have reached the spot and have annihilated him if he had stayed to fight: and if Holkar had continued his flight, which it is almost certain he would have done, in four days he would have been driven beyond the Hydraotes. But, before this, Sir George Barlow had concluded a peace with Scindiah, and had sent Lord Lake instructions not only to treat with Holkar, but also to grant him very favourable terms; and the chief of Lahore and of the whole Seik confederacy, having called a great council, which unanimously agreed to withhold all aid from Holkar, and to interpose as mediators, as the best

* Major Thorn.

* Major Thorn, 'Memoir of the War,' &c.

"During our march," adds the major, "the most scrupulous regard was paid to the property of the inhabitants, as well that which was exposed as that which they had in their dwellings; and when any injury happened unavoidably to be committed, a liberal compensation in money soon prevented complaint or restored confidence. Thus our route through this remote part of India, and amongst a people naturally fierce and jealous, was pursued, not only without opposition, but with cordiality on both sides. As all supplies were punctually paid for, we wanted nothing that the country could produce; which accommodating reciprocation begat a cheerful intercourse, that increased as we proceeded."

means of getting rid both of the Mahrattas and of the English, sent, on the 19th of December, a vakeel to the British camp. The negotiations were neither long nor difficult, though they must have been painful to his lordship, for he was bound by his instructions to reinstate Holkar not only in his own dominions, from which he had been driven, and which he had deserved to forfeit, but also to put him in possession of territory to which it was believed he never had any right. In conformity with the new system of policy which had been adopted of abandoning all connection with the petty states, and, generally, with the territories to the westward of the Jumna, and of making the Jumna the boundary of the British possessions, Lord Lake was instructed to dissolve the defensive alliances which we had contracted with the Rajah of Jypoor and other inferior powers who had rendered essential services to his lordship, and who looked upon their ruin at the hand of the Mahrattas as an inevitable consequence of their being abandoned by the English.

Although Holkar sent his own vakeel to the British camp, and although that negotiator agreed to the conditions, which were immeasurably more favourable than he had any right or reason to expect, Holkar withheld the ratification of the treaty, and had recourse to many objections and evasions. But Lord Lake told the Mahratta's vakeel that, if the papers were not presented duly signed within two days, he would cross the Hyphasis and continue his march against Holkar. And, to give more effect to this threat, his lordship marched his army down the left bank of the river to a ford or passage, and made his preparations for crossing over. This was on the 5th of January (1806), and in the afternoon of the 7th the treaty, properly ratified, was presented to Lord Lake with great ceremony.

Having gratified and in part terrified the Seiks (they are said at the sight to have blessed their stars that they had not joined Holkar and gone to war with the English) with a brilliant review on the banks of the Hyphasis, and with showing them some of the effects produced by our horse artillery, Lake struck his tents, and retraced his steps towards Delhi.*

By the treaty with Scindiah, which was concluded and signed on the 23rd of November, the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum made by General Wellesley on the 30th of December, 1803, was generally confirmed; but with this exception, that the Company explicitly refused to acknowledge the right of Scindiah to any claims upon Gualior and Gohud, though, from *friendly considerations*, it was agreed to cede to him Gualior and certain portions of Gohud. In case of any breach these said territories were to be resumed by the Company. The river Chumbul was to be the boundary-line. Scindiah renounced certain jaghires and pensions which had been granted to some of his officers by the preceding treaty, and which amounted to fifteen lacs of rupees annually; but the Company granted to Scindiah personally an annual pension of four lacs, and assigned, within the British territories in Hindustan, a jaghire worth two lacs to his wife, and a jaghire worth one lac to his daughter. The Company further engaged not to interfere with any settlement or treaty which Scindiah might make with his tributary chiefs in Mewar and Marwar, and not to interfere in any respect with the conquests he had made between the rivers Chumbul and Taptee or Tuptee. Scindiah agreed not to entertain any Europeans in his service without the consent of the British government, and to dismiss from his service and his councils for ever his turbulent father-in-law Surjee-Rao-Gautka, who had offered many insults and injuries to the English, and who was generally believed to have driven his son-in-law into the late hostility. Holkar was to be admitted into this treaty, and was to

* Lord Lake quitted his command in India in February, 1807, leaving behind him a high and well-merited reputation, together with most affectionate remembrances. He appears to have had almost every one of the good qualities of a British officer and a gentleman. He died on the 21st of February, 1808, in the sixty-fourth year of his age, and just six months previous to the death of his beloved and affectionate son and gallant companion in arms, Colonel George Lake, who, after sharing in the toils and dangers of his father's brilliant Indian campaigns, fell in Portugal.

obtain restitution of territory, &c., provided his conduct should be such as to satisfy the English of his amicable intentions towards them and their allies.

By the treaty with Holkar, which, as we have seen, was not ratified until the 7th of January, 1806, that chief renounced all claims upon any territories lying on the northern or English side of the Chumbul, upon Poonah and Bundelcund (a renunciation which greatly affected his interests and his pride), and all claims whatsoever upon the British government and its allies. He bound himself never to admit Surjee-Rao-Gautka into his service, and never to molest the territories of the Company or of its allies. But the Company agreed to restore, eighteen months after the conclusion of this treaty, Chandore, Gaulnah, and other forts and districts south of the Taptee and Godavery, belonging to the Holkar family, provided the chief fulfilled his engagements, and remained in a friendly attitude. He was to be allowed to return immediately from beyond the Hyphasis and the country of the Seiks into Hindustan, but by a route prescribed to him, by which he would avoid injuring the territory of the Company and its allies.*

The negotiation, in its kind, was far from being so good as the war, in its kind; and the new policy which was adopted was soon found to be impracticable. If the British had never crossed the Jumna and the Chumbul, and had never formed alliances and connections in the countries beyond those rivers, there might have been a temporary but very brief chance of success for this new system; but after the campaigns they had made, and the connections they had formed, there remained not a shadow of a chance; nor could the experiment be tried, or such treaties concluded, without diminution of credit and character—without a wound inflicted upon that moral force which must ever be our greatest force in India. With neighbours like the Mahrattas and their allies the predatory Pindarrees, there could not be any lasting peace in Hindustan, nor any permanent security to the Company's frontiers. By renouncing our connections beyond the two rivers, we threw our peaceful allies into the arms of Scindiah and Holkar, or left them exposed to the rapacity, vengeance, and tyranny of those chiefs: we brought the Mahratta confederacy to press directly upon our own territory — we knocked down the outworks and bulwarks to the rich countries which were beginning to thrive and grow happy under our dominion. As Lord Lake, Sir John Malcolm, and every other enlightened man in India (whose eyes were not distracted by the prospect of a present saving of money) had clearly foreseen, these treaties, with their concessions and renunciations, gave only a transitory calm to the country. But the campaigns, we repeat, had been conducted in a glorious style; the reports of them in England came opportunely to revive the spirit of the nation—a nation which had little to fear, when it could breed and send forth such men as fought with Nelson at Trafalgar, and marched and fought with Wellesley and Lake in Hindustan.

The Earl of Mornington, now Marquess Wellesley, had left India on the 20th of August, 1805, shortly after the arrival of the Marquess Cornwallis at Calcutta. All his plans were not accomplished, and some portions of them were impeded or spoiled by his immediate successors, or by the policy dictated to them by the home government. Nor had he done all that he had done without encountering numerous obstacles, as well in the Court of Directors as in the Board of Control, or without feeling the embarrassment which necessarily arises out of a double authority; for, notwithstanding Pitt's India bill, the declaratory act of 1786, &c., the power of the king's government, as exercised by the Board of Control, and the power of the East India Company, as exercised by the Court of Directors, had not been identified or so blended as to preclude disputes at home, and differences of opinion in the instruc-

* Sir John Malcolm, 'Sketch of the Political History of India.' Sir John was himself the negotiator and agent in all these transactions. But grieved would he have been to take the responsibility of a diplomacy which had been imposed upon him by Sir George Barlow, and of which, in nearly every particular, he disapproved.

tions sent abroad to the governor-general. As such a blending or identification of powers was impossible, the authority of the Board of Control ought to have been made more decidedly superior over the other power than it was. Our Indian empire was far too vast and complicate a system, even when Lord Mornington first arrived in the country, to be intrusted to the management of the representatives of a joint-stock company, or to be, confided to any but the national government and the responsible ministers of the crown; and every year of his lordship's administration, by extending the dominions in the East, and by complicating the relations with the native states, rendered the unity of power in the hands of the home government more and more necessary. A mind less elastic and self-relying than that of his lordship, would several times have been crushed or stultified by the double instructions and double warnings he received, or by the Board of Control pulling one way and the Court of Directors another. During the latter years of his administration, when his difficulties were greatest, he was not cordially supported at home by any party, and his bold plans were understood by none. They were criticised in the spirit of ignorance or faction, and neither the Court of Directors nor the king's government defended him as they ought to have done. The government was, and continued long to be, too much in the habit of deferring to the judgments and opinions of the Directors and the head employés in Leadenhall Street; and the British legislature had but slowly followed the progress of the power of the Company in India. It had legislated for factories, when the Company was in possession of provinces; and by the time the laws were completed to govern provinces, the Company had acquired kingdoms. At no time was there a system formed calculated to the greatness of the empire.* Very frequently both the king's government and the directorial government were disposed to apply the old tiny factory scale to the vast empire, or to pretend that the laws laid down for a set of traders ought to regulate the conduct of statesmen, soldiers, and conquerors. The breaking up of Mr. Pitt's cabinet in 1801, and the mediocrity and feebleness of the Addington ministry, were mischievous to Lord Mornington, and subversive of all boldness of policy; and when Pitt was brought back to political power, in May, 1804, the vigour of his body and mind was greatly impaired, and Lord Castlereagh, who was then appointed President of the Board of Control, was, in that department at least, but a bad successor to Dundas. Without taking the trouble to make himself acquainted with the history, condition, and character of that restless, predatory, and faithless people, Lord Castlereagh took it upon himself at various times to write long-winded notes or treatises about the Mahrattas, in order to demonstrate that the English in India might live in friendship with them, or that they might safely be left to themselves. These crudities, and the notions upon which they were founded, were exposed over and over again by the governor-general's great brother, who, soldier though he was, never loved war merely for war's sake. General Wellesley knew that there could be no permanent peace in India until the Mahrattas were deprived of the means of invading and plundering their neighbours. "If," said he, writing to Major John Malcolm, in January, 1804, "a Mahratta could sit down quietly, and establish a regular government, with a view to future prosperity, I should not despair of peace: but unless Scindiah changes his nature, and that of a great proportion of his subjects, and dismisses a very large part of his army of horse (who must eat up more revenue than he can afford to pay them), and obliges the men to adopt habits of industry, which are entirely foreign to their nature, I do

* Sir John Malcolm, 'Political Hist. Ind.' In the second and enlarged edition of this valuable work, published in 1826, Sir John, though inclined to doubt the expediency of substituting any other medium than that of the East India Company for the direct government of our Indian empire, unhesitatingly expressed his opinion that the mixed power would not do; that the present government is inadequate, and the laws under which it exists defective, and not calculated for the greatness of the empire; and that *some great change must take place.*

not see how a peace is to last." As was Scindiah, so were all the great Mahratta chiefs; and there was no difference between their subjects. As Scindiah was humbled, Holkar rose and took his place, being enabled so to do by the old practice of the Mahratta horsemen, whose allegiance sat loosely upon them, and who were ever ready to desert from an unfortunate chief to join a fortunate one, even though it were the foe and rival of the master they had last served. These eastern Dugald Dalgetties looked merely to the best pay, or the best chances of making booty. They all lived in the saddle, loathing industry, and despising all pursuits except those of war and plunder. The chiefs were at once capricious and faithless, cunning and passionate, so that it was very possible to gratify them in their real interests, without securing their fidelity to a treaty; for in a moment of caprice or rage, their spears were in their hands, and their fleet hordes of horsemen were in motion. The curse of India was, and long had been, the freebooter system, and the Mahrattas might all be called freebooters. It was not reasonable to expect that persons of that description would adopt habits of industry, so long as the whole of Upper Hindustan lay open to their incursions, or so long as they had the power—by forming confederations and by following the banner of the greatest or most successful chiefs—of plundering all their neighbours, and then of baffling pursuit. No army, however great, could, by acting merely on the defensive, protect and effectually secure the far extending frontiers of Oude, the Deccan, Mysore, &c. &c. —frontiers which measured, altogether, many thousands of miles—and to have made the attempt would have been to incur a prodigious, a ruinous expense, together with most of the disadvantages of actual war, without any of its excitement, or glory, or advantages. When—as at Lord Mornington's arrival in India —this Mahratta confederacy contained within it the nucleus of a European system of military organization and discipline, which might in a few years have rivalled the sepoy system established by the Company—when M. Perron and other alert French officers could bring into the field 20,000 well-trained native infantry, and an immense and well-served artillery to back the Mahratta horse—the danger which threatened the British power was assuredly so great as to justify the policy and the measures which the governor-general adopted. If Lord Mornington had attempted to continue the neutrality and non-interference system of his predecessors, instead of resorting to the bold measures which he employed, he might have escaped censure as to details, but he would, in all probability, have been impeached, if not for losing British India, for leaving its prosperity and the prosperity of the states in alliance with it to be ruined by the Mysoreans, the Mahrattas, and the French. The criticism of detail, and the recurrence to first principles, were invidious and absurd. If Mr. Mill's rigid rule of right were to decide such questions, we ought not to be in India at all, except as a humble and trembling factory; we ought to have given up the splendid conquests of Lord Clive, and the dominions obtained by Warren Hastings, and by the more scrupulous Lord Cornwallis, and have retired to our warehouses and counting-houses on the coast; leaving all the good we had done to be undone; leaving the country and the people a prey to the anarchy under which we had found them suffering: but if our empire in the East was to be preserved, then was it indispensable to have recourse to policy and to arms, and to employ the means by which it had been acquired. No other means could have been of any avail. This was seen clearly by the governor-general, by his brother, and by all the able men in the country—and England has not had abler men than were at this period advancing her fame and her interests in India—and all these statesmen and soldiers were equally convinced that the British must either be the first power in India or cease to be a power at all. The happiness of the native populations was as much at stake as our fame and profit. More than a hundred millions of people were beginning to enjoy peace and prosperity under our dominion, or were entertaining the hope of escaping the evils of invasion,

civil war, and anarchy, by being included in our system or taken under our protection. The discontent of a score or two of effeminate, cowardly, cruel, rapacious nabobs, rajahs, and polygars, could not be put in the balance with the contentment and happiness their subjects and all the teeming population of the country had acquired or hoped to acquire. "This empire," says one who had passed his life in India, "though raised by the operations of many and various causes, has been chiefly established, and must be constantly maintained, by the sword. But, though we must continue to govern as conquerors, it is our duty to make our rule a benefit to mankind, and to carry among those whom we have subdued the blessings of peace, knowledge, and improvement in all the arts of civilized life.*"

During the whole of his Indian administration the Marquess Wellesley laudably exerted himself to promote and extend those blessings. Like Warren Hastings, he was the patron of every project which seemed likely to improve the condition and civilization of the natives, or to be useful in giving the European servants of the Company the means of becoming better acquainted with their languages, their manners and modes of thinking, their ancient laws and institutions; and if, at times, his lordship gave too ready an ear to visionary projectors, it was mainly through a generosity of feeling which grasped at every chance of a benefit to mankind, and an activity of intellect which could not bear repose. As soon as he arrived at Calcutta, he contemplated erecting a college in that city for the proper education of civil servants. Like all his conceptions, this plan was on a large and liberal scale.† In the college of Fort William he was supposed to have projected a magnificent repository of European learning and principles, and Asiatic erudition—a vast moral magazine or treasury, in which the stores of learning and wisdom might indefinitely accumulate, and in which the sages of the East might find studious solitudes more attractive even than the sacred shades of Benares.* But his first great object was one of a nature more practical, more immediate, and more pressing. It was, as his lordship expressed it in his own minute, "to supply the actual deficiencies of the civil service." Many of the servants of the Company had educated themselves, and had acquired most extensive knowledge under very difficult and often discouraging circumstances; but no proper provision had been made by the Company or by the British government for a general and systematic education. The servants of the Company were very different from what they had been in the days when poor young Clive sat in a warehouse making out invoices. "Lord Wellesley said: 'The denominations of *writer*, *factor*, and *merchant*, by which the several classes of the civil service are still distinguished, are now utterly inapplicable to the nature and extent of the duties discharged and of the occupations pursued by the civil servants of the Company. To dispense justice to millions of people of various languages, manners, usages, and religions; to administer a vast and complicated system of revenue through districts equal in extent to some of the most considerable kingdoms in Europe; to maintain civil order in one of the most populous and litigious regions in the world; these are now the duties of the larger portion of the civil servants of the Company. The senior merchants, composing the Courts of Circuit and Appeal under the presidency of Bengal, exercise in each of these courts a jurisdiction of greater local extent, applicable to a larger population, and occupied in the determination of causes infinitely more intricate and numerous, than that of any regularly constituted court of justice in any part of Europe. The senior or junior merchan employed in the several magistracies and zillah courts, the writers or factors filling the stations of registrars and assistants to the several courts and magis-

* Sir John Malcolm.

† He wrote to Sir James Mackintosh, to invite him to become the principal or head of this college; and Mackintosh, at that time a barrister not overburdened with briefs, would gladly have accepted the post, having always professed much fondness for an academical situation and the life of a professor.—*Memoirs, &c. by his Son.*

* Quarterly Review, No. XXXIII.

trates, exercise, in different degrees, functions of a nature either purely judicial, or intimately connected with the administration of the police, and with the maintenance of the peace and good order of their respective districts. . . . . Those civil servants who are invested with the powers of magistracy, or attached to the judicial department in any ministerial capacity, although bearing the denomination of merchants, factors, or writers, are bound by law, and by the solemn obligation of an oath, to abstain from every commercial and mercantile pursuit. The mercantile title which they bear not only affords no description of their duty, but is entirely at variance with it. . . . The civil servants of the East India Company, therefore, can no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern; they are, in fact, the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign. . . . . They are required to discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces. . . . . Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world; with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, a foreign language, the peculiar usages and laws of India, and the manners of its inhabitants.'"* He proposed that the institution should contain professors of ethics, jurisprudence, law of nations, English law, classical literature, the modern languages of Europe, history, geography, physical sciences, &c. &c. He made a good beginning, and appointed some able teachers of the Oriental languages, laws, &c.; but the Court of Directors were alarmed at the probable expense of the establishment, and treated it as a presumptuous innovation which might interfere with their patronage, by making merit, rather than interest, a qualification for office, and by transferring the estimate of fitness for judicial and other appointments from London to Calcutta. In spite of the governor-general's remonstrances, the college was broken up to make room for a system which is said to be twice as expensive, without being half so complete.† As a political economist, he was far in advance of the governing statesmen of his day; and from this circumstance alone proceeded many of the criticisms and reproaches of the Court of Directors, who, as a body, were very backward in emancipating themselves from some of the prejudices of the old school. His most strenuous efforts were directed to the extension of the commercial intercourse of India, and to the commencement and formation of those important financial reforms which eventually raised the revenue of the Company from 7,000,000*l.* sterling to upwards of 15,000,000*l.* annually, with advantage to British commerce and without injustice to the natives. He saw that the employment of cheap India-built ships in the trade with Europe would be of equal advantage to England and to India; and therefore he prepared so to employ them. He was opposed by the whole shipping interest of the port of London; and by a majority of his own masters or employers, the Court of Directors; but he persevered and prevailed; and before many months had passed, the wisdom of his policy was so evident that most of his opponents acknowledged their error. In other matters he was obliged to yield to the monopolist spirit of the day. Without any abatement of zeal, he set himself to complete the internal organization of the British empire in Asia, and to establish it on a broader basis. With this view, as soon as the fate of Tippoo Sultaun and his family was decided, he made a vice-regal progress through the upper provinces, visiting the native princes with a pomp equal to their own, redressing grievances, conciliating enemies, and winning over friends to his system. His love of state and parade, which might have been out of place in modern Europe, was imposing and advantageous to him and his country among

* Rev. T. R. Malthus. Statement respecting the East India College, &c. Marquess Wellesley, Minute relative to the College of Fort William.

† The East India College at Haileybury. In the first instance the College of Fort William was suspended altogether; but it was subsequently continued on a reduced scale, being confined to a mere seminary for the instruction of the Bengal civil servants in the Oriental languages appropriate to that presidency. At later periods similar establishments, but upon a still narrower scale, have been formed at Madras and Bombay.

the people of the East. Warren Hastings himself was not more indifferent to money for his own use and profit: though, for his rank and station, a poor man when he started, he returned to England, after seven years' residence in the land of lacs and rupees, little or not at all richer. On the fall of Seringapatam the sum of 100,000*l.* was set apart for his share of the spoil; but he wished to encourage the army, and to reward it well for the labours of the campaign, and he gave up every farthing of it to the troops. Where there was so much that was high and noble, petty faults ought not to be seen. His administration in India was not only brilliant, but also productive of lasting good; and though his great political system for making the power of England supreme was interrupted for the time, it has been found absolutely necessary to carry it out under his successors. The same rules which justified his conduct with respect to Tippoo Sultaun and the Mahrattas, must be applied to subsequent and recent proceedings against the Mahrattas, the Burmese, the Afghans, the Seiks, and others, or those proceedings must be given up as incapable of justification. No rational man will doubt that his lordship owed much to the advice and assistance of his younger brother, the now time-honoured Duke of Wellington, much to the energy and activity displayed by Lord Lake and the other British commanders in the field, and much to the high cast of official talent developed in the East India Company's service; yet still every liberal mind will re-echo the generous tribute paid by one of the ablest of his subalterns and advisers.

"The great success," says Sir John Malcolm, "which attended Lord Wellesley's administration of British India is, on a general view, calculated to excite astonishment: nor will that be diminished by a nearer contemplation of the manner in which he ruled the large empire committed to his charge. His great mind pervaded the whole; and a portion of his spirit was infused into every agent whom he employed; his authority was as fully recognised in the remotest parts of British India as in Fort William; all sought his praise; all dreaded his censure: his confidence in those he employed was unlimited; and they were urged to exertion by every motive that can stimulate a good or proud mind to action. He was as eager to applaud as he was reluctant to condemn those whom he believed conscientious in the discharge of their public duty. It was the habit of his mind to be slow in council, but rapid in action; and he expected the greatest efforts from those he employed in the execution of his measures, whom he always relieved from every species of vexatious counteraction and delay, which could arise from the untimely intrusion of official forms, or the unreasonable pretensions of lesser authorities. It was, indeed, with him a principle to clothe them with all the power they could require to effect those objects which they were instructed to attain; and, though there can be no doubt of the great and extraordinary merit of the distinguished officers who commanded the British armies during his administration, it is to that liberal confidence which gave them all the impression of the fullest power, and the most complete scope for the exercise of their judgment, that their unparalleled success is chiefly to be ascribed."*

The habit of contemplating objects of magnitude—and in the vast field of India nearly everything was large—of acting on a great scale, and of depending on their own abilities and resources, which, on account of distance and other causes, they were frequently obliged to do; together with the necessity of finding intellectual occupation and amusement in remote up-country stations, had raised many officers of the Company, both civil and military, who were admirably fit to perform whatever duty might be allotted to them, and who were more competent and accomplished, and better acquainted with the country and the people, than any class of Europeans that had ever before lived in India. If we take the full range, and include the islands as well as the continent, we may pretty safely affirm that there was in no part of the world a more able and accomplished body of public servants than that which flourished in India during

* Sir John Malcolm, Polit. Hist. Ind.

the first quarter of the nineteenth century. To name only a few of the distinguished many, it would not be easy to find anywhere such men as John Malcolm, Mountstuart Elphinstone, Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd, H. T. Colebrooke, W. Moorcroft, John d'Oyley, T. Prinsep, the Lushingtons, Major Ludd, Major Kirkpatrick, General Ochterlony, &c. It was from among a class of men like these that the Marquess Wellesley selected his officers and agents, without any reference to the patronage of the Court of Directors, who could not always distinguish between the merits of the claimants for promotion as he could, and who were but too often disposed to overlook the question of merit altogether. The honourable Directors, like all other bodies of men, corporate or incorporate, honourable or not, clung to their right of patronage, and were greatly and frequently incensed by the marquess's independent distribution of promotions and employments. They chose, however, to make no very great stir until a case occurred wherein their remonstrances would be almost sure to be backed by popular prejudices; for, when a man promotes his own brothers, the world is almost always ready to cry out against partiality and family interest, let the brothers so promoted be what they may. A dull murmuring had been raised in certain quarters against the rapid advancement of so young an officer as Arthur Wellesley; but these were presently drowned in acclamations of universal applause and admiration, excited by the genius the young general displayed, and by the energy and ability and straightforwardness with which he managed civil as well as military affairs. It was not against Arthur Wellesley the soldier and administrator, but against his brother Henry Wellesley * the diplomatist, that the Company raised their potential voice. The governor-general, in concurrence with Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, and with the approval of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, and of nearly every Englishman in India, appointed his brother Henry, who had managed with great ability the treaty with the Vizier Nabob, to be permanent resident or commissioner in Oude, to settle the frontiers, to carry out the treaty which he had himself concluded, and to regulate the system of administration proper to supersede that of the Vizier Nabob, in order to raise the prosperity and consequently the revenues of the country which had been so long misgoverned. At first the Company murmured at the expense of this mission; and next they declared that the governor-general had no right to appoint to it. An angry correspondence ensued about this and other appointments, between the governor-general and the governor of Madras on one side, and the Court of Directors on the other. Both Lord Mornington and Lord Clive were so incensed at some letters and instructions which were sent out from Leadenhall Street, and which seemed to implicate their personal characters, that they tendered their resignations as early as the year 1802; the governor-general declaring "that a sense of the propriety of observing a submissive and respectful deportment in all his official communications to the honourable Court, induced him to abstain from officially recording the real and efficient causes of his resignation." * But the Board of Control came to the support of the governor-general, and claimed a power above that of the Court of Directors; a new deputy chairman, Mr. Jacob Bosanquet, was chosen, and this gentleman, being intimately acquainted with Indian affairs, took a warm interest in maintaining the governor-general's system, which he believed to be the best adapted to times and circumstances; and being very desirous of preserving the good understanding with his majesty's government, though an advocate for supporting the Company's privileges, he, by his example and influence, induced the Directors to compromise the quarrel, and to request both Lord Mornington and Lord Clive to remain at their posts. These angry dis-

* Afterwards Lord Cowley.

* 'Rise and Progress of the British Power in India;' by Peter Auber, M.R.A.S., late Secretary to the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company. Marquess Wellesley, 'Dispatches,' &c. edited by Montgomery Martin.

cussions, however, produced or deepened in the minds of several of our statesmen the conviction of the necessity of increasing the powers of the Board of Control, or of adopting some other plan of giving to the crown greater authority in the administration of India. And the present compromise was so far from removing the evils of which the governor-general and the governor of Madras had complained, that Lord Clive, who resigned in 1803, before quitting Madras, addressed a loud and spirited remonstrance to the Court of Directors, on the evil use they made of their patronage, and on the bad consequences which resulted therefrom to the public service in India. His lordship declared that good and able men, appointed by himself and others, for their merits alone, had been superseded by inefficient persons appointed by the Directors; that the insubordination and delinquency of many of the Company's servants were to be traced to this abuse of patronage; that emulation had been suppressed, and that the energy of meritorious men, who in the consciousness of their virtue and ability looked for reward to those who exercised the Indian government, had been damped by the promotion of the idle and the dissolute by an authority superior to that of the government. A writer not disposed to take a part hostile to the Court of Directors says—"Lord Clive appears to have given a most zealous support to those measures he deemed essential to the best interests of the Company and to their government abroad, and to have evinced on all occasions a high and honourable feeling in the discharge of his public duties. It was not therefore unnatural that he should experience mortification at acts which affected the exercise of his authority and the interests of those whose good services formed the only claim to his lordship's support. If, in giving expression to these feelings, his lordship exceeded the bounds which a calm consideration of the position in which he stood towards the authority from whom he received his appointment would have prescribed, an apology was to be found in *the anomalous and fluctuating composition of such authority, which was subject to impressions from various causes, to which no other body exercising sovereign power was liable.*"* For ourselves, we cannot help feeling that this anomalous and fluctuating power—the Court of Directors—owed more respect than they paid to the honourable, pure-intentioned son of the great man—the first Lord Clive—to whom they substantially owed their sovereignty in India.

During the administration of Marquess Wellesley, the establishments of the Protestant church in India were improved, without any offence being offered to the religious prejudices of the natives; missionaries were encouraged in their arduous and, to this day, almost fruitless efforts at conversion; and countenance and protection, and a most liberal hospitality, were bestowed on the learned and scientific men of all countries that visited or dwelt in India. The dark superstitions and revolting rites of the Hindus could not be suppressed at one blow, or in a short series of years, and any rash attempt would have ruined our empire, and have deluged the country with European and native blood; but a commencement was made, and the horrible annual sacrifices at the island of Sagor, near one of the mouths of the Ganges, were suppressed.†

* Rise and Progress of the British Power in India. By Peter Auber, M.R.A.S., late Secretary to the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

† Sagor Island, on the east side of the Hooghly river, was a celebrated place of pilgrimage among the Hindus, on account of the great sanctity arising from its situation at the junction of the holiest branch of the Ganges with the ocean. Many human sacrifices were in consequence annually performed of aged persons of both sexes, which were voluntary, and of children, which were forced. The periods fixed for the celebration of these sacrifices were, the full of the moon in November and the full of the moon in January.

It is characteristic of the writer, his book, and school, that Mr. Mill, in his history of British India, should omit all mention of these benefits to humanity, and of the other unquestionable benefits conferred upon India and on the trading world of England during Lord Wellesley's administration. In the course of 600 tedious pages given to the history of this administration, Mr. Mill severely criticises almost everything that was done or contemplated by the governor-general. He censures him for not being wise enough to appreciate Jeremy Bentham's Panop-

By order of the Court of Directors, the libraries of Calcutta and the other presidencies have been well supplied with copies of the Marquess Wellesley's Dispatches; and to them the servants of the East India Company must often refer as to oracles. In an address which was unanimously voted to him in 1837, the Directors said:—"To the eventful period of your lordship's government, the Court look back with feelings common to their countrymen; and, anxious that the minds of their servants should be enlarged by the instruction to be derived from the accumulated experience of eminent statesmen, they felt it a duty to diffuse widely the means of consulting a work unfolding the principles upon which the supremacy of Britain in India was successfully manifested and enlarged, under a combination of circumstances in the highest degree critical and difficult."

The marquess was not recalled, but voluntarily resigned. It is said that he had only been prevailed on to retain the governor-generalship so long, at a most critical period of Indian history, by the earnest intercession of Mr. Pitt's government.* The financial repinings of the Court of Directors, which had so often vexed his ear while in India, seem to have died away on his return home; though many years were allowed to pass before his merits were fully acknowledged, or before he received substantial marks of the gratitude of that body. He was well received by the government of the day, but that government was fast approaching its dissolution; for Mr. Pitt was dying when he gave the hand of welcome to his friend, and he died a few days after the interview. It had become a fashion with a certain portion of the British parliament to denounce the conduct of every governor-general while in the East, and to endeavour to get up an impeachment against him on his return to England. Philip Francis had helped to establish this fashion, and was always ready to prompt or cram the accusers, and to give them the support of his eloquence in the House of Commons, or of his pen as a pampleteer. A very crack-brained person named Paull, who had lived for some time in India, and who had received there sundry favours from the marquess, stepped forward as chief accuser in the present instance, and did his little best to demonstrate that the governor-general and his brother Sir Arthur had pursued a line of policy and had committed deeds in India which called aloud for punishment, and which ought to exclude them for ever from the honour of serving their country in any capacity. The ultra-oppositionists took him by the hand (to leave him, when his fortune was ruined, to despair and suicide), and Francis did his usual spiriting, not gently, but passionately and yet effectively. It was not through the want of any exertion on the part of Hastings's "venomous knight"* that the greatest soldier of modern Europe was not set aside just at the moment when the country most needed his services. But the articles of impeachment against the marquess, presented by Paull, and supported by Francis and his party, were thrown out by a large majority of the House of Commons, and were reprobated by the general sense of the nation.

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ticon, and for not introducing utilitarian principles; he concludes with a balance of accounts, and censures his lordship for having spent a prodigious deal of money; but he says not one word about the progressive increase of the revenues derived from the country, not one word about his lordship's good political economy, and his extension of the principle of free trade, &c. &c.

* Lord Brougham, 'Statesmen of the Time of George III.,' 3rd series. The noble author adds: "Lord Wellesley always gratefully acknowledged the merits and services of Lord Sidmouth, to whom he had through life been much attached."

* "A serpent bit Francis, that venomous knight:
What then?—'twas the serpent that died of the bite."

Epigram by Warren Hastings.

CHAPTER VIII.

ADMINISTRATION OF SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

SIR GEORGE BARLOW had long been a civil servant of the Company; and had recommended himself to the notice of his superiors by an able and honourable discharge of the various subordinate offices which he filled before he reaclled the high station of governor-general. He was actively employed, during the first administration of Lord Cornwallis, in introducing the code of regulations for the civil administration of Bengal; and he filled the office of chief secretary to government under Sir John Shore and Lord Wellesley, before he obtained a seat in the Supreme Council. He had been a member of that Council during the last four years of the Wellesley administration, and he was now senior member. By act and charter the powers of government fell provisionally into his hands on the death of Lord Cornwallis. But the Court of Directors deemed Barlow a fit person to be confirmed in the office of governor-general, and the Board of Control approved of the measure, though only as a temporary arrangement. The death of Mr. Pitt had brought Mr. Fox and his friends into office, and these Whigs were desirous of nominating a governor-general out of their own party. The Court of Directors were anxious to retain Sir George Barlow, and pleaded their right to nominate the governor-general. Hence arose an angry collision at home between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, and not a little confusion and obstruction to public business in India.

Sir George expressed his resolution to follow the steps of Lord Cornwallis in his second administration, and his conviction that the British interests would be best promoted by throwing off a number of our allies, and by narrowing our territories and our connections. It was in this spirit that the recent treaties with the Mahrattas had been concluded. But Sir George, like others who had followed what was called the pacific system, thought it would be very advantageous to revive the contests and commotions which formerly prevailed among the states of Hindustan, and which kept all those states weak. The war policy of Lord Wellesley was not a tenth part so destructive of human happiness as this base peace policy: then a few great battles decided the contest, but now an interminable series of hostilities was to be kept up among the natives; then war had been deprived of more than half its horrors by the discipline of the British troops and the Company's sepoys, and by the honour and humanity and untiring vigilance of eminent British officers; but now all the atrocities of the Mahratta mode of warfare were to be let loose, in order to save the Company the *sin* and the *expense* of waging war in Upper Hindustan.* In

* Bishop Heber has left a short but striking sketch of the difference between European and Mahratta warfare. During part of his tour through Oude he was escorted by a few Mahrattas, who, after being well beaten, had entered the Company's service. They displayed a tawdry banner, and beat their kettledrum, whenever the amiable prelate approached a town or village. "Well it is for these poor peasants," says the bishop, "that the Mahratta banner and kettledrum are now to them no more than objects of curiosity and amusement. Ten years ago there were few parts of India where such a sight and sound would not have been a sign of flight and tears; the villagers, instead of crowding to see us, would have come out indeed, but with their hands clasped, kissing the dust, and throwing down before the invaders all their wives' silver ornaments, with bitter entreaties that the generous conqueror would condescend to take all they had and do them no further injury; and they would have accounted themselves but too happy if these prayers were heard, so that their

contrasting his bold, open, manly policy with this clandestine, mean, degrading system, Lord Wellesley was accustomed to say that *his* was the true peace policy, and that by persevering in it a stop would be put to the carnage and anarchy which had so long raged in Upper India, and which were sure to rage again, even without our instigation, if we did not deprive the native princes of the power of making invasions and wars. In every victory obtained by Lord Lake or by his brother General Wellesley, the governor-general saw the prospect of reducing to order and restoring to prosperity the whole of Upper Hindustan.

In spite of the earnest representations of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow dissolved the alliance of the Company with the Rajah of Boondee and the Rajah of Jypoor. Both these native princes had given proof of their fidelity and attachment to the English during the late Mahratta war. A British army under Major-General Jones was, by the Rajah of Jypoor's aid, and the ample supplies which his country furnished, enabled to maintain a position of the greatest importance to the success of the general operations of that war. Upon finding himself abandoned to the mercy of the Mahrattas, the rajah loudly exclaimed against the bad faith of the English. Sir George intended to complete his destruction of treaties by tearing up those which the Company had contracted with the smaller states of Bhurtpoor and Macherry; but circumstances prevented such proceeding, and the rajahs of Macherry and Bhurtpoor, with other chiefs settled in their vicinity, continued to adhere to their engagements, and to form an essential part of the strength which the Company derived from the maintenance of the territories to the west of the Jumna. When Sir George was superseded, it was found necessary to draw still more closely the ties of alliance with all the chiefs to the north-west of the Jumna and to the south of the Sutledge, so as to erect a strong frontier to the Company's territories; and this was done by the government of Lord Minto, who was satisfied that the security of our possessions was more likely to be maintained by using our great and commanding power to preserve the general peace and tranquillity of India, than by adopting a policy which declaredly looked to the disputes and wars of our neighbours as one of the chief sources of our security; and which, if it did not directly excite such wars, shaped its political relations in a manner calculated to create and continue them.* Lord Wellesley had exposed in spirited language the dishonour, the abomination of this last policy. "In the termination of hostilities," said he, "my solicitude has been directed to the important purpose of effecting a general pacification of India, on principles of reciprocal justice and moderation. The power, reputation, and dignity of the British empire in India will derive additional security and lustre from the establishment of peace and good order among the native states. In the decline of intrinsic strength, inferior states may perhaps have gained a temporary safety by fomenting the discord of contiguous powers; but in any extremity such a policy is unwarrantable and disgraceful, nor can permanent repose be secured upon such precarious foundations."†

Scindiah, far from being satisfied with the very advantageous treaty which he had obtained when his fortunes were desperate, lost no time in advancing claims to more and more territory. The province of Berar suffered severely from inroads made by Scindiah's Pindarrees; and it was in vain that the people applied for the protection of the British. Yet General Wellesley had formed a treaty with the Rajah of Berar, in which the Company was bound to afford protection. Fierce dissensions arose amongst the Rajpoot chiefs, which threatened to plunge the whole of Rajpootana into confusion and misery; but Sir George Barlow de-

houses were left unburnt, and their wives and daughters inviolate! War is, doubtless, a dreadful evil everywhere; but war as it was carried on in these countries appears to have horrors which a European soldier can scarcely form an idea of."—*Indian Journal.*

* Sir John Malcolm.

† Wellesley Dispatches, &c. Reply to the Address of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta on the 29th of February, 1804.

clined interfering, even as a mediator. Other commotions began to rage in other parts of the country, and if the pro-tempore governor-general did not excite or rejoice at them, he certainly did nothing to prevent them. At the same time he busily interfered in all matters within the Company's own territories, over-tightening the chords of government, and disgusting not a few of the able, high-spirited men who had risen in the service under the Marquess Wellesley. Sir George Barlow's authority, however, very soon expired.

Sir Gilbert Elliot, who had distinguished himself by the heat of his zeal against Warren Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey, had now succeeded Lord Castlereagh as President of the Board of Control. Between the date of that interminable impeachment and the year 1806 he had been governor of Corsica, he had contributed to our losing that island, and he had been raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Minto. He and his friends had been but a very few days in office when the news arrived of Lord Cornwallis's death in India. It was he that addressed the chairs in Leadenhall-street, and suggested that Sir George Barlow should be immediately appointed governor-general: but in so doing he had intimated *that it was to be viewed only as a temporary appointment, prompted by the exigency of the case in the first days of a new administration.* This new administration were very desirous of appointing the Earl of Lauderdale, who, as Lord Maitland, had been one of the managers in Hastings's impeachment, and had given numerous proofs of hot party zeal. On the 7th of March, 1806, or little more than three weeks after he had suggested that Sir George Barlow should remain ad interim, Lord Minto, presiding at the Board of Control, told the chairman and vice-chairman of the Court of Directors that the government had chosen to name the Earl of Lauderdale for the permanent successor of Marquess Cornwallis as governor-general. The Directors were astonished and displeased; and it is doubted whether Lord Minto was very anxious for the appointment of the Earl of Lauderdale, or whether he did not all along look himself for the honours and emoluments of the India vice-royalty. A correspondence ensued between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. In a letter dated the 12th of May, Lord Minto, as President of the Board of Control, urged the principle that the king's ministers ought to have an individual of their own party, or in their entire confidence, as governor-general. The Board claimed at the hands of the Court of Directors the same degree of credit and deference which it had been the happy system and practice of that Court to give to his Majesty's government in similar cases; and they again named the Earl of Lauderdale as the governor-general of their choice. The Court of Directors, however, refused to rescind their appointment of Sir George Barlow, and quoted acts and charter in proof of their right to *have* a governor-general who enjoyed *their* confidence (which Lord Lauderdale never did). The subject was hotly discussed in newspapers and in pamphlets. It was a paper war between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. The king, or the mixed Whig cabinet acting in his name, determined to revoke the Directors' *unanimous* nomination; and accordingly, on the 29th of May, it was intimated to the Court of Directors by Lord Minto that his Majesty had *vacated* Sir George Barlow's appointment. The Court presented a strong remonstrance against this proceeding on the part of his Majesty's ministers, in the exercise of the power of recall, insisting that it entirely nullified the power vested by charter in their Court. Lord Minto stated in reply that there were urgent reasons for not protracting the discussion,—that he was ready to assist in maintaining the right of the Court of Directors to appoint; but that they must feel that the power of revocation lay both in the crown and in the Court, and could be exercised either by the King or by the Directors, without mutual agreement or the consent of both. His lordship denied that ministers wished to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right of appointment, and subscribed to the remark of the Court of Directors, that it had been usual for them to have an understanding with his Majesty's minis-

ters, and to consult their opinions and wishes in nominating to so important a post as that of governor-general of India. The subject was brought before the House of Peers by Lord Melville, who had been for so many years at the head of the Board of Control, but who was now out of office and suffering under the ill effects of an impeachment. Melville took part with the Court of Directors. He said that the principal difference between the lost India bill of Mr. Fox, and the passed and sanctioned bill of Mr. Pitt, was this —The Fox bill aimed at putting the patronage of India into the hands of the Crown, the Pitt bill vested it substantially in the East India Company, on the assumption that it would be more beneficially exercised by the Company than by the King's ministers. Now Pitt's bill was the law; and it could not be supposed that that bill intended to enable his Majesty's ministers to appropriate to themselves the patronage of India, by exercising at their own will and pleasure the power of recalling the governor-general. The clause in that bill, continued Melville, was indeed intended to render the consent of the crown indispensable to a new appointment, and to act as a check upon the Court of Directors in case of their being led by partiality to make an improper appointment; but the concurrent power thus entrusted to the crown would be grossly abused if exercised merely with a view to enforce the appointment of a particular individual whom his Majesty's ministers might desire to make governor-general. This, he said, had been the first instance in which such a power had been assumed. On the other hand, Lord Grenville, the premier, contended that Pitt's bill clearly gave to the Crown a power of recall; and that it was not to be supposed that, because a particular appointment in India might be vacated or reversed by the Crown, all the appointments and the whole of the patronage must fall under the control of ministers. His lordship admitted that if it could be proved that the power of the crown had been exercised in this instance merely for the purpose of procuring the appointment of a particular person, it might be considered as a violation of the law, but he reminded Lord Melville that, from the passing of Pitt's bill in 1784 down to 1801, not a single governor had been appointed who had not been recommended by him (Melville) himself. The question was also debated in the Commons. Lord Castlereagh, so recently displaced from the presidency of the Board of Control, severely censured the conduct of the new ministers, and denied their power or their right to force the Court of Directors to submit to the appointment of an individual who had little to recommend him to the post of governor-general except his party connections and the wishes of his friends. Francis, who was still listened to as an oracle by a large portion of the Whig party whenever he spoke upon Indian affairs, and who was still as expert as ever in picking holes in men's characters, told the House that Sir George Barlow, though now the favourite and elect of the Court of Directors, had, on some former occasions, incurred the displeasure of that honourable Court. Paull, the crazy defamer of the Marquess Wellesley and his great brother, declared that, in order to secure the respect of the native princes, the governor-general of India should always be a man of high rank, and not a mere revenue officer like Sir George Barlow. Men of much sounder minds shared in this opinion; and it appears to have been a general feeling among those best acquainted with the man, the country, and the circumstances of the times, that Barlow had not the higher qualifications necessary to the office. On the other hand, very few thought that the Earl of Lauderdale, who had been a wretchedly bad ambassador, would make a good governor-general. The Court of Directors most stoutly resisted the appointment of this Thane, and being backed by public opinion their resistance was so formidable that ministers were obliged to yield to it. The cabinet, however, continued to insist that the governor-general must be an individual in their confidence or of their party; and that the appointment of Barlow must be vacated. The dispute ended in this curious compromise —ministers gave up Lauderdale, the Court of Directors gave up Barlow, and Lord Minto, President of the Board of

Control, was transmuted into governor-general.

Though nominated in July, 1806, Lord Minto did not reach India until July, 1807.

In the interval the Madras presidency had been the scene of some alarming events. Our power in the East had almost been shaken by the rashness of certain martinets who interfered with the beards, earrings, and turbans of our sepoys. Lord William Bentinck had succeeded Lord Clive as governor of Madras at the end of August, 1803, and had immediately set on foot various reforms or changes. In the particular reform which caused the trouble, he is said to have had little to do. It originated with Sir John Cradock, afterwards Lord Howden, who became in 1805 commander-in-chief of the forces in the Madras presidency; but it should appear that Lord William Bentinck, who showed himself, at a later period and in other countries, a very impatient reformer, was rather too zealous in enforcing Cradock's plan. Hitherto there had been no code of military regulations under the presidency of Madras. In March, 1805, General Sir John Cradock submitted to the governor of Madras a proposition for the preparation of a code; and Major Pearce, the deputy adjutant-general, was appointed to prepare it. The code was soon finished and presented; and Lord William Bentinck not only approved of it, but also considered it his duty to enforce it. It was made to appear afterwards that his lordship had never read the code, or, at least, had not attended to some old but dormant regulations which were now coupled or appended to it, and which were of a nature highly offensive to the prejudices of the native troops. Among these offensive regulations were the following—the sepoys were required to clip their mustachios, to appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and never to wear the distinguishing marks of caste on their forehead, or their earrings when in uniform. A turban of a new fashion, and of one unvarying cut, was also ordered for the sepoys.

At first the native soldiers seemed to submit to these innovations; but they were soon found to be as angry as the Russian Strelitz had been when Peter the Great took them by the beard. The first symptoms of mutiny appeared in the 2nd battalion of the 4th regiment of native infantry, which then composed part of the garrison of Vellore, in the fortress of which the family of the late Tippoo Sultaun still resided. On the 6th and 7th of May (1806), these sepoys, being called upon to wear the new turban, became disorderly, and vowed they would wear no such abomination. Sir John Cradock, as commander-in-chief, ordered a court of inquiry to be held to report upon the causes of this insubordination. But before the court met, he ordered that the non-commissioned native officers who refused to wear the new regulation turban should be reduced to the ranks; and he insisted upon the immediate adoption of the turban by the mutinous battalion. The court of inquiry soon reported that the objection to the new regulation turban had no warrant in the religious prejudices of the people; and that the evidence from all quarters, whether from Hindus or from Mussulmans, was in favour of the new turban. The court sentenced nineteen of the ringleaders in the disorderly battalion to punishment. Seventeen of these men were pardoned, but two were condemned to receive 900 lashes each. After a time the discipline of the battalion seemed to be perfectly restored; but on the 4th of July the commander-in-chief asked the advice of the Madras government on the expediency of revoking the order for the new turban, as he said he had reasons to suppose that it gave almost universal dissatisfaction to the native Mussulman troops, and as he understood that the sepoys were impressed with the notion that it was intended to convert them by force to Christianity. Sir John Cradock added that still it was his wish to persevere, and conquer prejudice; but that he could not, with satisfaction to his own mind, persevere to the full extent without the advice and sanction of the government. The governor in council regretted that the turban order had ever been adopted, but agreed with the commander-in-chief that to revoke the order would be to commit the authority and respect due to those who had issued it. It was thought that it

did not appear either from the report of the court of inquiry, or upon any other authority, that the regulation turban contained anything really offensive to the religious prejudices of the natives.* Several sepoy officers of high caste had declared that there was nothing in the regulation turban contrary to their faith. The governor in council proposed issuing a general order to the native troops, containing the most positive assurances that "no intention existed to introduce any change incompatible with the laws or usages of their religion." This general order was drawn up, and a copy of it was sent to General Sir John Cradock for his consent and approbation previously to its publication, for Sir John chanced to be absent from the council when the question was debated. Upon receiving the copy, the commander-in-chief warmly approved of its spirit; but having been led to believe that the reports which he had received about the discontent of the sepoys had been greatly exaggerated, he considered the publication of the general order to be no longer necessary. In an unhappy moment the governor in council adopted Sir John Cradock's opinion; and the general order was not published to the troops. A very few days after the commander-in-chief had written his letter the memorable massacre of Vellore was perpetrated.

The martinets had continued to try the temper of the native troops by insisting on that part of the unlucky military code which was intended to produce uniformity in the appearance of the soldiers on parade, by reducing their beards and mustachios to one pattern, by discontinuing the marks on the forehead which denote the several castes, and by making the men lay aside their huge earrings. It should, however, appear that, although these parts of the regulation were more odious than the new turban, the discontents of the sepoys would not have led them into mutiny, insurrection, and murder if their feelings had not been worked upon by a few designing desperate men, who aimed at restoring the family of Tippoo to the sovereignty which that sultaun had lost. The lesson taught by the wild outbreak of Vizier Ali and the assassination of Mr. Cherry and others at Benares had been thrown away upon our Indian governments, for the family of Tippoo and their numerous adherents had been allowed to remain in Vellore, at a short distance from the frontiers of their own country, the kingdom of Mysore, which General Sir Arthur Wellesley had taken such pains to put in order.* The splendour which the sons of Tippoo were enabled, by the liberality of the Company, to keep up, and the liberty which they enjoyed of holding intercourse with a continual influx of strangers, including nearly all that came to Vellore from the countries which had once belonged to their father, are believed to have contributed to strengthen a regular conspiracy, and to facilitate the

* We have before us a description of the turban and an account of the troubles to which it gave rise, written by an English officer on the staff of the naval commander-in-chief, who was at Madras at the time of the insurrection.

"The turban was made of English broadcloth, covering a slight iron frame; the only other material employed was a small cockade of leather, to which some objected, suspecting it to be the skin of a hog, which is an impure animal, though the chief dislike arose from a fancy that the whole resembled a hat, which particularly marks a European.

"The author was at that period at Madras, and well remembers that the sentries at his own door mounted guard for some days with a shawl or handkerchief bound about the head, rather than wear this hateful turban. In no other respect did the troops at the presidency show any disposition to resist the authority of their officers, though considerable pains were taken by the malcontents to instigate them to mutiny."—*Massacre of Vellore*, in the 'Plain Englishman,' vol. ii. London and Windsor, 1821.

The excellent officer and man who furnished this article—Edward Hawke Locker, Esq., Commissioner of Greenwich Hospital—was joint editor with Mr. Charles Knight of the 'Plain Englishman,' one of the very earliest of the works produced with the view of conveying useful information, and good taste and entertainment, to our industrious classes.

* "The Court of Directors appear to have had some doubts whether Bengal might not have been, upon the whole, more eligible in point of security from all possible effects likely to create disturbance; but it was not an opinion pressed against the arrangement which had been adopted at the termination of the Mysore war in 1799."—*Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, by Peter Auber, M.R.A.S., late Secretary to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

execution of the daring design. It is said that the confederates intended that all who were brought to join in the insurrection should act upon a preconcerted plan, which had been digested and privately circulated by some of the turbulent Marawa chiefs; and that in connection with these desperadoes were some few Frenchmen disguised as fakirs or dervishes, who went about the country inveighing everywhere against the English as robbers and tyrants.* It is also stated that placards were fixed up within the mosques and Hindu temples, where Europeans never entered, to excite a general spirit of revolt among the whole native population of Madras.†

Colonel Fancourt, an experienced and brave soldier, who commanded the garrison of Vellore, was taken completely by surprise, for he believed that the court of inquiry and the severe punishment of the two ringleaders had put down the spirit of mutiny. He was in bed and asleep at two o'clock in the morning of the 10th of July, when the conspirators began the massacre by attacking the European part of the garrison, which consisted of only four companies of his Majesty's 69th regiment. The mutinous sepoys being joined by Coilleries or professional robbers from Marawa, by the rabble of Vellore, a large and populous town, and by other desperadoes, were as ten to one to the British soldiers of the 69th,‡ who, moreover, were taken as completely by surprise as was Colonel Fancourt. Several warnings had been given, but none had been heeded. Except the ordinary weak night-guards, men and officers were in their beds. Just as the moon had risen above the horizon, the European barracks were silently surrounded; and then a most destructive fire was poured in at every door and window, from musketry and a six-pounder, upon the poor defenceless soldiers. At the same moment the European soldiers doing duty with some of the sepoys on the main guard, and even the sick in the hospital, were assaulted and inhumanly butchered. This being done, the assassins hastened to the houses of the British officers, where they put to death all who fell into their hands. Colonel Mac Kerras, who commanded one of the sepoy battalions, was shot while haranguing his men on the parade ground. Lieutenant Ely, of the 69th, with his infant son in his arms, was bayoneted before the eyes of his young wife. Four English officers of the 1st native regiment were killed and one was wounded. Three of these gentlemen were murdered in a horrible manner. Finding they could make no resistance against such numbers, they hid themselves in a bath. The sepoys discovered their retreat, first fired, then rushed forward and bayoneted them, and afterwards collected straw and other combustibles, and set fire to them: when found, the three officers were so disfigured that it was impossible to distinguish one from the other.* Others were barbarously treated, tortured, and then dispatched. The mental torture of those who survived was ex-

* Biographical Memoir of the late Major-General Sir R. R. Gillespie, as cited in the 'East India Military Calendar; containing the services of general and field officers of the Indian army.'

† Massacre of Vellore, in the 'Plain Englishman.'

‡ The Coilleries of Marawa and of some other neighbouring districts exercised their profession as a birthright. They never considered their calling in any way disreputable, it having descended to them as an inheritance from their ancestors. If questioned, any one of them would answer that he was a robber by birth, parentage, and education!

It afterwards appeared that some 3000 Mysoreans had followed the family of Tippoo from Seringapatam, and had settled in the town or in the immediate neighbourhood of Vellore; and that the number of the servants and adherents living within the fortress was not less than 1700 or 1800. In the last number, we suppose, were included the women of the zenanas, who were nearly 800, and who were all very handsomely provided for. These wives and concubines and dancing-girls had been collected from many quarters of India; and each furnished her apartment in the palace according to the fashion of her native country. The four elder sons of Tippoo were allowed 50,000 rupees, and the younger children 25,000 rupees each per annum. Without counting uncles, cousins, &c., there were twelve sons and eight daughters of Tippoo dwelling in Vellore, and living in great luxury and magnificence.

The police must have been carelessly managed, for many hundreds of vagrants, fakirs, jugglers, and the like, had been allowed to settle in the town, and to live upon the bounty of the Mysorean state prisoners.

* East India Military Calendar.

cruciating, and it lasted for many hours. We have in our hands a simple and touching narrative, written immediately after the event by a wife and mother—by the wife of Colonel Fancourt, the commander of the garrison. This lady says: "Colonel Fancourt and I retired to rest at ten o'clock on Wednesday night; about the hour of two on Thursday morning we were both awakened at the same instant with a loud firing. We got out of bed, and Colonel Fancourt went to the window of his writing-room, which he opened, and called aloud and repeatedly to know the cause of the disturbance, to which he received no answer, but a rapid continuation of the firing by numberless sepoys assembled at the main guard. Colonel F. then went down stairs, and about five minutes after returned to his writing-room, and requested me to bring him a light instantly. I did so, and placed it on the table; he then sat down to write, and I shut the open window from which he had spoken to the sepoys, fearing some shot might be directed at him as he sat, for they were *then* firing in all directions from the main guard. I looked at my husband, and saw him as pale as ashes. I said, 'Good God, what is the matter, my dear Sir John?' to which he replied, 'Go into your room, Amelice.' I did so, for I saw his mind so agitated, I did not think it right to repeat my question at that moment. I heard him, two minutes after, leave the writing-room and go out of the house. Between three and four o'clock, I believe, the firing at the main guard ceased, and the drum beat, which I afterwards found was owing to my husband's exertions to quiet the sepoys. It then began again at the European barracks, after my husband left the house; I hear he returned again, though I imagine but for a moment; I certainly heard the door of his writing-room tried very soon after the firing at the main guard had ceased, but having, after he quitted me, bolted the door, if it was he, he could not enter. When I heard the door attempted, I called out, 'Is it you, Sir John?' to which I received no answer. . . . . I bolted all the doors in my room, and brought my children into it: I fell on my knees, and fervently prayed that Colonel Fancourt's endeavours to restore peace to the garrison might be crowned with success, and his life spared through the mercy of God. I dressed, and twice cautiously opened the hall-door, and felt my way in the dark to the lower end of the hall, to look where they were firing most. I perceived it was chiefly directed at the European barracks. The last time I ventured from my room, as I stood at the lower end of the hall, which was quite open to the verandah, a figure approached me. It was so dark, I could only see the red coat by the *light* of the firing at the barracks. I was dreadfully frightened, expecting to be murdered, and having left the children in my bedroom, dreaded *their* last hour was come also. I had courage to ask, 'Who is there?' The answer I received was, 'Madam, I am an officer.' I then said, 'But who are you?' To which the gentleman replied, 'I am an officer of the main guard.' I inquired what was the matter? He said it was a mutiny; that *every* European on guard had been murdered already but himself, and that we should all be murdered. I made no reply, but walked away to the room where my babes and female servants were: the officer went out of the opposite door of the hall, and never got down stairs alive, for he was butchered most cruelly in Colonel Fancourt's dressing-room. I have since heard his name—Lieutenant O'Reilly, of the 1st battalion 1st native infantry. After this conversation with the above-mentioned officer, I began to think it unsafe to quit my room again; but as soon as daylight appeared I went into Colonel Fancourt's writing-room, and looked through the Venetian blinds on the parade. I saw some soldiers of the 69th lying dead; four sepoys were on the watch at Colonel Marriott's door,* and several issuing from the gates of the palace. The latter were not firing; indeed I think they were unarmed, and making a great noise. They were at this time firing on the ramparts, and appa-

* Colonel Thomas Marriott and his brother Major Charles Marriott were charged with the duty of looking after the Mysorean family. The Major was shot in the side while addressing some of the mutineers.—*East India Military Calendar.*

rently in all parts of the fort. . . . . They were next employed in ransacking the houses, intent upon murder and plunder. I at this moment gave up *all for lost*. I opened my dressing-table drawer, and took out my husband's miniature, which I tied on and hid under my habit-shirt, determined to lose that but in death. I had secured his watch some time before, to ascertain the hour. I had hardly secured the much-valued resemblance of my husband before I heard a loud noise in the hall adjoining my bedroom: I moved softly to the door, and looking through the keyhole, discovered two sepoys knocking a chest of drawers to pieces. I was struck with horror, knowing their next visit would be to my apartment. My children and three female servants were at this time lying on the mat just before a door which opened into the back verandah, and which, at the commencement of the mutiny, seemed the safest place, as shots were fired at the windows, and we were obliged to move as fast as possible from them. I whispered my ayah (native nurse) that the sepoys were in the hall, and told her to move from the door. She took the children under my bed, and begged me to go there also. I had no time to reply, for the door we had just left was at that instant burst open. I got under the bed, and was no sooner there than several shots were fired into the room; but although the door was open, nobody entered. I took up a musket-ball which fell close to me under my bed. The children were screaming with terror at the fire, and I expected our last hour was come; but, making one effort to save my babes, I got from my hiding-place, and flew into a small adjoining room off the back staircase. I opened the window, from which I only saw two horsekeepers. I returned instantly to my bedroom, desiring my ayah to take my little babe in her arms; I took Charles in my own; and, opening the door of the back stairs, ran down them as quick as I could. When we got to the bottom, we found several sepoys on guard at the back of the house. I showed them my babes, and told my ayah to inform them they might take all we had if they would spare our lives. One of them desired us to sit down in the stable with the horses; another looked very surly, but did not prevent our going there. While we stayed in the stable, I told the ayah I had my husband's watch, and requested she would hide it for me. She dug up some earth with her fingers and threw over the watch, and put two or three chatties upon it. We had not been seated five minutes before we were ordered away by a third sepoy. He told us to go into the fowl-house, which had a bamboo front to it; and in consequence we were quite exposed to view till the same man brought us an old mat, which we made use of by placing it before the door to hide ourselves; and afterwards the same kind sepoy brought my little boy half a loaf of bread to satisfy his hunger. Here I suppose we sat about three hours; I in the greatest agony of mind, endeavouring to quiet my dear Charles, whom I found it very difficult to pacify, he was so alarmed by the constant firing, and cried sadly to go out several times. I saw the sepoys from my concealment taking out immense loads of our goods on their backs, tied up in table-cloths and sheets; they all went by way of the ramparts, which made me fear they had still possession of the works.* I know not how I was supported; through the mercy of Providence I fainted not; I kept my senses through all the horrors of the night and morning. What I most dreaded to hear was my husband's murder; and I really believe I should have braved death, and searched for him on the parade, had not the situation of my babes withheld me from the rash attempt; my dread of having them murdered in my absence, or leaving them wretched orphans, made me remain in this place of concealment. I hoped for the arrival of the 19th dragoons from Arcot; the few lines Colonel Fancourt wrote in his room I thought most probably were intended

* Major Charles Armstrong, of the Madras establishment, who was stationed at Gooty, chanced to arrive on the glacis of Vellore between night and morning, and was seen and challenged by the mutineers from the ramparts. On giving his name he received a volley of musketry, which broke both his legs. As he lay bleeding and helpless on the ground, a savage fakir came up and dispatched him.—*East Ind. Military Cal.*

to be sent express to Colonel Gillespie (who was that morning coming to spend a few days with us); but whether Colonel F. had the means of sending off his dispatch or not, I was quite ignorant; still, however, I thought the news must reach Colonel Gillespie on the road by some means or other; and seeing a tremendous firing at the gates strengthened my hopes that the regiment was arrived. Our house appeared at this time quite deserted by the sepoys; but suddenly several of them rushed into the Ampound, and called out (as my ayah said) to find and murder me. She requested me to go into the further corner of the fowl-house, which I did, taking Charles with me and covering him with my gown. I had much difficulty to keep him quiet, he screamed so; every instant I expected we should all be murdered; but the firing at the gate became now so strong, that they were obliged to fly to it, and once more vacated the house, by which means we escaped death. I was so thirsty as several times to drink dirty water out of a dirty chatty, and gave the same to my dear Charles also. At last I heard distinctly the horses of the 19th on the drawbridge, and huzza repeated aloud; then I hoped everything, and presently after heard them enter the fort. An officer rode in, and called for me by name, but I could not answer or move. Again I heard my name repeated, and saw an officer in a red jacket I thought looked like my husband. I sprung forward to meet him; it was Mr. Maclean. I called for my husband; he told me he was alive. Colonel Gillespie and Mr. Maclean then joined us, and both gave me the same assurance. They took me up stairs and placed me on a chair, giving me wine and water to drink. When the agitation of my mind was calmed, they told me Colonel Fancourt was wounded, though not dangerously, and that he must be kept quiet. About an hour after, I was told by the surgeon of the 69th my husband was in danger, but that worse wounds had been cured; they were flesh wounds, and the balls had not lodged. Hope still made me think he would recover. I would not even ask to see him, thinking the sight of me might agitate him too much. Alas! I found too late there was no hope from the first; he breathed his last about four o'clock the same evening. Thank God he died easily; his death was happy, I am fully satisfied, for he lived religiously, and met his death in the faithful discharge of his duty."*

It appeared afterwards that Colonel Fancourt had been shot by the sepoys as he was proceeding to the main-guard, and that he had been found by some of the 19th dragoons in a dying state. Other wives and mothers suffered equally with the lady whose interesting narrative we have given at full length. In all 14 or 15 British officers and about 100 British soldiers were massacred. At about 7 o'clock in the morning two officers and a surgeon, whose quarters were near to the European barracks, contrived to get in, and took the command of the remains of the four companies of the 69th. These few men soon made a sally from the barracks and gained possession of the six-pounder which the mutineers had been using: they then fought their way through their assailants, till they reached the ramparts and a gateway, on the top of which Serjeant Brodie, with his European guard, continued most gallantly to resist the whole body of the insurgents. This Brodie was the hero of the day, for he fought on, and maintained his post for several hours after all the officers had been killed.

Such was the state of things when Colonel Gillespie, who commanded at Arcot, received the dismal tidings of what was doing at Vellore. Fancourt and Gillespie were old friends and fellow-soldiers—they had served together in St. Domingo—and they had been made happy by being stationed near to each other in the Carnatic. Gillespie had appointed to dine with his friend and family on the preceding day, and to sleep in their quarters at Vellore: but just as he mounted his horse to ride over, some letters had arrived from the government, and these requiring immediate answers, compelled him to send an excuse and postpone his

* Narrative of the Insurrection at Vellore in the year 1806, by the widow of Colonel Fancourt, in 'The Plain Englishman.'

visit till the morrow. Had it not been for the imperative circumstance of duty which detained him at Arcot, Colonel Gillespie would almost inevitably have shared the catastrophe of his brave friend. On the morning of the 10th he mounted his horse at six o'clock, with the intention of riding over to Vellore in time for breakfast. It was at this instant that he received the news of the tragic fate of Colonel Fancourt, and of the horrors that were still prevailing. Not a moment was to be lost; and, therefore, collecting instantly a troop of the 19th dragoons, whose horses were already saddled, and ordering the galloper guns to follow with all possible speed, he applied the spur, and went off at the racing pace. The distance from Arcot to Vellore is about sixteen English miles. It was seldom performed in so short a time. So eager was Colonel Gillespie to reach the place that he was considerably in advance of his troop of dragoons, when Serjeant Brodie, who had burned almost his last cartridge, descried him from the top of the gateway. Brodie, who had served with him in St. Domingo, turned to his drooping comrades and said, "If Colonel Gillespie be alive, here he is at the head of the 19th dragoons, and God Almighty has sent him from the West Indies, to save our lives in the East!" Regardless of his own safety, and in the face of a furious fire, poured upon him from the walls and close round towers, the Colonel pushed towards the bastion and the gateway. There, a chain, formed of the soldiers' belts, being let down by Serjeant Brodie, the Colonel grasped it, and was pulled up the face of the work. The poor survivors of the 69th welcomed him as a deliverer; and, at his word of command they promptly formed, charged with the bayonet, and drove the mutineers from that part of the works. Gillespie then waited till his dragoons and his galloper guns came up. Upon their arrival orders were given to blow open the gate, and, this being done, the dragoons dashed through the gateway into the fortress, and were soon followed by some native cavalry of Fort St. George who were quartered at Arcot. The mutineers and insurgents were numerous, and they were desperate: they seemed determined to maintain the battle in the interior of the fortress; but the sudden charge of our cavalry, and then the fire of our gallopers, broke them and dispersed them. From 300 to 400 of the mutineers were cut to pieces on the spot; some hundreds threw down their arms and cried for quarter, while the rest fled in all directions. A considerable number escaped through the sally-port; but some hundreds were taken in hiding places, and imprisoned. The disaffection had not reached the native cavalry, for they charged as fiercely as our own horse, and their sabres were as deeply stained as those of the English dragoons with the blood of their misguided mutinous countrymen.*

The standard of Tippoo Sultaun had been hoisted on the palace within the fortress almost as soon as the insurrection broke out, and no doubt was entertained that the sons of Tippoo who inhabited that palace were partakers in the plot. Colonel Gillespie felt so well assured of this fact, that in the first emotions of indignation and horror occasioned by the death of his dear friend Fancourt, and the shocking spectacle which presented itself on all sides, he would have consented to the demands of our enraged soldiers who were bent upon entering the palace. But he yielded to the entreaties of some of the persons who had the care of the Tippoo family; and though he could not be persuaded of their innocence, he condescended to take the Mysorean princes under his protection; and he sent them shortly after with a good guard down to Madras. It was reported and believed in the army that if Colonel Gillespie had not acted with such promptness and spirit, the insurgents, in the course of a few days, would have been joined by 50,000 men from Marawa, Mysore, and other parts.†

* "We state this fact," says a writer in the Quarterly Review, "upon the high authority of a respectable officer, who belonged to the 19th dragoons, and was with them on this memorable occasion."—*No. XXXVI.*

† Biographical Memoirs of the late Major-General Sir R. R. Gillespie, as quoted in the 'East India Military Calendar.' The brave Gil-

Two of the princes were clearly ascertained to have tampered with the garrison at Vellore previously to the mutiny. It was expected that some attempt would be made to rescue them while on the road to Madras; but there was nothing of the sort. The elder of Tippoo's sons on reaching Fort St. George sought an interview with the governor, Lord William Bentinck, and earnestly intreated to be allowed to remain on the coast; but Moize-ud-Deen, the younger prince, who was far more culpable than his brother, made no such effort; and they were immediately embarked with their attendants on board the 'Culloden' of 74 guns, which bore the admiral's flag, and proceeded direct for Bengal and Calcutta. The excellent officer on the admiral's staff, from whom we have already quoted, adds a few particulars. "We were officially employed in receiving them on board, and making arrangements for their accommodation, and witnessed the strong emotions of terror which they expressed on that occasion. To persons of their effeminate habits, who had never before touched salt water, and were bred up in the most indolent retirement, this transition was indeed most strange. They were suddenly conveyed by a rapid march to Madras, hurried through the tremendous surf, and hoisted up, half dead with fright and sea-sickness, into a huge fabric, which they contemplated as a prison, perhaps as their tomb. The rolling of the ship, and the roar of her guns, as she saluted the fort on weighing from the roads, completed their agitation. They regarded all around them with suspicion, and gave themselves up for lost; nor could they be persuaded of their personal safety, or that they would soon be joined, in Bengal, by their families, who were proceeding thither by land. Their removal from Vellore was undoubtedly a measure of judicious policy, although the idea of their attempting to recover the throne of Mysore was absurd."*

But if the idea of recovering possession of the lost and partitioned kingdom of Tippoo Sultaun was absurd, it was nevertheless very possible for the insurgents to have thrown parts of that country back into anarchy, and to have devastated some portions of the Carnatic. But for the promptitude of Colonel Gillespie some of the Mysorean leaders might have done at least as much mischief and have caused as much trouble and expense as Dhoondiah Waugh.

On the first intelligence of the sanguinary outbreak, and before it was known how far the conspiracy and the disaffection of the sepoys might spread, something very like a panic prevailed among the English, who, in many places, were surrounded by none but natives and native troops. While this alarm lasted, many rash and some ridiculous proceedings were resorted to. The commanding officer of Palamcottah, dreaming incessantly of plots and assassinations, suddenly disarmed the sepoy garrison, compelled his officers to shut themselves up with him in a large house, into which he collected their wives and children, and having strongly barricadoed it, he sent off for the assistance of a regiment of English cavalry, having fully persuaded himself that *his* last hour was come. This panic fear was without any foundation. The sepoys, when deprived of their muskets, remained in the fort, looking with tranquil surprise on the absurd procedure; and when at length their arms were restored to them, they resumed their duties without a murmur against the gross injustice which had been offered to their honourable fidelity.* The alarm extended even to Fort St. George and the city of Madras, where many persons believed that there was a deep laid conspiracy to destroy the whole of the white population, and thus to overturn the British empire in India. The dispossessed Nabob of the Carnatic, who was now residing at Madras as a mere pensionary of the Company, was strongly suspected by these alarmists to be involved in the plot; and this suspicion gave rise to some ludicrous scenes.†

lespie was killed in 1814, at the assault of Kalunga, in the Nepaul country.

* E. H. Locker, Esq., Massacre of Vellore, in 'The Plain Englishman.'

* E. H. Locker, Esq., Massacre of Vellore, &c.

† "It happened just at this time that he (the nabob) gave a splendid natch (an exhibition of dancing-girls) on the circumcision of his child,

Every black face, says one who was present, was now regarded with doubt, and the sepoys, proverbially faithful to their officers, though grievously wronged by their suspicions, were brought into a dangerous state of excitement by this very distrust. The attention of the Madras government was directed to every measure of precaution.

A few days after the massacre Lord William Bentinck stated to the council that he had not read *all* the code of military regulations; that he knew *nothing* about the shaving of the beards, clipping of mustachios, obliterating of the caste marks on the forehead, and depriyation of the ear-rings; that he had only been very lately informed of the changes in the dress of the sepoys, distinct from the new turban, and that the knowledge of this fact, and the advices received from Vellore, induced him to propose the immediate suspension of the orders regarding the turban, the marks of caste, the ear-rings, &c. It appears that these orders, though they had never been enforced or so much as known to the native troops, really existed in writing in some old regulations, consisting of regimental orders respecting drill, dress, discipline, &c.; that they had no place in the additional orders to which, as requiring the sanction of Government, the attention of Lord William Bentinck and the council was requested by the commander-in-chief. But as Lord William took it upon himself to adopt a regular military code, and to enforce its articles, whether old or new, he ought surely to have read and to have carefully studied both, even though the old regulations did fill 150 folio sheets. In a civilian the omission might have been more excusable, but his lordship was a soldier, a general officer, and one who prided himself in his military character and acquirements. His lordship, however, frankly declared that he had read only the new or additional set of orders, and that he was ignorant of there being anything in the dormant orders of the old regulations calculated to offend the prejudices of the native troops; and that he thought the best remedy would be to revoke those particular orders altogether. In conformity with this opinion the governor-general in council sent a resolution to the officer now in command at Vellore; and the commander-in-chief addressed a circular letter to all the commanding officers of divisions, and of the subsidiary forces at Hyderabad* and in Travancore, acquainting them that the rule about the beards, mustachios, ear-rings, and forehead marks was to be set aside, and that the old turban was to be restored unless where the native officers and soldiers should be found to prefer the new one. This last clause, which left the natives to choose what turban they should wear, was objected to by the governor in coun-

to which all the chief persons of the government were invited. The council, some of whose members were infected with these false suspicions, fancied this was a contrivance to collect all the principal Europeans into the palace of Chepauk, and there sacrifice the whole at one blow! They met in secret consultation, and determined to decline the invitation; but Lord William Bentinck, who disdained these apprehensions, considered it proper to show no distrust in his own person towards the nabob, and resolved to attend the ceremony.

"The writer of this article, with another officer on the staff of the naval commander-in-chief, was sent to represent him on this occasion, and accompanied Lord William Bentinck to the palace. As the carriage moved slowly along between the files of British troops which lined the way from the government house to Chepauk, he is free to own that he discovered some intuition of that qualm which is said to have been formerly experienced by certain persons on their way to Tyburn; and this sensation was not much mitigated by having in his pocket a curious dagger, which the admiral (who never knew fear) reached down from his cabin before they left the ship, and, lending one to himself, and another to his companion, humorously observed, 'It would be as well to have a little play for their lives in case of a struggle.'

"The match, however, went off extremely well, although scarce a European except themselves appeared in the immense company which assembled on the occasion; and the poor nabob, so far from meditating slaughter, was alarmed even at the suspicion, and dreaded it as much as the council."—E. H. Locker, Esq. Massacre of Vellore, in 'The Plain Englishman.'

* Although there was no massacre, very serious agitations occurred in the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, about the turban, the marks of caste, the beards, &c. The whole force of 10,000 men was thrown into disorder. The commanding officer, Colonel Montresor, with the concurrence of Captain Sydenham, the resident, wisely took upon himself the responsibility of revoking those obnoxious orders; and thereupon the disorder and the discontent ceased instantly.

cil, and Sir John Cradock as commander-in-chief deferred to the objection.

A special commission was appointed to inquire into the origin and causes of the mutiny at Vellore. It appeared to this commission that the innovations in dress and the residence and conduct of the Mysore family at Vellore were the chief if not the sole causes; and abundant evidence was produced to prove not only that there had been a previous plot, but also that it had been concerted to begin the insurrection and massacre as early as the 17th of June. A communication to this effect had been made on the night of the 16th of June to an English officer of the garrison by Mustapha Beg, a sepoy of the first battalion 1st native infantry; but the Englishman had most unwisely referred the communication to some of the native officers, and these men, deep in the plot themselves, had succeeded in inducing the belief that no discontent existed, and that Mustapha Beg was mad. The last assertion was the more easily credited as Mustapha was an habitual drunkard.*

A general court-martial was appointed by the commander-in-chief to try the mutineers of Vellore. On the 2nd of September, the commander-in-chief submitted to the governor and council of Madras, two propositions, both of which are said to have been strongly supported by the British commanding officers of the southern and Mysore districts. The first of these propositions was, that the mutineers condemned to death by the native general court-martial should be executed, not all in one place, but in detachments, at the different divisions of the army. To this measure, as indicating a suspicion of every part of the native army, *all* the members of the council refused their assent. The second proposition of the commander-in-chief was, that the guilty regiments should be erased from the army list and disbanded. It received the assent of the majority of the council: but Lord William Bentinck negatived it upon his own authority and responsibility, urging that such a step would only serve to perpetuate recollections which it would be the part of prudence to endeavour to extinguish. This conflict of powers was followed by another, for the supreme government at Calcutta, agreeing in opinion with the commander-in-chief, and the majority of the council of Madras, annulled the act of Lord William Bentinck, and ordered the erasure of the guilty regiments to be made immediately.

As a preliminary to the trial of the prisoners, Sir John Cradock had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes and Lieutenant Coombs, to investigate their *comparative* delinquency. These two officers reported that they could not make comparisons or distinctions, as all appeared about equally guilty. But as there were 600 of them, it became an embarrassing question how to deal with them. The commander-in-chief pressed for a general banishment. The supreme government at Calcutta recommended that the execution of some of the ringleaders should be followed by a general amnesty. Lord William Bentinck recommended a temporary continuance of the imprisonment, as this would leave scope for acting according to circumstances. Besides the 600 sepoys, there were about 500 men, fugitives from Vellore, who claimed the attention of the Madras government. It was felt to be dangerous to let all these people loose in a country so lately the scene of conspiracy and revolt, and therefore the recommendation of his lordship for the temporary continuance of imprisonment was adopted by all the council except Sir John Cradock, who was still of opinion that all the mutineers ought to be banished from India. The native general court-martial sentenced a few of the mutineers to death, as having been the most culpable in the massacres. The executions took place under circumstances of peculiar solemnity. On the firing of a signal gun, a certain number were hanged, and others shot by their comrades or blown from the mouths of cannon at the same instant, in presence of all the troops. The spectacle struck terror along the whole line. But the abandonment of the objectionable regulations proved the most effectual means of re-establishing disci-

* There was, however, no doubt of Mustapha Beg's fidelity. The government afterwards presented him with 2000 rupees and a gold medal.

pline and the public tranquillity.* Still, however, the panic continued in many quarters, and as cowardice is nearly always cruel, those who feared the most raised a loud clamour against Lord William Bentinck for being too merciful and indulgent. These men seemed to have forgotten that hundreds of the guilty sepoys had been cut to pieces in Vellore by the 19th dragoons and the native Madras cavalry. Their outcry excited or bewildered others, for even the commander-in-chief (and we would not accuse Sir John Cradock of cowardice) condemned the system of mildness and conciliation, and contended that great severity was necessary. The supreme government at Calcutta, too, gave up their plan of amnesty, and seemed to see no resource except in Sir John Cradock's dreadful plan of a general banishment—a dreadful plan indeed, as, in the eyes of all the Hindus, banishment was more terrible than death. By this time Sir George Barlow knew that he was superseded, and that Lord Minto was on his way to India as governor-general. Under such circumstances it was not likely that Barlow should resort to any decisive measure, or attempt to overrule the noble governor of Madras. Lord William Bentinck was therefore left to persevere in his system of mildness and conciliation. By degrees most of the prisoners were released; and although they were all declared incapable of serving the Company again, some of the least guilty of them were allowed small pensions for their past services. At the same time his lordship adopted various precautions, altering the distribution of the army, and bringing together the native and European troops which had previously been broken into insulated detachments.† If his conduct, his carelessness, or his love of innovation or of quick reforms had contributed to that fearful catastrophe, his lordship's management after the insurrection appears, in our humble apprehension, to have been wise, generous, humane, and altogether admirable. But the Court of Directors, who were greatly dissatisfied with other acts of Lord William's government, did not consider the atonement sufficient for the original error; and, perhaps, some of that honourable court did not approve of his lordship's leniency, there being at this period a very general belief in the efficacy and absolute necessity of extensive capital punishments. The Directors first received intelligence of the mutiny of Vellore, on the 17th of February, 1807, in a secret dispatch from Madras. It is said that their resolution was immediately taken to recall his lordship. A short time after, they received a letter from General Sir Thomas Maitland, then the crown-appointed governor of Ceylon, to whom the panic-stricken commandant of Palamcottah had written, when his fears were at the highest, representing, in very extraordinary terms, that a desperate conspiracy had taken deep root along all the coast, and that nothing but European aid could save our Indian empire from being wrecked.* This confirmed the honourable Court in their resolution; and on the 27th of April, after the question had been twice postponed, it was resolved by ballot —"that although the zeal and integrity of the present governor, Lord William Bentinck, are deserving of the Court's approbation: yet, when they consider the unhappy events which have taken place at Vellore, and also other parts of his lordship's administration which have come before them, the Court are of opinion, that it is expedient, for the restoration of confidence in the Company's government, that Lord William Bentinck should be removed, and he is hereby removed accordingly." They also determined that Mr. Petrie, a member of the Madras council, should take charge of the government as soon as their dispatch should be received; and that Sir John Cradock should as instantaneously be removed from his post of commander-in-chief of the forces in that presidency.†

* Account in 'The Plain Englishman.'
† Auber.

* Auber.
† In the dispatch communicating the resolution of recall, the Court said, "With respect to Lord William Bentinck, of the uprightness of his intentions, and his regard for our service, we have no doubt, and we have had pleasure in expressing our satisfaction with different measures of his government; but others, which we felt our-

Lord Minto, who had left England several months before this resolution of recall, reached Madras, on his way to Bengal, in July, 1807; and there gave his sanction to the measures of lenity which had been pursued or recommended by Lord William Bentinck towards the mutineers. But this sanction of the new governor-general could not rescind the resolution of the merchant-princes of Leadenhall-street, or stop the edict which was now upon the ocean. The Directors' dispatch reached Madras on the 17th of September. It was desired to continue to Lord William, during the remainder of his stay at Madras, the honours which he had enjoyed when governor; but he declined receiving them, on account of the terms in which his removal was announced in the letter of the Court. It had been usual to allow the superseded governor the nominal possession of his office until the arrival of his successor, or until he could conveniently embark for Europe; but his lordship's functions ceased immediately on the receipt of the Directors' dispatch. No measures had been taken to enable his lordship to return home, and but for the kindness of Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, he would have been obliged to remain at Madras, stripped of all authority, and in a very humiliating situation, until the departure of the homeward bound fleet of Indiamen.

General Sir John Cradock did not submit so quietly to the edict of the Court of Directors: he could not doubt of the Company's right to dismiss from the command of the Company's own troops; but he doubted—and other men shared his doubts—whether the Company had the power or right to deprive him of the command of the king's troops; and, at first, he refused to relinquish the latter command. It is astonishing that some fatal mischief did not, at some time, spring from these frequent and violent collisions of authority. Mr. Petrie, the pro-tempore governor, and the council, intimated that they would resort to the powers vested in them by charter and acts of parliament to enforce obedience; and they forthwith appointed Major-General Hay Macdowall, of the King's service, then on the staff, to the command in chief of the whole army. Sir John Cradock thought it prudent to submit, and to take his departure for England as soon as he possibly could.

On reaching England, Lord William Bentinck ineffectually endeavoured to obtain from the chairman of the Court of Directors a specific enumeration of the causes and circumstances which had led to his unceremonious recall. The chairman having declined to state the causes, his lordship addressed a powerful memorial or appeal to the whole Court of Directors. After explaining his conduct, and his ignorance of the existence of the old regulation about turbans, beards, &c., his lordship said—"The mutiny at Vellore cannot be attributed to me, directly or indirectly. I have been removed from my situation, and condemned as an accomplice, in measures with which I had no further concern than to obviate their ill consequences: my dismissal was effected in a manner harsh and mortifying; and the forms which custom has prescribed to soften the severity of a misfortune, at all events sufficiently severe, were

selves obliged in the course of the last year to disapprove, impaired our confidence in him." They did not state the instances in which his lordship had incurred their disapprobation; but it appears to have been pretty well understood by people in India what these instances were.

His lordship, without the consent or knowledge of the Court of Directors, had gone to Calcutta to confer with the governor-general; and this was held to be contrary to rule and precedent and acts of parliament, which forbade such communications except through the councils. He had made some alterations in the revenue system; and although the Court concurred in his views at first, a difference of opinion afterwards arose among them, and his lordship was taxed by one party as having been too precipitate. Another cause of disaffection was the employment of military men in civil duties and offices. His lordship had appointed Captain Grant, of his body-guard, to be the head of the police: and against this appointment in particular Sir Henry Gwillim, one of the puisne judges at Madras, had inveighed in an address from the bench. But the most comprehensive cause of offence appears to have been his lordship's proneness to listen to reformers and innovators.

There were other and secret causes of enmity, which no doubt had their weight both at Madras and in London. His lordship, who carried financial reforms into every department of the government, had made extensive retrenchments, and had boldly set his face against jobbery and peculation.

on this single occasion violated, as if for the express purpose of deepening my disgrace. Whatever have been my errors, they surely have not merited a punishment than which a heavier could hardly have been awarded to the most wretched incapacity, or the most criminal negligence. * * * I take it for granted, that the Court of Directors have been *misinformed*, and that to place the question before them in its true light is to obtain redress. I have been severely injured in my character and feelings. For these injuries I ask reparation."

The answer of the Court of Directors to this appeal was not given until the 25th of July, 1809; and then it was not very satisfactory to his lordship. It was diffuse and not very intelligible: it paid many compliments about integrity, disinterestedness, respect for the system of the Company, purity of intention, moderation, clemency, &c.; but it justified the recall both of his lordship and General Sir John Cradock, as essential to the welfare of British India; and it repeated that the enforcing of the military code of regulations had been a capital error, which had "produced unfortunate events of an alarming and unexampled nature, and had made a vast impression upon the general mind, both in India and in Europe." Public opinion—or that limited portion of it which occupied itself about India and its affairs—was much divided as to the case which his lordship made out. In general, men judged of it according to the feelings and prejudices of party. In the eyes of the whigs the conduct of his lordship in India was faultless, and his explanations at home full and satisfactory; in the eyes of the tories his whole administration at Madras was a fault or blunder, and his defence of his conduct impotent and inconclusive. On both sides there was gross exaggeration—the truth, as usual, lay between the two extremes—but, though strangers to any party bias ourselves, we cannot wholly acquit his lordship of carelessness and indiscretion in the matter of the military regulations, and in his enforcing articles which he had never read; nor can we (knowing his political conduct in later times and in other countries) allow ourselves to doubt that he was too impatient in carrying out reforms and innovations, and too eager in pursuit of popularity, or of the fame always given by one portion of the British nation to the professors of what are too exclusively called liberal opinions.*

Major Pearce, the deputy-adjutant-general, who had been appointed by Sir John Cradock to prepare the code of military regulations, and his superior, the adjutant-general, were both ordered to return to Europe. They were much better acquainted with the character and prejudices of the sepoys than was the commander-in-chief, who had been but a very short time in India when he proposed the unfortunate code. The adjutant-general was subsequently restored.

The massacre at Vellore, and the mutinous conduct of the native troops in other places, placed our Eastern empire in more real danger than ever it had known before. But for the fidelity and attachment of the sepoys that empire could never have been formed, and assuredly could not now be maintained. The new turban, it will be understood, was offensive only to the Mohammedan part of the native army; but the order for obliterating the marks of caste affected all the Hindu part of the army. Between the new turban and the attack on the outward signs of caste, all the native forces would have been disgusted and driven into mutiny. It is true that the Mussulman cavalry have subsequently submitted to greater changes, and that there was nothing in the materials of the new turban really repugnant to their religion;

* Having quoted rather copiously from an excellent officer and man who relates the events which led immediately to Lord William Bentinck's recall, it is proper we should state that that gentleman's opinion differs materially from that which we have expressed in the text. Otherwise it might be imagined that his opinions and our own are the same.

Mr. Locker says: "After an interval of so many years we may safely pronounce, that in taking their strong measure the Court of Directors at home acted upon partial information, and with much injustice. Lord William Bentinck published a report on the subject, which now lies before us; a perusal of which will convince any of our readers that his conduct was justified by the most satisfactory testimony relating to this unhappy transaction (the mutiny at Vellore)." —*The Plain Englishman.*

but it has not been found possible to make the Hindu soldiers forego any of their distinctions of caste; and at the time of these troubles the fanaticism both of Mussulmans and Hindus was worked upon by designing daring men, who inculcated the belief that there was a close connection between these innovations in dress and the labours of the Christian missionaries in India, and that there was on the part of the English a fixed determination to convert alike Mohammedans and Hindus to their own faith. These propagandists of disaffection and revolt propagated the most monstrous stories without believing them themselves. They represented the practice of vaccination, which had been recently introduced, to the infinite benefit of the country, as a cunning art for engrafting Christianity upon Hindu and Mohammedan babies. The new turban was a hat; the iron turnscrew in front of it nothing but a cross. At Hyderabad they reported that a hundred headless bodies had been found on the banks of the river; that the English were building a church, the sanctification of which required the sacrifice of a hundred heads; and that there was a project for surprising and murdering all the natives, with the exception of those who should renounce their ancient faith, and plant the cross at their doors. But for these machinations it is very possible that there would have been no massacre at Vellore. Yet there was another cause of discontent.

In the year 1796 certain regulations had been introduced into the Indian army, the whole form of which was in fact changed. Instead of single battalions of a thousand men, commanded by a captain selected from the Europeans in the Company's service, and a subaltern to each company; they were formed into regiments of two battalions, to which English officers were appointed of the same rank and nearly in the same number as to a battalion in the king's service. In this manner, in the regiments of the line, the number of European officers was greatly increased, while the number of native officers remained stationary or was decreased. In some of the cavalry regiments the case was different; but in the infantry few of the native officers could be considered as really occupying a higher post than that of non-commissioned officers. The first effect of these regulations was a great and sudden promotion of all the older British officers of the Company's service; and the arrival of a vast number of young officers from England, to complete the establishment. Many of the old officers, being thus promoted and secured in good retiring pensions, came home; the young officers were new to the country, and universally ignorant of its languages and manners. Many of these "Griffins" behaved like griffins, practising severity and harshness towards the men, and showing a contempt for the native officers.* The change appears to have been most acutely felt by the native officers in the coast or Madras army, many of whom had enjoyed under Tippoo Sultaun the chances of rising to high rank and fortune. And the disaffection of these men was likely to prove the more dangerous, as the whole of this presidency had been for years in a very turbulent, unsettled state, compared with the order, subordination, and tranquillity which prevailed in Bengal. The good understanding and confidence which before subsisted between the European officers and their native men, and which was the acknowledged

* One of the best and most amply experienced of all the officers of our Indian army said, a few years later: "I never knew an instance of unkind and gross behaviour to the natives of India in a person acquainted with their language and manners; and it would appear from this fact that, to secure their being treated with that indulgence and regard which both humanity and policy require, we have only to take care that those placed over them have that knowledge which is indispensable for such a charge."—*Malcolm, Political Hist. Ind.*

Some years after the mutiny at Vellore a regulation was made for all the infantry cadets to join, in the first instance, the Company's European regiment, where they were to continue till reported by the commanding officer qualified to join native corps. It fortunately happened that a very able officer, and one deeply versed in the languages of the East, was appointed to the command of the Company's European regiment, and to the additional duty of instructing the young officers who arrived from England. This excellent officer and instructor was Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Duer Broughton (then Major Broughton), the author of those well-known works, 'Letters from a Mahratta Camp,' and 'Specimens of the Popular Poetry of the Hindus.'

basis of our strength in India, was much shaken, and in some instances almost wholly destroyed in the Madras army before the arrival of Lord William Bentinck. If those ties which had formerly united the European officers and native troops under their command had existed in full force, the tragedy of Vellore, which gave such a shock to our empire, could hardly have occurred. If the native officers of the line had not been excluded from the hope of further honours and advancements, and had not been subjected to the contumely of a set of rash, uninformed, and unthinking schoolboys, the mutiny would have been nipped in the bud.*

* Malcolm, Political Hist. Ind.

CHAPTER IX.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD MINTO.

HAVING touched at Madras in July, the new governor-general reached Calcutta and entered upon the business of his office at the beginning of August, 1807. His lordship, like several of his predecessors, had come out to India impressed with the notions that our true policy was non-interference, that no attempt ought to be made to extend the limits of our possessions, or to increase the number of our connections with the native princes. Few men had inveighed so bitterly as he against the ambitious, encroaching, aggrandizing spirit of Warren Hastings, or had dwelt more pathetically upon the wrongs and sufferings of the Indian states and peoples. Yet his lordship had not been many days on the banks of the Hooghly ere he confessed that the security of our empire depended upon the actual superiority of our power, upon the sense which the natives entertained of that power, and upon the comparative weakness of our neighbours: and before he had been many months in India he found himself under the necessity of interfering in the internal affairs of our neighbour and ally, the Nizam of the Deccan, whom he soon reduced to be a mere cipher in his own capital. The Nizam's minister, Meer Alum, died in 1808. The Nizam wished to appoint Moonir-ul-Mulk his successor, but the government of Bengal preferred Rajah Chundu Loll, as being more favourably disposed towards the English interests, and by virtue of their military force at Hyderabad the Rajah was appointed: and from this moment the Nizam ceased to take any active part in public affairs.

In another direction, Lord Minto saw the necessity of departing from the non-interference system; and, though he declined more extensive engagements, he assisted the Peishwa in reducing to submission some of his refractory tributaries. His lordship also was made to feel that our ally, the Rajah of Berar, had been unfairly and impoliticly abandoned by Sir George Barlow's treaties with Scindiah and Holkar; and at the call of the rajah, or at the alarming prospect of fresh invasions and convulsions on or near to the Company's frontiers, he prepared to establish a permanent force on the Nerbudda river, far in advance of the frontier line which Sir George Barlow had fixed as our *ne plus ultra*. And this advance was indeed absolutely necessary to our preservation or to the tranquillity of our dominions, for the Patan chief Ameer Khan, after committing various murders, and making various invasions, was threatening, with a mixed army of Patans, Mahrattas, and Pindarrees, to overrun the whole of Berar, and to press upon the Company's territories. He was advancing towards Nagpoor when a British force, under the command of Colonel Barry Close, met him and drove him back. Ameer Khan withdrew into Malwa, in order to collect more Pindarree robbers, and to re-appear at a more opportune moment.

Active warfare was also waged in Baroda and Guzerat, in reducing some turbulent chieftains, and in preventing the crime of infanticide, which was very prevalent in that part of India. The troops under Colonel Walker planted the Company's flag in several places where it had never floated before, captured the fort of Kindador, stormed that of Mallia, and extended our real dominion on the side of the Guicowar's territory, and over one of the most flourishing tracts in Hindustan.

The renewed alarm about the designs of Bonaparte upon our Eastern empire

forced Lord Minto into many expensive embassies, and into a great extension of diplomatic relations; and it was now that the Indian government for the first time courted a close connection with the Afghans and the Ameers of Sinde. At the close of the year 1807, it was confidently reported that the French, who had for a time destroyed our influence at Petersburgh, Constantinople, and Teheran, entertained the design of invading India with the co-operation of Russia, Turkey, and Persia. This was a fantastical hydra, a mere chimera; nevertheless the apprehensions which it excited were real and rather lasting. Two hardy, fierce, and warlike nations—the Afghans and the Seiks of Sinde—occupied the countries which lie between Persia and Upper India, and through which the invaders must advance. These two nations had been mortal enemies to each other, but Lord Minto courted the friendship and alliance of both. The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, who, since Vizier Ali's massacre at Benares, had risen rapidly in the Company's service, and who had given proof of extraordinary abilities as resident at the Mahratta court of Poonah, was dispatched as ambassador-extraordinary to the Afghan court of Cabul. Zemaun Shah, who had twice invaded Upper India, and against whom our diplomacy and the mission of Sir John Malcolm had armed the Persians, had long ceased to reign, having been betrayed by his own family, and dethroned and then blinded by Prince Mahmood. Shujah-ul-Mulk, the full brother of Zemaun Shah, made war upon Mahmood, drove him from Cabul, and placed himself upon the throne. His success was owing to his being in possession of almost all the jewels and other property of the crown, which had been committed to his charge by his brother Zemaun. Between the years 1800 and 1809 some half dozen more revolutions or civil wars had taken place; but when Mr. Elphinstone and his splendid embassy reached the court, Shujah-ul-Mulk was in possession of the throne. He was a handsome man, about 30 years of age, of an olive complexion, with a thick black beard. "The expression of his countenance," adds our distinguished Elchee, "was dignified and pleasing, his voice clear, and his address princely. We thought at first that he had on armour of jewels; but, on close inspection, we found this to be a mistake, and his real dress to consist of a green tunic, with large flowers in gold and precious stones, over which were a large breastplate of diamonds, shaped like two flattened fleurs-de-lis, an ornament of the same kind on each thigh, large emerald bracelets on the arms (above the elbow), and many other jewels in different places. In one of the bracelets was the Cohi Noor, known to be one of the largest diamonds in the world.* There were also some strings of very large pearls, put on like cross-belts, but loose. The crown was about nine inches high, not ornamented with jewels, as European crowns are, but, to appearance, entirely formed of those precious materials. It seemed to be radiated like ancient crowns, and behind the rays appeared peaks of purple velvet: some small branches with pendants seemed to project from the crown; but the whole was so complicated and so dazzling, that it was difficult to understand, and impossible to describe. The throne was covered with a cloth adorned with pearls, on which lay a sword and a small mace set with jewels. The room was open all round. The centre was supported by four high pillars, in the midst of which was a marble fountain. The floor was covered with the richest carpets, and round the edges were slips of silk embroidered with gold, for the khans to stand on. The view from the hall was beautiful. Immediately below was an extensive garden, full of cypresses and other trees, and beyond was a plain of the richest verdure; here and there were pieces of water and shining streams, and the whole was bounded by mountains, some dark, and others covered with snow."† But in the midst of all this barbaric show our quicksighted Elchee

* There is a print of this wonderful diamond in Tavernier's travels.

† The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India; comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation, and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy.

saw that many things fell far short of his expectations, that "all bore less the appearance of a state in prosperity than of a splendid monarchy in decay;" and that "nothing could exceed the meanness and rapacity of his majesty of Cabul's officers."* At this moment, though seated on the throne, Shah Shujah-ul-Mulk was not in possession of his own capital; and the embassy was received not at the city of Cabul, but at Peshawer, and civil war or a war of clans was raging in all the country between the cities of Cabul and Candahar. Nevertheless Mr. Elphinstone ably did what he was sent to do; and in June, 1809, he concluded a treaty with Shujah-ul-Mulk, in which the co-operation of the Afghans was promised against the designs of the French, who were declared in the treaty to have entered into a confederacy against the kingdom of Cabul with ulterior views on India. The English, of course, bound themselves to pay for this co-operation, or to provide for the expense this new ally might incur in preventing the French and other enemies of the English from traversing his dominions and entering upon India.

The state of affairs was much too critical to allow the English embassy to prolong their stay. The king was about to take the field with a numerous but disorderly army; and on the 14th of June Mr. Elphinstone and his retinue commenced their return towards the Indus. They had not travelled four miles from Peshawer ere they were plundered by a band of robbers, of a mule loaded with fine shawls, and with rupees to the amount of about 1000*l.* sterling. On the 20th of June they crossed the broad Indus at Attock.* In three marches from the southern bank of the Indus, they reached the valley of Hussein Abdaul, famous in all ages for its beauty, and which had been a favoured resting-place of the Great Moguls on their annual migrations to Cashmere—that garden in perpetual spring, that land of lakes, cool streams and cascades, of the violet, the rose, and the lily, where the song of the nightingale is sweetest, where the women are fair-complexioned and beautiful. Here, in the famed valley of Hussein Abdaul, they were to await the decision of the fate of the kingdom of Cabul: but here Mr. Elphinstone received orders to return immediately to the British provinces. It was, however, necessary to wait for a letter from Shah Shujah-ul-Mulk, now in the field, and also to settle with the Seiks about a passage through their territories, which at first the Ameers positively refused. This occasioned a halt of ten days in the beautiful valley. As they were about to resume their journey, with the permission of the Seiks, the fugitive harem of Shujah-ul-Mulk arrived close to their camp. This boded no good to our new ally, and reports were soon circulated that the king had been defeated. The next day, the report being generally believed, all the king's partisans were depressed, while some adversaries of his started up where they were little expected. In the course of the day Mr. Elphinstone received a letter from the unfortunate Shah, who frankly stated that he had been defeated, and who added, that no expense was to be spared in conveying the women of his harem to a place of security. It was afterwards ascertained that the king's army had been suddenly attacked, as it was straggling or

* Lord Minto had sent many splendid presents to the king. The Afghan officers who received charge of these presents kept the camels on which some of them were sent, and even seized four riding-camels which had entered the palace by mistake. They stripped Mr. Elphinstone's elephant-drivers of their livery; and gravely insisted that two English footmen, who were sent to put up the chandeliers, were part of the governor-general's present to their Shah.

His Afghan majesty himself seems to have been rather craving; for having admired the English silk stockings worn by Mr. Elphinstone and the gentlemen of his suite, he sent a message desiring that some might be given to him.—*Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, &c.

* The Indus was here about 260 yards broad, and too deep and rapid to be correctly sounded. The embassy passed in boats; and notwithstanding the violence of the stream, the boats passed quicker here than at any river they had yet crossed. They saw many of the country people crossing, or floating down the river, on the skins of oxen inflated, on which they rode astride, with a great part of their bodies in the water. This contrivance is also made use of on the Oxus; and it brought to Mr. Elphinstone's recollection the practice of the natives of these regions in the days of Alexander the Great, as described by Arrian.

mixed with the baggage in a mountain pass, that it had been defeated before the king could get from the rear to the front, and that his majesty had fled to the mountains. Prince Mahmood, who had dethroned and put out the eyes of Zemaun Shah, had at one time been the captive of Shujah-ul-Mulk, who had shut him up in the Balla Hissar, or citadel of Cabul, but had spared his eyes—a piece of clemency which he had afterwards reason to deplore, and which, as Mr. Elphinstone observes, was probably the first example of the sort in Afghanistan. It was a partisan of this Mahmood who had beaten the Shah's army in the mountain-defile. Another battle, in which Mahmood himself appears to have been present, was fought soon after, and, being again defeated, Shujah-ul-Mulk was compelled to fly with only thirty horsemen. Mahmood re-established his throne in Cabul, but the people of the city of Peshawer, and several powerful clans of mountaineers living in that neighbourhood, adhered to the cause of Shujah-ul-Mulk, who assembled a fresh army, and being aided by the Subahdar of Cashmere, advanced once more against Shah Mahmood. Being again defeated, our unlucky ally fled to the south of the Indus, and took refuge in the fortress of Attock. Shah Mahmood, however, was foiled and beaten in his attempts against some of the mountain clans of Afghanistan; and quitting Attock, Shujah-ul-Mulk returned to Peshawer, and re-established his authority over the western part of those immense regions which are occupied by the Afghan race. But no authority among this wild people could be either strong or durable: other princes or chiefs revolted at the head of their tribes and partisans; and while some made war upon Shah Mahmood, who lived at Cabul, others made war upon Shujah-ul-Mulk, who lived at Peshawer. The monarchy which had been so powerful under Zemaun Shah was completely broken up. Nearly every mountain chief, and every great khan, became a sort of king on his own account.* It was indeed idle to think of forming a treaty of a binding character with a state subject to such vicissitudes. Yet the trouble and expense of Mr. Elphinstone's embassy were not thrown away: they procured to us an extension of knowledge, a most admirable book, and such an acquaintance with the rugged country, and the more rugged clans and tribes that inhabited it, as ought to have left no fear of French, Russians, or Persians penetrating through it, even if they could traverse the deserts lying between the Euxine and the Caspian seas, and the wilds of Bokhara. And if the information which Mr. Elphinstone collected and gave to the world about the country and the people had been properly attended to, and had not been set aside by the confident dicta of a later and much less able observer, the lamentable catastrophe which befel our Afghanistan campaign in 1841-2 would, in all probability, never have happened.

* As Mr. Elphinstone was travelling through the Seik country he was overtaken by Shujah-ul-Mulk's then fugitive harem, and in the train of these women was the blind and helpless Zemaun Shah. Our truly honourable Elchee, whose heart is as good as his head, says with much feeling—"We visited him on the 10th of July, and were not a little interested by the sight of a monarch whose reputation at one time spread so wide both in Persia and India. We found him seated on a plain couch, in a neat, but not a large tent, spread with carpets and felts. We stood opposite to him till he desired us to be seated. His dress was plain—a white mantle faced with Persian brocade, and a black shawl turban; but his appearance was very kingly. He looked about forty when we saw him. He had a fine face and person. His voice and manner strongly resembled Shaah Shujah's; but he was taller, and had a longer, more regular face, and a finer beard. He had by no means the appearance of a blind man; his eyes, though plainly injured, retained black enough to give vivacity to his countenance; and he always turned them towards the person with whom he was conversing. He had, however, some appearance of dejection and melancholy. After we were seated, a long silence ensued, which Shaah Zemaun broke by speaking of his brother's misfortunes, and saying they had prevented his showing us the attention he otherwise would. He then spoke of the state of affairs, and expressed his hopes of a change. He said such reverses were the common portion of kings; and mentioned the historical accounts of astonishing revolutions in the fortunes of various princes, particularly in that of Tamerlane. Had he gone over all the history of Asia, he could scarcely have discovered a more remarkable instance of the mutability of fortune than he himself presented, blind, dethroned, and exiled, in a country which he had twice subdued."

Mr. Hankey Smith was Lord Minto's ambassador to the Ameers of Sinde, whose country was in as turbulent and lawless a state as Afghanistan. A treaty, or amicable agreement, was, however, concluded on the 9th of August, 1809, the Ameers pledging themselves to permit no enemy of the English to cross their territories, and to exclude the *tribe* of the French from settling in their country. Gholam Ali, then one of the most powerful of the Ameers, wished the British to engage to assist him in conquering the neighbouring country of Cutch; but he was told that the British government had no desire to extend its dominions in any direction, or to aid other powers in projects of conquest; that the object of the British government was to maintain peace and tranquillity, to cultivate relations of amity with all surrounding states, to respect their rights, and to guard its own.* As soon as the Ameers found that no warlike assistance was to be expected from the English, they scorned the treaty they had made with them, and made plans for conquering Cutch without their aid.

The Rajah Runjeet Sing, now the ruler of Lahore, whose dominions included the Punjab, and reached from the borders of Cashmere almost to the southern frontier of the province of Delhi, and whose subjects consisted of Seiks, Sings, Jauts, Rajpoots, other Hindus of lower castes, and Mohammedans, was making advances towards the confines of the Company's north-west frontier. Lord Minto opened some communications with him at the beginning of 1808; but it was found necessary to march a British force in that direction. The presence of Colonel Ochterlony and his disciplined troops did more than the governor-general's representations, in making Runjeet Sing express a warm desire to live in friendship with the English. Mr. Metcalfe was despatched to Lahore, and in August, 1809, a treaty was concluded with Runjeet Sing, who agreed not to attempt conquests or occupy territory to the south of the Sutledge; and to suspend immediately the siege of Multan and certain other operations which he had commenced. The whole country of Lahore could at this moment have put 100,000 armed men on horseback, and this country, intersected by many deep rivers, must be traversed by the invaders of India—supposing them to have achieved their march across the deserts and through the Alpine passes of Afghanistan—before they could touch the northern frontier of our Indian empire. Runjeet Sing was much pleased with an English carriage and pair of horses which were presented to him "to cement harmony;" but he was evidently chagrined at the governor-general's refusing to enter into his schemes of territorial aggrandizement. Except the weakest of the states, who were contented with protection and guarantee, all the native princes, whether Mohammedans or Hindus, looked upon a treaty with the Company as little but a compact of future conquests, afterwards to be divided between them and the English. It was ridiculous to talk to such potentates about the balance of power, the virtue of moderation, the blessings of peace and tranquillity.

But, in the groundless panic about invasion, Lord Minto's diplomacy extended far beyond India and Afghanistan. He sent into the dominions of the Shah of Persia, Colonel J. Malcolm, who had gained a high reputation by his conduct and success in his previous embassy to that country. Malcolm was invested with plenipotentiary powers in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and Turkish Arabia, the separate political powers possessed by the Company's residents at Bagdad, Bussorah, and Bushire being for the time suspended. He was furnished with credentials as envoy or ambassador of the governor-general to the court of Persia and to the divan of the Pasha of Bagdad, in the event of his finding it practicable to proceed to either of those courts. This event seemed very hypothetical, for, after Admiral Sir Thomas Duckworth had forced the passage of the Dardanelles, and had threatened Constantinople with bombardment, the Turks had thrown themselves entirely into the arms of the French; and ever since the arrival at the court of Teheran, of an embassy, and

* Auber.

numerous French officers, from Bonaparte, the Persians had become even more Frenchified than were the Turks. Lord Minto could not have found a better agent than Malcolm for overcoming these difficulties.* But General Gardanne and his Frenchmen had gained such ground in the Persian court, that the Scottish Elchee saw no chance of succeeding; and being wisely of opinion that it would do mischief, rather than good, to remain at Bushire, or to proceed to the capital in a humiliating condition, or without the certainty of being honourably received, Malcolm hastened back to Calcutta, and proposed to the governor-general a bold plan for overawing the impotent Persian court, and for procuring the speedy dismissal of Gardanne. This plan was to take possession of the island of Kismis, in the Persian Gulf, and to make it at once an emporium of commerce, a depôt of military stores, and the seat of political negotiation. Lord Minto readily adopted the project, and Malcolm, by the month of January, 1809, was ready to start from Bombay for the Persian Gulf, with a force amounting to 2000 men. Events, however, had occurred which rendered the sailing of this armament unnecessary. The embassy of Gardanne and the prevalency it was obtaining, had determined the British government to send an envoy extraordinary from his majesty George III. to the Persian Shah. Sir Harford Jones, who was selected for this service, reached Bombay on his way to the Persian Gulf. Here, for a time, he doubted what course he should pursue, as Malcolm intimated that an embassy, not backed by an armed force, might be subjected to Persian and to French insolence. But soon news arrived that the Persians were irritated against Gardanne for the non-performance of the promises about Russian restitution and evacuation; and that the Spaniards and Portuguese had commenced an insurrection, which threatened to weaken the power of Bonaparte. Sir Harford Jones therefore proceeded to the Persian Gulf, and landed in the Shah's dominions. He carried presents from the king of Great Britain worth many thousand pounds; and he paraded these things, and made such a display of riches on the road, that the pauperized Persians took him for a second Aladdin, and the fame of his magnificence reached Teheran before he himself had got to Shiraz. The venal government of Persia hailed his approach with joy. "Mashallah," said the khans, "the English are not ruined; but the French are the grandfathers of lies, and have made us eat dirt!" Gardanne, with all his suite, was unceremoniously dismissed * before the English mis-

* After being rooted out of Egypt, Bonaparte seemed to think that he could only injure our Eastern empire through the medium of Persia. On the 10th of September, 1807, the French mission for Teheran left Constantinople. It consisted of General Gardanne, the ambassador, his brother, who was *homme de lettres*, six engineer officers, two officers of artillery, and about a dozen other Frenchmen, mostly of the military species. Bonaparte constantly employed military men as his diplomatic agents. Gardanne and his subalterns went to work in the usual manner, by representing the English as the tyrants of the world and the French as the friends of liberty and peace, and by prognosticating that the friendship and alliance between Napoleon the Great and the Persian Shah would be everlasting, and attended with incalculable advantage to both of the high contracting parties. Gardanne seemed to be carrying everything before him, when Lord Minto hurried off Colonel Malcolm to the Persian Gulf. The French had been received at the court of Teheran with marked attention, and some of them had been employed to train a corps of Persians in discipline and tactics. The officers of the French mission were employed in every quarter, surveying the country and examining its resources. Some of them were casting cannon for the king. The Persians, at the time, were waging an unsuccessful war with the Russians; and the Shah, seeing no prospect of support from the English, threw himself completely into the arms of the French, who had previously promised a large military force to repel the Russians. But when Gardanne became more fully acquainted with the treaty of Tilsit, and the strange friendship and alliance which the Emperor Alexander of Russia had suddenly contracted with the Emperor Napoleon, it became necessary to alter his language. As he could no longer promise an armed force, he promised the Emperor Napoleon's mediation with the Czar; and he induced the Persians to believe that the Russians, yielding to this generous mediation, would restore all the provinces they had taken, and evacuate the whole of Georgia. The Frenchmen declared on every side that the power of England was fast breaking to pieces; and the Persians readily believed them.

* Gardanne and his suite were furious at their humiliating dismissal, and at the triumph of Sir Harford Jones. Mr. Morier, who was attached to Sir Harford's legation, found on the walls of a

sion had arrived at the capital. Sir Harford offered English money, as something more solid than Bonaparte's promises; the Shah cheerfully accepted the subsidy, and concluded a treaty, by which he bound himself to have nothing more to do with the French. The king's ambassador was soon followed by the Company's ambassador. Colonel Malcolm—but without his armament—arrived at Bushire in February, 1810, and assumed the functions of envoy and plenipotentiary on the part of the Indian government to the Persian court. He also met with a very gracious reception; but his residence was not of long duration, as another mission, with Sir Gore Ouseley at its head, was on the point of starting from England. The three missions of Malcolm, Jones, and Ouseley did much temporary good, and produced some benefits of an enduring nature, in the shape of various excellent and amusing books descriptive of Persia and its inhabitants.* If we sum up the amount of our literary and scientific obligations to the servants of the East India Company, and the many able men employed in traversing the countries of the East, in connection with the affairs of our Indian Empire, the total amount will be found to be exceedingly large—and it is every year growing larger. But for our acquisition and dominion in Hindustan, we should still be ignorant about a very great part of Asia, while of other parts we should know very little beyond what was told in the fourteenth century by Marco Polo.

Lord Minto, in addition to all the embassies we have mentioned, negotiated with Nepaul and Ava, and by these means considerable acquisitions of knowledge were obtained, though an hostile conflict with those two powers was inevitable, and could be delayed only for a short time. The Rajah of Nepaul had long been a merciless despot in his own dominions, and a most troublesome neighbour to those of the Company. In 1806 some 1200 or 1600 of the Rajah's oppressed subjects fled from Nepaul into the British provinces: and in 1808 a border quarrel or dispute about boundaries took place between the Rajah and the English. The governor-general, being prevented from making war by his instructions from home, and being led into the belief that it would be at any time an easy matter to bring the Nepaulese to reason by giving them a sound beating, did nothing for the present. But in 1810, when the Rajah, growing bolder in the impunity he enjoyed, seized upon some territories belonging to the zemindar of Bimnughur, a subject of the Company, the Rajah was warned that force would be resorted to, unless he made immediate restitution. Force, however, was *not* employed *then*. At nearly the same time the dominant tribe or family of the Gorkhas, who were making conquests in some parts of Nepaul, which they had not yet subdued, and waging a war of destruction upon the hill chiefs towards the Jumna and Sutledge, prepared to encroach upon the Seik chieftains south of the Sutledge, who were living under British protection. And in 1811 these fierce and warlike Gorkhas, who as they advanced erected forts and stockades and strong lines of posts to secure what they had gained, overran the district of Kyndee or Kyndeenaghur, in the province of Bahar, contiguous to the great Benares road, and erected a fort in the Company's territories. To such encroachments it was impossible to submit; and the governor-general apprised the Court of Directors that there was no hope of obtaining restitution and satisfaction from the Nepaulese and Gorkhas except by force of arms. At the end of the year some troops were sent to expel the encroachers; and in

house where he halted on his journey to Teheran an inscription scrawled by a Frenchman, which briefly expressed the bitterness of their feeling. It was—"Venimus, vidimus, et maledximus Persidi, regique ejusque magnatibusque populoque."

* There proceeded from these embassies, among other good books, Sir John Malcolm's 'History of Persia,' and that amusing little volume, his 'Persian Sketches;' Mr. Morier's 'Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor;' Macdonald Kinneir's 'Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire,' &c.; and Mr. Morier's admirable story of 'Hajji Baba of Ispahan' (by far the most perfect picture we possess of Eastern manners), sprung from the experience and familiarity with the manners and customs of the Persians and Turks obtained by Mr. Morier during his journeys and his residence in Teheran and other parts of Persia.

May, 1813. Major Bradshaw was deputed by the Company to settle the disputes about boundaries. But none but a precarious settlement could be made; and the confidence and insolence of the Gorkhas convinced Lord Minto that a little sooner or a little later our pacific system must give place to an energetic war. Even while Major Bradshaw was at Bootwul, negotiating with the Nepaulese commissioners, fresh encroachments were made in more than one direction. Lord Minto with proper spirit refused to enter into a compromise, which would have been considered as nothing but a confession of weakness on the part of the English.

Ava and the Burmese empire either held a direct sovereignty or exercised control over nearly one half of the vast regions described in maps as India beyond the Ganges. The Burmese, the real masters of the soil, resembled the Chinese rather than the natives of Hindustan; but with the superior physical strength and activity of the Chinese, they had a much more warlike spirit than the subjects of the Celestial Empire. In civilization they were far behind the Chinese, the people of Hindustan, or even the Siamese and Cochin-Chinese. By a series of conquests they had overthrown all the adjacent nations, and had advanced their frontier to the shores of the Bay of Bengal, and close to the limits of the Company's territories. They proved but troublesome and encroaching neighbours. During Lord Wellesley's administration in 1799, when the mass of the Anglo-Indian army was engaged in the last war against Tippoo Sultaun, the Burmese made frequent attacks, and were very troublesome on our then weak eastern frontier.* As exclusive and anti-social as the Chinese, and quite as proud and insolent in their bearing towards foreign envoys and foreigners of all classes, it was difficult to establish any intercourse with them, or to obtain by pacific representations any redress of grievances. Their government too was subject to frequent and sanguinary revolutions, insurrections, and rebellions, one tyrant being murdered and succeeded by another. In 1795, during the pacific administration of Sir John Shore, Colonel Symes was dispatched on an embassy to the Golden Foot of the Lord of the White Elephant; but little came of the mission, except a very interesting book of travels.* In the year 1809 a French ship attacked a small island belonging to the Burmese, and the Golden Foot not understanding the difference between French and English, sent a sort of mission to Calcutta to expostulate against the proceeding, and to demand satisfaction. As this seemed to open the door of the jealously guarded court of Ava to some diplomatic intercourse, Lord Minto dispatched Lieut. Canning on an embassy. This officer reached Rangoon; and the King of Ava, from the midst of his white elephants, decreed that the Englishman should be allowed to proceed to the capital in all safety and honour; but the incursions into the Company's territories at Chittagong of a predatory tribe of Burmese, called the Mhugs, and other untoward events, broke off an intercourse which could never have promised any very satisfactory result. Both our embassies to Ava appear to have been capital mistakes, for they exhibited to a semi-barbarous and vain-glorious people a number of Englishmen in a very humiliating condition, and in the attitude of supplicants.

* Marquess Wellesley, Ind. Dispatches, &c.

* Symes's 'Embassy to Ava,' &c. It was owing to certain transactions during Sir John Shore's spiritless administration that the Burmese insolence increased. In 1795 a Burmese army of 5000 men pursued three rebellious chiefs, or, as they termed them (and as they might be), robbers, right into the English district of Chittagong. A strong detachment was sent from Calcutta to oppose these Burmese; but the officer in command had orders to negotiate—not to fight. After some tedious negotiations, which ought not to have been allowed to occupy a single hour, the violators of our frontiers condescended to agree to retire; and they retired accordingly, into their own country. Nor was this all. The three men who had taken refuge in our territories were subsequently given up to the Burmese, and two out of the three were put to death with atrocious tortures. "This acquiescence on the part of the English government had a very prejudicial effect on the subsequent conduct of the Burmese, for it was impossible to convince this most self-important people that the men were given up from any other motive than that of fear."—*Walter Hamilton, East Ind. Gazetteer.*

Lieutenant Canning returned to Calcutta, and disputes continued to occur on the frontiers of Chittagong and Tippera. As they were met, not by bayonets and cannon-balls, but by pacific negotiators, the Burmese grew bolder and bolder; and at the time when Lord Minto gave up his authority in India to the Earl of Moira, the King of the World and the Lord of the White Elephant was threatening to march with 40,000 soldier pilgrims from Ava to Benares.

During this peace-keeping or peace-seeking administration there were many disorders and quarrels in the Madras government, and some very alarming discontents in the army of that presidency. Sir George Barlow, whose appointment as governor-general had been vacated by the Fox and Grenville administration, had accepted the inferior post of governor of Madras. Reaching that presidency at the end of 1807, Sir George displaced Mr. Petrie, who had been nominated pro tempore successor to Lord William Bentinck, and who did not relish the speedy loss of his place. Petrie remained as a member of the council and as an opponent to nearly all the measures which Barlow might propose. Lieut.-General Hay Macdowall, of the king's service, who had been named commander-in-chief of the coast army in lieu of Sir John Cradock, also claimed a seat in the Madras council. And here there was another awkward collision between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. The president of the Board, now Mr. Tierney, had suggested that General Macdowall should be appointed as usual to a seat in the council; but the Court of Directors had determined that, in a subordinate presidency, like Madras, the commander-in-chief ought not to have a seat in council. After some long delay and correspondence, and a tender of his resignation, Macdowall's Highland blood grew hot, and he quarrelled most violently with Sir George Barlow, whom he accused of usurping his military authority, and of making military arrangements without having any military knowledge, and without consulting those who had.* This conduct, the general said, was altogether different from that of Mr. Petrie, who, when he filled the presidential chair, had always consulted him on all military measures. In a very angry letter the general denounced some proceedings of a military nature against Travancore, as having been discussed and decided upon in council whilst he was left in total ignorance of the circumstances. In another letter he intimated that he should feel great inconvenience from the officer selected by the governor in council being detached on this service in Travancore, as he had seen fit to place that officer's senior, the quartermaster-general, Colonel John Munro, under arrest. The government replied, that as he had placed the quartermaster-general in arrest, the assistant quartermaster-general would not be sent on the service, as was at first intended. For the rest, the Madras governor held language as high as that of the general, who received no support from home, as Mr. Tierney and his friends had by this time been long out of office. Thus situated, Macdowall declared that he would leave the presidency, and resign an employment which he could not hold without degrading it. The arrested quartermaster-general appealed to the governor in council; and these functionaries, after consulting their judge-advocate-general, declared that the quartermaster-general ought to be set at liberty; and they earnestly recommended the commander-in-

* Cabals among the civil servants, as well as among the military, had existed in the presidency of Fort St. George or Madras long before the appointment of General Macdowall or the appointment of Sir George Barlow; but the latter appointment is said to have accelerated the crisis. Barlow was a man of stern, cold, and repulsive manners; his appointment to Madras excited jealousy, because he had been bred to public business in *Bengal* and not on the coast. "To appoint a person to the government of one presidency whose life has been passed in another, does not indeed seem a wise measure, because it implies that the advantages of local and personal knowledge may be dispensed with; but our home system of government has familiarized us to absurdities of this kind; and as the appointment of a person who had never before set foot in India would have given no displeasure, none ought to have been felt at the appointment of Barlow, for surely a governor might as well come from Calcutta as from England. This, however, gave occasion to the discontented to complain of a system of favouritism."—*Southey, in Edinburgh Ann. Reg. for* 1810.

chief to release him accordingly. This was heaping coals upon the fire of Macdowall's wrath: he refused to liberate his prisoner, and brought a fresh charge against him. Sir George Barlow and his colleagues then addressed a letter to the commander-in-chief, peremptorily ordering him to release the quartermaster-general.* Macdowall replied that he could not comply; that the question was strictly military, and that he could not evade bringing it to issue before a court-martial without committing the honour of the whole Madras army. The government liberated the prisoner by its own authority. Upon this—on the 28th of January, 1809—Macdowall embarked for England, having previously forwarded to the governor in council an address to the Court of Directors from sundry officers of the Madras army, who complained of several grievances, and amongst them of the exclusion of their commander-in-chief from a seat in council. Macdowall also left behind him a general order, in which the conduct of the quartermaster-general was strongly condemned. The deputy adjutant-general, Major Boles, in the absence of his senior, complied with the injunction or the wish of the departed commander-in-chief, who had gone away without leaving his formal resignation, and issued the general order. The governor and council then suspended the deputy adjutant-general, and issued a general order of their own, declaring that General Macdowall was removed from the office of commander-in-chief. Colonel Capper, the adjutant-general, informed the governor that he, and not Major Boles, was the responsible person; as the paper would have been issued under his signature if he had not been engaged in accompanying the commander-in-chief on board ship. Sir George Barlow then, without removing the suspension from Major Boles, suspended Colonel Capper also. A considerable portion of the officers of the Madras army drew up, and circulated for signatures, a memorial to Lord Minto, as governor-general, repeating their grievances and condemning the treatment which their commander-in-chief had received from the civil power. The same officers also drew up a flattering address to the deputy adjutant-general,

* Colonel Munro, the quartermaster-general, had been charged during Lord William Bentinck's government to draw up a report upon the eligibility of abolishing a certain monthly allowance, which it had been the practice to grant to the commanders of native corps for the provision of camp equipage, and which was thence commonly called 'the Tent Contract.' Munro prepared a detailed report on the subject, in which he expressed an opinion very adverse to the continuance of the practice, which he described as a system which "placed the interest and the duty of officers in direct opposition to each other." Lord William Bentinck and General Sir John Cradock had both approved the report, which had been transmitted to the supreme government in Bengal with a strong recommendation that 'the Tent Contract' should be universally abolished. The report received the sanction of the supreme government, and directions were sent to Madras to carry it into effect. It was by virtue of these instructions of the supreme government at Calcutta that Sir George Barlow, who had succeeded to the post of governor of Madras, abolished 'the Tent Contract,' by a general order, dated May, 1808. The British officers commanding native corps took great offence. They afterwards took pains to prove that the seat of the quarrel was not in the purse—that the abolition of the old monthly allowance for camp equipage was, in a pecuniary light, no sensible evil to them, and that their dissatisfaction and mutiny did not originate in motives of so sordid a nature, but proceeded from the sense of other injuries, and of many insults offered either to themselves or to their commander-in-chief, General Macdowall. They said, for example, that Colonel Munro's report conveyed an insinuation unfavourable and outrageous to the honour of their whole body. Macdowall might be a hot-headed, but he certainly was not a low-minded or mercenary man. Though smarting under other injuries, or under things which he considered as injuries, he cared not a straw about the emoluments of 'the Tent Contract.' Numerous letters of complaint were addressed to him by his officers; but he always replied that the question had been settled before he came to the command, and that the matter ought to be considered as now at rest. The officers, however, prepared charges against the quartermaster-general, Colonel Munro, for having made (in his report) use of false and infamous insinuations, injurious to their reputation; and demanded that he should be brought to a court-martial. For more than two months the commander-in-chief did nothing in the matter; but when his own quarrel with the Madras government about his exclusion from the council, &c. reached its climax, he very unexpectedly put Colonel Munro under arrest. But for Macdowall's exclusion from the council-board, and the other wrongs of which he complained, the discontents of the officers under his command would, in all probability, have died out in a few murmurs.

whom Sir George Barlow had suspended. This was looked upon by the Madras government as downright mutiny; and on the 1st of May, 1809, another general order was issued, severely censuring the officers who had circulated the two offensive papers, removing some of them from their particular commands and suspending others altogether. This last general order spread the flames instead of extinguishing them. In Travancore, at Masulipatam, Seringapatam, Hyderabad, and other stations, the officers burst into open mutiny. Blood was shed in the Mysore, for, as a mutinous battalion was marching from Chitteldroog to join the mutineers at Seringapatam, they encountered resistance from a body of dutiful troops, and fired upon and received the fire of their own countrymen or friends and fellow-soldiers. This was a dangerous spectacle to exhibit to the armed sepoys and the native inhabitants. It was the inevitable conviction of this danger that brought the English officers rapidly to their senses. First those at Hyderabad submitted to the voice of the civil authority, and their example was soon followed at all the other stations. Colonel Barry Close, who was at the time political resident at the Mahratta court of Poonah, behaved with admirable skill, firmness, and courage. At the voice of the supreme government he flew from Poonah to Hyderabad; and although he did not succeed in the first instance, the sepoys obeying their mutinous English officers, and pointing their muskets and bayonets against him and his escort, his heroic bearing, his prudent advice, and his evident and great eagerness to prevent the effusion of blood, soon produced a great and healing effect. Other superior officers and servants of the Company behaved most admirably at this moment of crisis. In Mysore, Lieut.-Colonel Davis, the commanding officer, and the Honourable Arthur Cole, resident at the court of the Rajah (though Davis was enfeebled by sickness, and Cole but a very young man), conducted themselves with rare prudence, wisdom, and fearlessness, and contributed very essentially to the restoration of order and the prevention of sanguinary extremities. Colonel Gibbs and Colonel Montresor also distinguished themselves greatly, under circumstances more difficult than any that English officers had been placed under in India.

Lord Minto very laudably went to Madras, whence all the mischief had sprung, but before he reached that presidency (on the 11th of September) all signs of the mutiny were over, except the feelings of contrition of those who had been engaged in it. His lordship applauded "the inflexible firmness of Sir George Barlow, which had preserved the authority of legal government unbroken and unimpaired;" and reprobated the recent revolt, of which the object had been to overawe and control the civil government. Many of the mutinous officers were very young men, who had believed that they were doing right in supporting their commander-in-chief, who held the king's commission. Only a few were punished in any way. Macdowall, who had been so long living in a fire, perished in water, the ship in which he took his passage being lost at sea. If he had reached England alive, he would probably have been subjected to some severe punishment or ruinous prosecution. Yet the Court of Directors seemed to acknowledge that they had been in the wrong in opposing the wish of the Board of Control, and refusing him a seat in the council, for they lost no time in giving a seat in the council to their new Madras commander-in-chief, Sir Samuel Auchmuty. Mr. Petrie was recalled, and a minority of the Court of Directors would have recalled Sir George Barlow likewise, but he was warmly supported by Mr. Perceval's cabinet, and by the majority of the court, who declared that he had come out manfully from a desperate contest with the military, who had long been disorderly at Madras, and who had aimed at nothing short of erecting their own power as supreme over the civil power. Yet the Court of Directors, or their predecessors in office, had done a good deal to promote the insubordination of the military. Many of the Company's officers were connected by family interest or by other strong ties with the Directors, or with leading persons among the proprietors of East India stock, and they had been accustomed to the belief that their

delinquencies would never be very severely punished. In several instances the home patronage and support had screened officers who ought to have been cashiered for their conduct in India. In one striking instance, when an officer had been cashiered, his friends at home succeeded in getting him re-appointed, and even promoted. This instance occurred in the Madras presidency: Sir Robert Fletcher, having been cashiered for mutiny, was afterwards appointed by the Court of Directors commander-in-chief of the Madras army! Perhaps, however, a reviewal of all the present transactions and of the circumstances which preceded them will leave the conviction that all the blame was not on the side of the military, and that what was most at fault was the mixed, anomalous, and unfixed system by which India was still governed.

The mutiny of the British officers might have proved of far more perilous import than the mutiny of the native officers and men at Vellore. The sepoys, as a body, were remarkable for their fidelity and warm personal attachment to the European officers who had the immediate command over them. If they were left to the impulse of these feelings, it was feared they would go to any length to which their officers chose to lead them. If the Company, or the supreme government, or the presidential governments, or the superior field and staff officers who opposed the mutiny, attempted to break the ties which bound the sepoys to their own British regimental officers, where was the hope that the discipline of these corps would not be ruined, and that rebellion and an universal anarchy would not follow?—There was just this hope: the sepoys had obeyed the voice of Lord Clive, and had put his mutinous English officers under arrest, without losing any of their discipline, or bating a jot of their respect to those whose salt they eat. Still, this was an experiment not to be tried too often; and high as were the merits of many of the superior officers now serving in India, there certainly was not a Clive among them. Every shock which could be offered to the affection and regard of the sepoys for their immediate British leaders was surely a shock offered to the stability of the British Empire in the East. It was, however, found necessary to give this shock—to try this dangerous experiment—and the governor of Madras, by letters and by verbal messages, endeavoured to separate the sepoys from their regimental officers, by representing those British-born subjects as rebellious and traitorous men, who had no claim on the obedience of their troops. If the rash, misled officers had not speedily seen the fatal course they were running, there might well have been some long and bloody struggles, and these might have ended in the utter ruin of our Empire, as well as of the prosperity of many millions of the native inhabitants of India. Even as it was, the facility with which the sepoys believed what their immediate leaders told them, and the prompt obedience they paid to those officers, led to a scene of carnage—the most lamentable and revolting part of the whole story, for the poor, duped sepoys were butchered, while their leaders all escaped except one, who was wounded and taken prisoner.*

* This was the encounter to which we have alluded in the text, as the one in which blood was shed. The circumstances of the case were briefly these:—The officers of the Chittel droog battalions told their men that a mutiny worse than that of Vellore had broken out at Seringapatam, and that they were only marching to suppress it and restore the authority of the Company. On their march the battalions were attacked by some irregular Mysorean cavalry, who had been sent to oppose them by the Rajah of Mysore, at the request of the resident, the Honourable Arthur Cole, but who were taken by the poor sepoys to be a portion of an insurgent army making war for the family of Tippoo Sultaun. The sepoys were much harassed by the desultory attack of the Mysoreans, when Colonel Gibbs appeared in their front with the king's 25th regiment of light dragoons. They gave a joyous shout at the sight, not doubting but that the dragoons were friends. Colonel Gibbs sent forward a lieutenant of dragoons with a white flag, to parley with the mutinous officers of the sepoy battalions. The sepoys were exclaiming the lieutenant of the 25th, when that officer received a shot in the face—a shot which must have gone off by accident or have been fired by a madman. The mutinous officers one and all declared that the shot must have been accidental. The wounded lieutenant galloped back bleeding to Colonel Gibbs and his regiment. The enraged dragoons could not be restrained, if any such wish now existed; they believed that the sepoys were in open rebellion; and that they had purposely and perfidiously fired upon an

Throughout the whole of the mutiny of the army of Madras and the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the *King's* British troops preserved the most perfect order and discipline, and manifested an entire devotion to the Indian government. The jealousies and antipathies which divided the officers holding the King's commission from the officers who held the commission of the Company, were of themselves enough to preclude any chance of an agreement and union in mutiny: yet was it but a bad, Machiavellian policy to trust to these jealousies as a ground of safety and strength. The British Empire in the East will be strongest when no such jealousies and differences exist, and when it shall appear almost incredible that they ever had existed. The men of the Company's European regiment at Madras were quite as mutinous as their officers. The native armies of Bengal and Bombay took no part whatever in the mutiny.

Lord Minto revoked a pardon which General Pater had promised at Masulipatam, as being unauthorized by his instructions. Lieutenant-Colonels Bell and Doveton and Major Storey were ordered for trial; and the governor-general, making, as he said, a small selection from a great mass of delinquency, excepted from a general amnesty he now granted eighteen other officers, giving them their choice either to quit the service or stand trial by court-martial. Colonel Bell was found guilty, sentenced to be cashiered, and declared unworthy of ever serving the Company in any military capacity whatsoever. As Bell had been a leader in the revolt, it was thought that this sentence was altogether inadequate to his crime. Offences like his, but lighter in degree, had been repeatedly and recently punished in India with death, by sentence of court-martial; and General Gowdie, who presided over the present court, expressed his pointed disapprobation of the lenient sentence. But the mutiny among the officers had been far too general, and the prevailing temper of the Madras army was much too hostile to severe sentences, to allow General Gowdie any chance of being gratified with a capital punishment. Some of the very officers who sat on the court-martial entertained a warm friendship for their late commander-in-chief Macdowall, and thought that Sir George Barlow was at least as blamable as the mutinous officers. Colonel Doveton, who maintained that he had only marched with the mutineers for the purpose of moderating them and preventing greater evil, was honourably acquitted. Major Storey, whose defence, like that of Colonel Bell, was in great part a justification, was sentenced to be cashiered, but was not declared incapable of serving the Company again. It was in vain that the governor-general, the governor of Madras, the commander-in-chief of that presidency, and the judge-advocate called for greater severity; the courts-martial would not be severe. Of the eighteen officers excepted by Lord Minto, nearly all appear to have resigned; the rest of the mutineers remained, and caused their offences to be forgotten by their gallantry and conduct in the wars which took place under the administration of the Earl of Moira.*

officer with a flag of truce. Sabres were drawn, spurs were applied, and on went the king's 25th, followed by the rajah's Mysorean cavalry. Among the sepoys were a battalion who had fought heroically under General Wellesley in the great battle of Assaye, and many men who had marched breast to breast with the English in the battle of Mallavelly or in the storming of Seringapatam: but all were now bewildered and panic-stricken—none could understand how, while English officers were at their head, English dragoons should charge them—and instantly all of them broke and fled in that sort of disorder which ensures a wholesale destruction. The dragoons and the Mysoreans cut up and killed or wounded from 200 to 300 in their flight; the rest escaped by swimming across a deep nullah, with high and difficult embankments, which the cavalry could not cross.

* The limits of our work have prevented our giving anything beyond a very brief sketch of these truly important events. A detail of them would fill a large volume; many hundreds of pages were written and published at the time in England. Among these volumes and pamphlets was a paper by Mr. Petrie, who attributed a great deal of blame to Sir George Barlow. In an article in the Quarterly Review, which fills sixty-five closely printed pages, the whole story of the disturbances at Madras is told in a very clear and interesting manner. The facts are carefully, and, on the whole, candidly sifted, making allowance for a slight bias on the side of Sir George Barlow, or in favour of the civil authority and the powers of government. See Quarterly Review, No. IX. The account of the 'Rise, Progress, and Ter-

Lord Wellington, who carried with him into Spain, and wherever else he went, a warm regard for the Madras army, was sorely grieved at the accounts he received from his friend Colonel John Malcolm, and immediately hastened to explain the chief causes of the unhappy disturbances. Writing from Badajoz on the 3rd of December, 1809, he says,—

"You cannot conceive how much I have felt for what has passed on the Madras establishment. I scarcely recognise in those transactions the men for whom I entertained so much respect, and had so much regard, a few years back; and I can only lament that they and the army, and the affairs of that presidency in general, *have been so much mismanaged.* . . . . . These transactions owe their origin to the disputes of the persons in authority in India—that is to say, the governor and the commander-in-chief. Both, but principally the latter, looked for partisans and supporters; and these have ended by throwing off all subordination, by relinquishing all habits of obedience. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretext for this conduct. Colonel Munro's opinions might be erroneous, and might have been harsh towards his brother officers; but not only he ought not to have been brought to a court-martial for giving that opinion, but he ought to have been brought to a court-martial if he had refrained from giving it, when he was called upon by the commander-in-chief (Sir John Cradock) to make him a report on a subject referred to his official consideration. The officers of the army are equally wrong in the part they have taken in the subsequent part of the question, which is one between the governor and the commander-in-chief, whether the former had a right to protect Colonel Munro from the acts of the latter, upon which question no man can have a doubt who has any knowledge of the constitution of Great Britain and of that of our Indian governments. I, who have arrived pretty nearly at the top of the tree, should be the last man to give up any point of military right or etiquette. But I have no doubt whatever, not only that it was the right, but that it was the duty of the governor in council to interfere to save Colonel Munro; and that if he had not done so, and the public had sustained any loss or inconvenience from his trial, the governor would have been severely responsible for the omission to perform his duty. So far for my opinion upon the main points of the question. As for the others, the conduct of officers upon the addresses, the orders issued, the reso-

mination of the Disturbances at Madras,' in the Edinburgh Annual Register for 1810, which evidently proceeded from the pen of Southey, who then wrote the historical part of this periodical work, is clear and good, and considerably shorter than the account given in the Quarterly Review. In some points it severely censures the conduct of Sir George Barlow. It says—"The ablest and wisest governor might have found his situation difficult; and whether a system of conciliation, uniting generosity with firmness, could have allayed the general agitation, is doubtful; *but it certainly was not attempted.* Sir G. Barlow seems to have thought that firmness alone was sufficient, and that *the way to make the authority of government respected, was to punish any person who displeased the governor.* Upon this angry and vindictive system some persons were displaced from their official situations, others degraded, others, by distant and unwelcome appointments, banished from Madras. Some of these examples may have been expedient, but most assuredly some of them were arbitrary, oppressive, and cruel; and the general ferment and general disgust which such measures created encouraged the discontented officers, who found the civil servants of the Company ready to sympathize with them, because they were exasperated by their own grievances. Things were in this state when General Macdowall embarked for England, and from this time it is difficult to say whether the conduct of the army or of the government was most censurable, till, by the imprudence and intemperance of both, a crisis was brought on, which decided the guilt of one party, without exculpating the other."—*Edinb. Ann. Regist.*

General Sir Thomas Maitland, at this time Governor of Ceylon, and afterwards the "King Tom" of Malta and the Ionian Islands, was, as all the world knows, no very great admirer of weakness or laxity of government, yet he censured the conduct of Sir George Barlow as being *too rigid.* In 1810 Sir James Mackintosh, who was then visiting Colombo, was told that he (Sir T. M.) thought that Lord Minto had slackened the chords of government *as dangerously as Sir George Barlow tightened them.*—Diary, in the Life of the Right Hon. Sir James Mackintosh, edited by his Son.

In the histories and other books written by the functionaries and servants of the East India Company, we see, generally, a disposition to glide over the whole of this story as quickly as possible. This surely is not the proper way to treat a subject which was so important and so critical at the time, and which contains lessons and warnings proper for all times.

lutions entered into, the resignation of the offices, &c. &c., they are consequences of the first error; that is, of persons in authority making partisans of those placed under them, instead of making all obey the constituted authorities of the state. This conduct of the officers in the army would have been wrong, even if the cause had been just, and the commander-in-chief had wished to screen Colonel Munro from the persecution of the government: it is really not worth while to take up my time in describing, or yours in perusing, a description of the folly, the inconsistency, or the breaches of discipline and subordination contained in all those documents. I have so much regard for the Madras army, to which I owe so much, that I would sacrifice a great deal to have it in my power to restore it to that state of discipline, union, and respectability in which I left it in the year 1805; and I assure you that I shall rejoice most sincerely when I shall hear that their good sense and good temper have predominated over their feelings of party and their prejudices."*

During the administration of Lord Minto our conquests and operations in the Eastern Archipelago, or Insular India, were widely extended—so widely, indeed, that the forces and resources employed in this direction would have made it difficult to prosecute any important war on the Indian continent. The complete and established supremacy of our national navy facilitated these enterprises. Our fleets commanded in every sea, so that the Dutch and French colonies could receive only a scanty and precarious support from the mother-countries. All the Molucca or Spice Islands which had been colonized by the Dutch, but which now in reality belonged to the French, who had annexed Holland to their empire, were reduced with very little difficulty by Anglo-Indian expeditions. The first attack was made upon Amboyna, which had been taken by the English during the first revolutionary war, but which had been restored at the peace of Amiens. A small flotilla of Company's armed vessels, commanded by Captain Tucker, and a small military force, consisting of a part of the Company's Madras European regiment and a few artillerymen (about 400 landsmen in all), under the command of Captain Court, stormed the principal batteries on the 16th of February, 1810; and, on the following day, the whole of the island was surrendered to the British, although it was defended by 1300 men and a great quantity of artillery. The five dependent islands quietly submitted to the conquerors. Being reinforced by Captain Cole, the Amboyna expedition drove the Dutch from their very strong works on Banda Neira, and, in the course of the month of August, 1810, reduced the whole of the group called the Banda Isles, so productive in nutmegs.

Nothing now remained to the Dutch subjects of Napoleon in those seas except the rich island of Java and some settlements on the coast of the richer and far larger island of Sumatra. The reduction of these settlements was first suggested to the governor-general by Mr. Stamford Raffles, one of the many men of rare talent that had been trained under the East India Company. Raffles, during only a short residence on the coast of Malacca, had contrived to obtain a vast mass of information concerning the Indian Archipelago; and he not only suggested the expeditions, but accompanied and materially aided those who were intrusted with the commands. Though bred to the law, and never in any degree a military man, Lord Minto himself determined to go with the troops. His lordship left Calcutta on the 9th of March, 1811, for Madras, which establishment was to furnish part of the forces. The Bengal troops were embarked in the middle of April; and, about the middle of May, the whole of the expedition arrived at Malacca, the place of rendezvous, as the best starting-point for the conquests proposed. Great was the difficulty of making a passage with a large fleet through an archipelago where the wind blows strongly from one point of the compass for several months together, where the passage between the islands is often so narrow that only one ship can pass at a time, and then so close to the land that the sides of the vessel are shadowed by the luxuriant ve-

* Wellington Dispatches.

getation which extends to the water's edge.* The accounts of this navigation were contradictory and obscure; few or none of the British naval officers engaged in the expedition had ever threaded that perplexing maze, and their opinions were divided as to which was the best course to pursue in order to reach Java expeditiously. There was no time to waste in disputations, for the favourable monsoon was near terminating when all the forces were collected at Malacca. Many insisted that the only practical course for a fleet was the northern route round Borneo; but Raffles strongly recommended the south-west passage between Carimata and Borneo, and "staked his reputation on the success which would attend it." He had ascertained the practicability by an experiment in a small vessel, the "Minto," commanded by Captain Greigh, a most intelligent and zealous officer, who had been placed under his orders, and to whom he was indebted for the discovery of the passage by the coast of Borneo. Several of the naval authorities were opposed to the notion, not taking sufficiently into account the local information which Raffles had acquired; but Lord Minto reposed full confidence in that information, and in the excellent judgment of the man who was the real planner of the whole expedition; and accordingly the governor-general embarked with Raffles in his majesty's ship the "Modeste," commanded by Captain the Hon. George Elliot, on the 18th of June, 1811, and led the way on Raffles's sole responsibility. For a landsman this must have been a season of intense anxiety. But the expectations which had been formed were verified in every part of the passage, and everything turned out precisely as had been foretold and proposed by Raffles, with the exception that the difficulties were less and the voyage shorter than he could have hoped for. In less than six weeks after quitting Malacca the fleet, counting more than 90 sail, was in sight of Batavia, without accident to a single vessel.* The land-troops were under the command of General Sir S. Auchmuty: they were divided into four brigades, and amounted to nearly 12,000 men, of which about one half were British. The climate on that coast, however, proved so noxious, that the hospitals were soon crowded with our native Indian sepoys and with our British soldiers. It is said that at one time there were 5000 men on the sick-list and incapable of duty. But neither these disastrous circumstances nor the strength of the works prevented the easy conquest of the island. Batavia, the capital, to which the Dutch had given the proud title of "Queen of the East," was surrendered on the 8th of August by the burghers, the garrison having retreated to Weltevreeden. Though large storehouses of public property were burned by the enemy previous to their retreat, some valuable granaries and other stores escaped the flames. Provisions were in abundance, and the port afforded the means of an easy communication with the fleet; and the city, although abandoned by the principal European inhabitants, was filled with industrious races of people, Chinese and others, who had but small affection for their Dutch masters, (whose rule had been unwisely harsh and oppressive,) and who were consequently well disposed to be useful to our Anglo-Indian army. On the morning of the 10th of August Colonel Gillespie, with part of our troops, marched to Weltevreeden. The Dutch had abandoned their cantonment there, and had taken post about two miles farther up the country, at Cornelis. Their position was strong, and defended by an abattis, occupied by 3000 of their best troops and four guns of horse artillery;

* Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S., &c. &c. particularly in the Government of Java, 1811-16, Bencoolen and its dependencies, 1817-24; with Details of the Commerce and Resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and Selections from his Correspondence. By his Widow.

* "The whole fleet," says the governor-general, "had assembled on the coast of Java by the 30th of July. The 'Modeste,' if alone, would have done it a fortnight sooner. I have been the more particular in detailing these circumstances, because this expedition must have been abandoned for the present year (an earlier departure than actually took place from India having been found totally impracticable) if I had yielded to the predicted difficulties of the passage."—*Id.*

and behind them were the fort of Cornelis and other very strong works. Gillespie attacked with great vigour. The Dutch for a time defended themselves stoutly, but at length their four guns were captured, and they were driven from the abattis at the point of the bayonet. The Dutch left on the field about 500 in killed and wounded, including a brigadier-general, who was wounded dangerously. The loss of the British was but trifling. Those most distinguished in the bayonet-charge were the grenadier company of the 78th and a detachment of the 89th king's regiments. The enemy, driven from the abattis, took shelter under their batteries. Their main body, still greatly superior in numbers, was strongly entrenched in a position between the great river of Jacotra and a deep canal dug by the Dutch and called the Sloken: this position was shut up in front by a deep trench strongly palisadoed; neither the river nor the canal was fordable: seven redoubts and many batteries mounting heavy guns occupied the most commanding points of ground within the lines, the key-fort of Cornelis being in the centre, and all the works being defended by a numerous and seemingly well-organized artillery. The heat was too violent, the malaria of the spot too destructive, and the number of our forces too small to admit of regular approaches. The works must be taken by battery and assault, or not at all. Sir S. Auchmuty came up with more troops, Rear-Admiral Stopford spared 500 of his seamen to assist at our batteries; and these were worked so well that, one by one, the nearest Dutch batteries were silenced. At last, on the 26th of August, the assault was made, under the immediate direction and gallant leading of Colonel Gillespie, Colonel Gibbs, Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod, and Major Tule; and the works were all carried, and the whole of the enemy's army was killed, taken, or dispersed. The combat had been most obstinate and our loss very heavy. A tremendous explosion of the magazine of one of the Dutch redoubts (whether by accident or by design was not ascertained) took place at the instant of its capture, and destroyed a number of our officers and men, who at the moment were crowded on its ramparts, which the enemy had abandoned. Colonel Macleod, who attacked another of the redoubts, fell in the moment of victory. In all, 27 native troops and 114 British fell; 123 native and 610 British were wounded, and 13 were missing. But 5000 Dutch were taken prisoners, about 1000 were buried in the works, multitudes were cut down in the retreat, the rivers were choked up with the dead, and the huts and neighbouring thickets were filled with wounded. Among the prisoners were 3 general-officers, 34 field-officers, 90 captains, and 150 subaltern officers. General Jansens, the Dutch commander-in-chief, who had thrice rallied his retreating troops, escaped with difficulty, followed by a few cavalry, the sole remains of an army of 10,000 men.*

* Sir Samuel Auchmuty's Dispatch to Lord Minto.

On the 27th of August, the day after the bloody battle of Cornelis, the warm-hearted, the good, the learned, the poetical Doctor John Leyden, the associate and friend of Walter Scott, the bosom friend of Stamford Raffles, the admired of all who knew him, died of the country fever at Weltevreeden. He expired in the arms of Raffles, who deeply mourned his loss:

"Where sleep the brave on Java's strand,
Thy ardent spirit, Leyden, fled;
And fame with cypress shades the land
Where genius fell and valour bled.

When triumph's tale is westward borne,
On Border hills no joy shall gleam;
And thy lov'd Teviot long shall mourn
The youthful Poet of her stream:"

—*From Verses by Sir John Malcolm.*

Many congenial spirits at home mourned his premature fate. Southey, in giving an account of the conquest of Java, paid a merited compliment to the learned Dutch writers of an earlier age, who had visited and described the island, and then concluded with this beautiful tribute to Leyden:—

"But the writings of Nieuhoff, and Baldæus, and Valentyn, and Rumphius remain; and time, which destroys the work of the conqueror and of the statesman, will but increase their value. Unhappily our conquest cost us the life of one who, had his days been prolonged, would probably have added more to our knowledge of Eastern literature and antiquities than all his predecessors: I speak of Dr. John Leyden, who, for the sake of increasing his stores of knowledge, accompanied Lord Minto upon this expedition, and fell a victim to the climate; and whose early death may be considered as a loss so great, so irreparable (for generations may pass away before another be found, who with the same

The final capitulation of the island, or of all of it that had been occupied by the Dutch, was not signed till the 18th of September, by General Jansens and Sir S. Auchmuty at Samarang, whither the Dutch general had retreated with a very slight attendance of troops. The principal part of the island, occupied by native chiefs or princes, was still to settle. Some of our men in authority recommended that, now the Dutch were driven out, the island should be abandoned to the natives; but Lord Minto checked the idea, and adopted, on his own responsibility, various measures proper to convert it into a permanent British possession.

He did not overrate the importance of Java in his dispatches to the authorities in England. "An empire," said he, "which for two centuries has contributed greatly to the power, prosperity, and grandeur of one of the principal and most respected states in Europe, has been thus wrested from the short usurpation of the French government, has been added to the dominion of the British crown, and converted from a seat of hostile machination and commercial competition into an augmentation of British power and prosperity." Raffles, who could not foresee how soon the British government would be induced to restore to the emancipated Dutch these splendid conquests in the Eastern Archipelago, was even warmer than the governor-general in describing the value of Java. "It is, in fact," said he, "*the other India!*" Raffles himself, under the title of Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependencies, was appointed to preside over this new empire, "as an acknowledgment of the services he had rendered, and in consideration of his peculiar fitness for the office." This appointment was highly honourable to Lord Minto, who is said to have been partly pledged to bestow it on a gentleman who stood higher in the service, or who enjoyed more powerful patronage than Raffles, who had worked his own way from the very humble condition of an extra-clerk in the East India House. Lord Minto remained in Java six weeks, and was occupied in arranging the form of government, forming plans for the improvement of the country and for the suppression of piracy; or in consulting with Raffles, who was every day adding to his stock of information about the Archipelago, its vast capabilities, its products, navigation, and trade. Such of the natives or Asiatic settlers as had been subjects to the Dutch, rejoiced in the change; and many of the independent chiefs courted the alliance of the new conquerors. The governor-general appointed Mr. Hare resident at Banger-Masing, with the view of checking the war which was almost constantly raging among the native princes or chiefs, and of putting down the practice of piracy, which was no-

industry, the same power of mind, and the same disinterested spirit, shall possess the same opportunities), that I will not refrain from expressing a wish that Java had remained in the hands of the enemy, so Leyden were alive."—*Edinburgh Ann. Regist.*

Walter Scott drew up and published in this same miscellany a very touching biographical memoir of Leyden. At the sad end of it, after stating that the philologist and poet accompanied the expedition to Java for the purpose of investigating the manners, language, and literature of the tribes which inhabit that island, and partly also because it was thought his extensive knowledge of the eastern dialects and customs might be useful in settling the government of the country, Scott added: "His spirit of romantic adventure led him literally to rush upon death; for, with another volunteer who attended the expedition, he threw himself into the surf, in order to be the first Briton of the expedition who should set foot upon Java. When the success of the well-concerted movements of the invaders had given them possession of the town of Batavia, Leyden displayed the same ill-omened precipitation in his haste to examine a library in which many Indian manuscripts of value were said to be deposited. A library in a Dutch settlement was not, as might have been expected, in the best order; the apartment had not been regularly ventilated, and either from this circumstance, or already affected by the fatal sickness peculiar to Batavia, Leyden, when he left the place, had a fit of shivering, and declared the atmosphere was enough to give any mortal a fever. The presage was too just; he took his bed, and died in three days, on the eve of the battle which gave Java to the British empire."

There appears to be a little of our great novelist's usual carelessness as to dates in this account of the death. Leyden did not die on the eve of the battle of Cornelis, but on the day after that battle. Other accounts make Leyden die on the 28th of August, or *two* days after the battle. This must be incorrect. The battle was fought on the 26th, and Raffles, in whose arms he expired, says, in a letter written soon after the event, that poor Leyden died on the 27th.

where carried on in a more ferocious manner or on a larger scale.

It was also during this administration that the Mauritius, or Isle of France, was reduced, and chiefly by forces detached from India. In the month of November, 1810, troops from Madras, from Bombay, and from Bengal formed their junction at an appointed rendezvous near to the Isle of France. They were to be joined by a division of king's troops from the Cape of Good Hope, but as these royal forces did not arrive in time, the attack was made without them. The army was commanded by Major-General J. Abercromby, the fleet by Vice-Admiral Bertie. The island was surrounded by dangerous reefs; but the whole of the leeward side was carefully examined and sounded, and a passage for vessels was found where none was supposed to exist. On the 29th of November, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the whole fleet, consisting of nearly seventy sail, got safely to anchor at the point of debarcation in Grande Baie, about 12 miles to the windward of Port Louis; and the army, with their artillery, stores, and ammunition, several detachments of marines, and a large body of seamen, were landed in the course of the day, without a single loss or accident. The French had considered such a landing, or any landing except opposite to Port Louis, as an impracticability; and, in consequence of this old and confirmed persuasion, while the seaward fortifications of their capital were very formidable, their works on the land side—where they never expected to be attacked—were contemptible. The island, in fact, was gained the moment that the passage through the reefs was discovered; or, at latest, the moment that the landing of the troops was so successfully effected. Numerically, the French were too weak to offer any great resistance in the country which lay between the point of debarcation and the capital of the island. They skirmished a little in a wood, they attempted to defend a narrow defile, and they made a short stand in some lines behind the town of Port Louis; but, on the morning of the 2nd of December, as General Abercromby was preparing to make a general attack, De Caen, the French governor and commander-in-chief, sent out a white flag, and proposed to capitulate. The attack was suspended, and the capitulation was hastily concluded. Considering the relative situations of the two forces, it was thought by many persons that the British commanders allowed the French conditions much too favourable. The capitulation was, however, in strict conformity with the spirit of Lord Minto's instructions, with the single exception that the French garrison were not to be made prisoners of war; and General Abercromby justified this exception. "Although," said he, "the courage and high discipline of the army under my command could leave not the smallest doubt in respect to the issue of an attack upon the town, I was nevertheless prevailed upon to acquiesce in this indulgence being granted to the enemy, from the desire of sparing the lives of many brave officers and soldiers, and out of regard to the interests of the inhabitants of this island, who have long laboured under the most degrading misery and oppression. Knowing confidently your lordship's further views in regard to this army, and seeing also the late period of the season, when every hour became valuable, I considered these to be motives of much more national importance than any injury that could arise from a small body of troops, at so remote a distance from Europe, being permitted to return to their own country free from any engagement. In every other particular, we have gained all which could have been acquired if the town had been carried by assault." * De Caen and his garrison were, therefore, sent to France, without being bound not to serve against England or her allies during the war—a very idle and useless condition, as the French of the revolutionary school had long ceased to respect any such engagement. But the rich colony and its dependencies, the forts, well-stored magazines, &c. were given up; the conquerors obtained possession of 209 pieces of ordnance in excellent condition, of four large French frigates, one French sloop and

* General Abercromby's Dispatch to the Right Hon. Gilbert Lord Minto, &c.

one brig, of two small English frigates which had been captured by the French, and of a number of merchant ships, many of the latter being prizes picked up by the privateers of the island, and some of them being of great value. And, what was most important of all, the French were dispossessed of a stronghold, from which, during the whole of this war, they had so sorely annoyed our East India trade. As the neighbouring Isle of Bourbon—another French stronghold and haunt of privateers—had been reduced in the preceding month of July, by an Anglo-Indian force under Colonel Keating, and a small squadron of his majesty's ships under Commodore Rowley, there was no further mischief to be apprehended in this quarter. Both these islands ought always to remain in the hands of the power which holds the empire of India; but at the peace of Paris, in 1814, the British government, keeping the Isle of France, very unwisely gave back Bourbon. In making these two very important conquests, the troops had but few opportunities of displaying their valour; but the sepoys from India, as well as the British soldiers, acted with admirable promptitude and discipline, and cheerfully and patiently submitted to many fatigues and privations. In the Isle of France they were left for twenty-four hours with hardly any water to drink; and the heat was excessive. De Caen and his people had been taught to despise the native troops of our trading East India Company, but the march of the sepoys from Grande Baie to Port Louis, and the conduct and *tenue* they displayed on the march, in the skirmishes, and in front of the lines, gave them a juster notion of the qualities of our native Indian soldiery. Unfortunately Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Major O'Keefe, two excellent officers, were killed in clearing the defile which the French attempted to defend. Otherwise the loss in the Isle of France was very small, for, counting Europeans and natives, there were only 29 killed, 99 wounded, and 48 missing.*

The facility with which large detachments from the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were wafted to distant islands and peninsulas, seas and gulfs, and then formed into a strong and compact army, was every way calculated to raise our military reputation; and if much of the merit was due to our national navy, still the East India Company, its governors, officers, and servants, may fairly claim a large share in the honours.

The pirates in the Persian Gulf, forgetful of several severe chastisements they had previously received, attacked and plundered an English trading vessel, and treated the crew and passengers in a barbarous manner. Forthwith a small expedition was dispatched from Bombay to chastise these ruffians and to destroy their shipping. The chief nest of the pirates was the port of Mallia; and this port was defended by a fortress, which had a high traditional reputation, being in fact considered impregnable. But the small Bombay force took the fort by storm, and captured or destroyed the vessels it had protected. The pirates were driven out of other nests with great ease. The fort of Shenass, where the pirates had collected in great strength, was found to be more formidable; but the Imaum of Muscat, who had been secured in our alliance by the good diplomacy of Colonel J. Malcolm, sent a squadron to co-operate with the Bombay force, and after some desperate fighting this place too was carried by storm. In other ports on the gulf, the pirates burned their vessels themselves, and then fled up the country.

Another expedition was sent, during this administration, to the Canton river. This was at the very beginning of Lord Minto's government, when such lively apprehensions were entertained of the designs of the French on the East, and when Bonaparte was apparently making himself master of Spain and Portugal. It was felt that if the French should obtain possession of the Spanish colony of Manilla, they would, from that point, make an attack upon the not distant Portuguese possession of Macao. As yet we had no treaty with Ferdinand VII., or with the Spanish cortes, who were determined not

* The loss sustained in conquering the Isle of Bourbon was still smaller, amounting only to 18 killed, 79 wounded, and 4 drowned in landing.

to submit to the intrusive King Joseph Bonaparte; but we were bound by treaties to protect Portugal and her colonies, and if the French or their partisans should be allowed to gain possession of the very old Portuguese settlement of Macao, there would be but small security for our Chinese trade. The Portuguese in the East felt that they were far too weak to be able to defend themselves. The governor of Goa entered into a convention with Lord Minto, and allowed the English to garrison that colony. This being done, his lordship thought it advisable to dispatch another garrison to defend and hold Macao. This last experiment had been tried in the year 1802, under the administration of Marquess Wellesley, and it had then failed very completely, the viceroy of Canton having indignantly repelled the idea of any part of the Chinese empire needing aid from foreigners.* Lord Minto's expedition consisted merely of 200 rank and file of the Company's European regiment, a sepoy battalion of 650 firelocks from Bengal, 2 companies of his majesty's 30th foot from Madras, and 100 European artillerymen, with 18 pieces of ordnance. It was found now, as it had been found in 1802, that the Chinese treated Macao as a portion of their empire, and the Portuguese there as mere tenants at will; that the Chinese were furious at the landing of any British force, and that the Portuguese, and the men of mixed race that dwelt at Macao and were called Portuguese, were far from being disposed to give our troops a hearty welcome. Our troops were, however, landed, and with the consent of the local Portuguese authorities. A general feeling of enmity on the part of the Chinese inhabitants manifested itself in repeated affrays and assaults, particularly on the sepoys. As for the so-called Portuguese garrison, it consisted of only 200 or 300 half-starved blacks. An order soon came down from Canton for our troops to depart; and as this was not complied with, the trade at Canton was stopped, and provisions were denied both to our Indiamen and to the squadron of his majesty's ships. The British factory at Canton remonstrated, representing that Macao was, and had for ages been, the possession of our ally the king of Portugal. "Put your troops on board, and then we will hear you," replied the Mandarins. They further said, in an edict, "Knowing, as you ought to know, that the Portuguese inhabit a territory belonging to the Celestial empire, how could you suppose that the French would ever venture to molest them? If they dared, our *warlike* troops should attack, defeat, and chase them from the face of the country." * At the same time, some of the warriors of the Celestial empire began to march towards Macao, and a line of war-junks was drawn across the river, to intercept the communication, leaving space for only one boat to pass at a time.† Admiral Drury, who commanded our squadron, proposed to the viceroy an interview at Canton. The viceroy returned no answer to the admiral's letter. Shortly after this, all British subjects were ordered to embark on board the Indiamen or Chinamen in the river, and his majesty's ships were ordered higher up the river. As the viceroy still refused an audience, Admiral Drury went up to Canton in person, to insist on an interview, in which, he said, matters might easily be accommodated. The viceroy persisted in declining the visit, and then the admiral returned to his ship. A demonstration of breaking through the line of war-junks was made next, as those junks were now filled with soldiers, who refused to allow even a single boat to pass up to Canton. The boats of all our men-of-war and of all our Indiamen were manned and armed. They could have cut through with very little difficulty, but Admiral Drury, on reaching the line, pulled up in his own boat to address the mandarins, through the medium of a Portuguese priest from Macao (who, very possibly, misinterpreted nearly every word that was said to him by the ad-

* John Francis Davis, late his Majesty's Chief Superintendent in China (and now Governor of Hong Kong). 'The Chinese; a General Description of the Empire of China and its Inhabitants.'

* Id., id.

† Services of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Wegnelin, the officer in command of our land forces, in East Ind. Military Calendar.

miral). Instead of entering into this parley, the Celestials in the junks began to fire into the English boats. One man was wounded in the admiral's own boat, and thereupon the admiral ordered the signal to be made for the attack. But—"The signal was not observed, and ordered not to be repeated. The admiral then declared his intention not to force the Chinese line, and returned with the boats to the fleet. Though a man of undisputed courage, Admiral Drury seems not to have possessed that cool and deliberate judgment which was essential to the success of the business he had been engaged in."* Our humiliation was completed by a convention entered into at Macao, in the month of December (1808), in conformity with which our troops were re-embarked, and Admiral Drury sailed away for Bengal. The trade, which had been stopped for more than three months, was then renewed. It should appear that the governor-general of India, who had conceived the plan and sent the expedition, escaped any severe censure. But the Company strongly disapproved the conduct of some of their servants at Canton, and recalled the president of that factory. The pecuniary loss incurred by the English was very large; and it was soon discovered that no trifling addition was made to the usual arrogance of the Chinese.†

Lord Minto resigned his office and took his passage for England towards the close of the year 1813. On the whole, his administration was popular in India, while in Europe it certainly raised his reputation as a statesman, relieving him from the criticisms he had incurred by his not very judicious conduct as Viceroy of Corsica. Perhaps few persons then noticed how close a resemblance some of his measures and policy bore to those which had been pursued by Warren Hastings, upon whose head he, as Sir Gilbert Elliot, had poured such vials of virtuous wrath. But his lordship himself could hardly fail to recognise the resemblance; and it is said that when he returned from India he frankly confessed that his notions about the first and greatest of our governors-general were very different from what they had been a quarter of a century before, when he harangued in the House of Commons or sat with the managers of Hastings's impeachment in Westminster Hall. More than this, his lordship recommended carrying out the system of aggrandizement, connection, and supremacy which Hastings had been the first to adopt; and he confessed that without this supremacy, by conquest or by connection, our empire in the East could not stand; and that the timid, neutrality, non-interference system which had now been so long cherished by the British legislature and government, and by the Court of Directors, was altogether inapplicable to our situation in India. If his government had lasted six months longer, he must have found himself involved in extensive wars in Hindustan. The Anglo-Indians complain that the conquests he directed in insular India cost far more than the conquests which his predecessors had made in continental India, and that while these continental territories remained permanently in our possession, the islands taken from the French and Dutch were nearly all restored to their original possessors at the peace. The facts are indisputable; but it is to be remembered that at a general pacification every great and fortunate country is expected, and is in a manner bound, to make some restitutions. England had always required some score of islands to throw into a treaty of peace. If

* Parliamentary Evidence, as quoted by J. F. Davis, Esq., in 'The Chinese.'

Mr. Davis adds—"The attempt to proceed to Canton in the boats ought never to have been made, or it should have been carried through. A pagoda was built by the Chinese near the spot, to commemorate their *victory* over the English."

† It is but justice to state that the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Wegueliu, the officer in command of the forces that were landed at Macao, was prudent, discreet, vigilant, active, and spirited. This was liberally acknowledged by the governor-general himself, who, in council, highly approved of his uniform and successful attention to the discipline of his troops, at a time when their patience and forbearance were put to the severest trials by the insults and provocations of the Chinese inhabitants of Macao. His lordship also approved of all the measures he had adopted for the accommodation and relief of the troops, and of the excellent defensive arrangements he had adopted, to provide with so small a force against the contingency of an attack by an immense Chinese army.

we had not taken Java, the settlements in Sumatra, and other islands and establishments from the Dutch, and if we had not had them in hand at the conclusion of the war to give back to their old owners, it might not have been found quite so easy to silence the murmurs of Holland and of other continental nations about our retaining the Cape of Good Hope and other conquests which were made permanent to us. It is probable that Lord Minto did not foresee that the vast acquisitions made in the Eastern Archipelago would be so soon given up; and it is certain that the British government could not provide against, or so much as suspect—in its full extent—the harsh and oppressive policy which has since been pursued by the Dutch in those colonies.

CHAPTER X.

HOME LEGISLATION.

THE commercial monopoly of the East India Company had long been a subject of complaint with the general mercantile interests of the United Kingdom; and at every renewal of the Company's charter some efforts had been made to throw open some portions of the East India or China trade. The first great inroad on the Company's exclusive privileges did not however take place until the year 1813. On the 22nd of February, the Company, well aware of the many and strenuous efforts that were making to break up their monopoly, represented by petition to parliament that without their commercial privileges they could not maintain their political privileges or territorial possessions; the commercial monopoly being but an instrument for political purposes, &c. A modification of the system had, however, been previously resolved upon by ministers; and before the session closed a bill (Act of the 53 Geo. III.) was carried through both Houses. The trade with India was thrown open in ships of a given tonnage, under licence from the Court of Directors, on whose refusal to grant such licence an appeal lay to the Board of Control. The resort of individuals to India for commercial or for other purposes was put under similar regulations. Thus there was introduced a divided authority in matters of commerce, as there had previously been in politics. Henceforward it was enacted that the Company's accounts should be kept under the two separate heads of "territory" and "commerce." A general authority was given to government, through the Board of Control, over the appropriation of the territorial revenues and the surplus commercial profits which might remain after a strict observance of the appropriation clauses and the claims of the Company's creditors. From this time forward no governor-general, governor, or commander-in-chief was to be appointed by the Company without the approval of the crown; and no suspended or dismissed servant of the Company was to be restored without the consent of the Board of Control. The bounty of the Court of Directors was also restricted, it being laid down that in the bestowal of any sum exceeding 600*l.* the concurrence of the Board of Control was indispensable. Moreover the Board of Control was to hold and exercise control over the Company's college and seminary in England.*

At a very early period the Company had paid considerable attention to the establishing of schools and chapels in their factories, and to the means of diffusing the doctrines of the Christian faith among their native servants, and among other natives living in the neighbourhood of their settlements. There had been no want of chaplains or of missionaries, but the labours of the latter had not been attended with any great success, and the more cautious Anglo-Indians had shrunk from the risks attendant on a too energetic spirit of proselytizing. The Hindus, submissive in all but that, had always seemed ready to rush into insurrection at the slightest interference with their religious rites and ancient customs—customs and rites not more ancient than (in many cases) revolting and degrading to humanity. Partly through their own fault in attempting to translate the whole of the Scriptures into most difficult languages, with which they were most imperfectly

* The establishments at Haileybury and Addiscombe.

acquainted, and partly through the sense-striking, attractive, and splendid ritual of the Roman Catholic church, the success of the English missionaries, whether of the Established Church or Baptists, had been very inferior, at least in numerical amount, to that of the papist missionaries. And yet the most able and best member of the great Roman propaganda had been fain to confess, after residing forty years in India, that only the very worst of the natives he had converted remained steady to their new faith. Nevertheless it was now hoped that a regular and well appointed hierarchy, headed by prelates of the Anglican church of learning and virtue, might contribute to diffuse the Protestant religion among the natives; while the vast and constantly increasing numbers of Englishmen settled or serving in India seemed to demand more spiritual care than had hitherto been bestowed upon them. A Bishop of Calcutta, with diocesan authority over the whole of British India, and three archdeacons to superintend the chaplains of the presidencies and of all the settlements, were appointed. But it was not deemed prudent to enter fully into the wishes expressed in petitions presented to parliament from various parts of the kingdom, praying that provision might be made for the resort of missionaries, &c. to India. A few indiscreet missionaries spread over Hindustan might have jeopardized our empire, without doing any spiritual good to the natives. The first appointments to the Calcutta Bishopric were admirable, for the lawn has not often been worn by better men than Bishop Middleton and Reginald Heber. We do not know that the diffusion of our religion among Hindus, Mohammedans, or Parsees has been very materially accelerated; but we believe there is no doubt that the discipline of our church, and the general morals and devotion of the British subjects in India, have been improved by the ecclesiastical institutions provided for by the legislature in 1813. The obscene and bloody superstitions which disgrace Hindustan (speaking of merely mortal means) can be removed only by time, and slow and cautious measures; but it is consoling to reflect that some of the worst abominations have been at the least dwarfed and checked. Any sudden attempt at conversion, enforced by the British government in India, would have caused the country to be deluged with blood, without presenting any chance of spiritual or moral good.

As isolated beings, unconnected with government, the few Protestant missionaries in the country caused little or no alarm to the guardians of the Hindu religion, or to the professors of Mohammedanism; but if the legislature had complied with the wishes of some well-meaning and pious persons at home, and had suddenly thrown into India a great number of "Act-of-Parliament missionaries," to be protected by and connected with our Indian government, there can be no doubt but that a great alarm would have been immediately excited. But a respectable church establishment, with a suffragan bishop at the head of it, and with the clergy intrusted with the care and zealous in the superintendence of the public schools in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, might, without exciting any jealousy or alarm, silently and gradually effect a favourable change, not only in the religion and morality of the British subjects, but in those of the natives also. The establishment of the "Bishop's College" at Calcutta, by Dr. Middleton, the first Protestant bishop in India, was calculated to do infinite good; and since its improvement and enlargement by the accomplished Reginald Heber, our second bishop, great good, we believe, has been done by it. It has been well said that much may be expected from the institution of schools on a liberal plan for the benefit of the rising generation of the Hindus; and that to convey instruction, through the medium of the English language, in every branch of useful knowledge, and in the principles of religion and moral rectitude, will do more to open their minds to conversion, and to convince them of the monstrous absurdity of their own polytheism, than all the translations of the Scriptures and religious tracts which have been circulated among them. "A general knowledge of history or geography will at once disperse

that cloud of more than Egyptian darkness, which for so many ages has confined their view. . . . . When they cease to consider Mount Meru as twenty thousand miles high, and the world as a flower, of which India is the cup, and other countries the leaves, their minds may become more open to rational views on the subject of religion." *

* Quarterly Review, No. lxv.

CHAPTER XI

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.

THE Earl of Moira, afterwards Marquess of Hastings, succeeded Lord Minto as governor-general. As Lord Rawdon he had greatly distinguished himself in the war of American independence, more than 30 years before his Indian appointment. He had the reputation of being a brave soldier, and—if not throughout a consistent politician—a man of honest intentions, highminded, and of liberal views. He had greatly impaired a large fortune, the principal part of which he had obtained through his wife; but if, through the favour of the Prince Regent, he was sent to Bengal to restore his finances, he was not capable of any meanness, or even of an ordinary attention to his pecuniary interests, for, after a long and brilliant administration, he returned to Europe no richer than he was when he went to the East. With second and third rate men, holding inferior places, the case may have been different, but hardly any of our high functionaries in India have been sordid or selfish men.

His lordship was nominated on the 18th of November, 1812, and, arriving in India, Lord Minto resigned the government to him on the 4th of October, 1813. He was obliged to attend almost immediately to matters of war, for the Birmans, or Burmese, continued to trouble one of the frontiers of our empire, while the Nepaulese made encroachments on another, both being encouraged by the pacific system which had been imposed upon his lordship's immediate predecessors. The Birmans were brought to reason for the present; but the Nepaulese spurned negotiation, and were to be reduced only by force. The Gorkhas, who domineered over a great part of Nepaul, retained that passion for war and conquest to which they owed their recently established dominion, and by which they hoped to extend their empire in Hindustan. Their far extended frontier pressed everywhere upon the territories of the Company, or the territory of the Company's allies or dependents; and except in the neighbourhood of our military stations, it was found difficult or almost impossible to check the border forays of the Nepaulese or the quarrels that were constantly breaking out. In the month of May, 1814, while some negotiations were still pending, the Nepaulese treacherously attacked and murdered all the police-officers stationed in Bootwul. Lord Minto had been repeatedly told that he must conquer the Gorkhas and reduce the power of all Nepaul, or live in constant inquietude. The Earl of Moira determined to send armies to deal with these troublesome neighbours. He had been named commander-in-chief of the forces, as well as governor-general. Age had not chilled his lordship's military ardour. He quitted Calcutta in June, 1814, to make a tour of inspection in the western provinces, to concert measures for the campaign among the Himalaya mountains, and the great hills the offshoots of that chain, and to make defensive arrangements against the marauding Pindarrees, who were threatening our northern frontiers, and who were expected to make an attempt at invasion while our troops were engaged in the hills of Nepaul. The Nepaulese frontier was about 600 miles in length and for the most part very rugged; and the enemy had the command of all the passes of the forest, as well as the hills.* Lord Moira found

* History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823. By Henry T. Prinsep, of the Bengal Civil Service.

it exceedingly difficult to collect intelligence for the arrangement of his plan of operations, for few parts of the country had ever been examined by Europeans, and the Nepaulese were as jealous and vigilant as the Chinese, from whom most of their tribes originally descended. His lordship, however, resolved that his forces should act offensively along the whole line of the frontier, and break into the country from different points. For the whole plan of the campaign—which was clearly defective through want of local information—his lordship seems to be answerable. Major-General Marley, with the principal force, consisting of about 8000 men, was to march upon Catmandoo, the capital; Major-General Wood was to overrun all Bootwul, and to menace Pulpa; Major-General Gillespie was to seize the passes of the rivers Jumna and Ganges, in order to cut off the retreat of the enemy to the eastward; and Major-General Ochterlony, with the 4th corps, was to invade the western provinces of the Gorkhas. Some of the hill states which enjoyed English protection were to cooperate with the forces of the Company in order to expel the enemy from all their recent conquests between the Jumna and the Sutledge. The Gorkhas alone had at this time about 12,000 fighting men, dressed, armed, and disciplined in imitation of the Company's sepoys; and if this imitation was not very perfect, the men were robust, active, and courageous. The strength of the country was great, being skirted and intersected by lofty mountains, and abounding in excellent defensive positions.* As our forces advanced towards the frontiers, the Gorkha officers ordered that all the wells should be poisoned; but this is a threat which has often been used, and has never been carried extensively into practice. The Nepaulese mode of making stockades in excellent positions, and the stubbornness with which they defended them, proved more mischievous to the invaders. General Gillespie fought his way well into the country, but was killed on the 30th of October, 1814, in a too hasty assault on the fort of Kalunga. General Wood failed completely in his operations, and General Marley failed so miserably as to be taxed by the commander-in-chief with gross neglect and imbecility. The mistake common to all these commanders in the first Nepaul campaign appears to have been a too great contempt for these new and untried enemies. But the whole campaign must be considered as a war of experiment—as a war in a novel field, where almost everything was yet to learn. General Ochterlony, however, with his single division, gained brilliant successes in the western provinces of the Gorkhas, defeated the enemy in several battles, drove them into the fort of Maloun, and there forced them to capitulate. By these victories the countries between the Jumna and Sutledge were effectually cleared of the Gorkhas, to the great satisfaction of the Seiks, and of the hill chieftains who were allied with the Company. But the war was not yet terminated, though it had already lasted more than a year. Those who held authority at Catmandoo, the capital of Nepaul, consented to a treaty, then refused to ratify it, and then defied the English to another campaign in the heart of their own country.

The entire management of this second campaign in Nepaul, which commenced in February, 1816, was left to Major-General Ochterlony, who had so ably conducted all his part of the first campaign. Ochterlony had nearly 20,000 effective men, including three European regiments, his Majesty's 24th, 66th, and 87th. The British soldiers were better suited to a war among lofty and bleak mountains than were the sepoys from the hot plains of Hindustan. He divided his forces into four brigades, which were respectively commanded by Colonel Kelly, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, and Colonel Dick. Colonel Kelly was detached to the right, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol to the left; the other two brigades, guided by Ochterlony, moved straight through the forests to the foot of a pass, above which the Nepaulese were strongly posted behind their

* Walter Hamilton. Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, and of the Territories annexed to this Dominion by the House of Gorkha.

troublesome stockades. * These works were altogether unassailable in front; but, after four days' diligent search, Captain Pickersgill, of the quarter-master-general's department, found a route which turned the pass. In the darkness of night General Ochterlony in person led Miller's brigade through a deep and narrow chasm, and then over the brow of the first formidable barrier of hills. By seven o'clock on the following morning the heights to the west of the enemy's position were occupied without resistance. Nearly at the same time Colonel Dick's brigade, which had been left at the foot of the pass, moved up in front, close to the enemy's outer stockade; and in the course of the day found the triple fortification evacuated in consequence of the success of Ochterlony's operation for turning the position. Our troops were obliged to bivouac on the bleak mountain tops for four days, waiting the arrival of their supplies and tents, as no laden animal had been able to accompany them or to climb the hills which they had climbed. For the first two days the men suffered extreme privations, being for the most part without any food. But their gallant leader shared in their hardships, having no baggage, and sleeping under cover of a hut, hastily constructed for him by the men of the 87th, of boughs cut from the green trees.* By the 20th of February the supplies and tents were brought up, and the roads were prepared for a further advance. The enemy, vexed and disheartened at Ochterlony's unexpected discovery of the route across the first barrier of hills, continued to retreat from stockade to stockade, until they came to the town of Mukwanpoor, which stands on a hill, and which had both a fort and a stockade. On the 27th Ochterlony occupied a hill in front of Mukwanpoor, and within two miles of that town. The Gorkhas, who had committed a blunder in evacuating that position, endeavoured to recover the hill. In their first attack they drove in a weak outpost, and killed the commanding officer, Lieutenant Tirrell. A small village on the hill was, however, gallantly maintained after the fall of Tirrell by Lieutenant Kerr and Ensign Impey (a grandson of Sir Elijah Impey), who were both publicly thanked in general orders for this service.† Ochterlony threw forward the flank companies of the 87th and the 25th regiment of native infantry. On the other side, the Gorkhas poured forth two thousand men from their stockade in front of Mukwanpoor, and showed a determination to gain the village and recover all the ridge of the hill. The English general then threw forward four more companies of the 87th, and the second battalion of the 12th native infantry. Again, on the other hand, the Gorkhas reinforced their columns of attack. Ochterlony brought his guns to play along the ridge. The Gorkhas brought up some of their guns, and fired hotly on the camp and line, where Ochterlony and his staff were conspicuous objects. A menial servant of the general's, who was carrying his pen and ink, was killed by this fire; but, on the whole, it did remarkably little execution.‡ After a stern contest, the Nepaulese yielded to our superiority of artillery, and to a bayonet-charge made

* The Nepaulese stockaded all their posts.

"The strength of these stockades was originally greatly miscalculated: made of rough-hewn wood and stones, heaped together between an inner and outer palisade, they were in appearance so contemptible as to invite assault, without even seeming to require breaching. On the plains, much more formidable-looking places were constantly carried in that way; but appearances were deceitful, and the Gorkhas, having a just confidence in their defences, always stood boldly to them, and made the assailants pay dearly for their temerity. Our lighter artillery made little or no impression; and the difficulty of bringing up heavy guns rendered them, in truth, most formidable defences. The wood and materials for raising them were everywhere at hand, and the celerity with which they could be prepared in any position formed a main source of the strength of the country."—*Henry T. Prinsep, Esq.*, 'Hist. of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings.' In the first campaign, our losses before some of these stockades were terrible.

* Id., id.; E. Ind. Military Calendar.

† Id., id. Henry Raleigh Impey, the eldest son of the eldest son of Sir Elijah, fell a victim to the climate of Calcutta, the grave of many a his name, who have done the Honourable Company some service.

‡ Id., id.

by some of the British soldiers; and they fled beyond a deep hollow which separated the ridge from Mukwanpoor. There, however, and in a jungle, they maintained themselves for some hours, keeping up a hot fire of artillery across the hollow, which did little mischief, and an incessant fire of musketry from the jungle, which did a good deal. But towards sunset Ochterlony brought up a fresh sepoy battalion, and Major Nation, putting himself at the head of it, dashed across the hollow, charged with the bayonet, and captured the nearest of the guns. After this the Gorkhas retired behind their stockades or into their fort, leaving their dead and wounded behind them. Hitherto they had always shown the greatest devotion in carrying off their wounded. Their loss was very severe—they acknowledged themselves that it exceeded 800 men. Ochterlony's loss in killed and wounded rather exceeded 200; but Lieutenant Tirrell was the only officer slain. The day after the battle Colonel Nicol, who had been detached with his brigade to the left, joined Ochterlony, having succeeded in penetrating into the country by a pass near Ramnugur and by the winding valley of a river. Colonel Kelly, who had been detached with his brigade to his right, had also succeeded in finding a route which led him across the hills to the important fortress of Hurreehurpoor. As usual, this fort had a strong stockade in its front. But the Gorkhas committed the same mistake here which they had committed at Mukwanpoor, by abandoning an eminence at about 800 yards' distance from their stockade. This ridge was instantly seized by a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Halloran. The enemy sallied in full force to recover the ridge; and O'Halloran had to sustain an unequal fight from six in the morning until near the hour of noon. But when a strong reinforcement from Kelly's brigade came to the ridge of the hill with two 6-pounders and two howitzers mounted on elephants, the enemy fled back to their stockade. They left a considerable number of killed and wounded on the hill; and they made no further attempt to regain possession of it. On the side of the victors, only 4 Europeans and 4 natives were killed; and 5 English officers, 23 English soldiers, and 25 natives were wounded. Both the stockade and the fort of Hureehurpoor were evacuated in the course of the ensuing night. Colonel Kelly converted the fort into a depôt, and was preparing for a further advance when he received intelligence that the war was over.

The defeat at Mukwanpoor had carried consternation into the court of Catmandoo. The Nepaul Rajah put the red seal to the previous treaty, which he had refused to ratify, and sent an envoy to General Ochterlony's camp to notify that the treaty was ready for delivery. Other parties claimed to be partakers in the benefits of this peace, which, they protested, should, as far as they were concerned, be sacred and lasting. The Earl of Moira had very wisely instructed Ochterlony not to conclude a treaty until the enemy were sufficiently humbled to make it safe to rely on their sincerity; but for the rest he had given the general in the field full powers to use his own discretion, in accepting the terms of the former treaty, or in advancing further demands, according to circumstances and the state of the season. To humble the pride of these warlike tribes and to destroy their prestige in the eyes of the peoples and rulers of India, was more important than to make acquisitions of territory. General Ochterlony, however, determined to do both. He told the envoy that the Company must now retain all the territory in Nepaul which their troops occupied, including the valley of the Raptee, Hureehurpoor, &c.; that the Rajah must write a letter to the governor-general, to declare his submission to these demands; and finally, that he, the Gorkha negotiator, must present the ratified treaty on his knees at his (General Ochterlony's) durbar, in the presence of all the vakeels in camp. To all these conditions the court of Catmandoo was obliged to submit. The Gorkha negotiator knelt in the camp, Ochterlony signed the treaty; and then preparations were made for leaving a country which was becoming very unhealthy. Our army, however, did not quit the hills of Nepaul until two important forts were surrendered, as promised by

the treaty, to our ally the Rajah of Sikhim.* All the articles of the treaty were executed with rare punctuality. The Rajah of Nepaul bound himself never to disturb the Company's frontiers or the territories of any of its allies; never to advance any claim to the territories which had formerly been disputed or which were now ceded; never to retain in his service any British subject or the subject of any European or American state without the consent of the British government; to allow the permanent residence of an English minister at the court of Catmandoo, and to send accredited ministers of his own to reside at Calcutta. The governor-general, as a politic act of conciliation, restored some of the territory which had been conquered, after a straight and even frontier for the Company's dominions had been drawn and marked at certain distances with pillars of masonry, to prevent any future disputes.

One of the many curious circumstances attending this war in Nepaul was the chance of an English army coming in contact with an army of the Celestial empire. The Chinese, whose real dominions extended to the feet of the Himalaya, claimed a fictitious dominion over the whole of Nepaul; and their claim was so far admitted that the Nepaulese sent, every three years, some trifling tribute to Pekin. During our first campaign of 1814-15, the Nepaulese called upon the Emperor of China for assistance, declaring that the quarrel with the English had arisen in consequence of their having demanded to be put in possession of the passes through the mountains, in order that they might invade China. At first the Chinese gave no credit to this falsehood; but when they heard from their own officers commanding on the Himalaya frontier that the red coats were really advancing through Nepaul, they believed the Nepaulese story. It was accordingly determined by the court of Pekin that an invincible army and the most confidential and able of Mandarins should be sent into Nepaul. But from Pekin to the Himalaya is a very long march, and the Chinese are slow and procrastinating. The first campaign and the second were ended, the war was over, and the Rajah beaten and humbled before the army of the Celestials was heard of at Catmandoo. In the month of August, 1816, more than four months after the treaty had been signed and presented on bended knees in Ochterlony's tent, a Chinese force reached the Himalaya; and in the month of September the governor-general received through the Sikhim Rajah a very strange letter, in very strange Persian, from a Mandarin, whose name, as written in our characters, was Shee Cheeoon Chang, and who wished to know distinctly what were the views of the British government in that direction. It appears that the Mandarin's letter had very little of the Chinese arrogance in it, and that it confessed that the views of the British government had been grossly misrepresented by the Gorkhas. Nearly at the same moment that this curious letter was received by the governor-general, the Gorkhas applied to the English resident at Catmandoo, to know whether, in case the Chinese should invade their territories, they might depend on the co-operation of a British army in resisting them! The governor-general sent a statement of all that had occurred previously to the war in Nepaul, to Shee Cheeoon Chang, and ordered the resident at Catmandoo not to give any promise of co-operation or support, lest the Nepaulese should be thereby encouraged to seek a quarrel with the Chinese. The Mandarin professed himself satisfied with the governor-general's explanations; but he demanded from the court of Catmandoo that an embassy should be sent to him. Without English succour the Nepaulese would not brave the wrath of the Chinese; and therefore a mission was forthwith dispatched. Shee Cheeoon Chang treated these Nepaulese envoys very haughtily. He is said to have declared to them that they were a mischievous race, that they had caused the ruin of many rajahs, that they had provoked the English by murdering their police-officers, and that they had been justly punished. With respect to our invading China, by crossing Nepaul and

* Henry T. Prinsep.

the Himalaya, the Mandarin is reported to have said, "You wrote us that the English had demanded the passes into Coten-China; but we know this is false:—*if they desired to come to China, it would not be by that route.*"* It should appear that the Chinese army soon withdrew, under the apprehension that, if they invaded Nepaul, the English would be provoked to give them a rough meeting. The lesson which the Nepaulese had received from Ochterlony made a lasting impression, for they have never since disturbed our frontiers or given any trouble whatever. The able officer who had so well managed the second and last campaign was properly honoured and rewarded.† He was a man of genius, and not above learning what was useful even from a semi-barbarous enemy. If he had been a man of routine, or a formalist and pedant attached exclusively to one art of war, either he would never have threaded the passes and labyrinths of Nepaul, or he would have been sacrificed with his whole army long before reaching Mukwanpoor. But Ochterlony saw that the resource of stockades would be equally available to an invader; that it might be made to cover and secure every advance of the British, and be thus turned against the invaded; and that it placed the issue of the war in the power of continuance. He therefore adopted the Nepaulese system of stockading both in his first and second campaign, and to this he was principally indebted for his success. By this means the operations of our divisions which penetrated the hills were converted into a war of posts, and depôts and weak detachments were put in a position of security when the main divisions were far away.* He also attended sedulously to his commissariat, establishing and stockading good magazines of provisions as he advanced. If, at any time, he had been compelled to retreat, his troops would have found food and shelter provided for them in these fortified depôts.

The governor-general had found it very difficult to procure the funds necessary for this unusually long war in Nepaul. The treasury had been drained by the great expenses attending Lord Minto's armaments in the Archipelago, and by the demands made upon it by the Court of Directors. The increasing value of gold bullion in England had also made itself felt in India; and when 2*s.* 10*d.* could be procured for a sicca rupee, very few persons were disposed to let the government have them at 2*s.*, their ordinary value. Specie seemed to be disappearing in Bengal, and credit was sadly deranged. But the war in Nepaul must be prosecuted, remittances must be made to England, or disgrace or ruin must ensue. The crisis was far from being so bad now as then, yet the Earl of Moira acted much upon the same plan which Warren Hastings had pursued, in the first instance, in 1780, when the French and the Mysoreans were threatening the overthrow of our empire. He cast his eyes upon the nabob vizier of Oude, and determined to make his coffers contribute to the support of the Nepaul war and to the fast sinking credit of the Company. Saadut Ali was known to be fond of hoarding, and was believed to be very rich. It was represented to him that his territories had suffered as much as our own

* For further particulars relating to these very curious transactions we refer the reader to Mr. Prinsep's very interesting and accurate work. From the situation this gentleman held under the Marquess of Hastings's administration, he had ample means of obtaining the best information.

† He received the Order of the Bath, and was afterwards created a baronet. The East India Company voted a pension of 1000*l.* per annum to Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, Bart., and K.C.B., in acknowledgment of his splendid services in the Nepaulese war.

* Little advance was made in Nepaul until we adopted the plan of stockading posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limits of prompt succour. Had this plan been adopted at the beginning, several serious disasters would not have happened. "It was, however," adds Mr. Prinsep, "altogether a new thing to the Bengal army; for, from the earliest days, there had never been works thrown up for the defence of an outpost. . . . Sir David Ochterlony has the merit of having first resorted to this plan, and of having adopted it, too, as a resource of prudence which occurred to his own mind, not taught to him by the experience of disaster, as was the case with others."—*Hist. of Polit. and Mil. Transactions, &c.*

from the aggression of the Nepaulese, and that therefore it was but just that he should pay part of the expenses of the war; and that as he oppressed and impoverished his own subjects, in order to gratify his avarice, it was but fair that the British government, which had made him a ruler, should curb his abuse of power and step forward as the protectors of his people. It is quite clear that if the avaricious nabob vizier had lived, he must have emptied his coffers or have made other sacrifices; but he died at Lucknow on the 11th of July, 1814, as the governor-general was on his way from Calcutta to that city. Colonel Baillie, the resident in Oude, took it upon himself to procure the nomination to the musnud of the deceased nabob's eldest son Gazee-ud-Deen, who promised to give money and to submit to all the reforms which the governor-general might choose to dictate. Gazee was the more liberal in these promises, as his younger brother Shums-ul-Dowlah was a competitor for the musnud, and at the head of a party which had been created for him by his father the late nabob, who loved him better than he loved his eldest son. Gazee-ud-Deen, who must have known how Vizier Ali, when seated on the musnud, had been deposed to make room for his rival Saadut Ali; who could not be blind to the fact that the British governor-general was the real king or nabob-vizier maker; and who could not be insensible to the fear that his own rival might outbid him, came down to Cawnpoor to meet the Earl of Moira, who was going up in quest of money. The nabob and the earl met on the 11th of October, 1814. It should appear that Gazee-ud-Deen, by the assistance of the British at Lucknow, had secured some good part of his deceased father's hoards; for he at once offered a crore of rupees to the governor-general by way of loan. At a subsequent interview he offered his crore of rupees as a free gift to the Company.* His lordship declined accepting it as a gift, but took the money as a loan, and at a low rate of interest. After these interviews the competitor for the musnud, Shums-ul-Dowlah, was ordered to quit the country, a stipend being allotted for his support, to be paid by the Company out of the interest which would be due to the now confirmed nabob vizier on his liberal loan of the crore of rupees. The old Anglo-Indian writers whose books are before us do not seem anxious to intimate that Gazee-ud-Deen owed the musnud to his money and his prompt obedience; and yet few facts are clearer than this. We would not criticize the transaction too severely; but we would show what a nobleman, who piqued himself on his chivalry and high sense of honour, was capable of doing to procure money in a moment of crisis. But the money transactions with the new nabob of Oude were not yet concluded. Deceived as to the probable duration of the war in Nepaul, and straitened by the heavy expenses it caused, the governor-general in the very next year (1815) applied for another loan of a crore of rupees. This time Gazee-ud-Deen did not open his strong boxes quite so readily; but he was soon obliged to send the money. His younger brother and rival was living no farther off than at Benares, where Saadut Ali was residing when Sir John Shore bargained with him for bringing him to Lucknow and putting him on the throne instead of Vizier Ali, whose right had been recognised by Sir John a very short time before. But for these two crores of rupees, or more than 2,000,000*l.* sterling, the pride and power of the Nepaulese could not have been broken; and the disastrous issue of a war in the mountains might probably have been followed by insurrections and wars, and the defeat of the British in the plains of Hindustan; for other enemies were only waiting for a favourable moment to take the field; and our power in India can never be made independent of the opinion entertained of it by the natives. Let the charm be once broken, and exhibited in its fractured state for any length of time, and our empire must burst like a bubble.

At the successful termination of the Nepaul war it was found more convenient to transfer to the nabob vizier of Oude some of the territories which had

* A crore, or 10,000,000 of rupees, was worth rather more than 1,000,000*l.* sterling.

been ceded to us, than to continue to pay him the interest of the two crores of rupees. It is to be hoped that the governor-general and his advisers had some assurances that this ruler would not grind his people as his avaricious predecessor was said to have done.

In the course of the year 1816, when money was again wanted to put the frontiers of the Company in a good state of defence against the Pindarrees, and to provide for the contingency of a fresh war with the Mahrattas, the old Fyzabad Begum, whom Warren Hastings had squeezed so sorely, departed this life. Hastings's harshness had not cured her of her hoarding propensities: she died worth 56 lacs of rupees; and, as she could not take her beloved money with her, she bequeathed it to the Honourable Company, on the condition of its providing annuities for her friends and dependents equivalent to the interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum—then, for India, a very moderate rate.

During our war in Nepaul the people of Cutch had committed depredations in the territories of our allies the Peishwa and the Guicowar families. A small force under Colonel East took the field, and captured the fortress of Anjar in Cutch. The ruler of that lawless country agreed to give compensation for the damages to our allies, and to yield to the English the permanent possession of Anjar on condition of their assisting him to reduce some of his rebellious subjects. The Rao also engaged to prevent his subjects in future from crossing the Gulf of Runn for hostile objects, and from carrying on the practice of piracy, in which they were great adepts. All those lawless regions were to be thoroughly reformed; but the British at Anjar were solemnly bound not to outrage the religious feelings of those robbers by killing bullocks and eating beef. The inevitable course of events, or the natural course of expansion, was gradually yet quickly advancing the Company's frontier towards the mouths of the Indus. In the year 1800, when Surat was assumed, it was stated and believed that the Tuptee river on the Gulf of Cambay would be our ne plus ultra in this direction; but now, in 1816, we got beyond the Gulf of Cutch, and close upon the Runn of Cutch, by possessing ourselves of Anjar, which place was not much more than two geographical degrees from the Koree, or most southern mouth of the Indus.

The court of Poonah had been guilty of various infractions of the treaty of Bassein. The Peishwa had given his friendship and entire confidence to a menial servant named Trimbukjee, and had almost ceased to consult his own prime minister Munkaseir. Trimbukjee was a man of a violent character, and very hostile to the English, who had laboured hard to introduce order and law into the Peishwa's country. He committed sundry outrages on our ally the Guicowar, who dispatched an ambassador or vakeel named Gungadur the Shastry to Poonah to remonstrate with the Peishwa. The Peishwa referred the Shastry to Trimbukjee; and Trimbukjee treated the Guicowar vakeel so unhandsomely that the latter resolved to return to Baroda, his master's capital, and leave the points in dispute to the arbitration of the British government. But when this intention was made known, Bajee Rao (the Peishwa) and Trimbukjee changed their tone. The Peishwa talked of giving one of his daughters in marriage to the Shastry's son, and invited that vakeel to accompany him and Trimbukjee on a pilgrimage to some famous Hindu shrines. The Shastry, suspecting no evil, accepted the invitation, and was prevailed upon to leave most of his attendants behind him at Poonah. The poor man was basely and most foully murdered by assassins employed by his host, at Punderpoor, in the month of July, 1815. He had been to an entertainment provided for the Peishwa, and had returned to his lodging with a fever upon him. Trimbukjee sent lovingly to invite him to come forth, and visit with him the famous temple of Vishnu, or Wittoba, which gave to Punderpoor its character of a holy city. The attendants said that the ambassador was sick; but the Shastry yielded to the importunities of the Peishwa's favourite, and came forth, sick as he was, and proceeded to the shrine, which is said not to have been made by mortal hands, but to have fallen from heaven.

Chieftains of Cutch.

The Guicowar's envoy and the Peishwa's favourite prayed together in the temple, swept its sanctified floor with holy brooms, and conversed together about religion and friendship. But as Gungadur the Shastry was returning from the temple, he was attacked by a band of assassins, who literally cut him to pieces. The Shastry's people had to search for "the bits of his body." He was a Brahmin of the very highest caste, and of great reputation for sanctity and learning.* Bad as they were, the Mahrattas had a detestation of assassination; and the crime in the present case was the more horrible in their eyes from the character of the victim and the holiness of the place—the holiest part of a holy city, where myriads of pilgrims were collected—the precincts of the sacred temple, wherein the solemnities of religion were at that moment in full progress. The Mahrattas and all the Hindus predicted that the vengeance of their gods would fall upon Trimbukjee and the assassins he had employed, and that the Peishwa would date his ruin from this atrocious deed. The favourite declared that he was so busy sweeping the temple that he knew nothing about the matter; but his armed bravos were seen both to issue from the temple and to return to it while he was there; and none doubted his guilt. As soon as these horrible circumstances came to the knowledge of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, our resident at Poonah, he insisted that Trimbukjee should be given up; and as the general voice of the Mahratta people backed the demand, the Peishwa, Bajee Rao, found himself under the necessity of yielding. Trimbukjee was arrested, and thrown into the strong fortress of Tanna, on the island of Salsette, not far from Bombay. But his imprisonment was not of long duration. A common-looking Mahratta groom, with a good character in his hand, came to offer his services to the English commandant of the fort. He was accepted. The stable where he had to attend his horse was close under the window of Trimbukjee's prison. He was observed to pay more than usual attention to his steed, and to have a habit, while currying and cleaning him, of singing snatches of Mahratta songs. At length, in December, 1816, Trimbukjee disappeared from his dungeon, and both horse and groom from the stable. And now it was recollected that the groom's singing had been made up of verses something like the following:—

"Behind the bush the bowmen hide,
The horse beneath the tree;
Where shall I find a Knight will ride
The jungle paths with me?

There are five-and-fifty coursers there,
And four-and fifty men;
When the fifty-fifth shall mount his steed,
The Deckan thrives again!"*

It was believed that Trimbukjee fled straight to his infatuated master the Peishwa, who concealed him, and solemnly declared to the English resident that he knew nothing about him. The murderer's love for the English had not been increased by the captivity he had suffered; and, wherever he might be, it appeared very certain that he urged the Peishwa to throw the whole treaty of Bassein to the winds, to form a new Mahratta league, and to make war upon the Company.

In the meanwhile our Indian armies were drawn into the field by a more contemptible enemy.

* He was called the Shastry on account of his familiarity with the Shasters, or sacred Sanscrit books.

* Bishop Heber, Indian Journal. "This," adds the Bishop, "might have been a stratagem of the Scottish border,—so complete a similarity of character and incident does a resemblance of habit and circumstance produce among mankind."

CHAPTER XII.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS CONTINUED.

THE Pindarrees were not a distinctive race, but a numerous class of men of different races, religions, and habits, gradually associating and assimilated by a common pursuit. They were all horsemen and all robbers. They were something like the first Mahrattas in their habits of life and warfare, but unlike them in not being united by nationality and one religious faith; in not having the legitimate and permanent motives of attachment to a native soil, and resentment against the intolerant and oppressive rule of the Mohammedan conquerors of India. The Pindarrees have also been compared with the Tartars; but when the Tartar tribes came to a rich and fertile country, they would settle and repose, and give over war and plunder to take up the occupation of herdsmen and shepherds. Not so the Pindarrees. "Like swarms of locusts, acting from instinct, they destroyed and left waste whatever province they visited. Their chiefs had, from grants or by usurpation, obtained small territorial possessions; but the revenues of their land were never equal to the maintenance of one-tenth part of their numbers, and they could, therefore, only be supported by plunder." Their name first occurs in Indian history about the end of the seventeenth century. From obscure freebooters, they rose into sufficient consequence to be deemed useful auxiliaries by the different Mahratta powers, whose desultory mode of warfare was suited to their own habits. From their preceding or accompanying Mahratta armies, the Pindarrees became occasionally confounded with the Mahrattas, though they were always considered by the latter as essentially distinct, and so immeasurably inferior as not to be allowed to eat with them or even to be seated in their presence. Occasionally the Mahratta rulers purchased their aid by grants of land or by a tacit admission of their right to possess tracts which they had already usurped. But the more usual price paid for their assistance was the privilege of plundering, even beyond the ordinary licence given to a Mahratta army.* At times some of their durras acted for one Mahratta chief, and some on the opposite side for another Mahratta chief; and it occasionally happened that all the durras leagued themselves against the whole Mahratta confederacy, plundering the territories of the Peishwa, Scindiah, the Nagpoor Rajah, &c. indiscriminately. As the Pindarree chiefs acquired reputation, their claims to the services of their adherents became hereditary, and were transmitted to their descendants. Gangs and tribes were cemented in federal union, and common motives of action led to the establishment of a community of interest throughout the whole of this community of robbers. The very looseness of the composition of their union was favourable to its increase, as it admitted all castes and all faiths, and offered a ready refuge to poverty, indolence, and crime—to all that was floating and unattached in the frequently revolutionized communities of Central India. What their numbers were could at no time be correctly estimated: they varied with circumstances, being thinned by failure and swelled by success. "It is also to be observed," adds Sir John Malcolm, "that the Pindarrees were fed and nourished by the very miseries they created; for, as their predatory invasions

* Sir John Malcolm, Memoir of Central India. MacFarlane, Lives and Exploits of Banditti and Robbers.

extended, property became insecure, and those who were ruined by their depredations were afterwards compelled to have recourse to a life of violence, as the only means of subsistence left them. They joined the stream which they could not withstand, and endeavoured to redeem their own losses by the plunder of others." The strategy of these overgrown bodies of banditti will show at once how difficult it was either to suppress them or intercept them. "When they set out on an expedition, they placed themselves under the guidance of one or more chosen leaders, called Lubburiahs, who were selected on account of their knowledge of the country that it was meant to plunder. The Pindarrees were encumbered neither with tents nor baggage; each horseman carried a few cakes of bread for his own subsistence, and some feeds of grain for his horse. The party, which usually consisted of two or three thousand good horse, with a proportion of mounted followers, advanced at the rapid rate of forty or fifty miles a day, turning neither to the right nor left till they arrived at their place of destination. They then divided and made a sweep of all the cattle and property they could find, committing at the same time the most horrid atrocities and destroying what they could not carry away. They trusted to the secrecy and suddenness of the irruption for avoiding those who guarded the frontiers of the countries they invaded; and before a force could be brought against them, they were on their return. Their chief strength lay in their being intangible. If pursued, they made marches of extraordinary length (sometimes upwards of sixty miles), by roads almost impracticable for regular troops. If overtaken, they dispersed, and reassembled at an appointed rendezvous; if followed to the country from which they issued, they broke into small parties."*

Their horses must have been of a good breed, and hard of hoof (they were mostly bred in the mountains of Upper India), for they were fleet, capable of sustaining excessive work, and were never or very rarely shod. There was thief-logic for the last custom, as horseshoes are liable to be broken and to be cast; and this obliges the horseman to pull up and lose time, and even to be dependent upon the services of a farrier, which could not have suited Pindarrees flying for their lives before British dragoons. A Pindarree prisoner, when questioned by an English officer why they did not shoe their horses, replied, with a slight elevation of the nostril, "Do you think I would trust my life to a bit of iron?" *

"Their wealth, their booty, and their families were scattered over a wide region, in which they found protection amid the mountains and in the fastnesses belonging to themselves or to those with whom they were either openly or secretly connected; but nowhere did they present any point of attack; and the defeat of a party, the destruction of one of their cantonments, or the temporary occupation of some of their strongholds, produced no effect beyond the ruin of an individual freebooter, whose place was instantly supplied by another, generally of more desperate fortune, and therefore more eager for enterprise."† They never fought when they could run away: they considered it wisdom to plunder and fly, but folly to stay and fight. Even when acting with the Mahrattas as auxiliaries, their object was plunder, not war. They went before, indeed, but it was only by surprise or in defenceless provinces; they were, from their very origin, the scavengers of the Mahrattas; and though in the van, they had little more pretension to martial conduct or valour than had the birds and beasts of prey that followed in their and their allies' rear. Some of their chiefs, however, united to the qualities so essential to their profession,—activity, cunning, ready enterprise, presence of mind, and promptitude of resources,—a wonderful strength of mind (or it might be apathy) in bearing the reverses of fortune and the privations of their lot. Foremost among these chiefs was Cheetoo. This man first attracted the attention of the English towards the end of 1806, when, raising

* Sir John Malcolm, Memoir of Central India.

* MS. Notes by Colonel S—— (now General S——), of the East India Company's service.

† Sir John Malcolm.

himself on the temporary ruin of Kureem, another Pindarree chief, who had incurred the displeasure of one of the Mahratta potentates, and had been inveigled and made prisoner, he united the durras or bands of many other leaders under his own standard, and prepared to commit depredations on an unprecedentedly grand scale. Numerous and profitable to himself, and altogether ruinous to the inhabitants of many wide districts of Hindustan, were the expeditions undertaken by Cheetoo on his own account. But in 1811 the captive Pindarree, Kureem, purchasing his liberty from the Mahrattas, returned to the scenes of his former power, and soon obtained his former supremacy. To make up for lost time, and to restore his reputation among the robbers, Kureem laid his plans to effect a general combination of all the Pindarree bands for a predatory expedition more extensive than any that had hitherto been made. Cheetoo was obliged to follow the example of the majority of his fellow-chiefs; and at the great gathering of 1811 his durra made part of 25,000 cavalry of all descriptions, that were ready, under the command of Kureem, to march against and plunder the city of Nagpoor, the large and populous capital of the Boonsla Mahrattas. But Cheetoo, who continued to hate Kureem as a rival, plotted against him, sold himself to his enemies, and went over to them with all his durra. Not long after this he entirely ruined Kureem, and obliged him to flee with his diminished adherents to a distant country. Cheetoo again shone forth on his rival's eclipse, and at his cantonment near Nemawur, in the province of Malwa, on the north bank of the Nerbudda, no fewer than 15,000 horse annually assembled to issue forth to plunder. The power of these Pindarree freebooters had a notable increase during the prevalence of our neutrality and pacific system, as our governors-general would neither pursue them beyond our own frontiers nor take the field in any force, lest offence should be given to the Mahrattas and to some other native powers, who were by turns foes and friends to the robbers. As the territories of the Company and those of its protected allies offered the richest booty, the eyes of the Pindarrees were always bent in that direction. This imposed the necessity of constant vigilance along the whole extent of the south-west frontier of the Bengal presidency: while, for the security of the Deccan, the subsidiary forces of the Nizam and Peishwa were annually obliged to move to the frontiers of their respective territories; and notwithstanding all these precautions, those states were constantly penetrated and overrun by the marauders.*

As soon as the Earl of Moira assumed the government of India, he turned his attention to this subject, and resolved that the Pindarrees should no longer be encouraged by the impunity they had enjoyed under his predecessors. His lordship thought it better, even for humanity, to risk a long and sanguinary war than to leave the people of India exposed to these terrible irruptions, which came as regularly, year after year, as the tempests of the monsoon. In 1814 the supreme government made strong representations to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, and requested their sanction to a systematic combination of measures for the suppression of the evil. Before any answers could be received to these representations, the governor-general went to the upper provinces to plan and make preparations for the first campaign against the Nepaulese. During that campaign his lordship kept a body of troops detached to watch the Pindarrees. He also endeavoured, as his immediate predecessor, Lord Minto had done, to establish a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of the Boonsla Mahrattas, whereby the whole of our most exposed frontier, or the line from Bundelcund to Cuttack, might be covered and defended. But the Rajah Ragojee Boonsla persisted in rejecting the English alliance, although he knew that Kureem had threatened to plunder Nagpoor, his capital, and that parts of his dominions were annually devastated by the robbers. Other attempts made by his lordship to extend a chain of positions which should cover the frontiers

* Henry T. Prinsep, Esq. Hist. of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings.

of the allies of the Company, by means of establishing a friendly connexion with the states of Bopaul and Sacur, were not more successful, the truth being that the felon and murderer Trimbukjee had more influence than the governor-general in these native courts, and that Ragojee Boonsla was privy to a covert design of forming a general combination of the Mahratta and other powers against the English and their allies. Nothing therefore was left to his lordship but to trust to his own detachments, and to his inner or secondary lines of defence, while the main body of his army was engaged in the mountain-passes and forests of Nepaul.

The reverses and losses sustained in the first campaign in Nepaul encouraged the Pindarrees, and the success of these freebooters must go to injure the resources of the Company and its allies, and give encouragement to the leaders of the hostile Mahratta confederacy. In October, 1815, when our main army was fully occupied in forcing the stockades of the Gorkhas, Cheetoo crossed the Nerbudda with nearly 8000 of his Pindarrees. On the southern side of the river they broke into two parties and took opposite routes. Major Fraser, with 300 sepoys and 100 irregular native horse, surprised one of the parties in a bivouac, and made them suffer some loss before they could mount, gallop off, and disperse. But this did not deter them from continuing their depredations as far as the black river, the Krishna or Kistna. The other party, which had met with no such molestation, traversed the whole of the territory of our ally the Nizam of the Deccan, from north to south, and also appeared on the banks of the Kistna. The territories of our Madras presidency lay on the other side of the river, and were saved from devastation only by the fortuitous circumstance of the river's continuing not fordable so unusually late in the season as the 20th of November. "Finding the Kistna impassable, the freebooters took a turn eastward, plundering the country for several miles along its populous and fertile banks, and committing every kind of enormity. On approaching the frontier of Masulipatam, they shaped their course northward, and returned along the line of the Godavouree (Godavery) and Wurda, passing to the east of all Colonel Doveton's positions, and making good their route to Nemawur (Cheetoo's head-quarters) with an immense booty collected in the Nizam's dominions, and with utter impunity."* It is said that the plunder obtained in this lubbur, or raid, was greater than that of any previous expedition; and that merchants were sent for from the rich city of Oojein, the capital of the Scindiah Mahratta, to come and purchase the valuables in a camp auction at Nemawur. Not Dhoondiah Waugh, that sublime thief who had claimed sovereignty over both worlds, had ever done more mischief to the inhabitants of this world. Elated by his success, Cheetoo planned and proclaimed a second lubbur immediately upon the return of the first. The Pindarrees again flocked in from every side to join in it; and by the 5th of February, 1816, 10,000 horsemen had again crossed the Nerbudda from Nemawur. This time the Company's territories did not escape. On the 10th of March, leaving plundered and burning villages in their rear, the Pindarrees appeared on the western frontier of the district of Masulipatam, under the Madras presidency. From this point they pressed southward. On the 11th they made a march of thirty-three miles, plundered seventy-two villages, and committed the most horrid cruelties upon the inoffensive and helpless villagers. On the next day they destroyed fifty-four villages, marched thirty-eight miles, and arrived at the civil station of Guntoor. Here they plundered a considerable part of the town, and the houses of all the civil officers; but, steady to their system of never risking life or limb in battle, they shrunk from the collector's office, where the government treasure and the persons of the British residents were protected by a handful of sepoys and invalids. The robbers went off as they came, suddenly and noiselessly. That night there was not one of them to be seen in the neighbourhood, and before the next day closed

* H. T. Prinsep.

they were more than fifty miles from Guntoor, looking westward for more defenceless villages. They swept through the Kirpah or Cuddapah district, and, after being twelve days within the Company's frontier, they recrossed the Kistna. Many were spurring after them, but none could catch them. A squadron of native cavalry belonging to the Madras establishment reached the opposite bank of the Kistna just after they had made good their passage. Farther to the west there were numerous detachments of the Company's troops scouring the country in all directions, yet the plunderers escaped without the least brush. Shortly after recrossing the Kistna the marauders broke up into separate bodies. The greater part moved along the north bank of the Kistna, passing south of Hyderabad, until they approached the Peishwa's dominions. Then, turning short to the north, they retraced their steps to the Nerbudda in several divisions and by various routes. Colonel Doveton came close up with one of the divisions as it was passing a ghaut, but still the robbers escaped untouched. Another and a larger body was equally fortunate in escaping from the colonel, who had obtained from a Pindarree prisoner a clue to its movements, and who had made sure of cutting it up. It was soon afterwards ascertained that nearly the whole of these Pindarrees who had passed the Nerbudda on the 5th of February had recrossed it before the 17th of May, bringing a second immense harvest of booty to Nemawur within the year. It was ascertained by a commission appointed for the express purpose of the investigation, that, during the twelve days the ferocious banditti remained within the Company's frontiers, three hundred and thirty-nine villages had been plundered, one hundred and eighty-two individuals* put to a cruel death, five hundred and five severely wounded, and no less than three thousand six hundred and three subjected to different kinds of torture.*

The governor-general obtained certain information that the Peishwa, Scindiah, and other Mahratta potentates were in close and friendly correspondence with the robbers, and that Mahratta agents had visited Cheetoo's cantonment at Nemawur just before the last raid was undertaken; and there was every ground for believing that the new Mahratta confederacy contemplated an invasion of our territories while our main army was engaged in Nepaul, and the rest of our troops in the field occupied in an exhausting and useless pursuit of the Pindarrees. His lordship, who saw the Nepaul war brought to an honourable and advantageous conclusion, at the very moment when both the Mahrattas and the Pindarrees were confidently calculating on its duration, was most eager to employ the unreduced strength of his armies in the accomplishment of the important object of securing the peace of Central India by the extirpation of the robbers. He had written for the sanction of the home authorities, and had made a second and stronger representation of the horrors to which the country was exposed; but the sanction he required before commencing operations on a grand scale had not yet arrived. A large part of the Bengal army was, however, kept in advanced cantonments ready to take the field at any moment; and the interests of the Company were greatly served by the death of two of our enemies. The Nabob of Bopaul, and Ragojee Boonsla, the Rajah of Nagpoor, both died in the month of March, 1816. The Bopaul ruler was succeeded by his son Nuzur Mohammed, a very young man, whose claims were disputed by several competitors, and whose dominions were threatened by the Mahrattas and by the Pindarrees. Ragojee Boonsla's

* A great number of women destroyed themselves to escape violation. No less than twenty-five drowned themselves, several with infants. At Mavolee, where some resistance was attempted by the villagers, the women, seeing their protectors about to be overpowered, set fire to the house in which they had assembled to abide the result; and no less than ten, with six children, perished in the flames. Another woman, having fallen into the hands of the savages, and seeing no other means of destruction, tore out her tongue, and instantly expired! Many similar horrors, and some barbarities even more revolting to humanity, will be found recorded at length in the Report of the Committee.—*H. T. Prinsep.*

* Id. Hist. of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings.

successor was his only son, Pursajee Boonsla; and in Nagpoor, as in Bopaul, there were rivals and pretenders, as also the fear both of Mahratta and Pindarree invasion. It was ever thus in these ill-organized states: the death of an old and experienced ruler was always the signal for civil war, plots, and invasions; and the succession of a young prince, however clear his right might be, was invariably disputed. Pursajee Boonsla was sensible of his danger and of the advantages which might be derived from a treaty with the Company; and, under these impressions, he courted an alliance which his father had constantly rejected. The young Nabob of Bopaul also courted the Company's alliance, as the only means of supporting his shaking musnud. Negotiations were opened at Nagpoor, but with regard to Bopaul the governor-general instructed his agents to refrain from giving any encouragement to the overtures of the Nabob. While the negotiations were going on at the court of Nagpoor, the new rajah Pursajee fell sick and became crazed. Blind, paralytic, and mad, it was impossible that the rajah should be allowed to govern. The next heir to the musnud was Apa Saheb, cousin to Pursajee. But his appointment to the regency or his elevation to the musnud was opposed by another member of the family. Both of these parties applied to the English resident for assistance. As Apa Saheb was thought to unite with the better right a better reputation and a more decided leaning towards the interests of the Company, the governor-general resolved to support him; and the division of Colonel Doveton was placed at the disposal of Mr. Jenkins, the resident at Nagpoor, in case Apa Saheb should require immediate military aid. The rival party formed a connexion with some of the fierce Patan tribes; but before these bands could move Apa Saheb was secured in the government. He contented himself with the powers of a regent, and left the honours of the musnud to his unfortunate cousin, who is said to have approved his appointment as Naïb-ul-Moktar, or deputy, with full powers. The English gentlemen at Nagpoor were present at the ceremony of the regent's installation; and Mr. Jenkins was the first to congratulate him after the ceremony. In other words, Apa Saheb would never have been regent at all, or he would have attained to the dignity by means of a sanguinary struggle, if Mr. Jenkins and Colonel Doveton had not been ordered to declare for him. Though impeded through obstacles raised in his way by some of the ministers of the deceased rajah, who predicted that a subsidiary treaty with the Company would lead to the loss of independence, the regent very soon concluded the treaty which the governor-general proposed to him. The Company was to send into Nagpoor a subsidiary force of six battalions and a regiment of cavalry; and Apa Saheb was to pay seven and a half lacs of rupees per annum for the maintenance of these troops. The regent also engaged to keep on foot a contingent force of his own, of 3000 horse and 2000 foot, and to allow this force to co-operate with the English in checking or putting down the Pindarrees. By these negotiations, the Earl of Moira obtained what he had so earnestly desired, namely, the means of covering and defending our most exposed frontier, or the line from Bundelcund to Cuttack. And, simultaneously with these negotiations, others were carried on with the Rajah of Jypoor, whose alliance had been so unwisely (and not without dishonour) thrown up by Sir George Barlow in 1806, during the reign of our pacific, non-interference system. What Lord Lake and Colonel J. Malcolm had predicted from the arrangements made at that time, had fully come to pass. Jypoor had been desolated by the constant attacks of the Mahrattas and Patans, and our reputation had been tarnished by the sufferings of an old and faithful ally, whom we had been bound by the Marquess of Wellesley's treaties to maintain and protect. This state of things was allowed to last rather more than seven years; but at the end of 1813 the secret committee of the Court of Directors sent out orders to the governor-general to place Jypoor under British protection. It was, however, felt that this step would involve us in an immediate war with the Mahrattas, while the Nepaul war was as yet unfinished, and while the Pindarrees seemed to de-

mand a great share of our attention; and, being apparently ignorant of the league or concert already existing between the Mahrattas and the Pindarrees, hoping that if we gave the Mahrattas no offence by interfering in the affairs of Jypoor, they would leave us undisturbed to deal with the Pindarrees, the secret committee in the following year instructed the governor-general to suspend the renewal of our connexion with the Jypoor Rajah. The poor rajah was thus abandoned for many months longer to the tender mercies of the savage Patans and scarcely less cruel Mahrattas. At the end of 1815, in an extremity of misery and woe, he called upon the governor-general, imploring to be received under the wing of protection. Contrary to the decided opinion of some of the members of the supreme council, the governor-general resolved to carry into immediate execution the suspended orders, and to extend the protection of British arms to Jypoor. His lordship thought that this would aid his great plan for suppressing the Pindarrees, and that the measure, apart from any general plan of operations, was good in itself, as it would cripple the resources of one of the predatory powers (the Patans), and save a fine territory from ruin and devastation.* No doubt his lordship also conceived that it was high time to remove the foul blot which had fallen upon our national reputation. Accordingly a subsidiary treaty was offered to the rajah of Jypoor, whose capital was actually besieged by Meer Khan and the Patans. As long as the siege lasted, the rajah seemed eager to comply with every article of the proposed treaty, and with every requisition made by Mr. Metcalfe, the resident at Delhi, to whom the negotiation was principally confided; but when the siege was raised, when the Patans were bought off by a large sum of money, the rajah listened to the counsels of some of his proud Rajpoot chiefs, who were opposed to the English connexion as destructive of the independence of their country and of their own feudal-like power (a power in virtue of which they often made war upon one another or engaged in hostilities with their neighbours), and his vakeels at Delhi raised so many doubts and difficulties about the treaty, that Mr. Metcalfe dismissed them, and broke off the negotiation. But a loud murmur was raised by the suffering people of Jypoor, and by some of the nobles, who preferred peace and security under British protection to a tumultuary and uncertain independence; and the rajah's ministers and advisers found themselves under the necessity of sending their vakeels back to Delhi to solicit a renewal of negotiations. The vakeels, however, advanced several propositions which could not be acceded to: they asked for large pensions for themselves, and for English assistance to enable the rajah to make conquests over some of his neighbours. Mr. Metcalfe dismissed the vakeels with some indignation; and the troops which had been collecting to march to the support of the rajah, were ordered to proceed to the Nerbudda in order to be employed in the campaign against the Pindarrees. The plan of this campaign was now completed, the governor-general having received the sanction of the home authorities to his scheme for breaking up the confederacy and power of those banditti. To overawe the Mahrattas, and to cover the frontier of our allies, nearly 40,000 foot and 12,000 horse, besides artillery and the contingents of the native powers, were collected in positions near Scindiah's and Holkar's dominions, and were kept in a state of readiness to put down any attempt that might be made to obstruct the execution of the salutary plan.

By the end of October, 1816, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker took up a defensive line on the southern bank of the Nerbudda, with the main body of the subsidiary force which the Company had sent into Nagpoor. This defensive line, being nearly one hundred and fifty miles in length, was loose and weak; but the first appearance of a British army in the valley of the Nerbudda spread consternation amongst the robbers, and induced Cheetoo to prepare to quit the northern bank of that river and cross the mountains into Malwa. Perceiving, however, that the red coats did not cross the Nerbudda, the Pindarrees recovered confidence; and

* H. T. Prinsep.

on the 4th of November they resolved to push small parties between Colonel Walker's posts, and round his flanks; and a party crossed the river, and then dividing into two, took different directions. Colonel Walker, in attempting to intercept one of the divisions, unexpectedly fell upon the other as it was bivouacking in a jungle; he inflicted some loss; but the nimble robbers were soon in the saddle, and before long they had recrossed the river. On the 13th of November all the durras were in motion. Cheetoo had discovered that Walker's cavalry was all on his left flank, and he therefore threw forward more than five thousand of his well-mounted thieves to turn Walker's right flank. This band, which appears to have been followed by others, crossed the river in sight of the infantry post on the extreme right of our line, and then dashed on with a rapidity which left our infantry no chance of stopping or harassing their march. When collected on the southern side of the Nerbudda, the Pindarrees separated into two great bodies. One swept due east, through forests and over mountains, and fell unexpectedly upon the Company's district of Ganjam, the northernmost frontier of the five Circars, with the evident intention of proceeding to Cuttack and Juggernauth, to plunder the rich stronghold of Hindu superstition, to carry off the idols and the votive offerings and rich donations of the pilgrims and devotees. But this lubbur was met by a small body of the Company's troops almost as soon as it entered Ganjam, and was driven back with considerable loss. The other lubbur, which had gone off to the southward, rushed into the Nizam's territory before Colonel Doveton could come up with it. It then marched leisurely along, plundering and destroying, until it came near to the town of Beeder, the capital of a province of the Deccan, and about 73 miles north-west from Hyderabad. Here it came to a halt, and its chiefs to a disagreement as to the further course which ought to be pursued. While the leaders were in this state of indecision, Major Macdowall, who had been detached from Hyderabad, fell upon the lubbur by night with the van party of his light troops, and cut it up completely, although it was six thousand strong, and the first attack made by a mere handful of light cavalry. The robbers abandoned most of their horses and the greater part of their booty, dispersed themselves over the country, and thought of nothing but their personal safety, and of the means of returning to the northern side of the Nerbudda. But one leader, named Sheik Dulloo, indignant at the want of energy and concert betrayed by those who had the chief command, had abandoned this lubbur altogether a few days before Macdowall's exploit, and had gone off with from three to five hundred Pindarrees to act for himself. He dashed across the Peishwa's territory, descended into the Konkan, and thence shaped his course due north, plundering the western shores of India, from the 17th to the 21st degree of north latitude, and returning by the valley of the Taptee, and the route of Boorhanpoor, the capital of the Candeish province of the Deccan. This was the only lubbur that met with any success this season. The only loss it sustained from British troops was on its return to the Nerbudda, in the following March. Here Sheik Dulloo and his people were within a few miles of home, or of Cheetoo's cantonment; but they found the ford by which they had hoped to cross the river guarded by a redoubt occupied by a small party of our sepoys. Several of the robbers were shot in attempting to dash across; but the sheik himself, with his main body and best-mounted followers, retiring from the ford, boldly swam the river lower down, though not without a further loss of men and horses. Those who had worse horses or less courage dispersed, and fled into the jungle on the English side of the Nerbudda, where the greater part of them were cut off by the wild inhabitants of the country. By the various accidents of flood and fire more than one half of those who had followed Sheik Dulloo perished; but the rest reached Cheetoo's durra with a rich booty in their saddles.* The sheik's fame waxed great: his daring lubbur and his marvellous return became the

* H. T. Prinsep.

admired theme of the whole Pindarree world.

Two or three other lubbars had contrived to cross the Nerbudda by passing between the distant posts of Colonel Walker's line, or by turning that line; but they met with nothing except hard blows and disappointment. One of them was cut to pieces by the 4th Madras native cavalry, led on by Major Lushington. Making a forced march of more than 50 miles, the greater part by night, Lushington surprised the Pindarrees as they were cooking and eating, and presently strewed the field with some seven or eight hundred of their dead bodies. As the ground was open, the Madras cavalry pursued with good effect. The Ganjam lubbur was almost annihilated on its rapid return homeward; and as the different ghauts and fords by which they must pass in order to get to the north bank of the Nerbudda were by degrees all guarded, very few of the remnants of the other shattered lubbars ever reached their homes. Hosts of them were cut off by our sepoys, and by the people whom they had plundered in their advance. They had been continually fleeing before a handful of men, and had been beaten every time they had been met with.* Still, however, their depredations during this campaign or season of 1816-17 had embraced a more ample expanse of territory than had ever before been attempted, extending from shore to shore of the peninsula of India, and including all the intermediate provinces they had omitted the preceding year.

By this time it was very completely demonstrated that stationary posts of defence could not prevent the Pindarrees from crossing the Nerbudda and getting into our territories; and that it would not be possible to deal properly with those plunderers and murderers, unless our troops advanced into the country north of the Nerbudda, to the "procreant cradle" of the infamous race. The Marquess of Hastings (the patent conferring this new title was dated on the 7th of December, 1816) resolved to defer no longer the full execution of his plan, but to throw his armies across the Nerbudda, although he had not yet received instructions from home to this effect. But the year 1816 was now near its close, and various events occurred which prevented our troops crossing the Nerbudda until the autumn of the following year. Troubles, excited or encouraged by the Mahrattas, broke out in the Company's district of the Doab and in Rohilcund. In the province of Agra, Dyaram Thakoor and Bulwunt Sing, having obtained possession of some strong forts and castles, began to levy contributions on the Company's subjects, and to interrupt the trade of the upper provinces. Robbers and cut-throats were repairing to their free-booting banners from all the neighbouring districts; and the laws were openly set at defiance nearly everywhere between Agra and Delhi. At the close of 1816 measures were taken to put an end to this anarchy, and to reduce the two zemindars to their proper condition of subjects. Three divisions of the Company's troops —from Cawnpoor, Meerut, and Mutra— were ordered to concentrate near Hatrass, Dyaram's principal stronghold, and one of the strongest forts in all India. These troops concentrated accordingly, Major-General Marshall took the command, and by the 11th of February, 1817, Hatrass was completely invested. Dyaram had collected within his works five hundred pieces of ordnance of all sorts. There was an outer fort with twenty bastions, the whole being surrounded by a ditch ninety feet broad and seventy-five deep, and now containing six feet of water. The fort was in an excellent state of repair, and every improvement which the English had introduced into their neighbouring fort of Alighur had been carefully copied by Dyaram. Thus Hatrass presented the aspect rather of an European than an Indian fortress; and thus General Marshall found it expedient to go to work by way of regular approaches.

* They were always beaten by the sepoys and the native cavalry, no matter how vast their own number or how small the number of their pursuers. A good many men and officers were exhausted and invalided by the exertions required to get up with them; but very few were either killed or wounded in actual combat. In Major Lushington's brilliant affair, however, Captain Darke was slain by a Pindarree spear.

These approaches were made, and the breaching-batteries were raised by the evening of the 1st of March, and on the following morning forty-five mortars, and three breaching-batteries, mounting very heavy guns, began to play on the fort. Such a tremendous artillery had never yet been employed in India. The garrison were astounded and dismayed. Dyaram's best new masonry was knocked to pieces. At five o'clock in the evening a shell struck a huge powder-magazine, which blew up within the place, destroying half the garrison and nearly all the buildings. Dyaram, with a few horse, rushed out of the ruined place shortly after, and made his escape in the darkness of night, though pursued by a party of the 8th dragoons.* The rest of the garrison attempted to follow their chief, but they were stopped, driven back, and compelled to surrender at discretion. Bulwunt Sing, the ally of Dyaram, had a strong fort, but it was not so strong as Hatrass; and after the fall of that place he could have no hope of repulsing the besiegers: he therefore agreed, on the first summons, to dismantle his fort, to restore the plunder he had made, and to live honestly and peaceably for the future.

Though only one European and five natives had been killed, an enormous quantity of English powder had been burned in the siege of Hatrass. One whiff of grape-shot sufficed to put an end to the troubles in Rohilcund. The Patan population of that country had insurged for the purpose of resisting some regulations of the police, and had fallen upon three companies of sepoys commanded by Captain Boscawen, who constituted the only force we had at hand. Boscawen formed his little detachment into square; the insurgents broke into the square, and they were blown out again by one of our guns at the angles, which was pointed inward and discharged. Many fell killed or wounded by the grape-shot; the rest fled.

Commotions and much trouble to the English were created in Nagpoor by Apa Saheb, who owed his regency to the Company. The regent was induced to believe that his cousin the rajah was recovering his health and his senses, and was anxious to recover all his regal authority; that the English would be sure to support the rajah if he were really restored to a sane state, and that so long as the Company's troops were cantoned on the Nerbudda, or in any part of Nagpoor, his authority as regent was a nullity. After other detestable measures and cunning plots, the poor Rajah Pursajee was strangled in the palace by order of his cousin Apa Saheb the regent. Pursajee's body was burnt on the 10th of February, 1817; and his wife burned herself with it. Apa Saheb was then proclaimed rajah. He forthwith sent vakeels to the Peishwa, to Scindiah, to Holkar, and to all the powerful Mahratta chiefs, to request their alliance and assistance in expelling the English. The Peishwa was disposed to give a ready ear to Apa Saheb, as he was acting entirely under the advice of his pernicious favourite Trimbukjee, and making his preparations for another war with the Company. Yet all the while this supreme chief of the Mahrattas declared and vowed to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone that he knew not where Trimbukjee was; that he entertained the most friendly sentiments for the English; that he highly approved of their intention of proceeding against the Pindarrees in the regions north of the Nerbudda; that he disapproved of all plots or intrigues or combinations against the Company, and that he had instructed his vakeels to inform Scindiah that it was very wicked in him to encourage the Pindarrees in making incursions into the territories of the English. If our able resident at Poonah was deceived at all by these protestations, it was only partially, and for a very short

* Dyaram Thakoor remained in concealment for more than three years; but, in the course of 1820, he presented himself and entreated the compassion of the British government. Commiserating his great age and misfortunes, the Company settled a pension on him of 1000 rupees per month, and gave him permission to retire to Soron, a Hindu place of worship on the banks of the Ganges. Before he quitted his concealment, pensions had been settled on his two wives and on his son. Since the tremendous bombardment of the fort, the town of Hatrass has greatly increased in population and trade. A few years ago it was described as being one of the busiest, most thriving places in Upper Hindustan.

time. He soon ascertained that troops were collecting in the hills to the south-east of Poonah, that the Peishwa was levying troops in other directions, was repairing his forts, and sending agents and money into Malwa and other parts of Central India to recruit for his service. He demanded that all these things should cease, and that the felon and murderer Trimbukjee should be given up, and that the adherents and the members of Trimbukjee's family should be put under restraint, instead of being continued in favour and office. The crafty Mahratta prince put part of Trimbukjee's family under arrest, and declared to the English resident that the troops in the hills were only a set of desperadoes, driven into insurrection and armed by Trimbukjee.

But Mr. Elphinstone was not duped by this juggling. He called down the subsidiary force to Poonah, and told the Peishwa that he must not leave his capital. This prince, who had been restored to his capital and to his throne by General Wellesley, had sent all the treasures, jewels, wardrobe, and precious furniture of his palace to Ryeghur, the strongest of all his fortresses, and evinced a very eager desire to quit Poonah. He declared that at the season of his misfortunes, when a helpless prisoner in the hands of his enemies, he had made a vow to perform every year a pilgrimage to Jooneer or Soonur, a holy place abounding in cave-temples; but although he had been at liberty a great many years, he had not yet made any pilgrimage to that spot, and nobody had ever before heard of his vow about it. His last holy journeyings, in company with Trimbukjee, had ended in the detestable murder of the Shastry, the ambassador of a state in alliance with the English. He had already made one journey in the direction of Soonur, solely, as was believed, because Trimbukjee was lurking in that neighbourhood. As soon as the Company's troops assembled in some force, a portion of them were detached to the Mahadeo hills, where they discovered and dispersed the pretended insurgent army; and the rest were drawn round Poonah, within which city the Peishwa had 6000 or 7000 foot, a large body of cavalry, and a fortified palace. Mr. Elphinstone's first intention was to demand hostages for the surrender of Trimbukjee and for the punctual performance of the treaty of Bassein, and, in case of a refusal, to storm the palace and seize the person of the Peishwa; but he shrunk from the carnage and destruction which might attend a war of streets, and a battle in the centre of a populous city, all the peaceful inhabitants of which continued to regard the English not as enemies, but as their best friends. Our resident therefore waited events, not without a hope that the Peishwa would throw off the unaccountable spell which that low ruffian Trimbukjee had cast upon him, and would listen to the advice of better counsellors and to the wishes of the majority of his subjects for a continuance of peace with the Company. But while Mr. Elphinstone waited, the adherents of Trimbukjee took possession of several of the Peishwa's forts, stopped the post in Cuttack and other places, and thus cut off our resident from all communication with the governor-general and the council at Calcutta. At the most critical moments of this trying crisis Mr. Elphinstone was left without instructions, to act as his own judgment might prompt and on his own responsibility. But his sagacity and good judgment never failed him, and with the training he had had, he was not the man to be bewildered or intimidated by any amount of responsibility. We can only briefly sketch the particulars of his conduct; but they were such as obtained for him universal admiration. If the Peishwa should escape to Ryeghur, which is situated among the ghauts of the Konkan, it would be impracticable to follow him till after the monsoon torrents; and once in that strong position, he might make it his centre of operations, and unite behind its walls all the Mahratta chiefs that were bent upon a war with the English. Mr. Elphinstone therefore determined to wait no longer, and drawing his troops more closely round Poonah, he demanded that the Peishwa should within twenty-four hours solemnly engage to deliver up Trimbukjee, the source of all the mischief, within a month, and put the English in possession of his forts of Ryeghur, Singhur, and Poorandur as

pledges. The Peishwa hesitated, but the aspect of our troops was alarming, and the temper of the people of his capital scarcely less so; and within the four-and-twenty hours he accepted the conditions offered to him, and the forts were forthwith placed in our possession. But true to no line of policy, steady in nothing except in his infatuation for Trimbukjee, the Mahratta potentate repented of the bargain he had made, and endeavoured to break it. Finding, however, that the attempt was for the present too hazardous, he offered a reward for the apprehension of Trimbukjee, dead or alive, and confiscated his property and the property of twelve of his principal partisans. Yet at the same moment he took measures to provide for the safety and concealment of that foul murderer, and secretly remitted him some money. A few days after this—on the 13th of June—the Peishwa signed a treaty offered to him by Mr. Elphinstone, as the only mode of removing doubts and jealousies. By this treaty the Peishwa engaged to make every effort to seize and deliver up Trimbukjee to the English, &c., to confirm the treaty of Bassein in all points not changed or modified by the present agreement; to dismiss all Frenchmen, &c. from his states, and to admit none in future; to renounce all negotiations with all powers hostile to the Company, and not to receive the vakeels or ambassadors of any such powers; to renounce all right of supremacy over our ally the Guicowar; to give up all rights and pretensions in Guzerat, Bundelcund, and every part of Hindustan Proper; to surrender to the Company in perpetuity the fort of Ahmednughur and certain other territories; and to dissolve the great Mahratta confederacy by abandoning all connexion with the other Mahratta powers, and consequently his station as their Peishwa or head. He also agreed to an important alteration in the treaty of Bassein. By that treaty he had bound himself to furnish to the Company in time of war a contingent of 5000 horse and 3000 foot, with ordnance proportionate; but this was now exchanged for an engagement to furnish to the Company the means of paying and maintaining an equal force. Altogether the revenue ceded by the Peishwa was estimated at thirty-four lacs of rupees. The treaty was ratified by the governor-general within a month, or on the 5th of July, 1817. The Peishwa's perfidy, and his preparations for joining the worst of our enemies at the moment when we were about entering on a connected plan of operations for extirpating the Pindarrees, might have justified harsher conditions; but, as it was, the humbled Mahratta prince considered the treaty as far too harsh. Without his connivance resistance might have been offered by his officers and chiefs who held the forts and territories that were ceded to the English; but it is not to be supposed that he regretted the efforts made in the Konkan, and in some other districts, or that this war was disagreeable to him. This resistance, however, was soon put down by Colonel Doveton and Colonel Scott. Doveton routed and expelled the partisans of Trimbukjee in Kandes; and Scott, making ladders of his tent-poles, gallantly escaladed and stormed the strong fort of Dorana. After the loss of this their chief stronghold, Trimbukjee's adherents ceased to make head, and the murderer himself fled to some new hiding-place among the jungles in the valley of the Nerbudda, where he could communicate with Cheetoo and other Pindarree chiefs. It should appear that Trimbukjee found means of communicating with the Peishwa also, for at the very moment that the English army was ready to cross the Nerbudda in order to fall upon the robbers, the Mahratta potentate threw the treaty of the 13th of June to the winds, and fell upon the English at Poonah.

As soon as the imposing force which Mr. Elphinstone had assembled retired to its cantonments, the Peishwa's kettle-drum was beat in every direction for recruits and volunteers. Every man that had a horse was feed and invited to join his standard; and by the beginning of October masses of cavalry, prodigious in their numbers, but for the most part contemptible in everything else, were collected at various stations. To the English resident the Peishwa represented that he was raising troops for no other object than that of complying with the

request of the governor-general to co-operate against the Pindarrees. But Mr. Elphinstone's experience did not allow him to trust to any Mahratta protestations or oaths; and he soon discovered that the Peishwa's agents were attempting to corrupt the Company's sepoys belonging to that portion of the subsidiary force which had been left at Poonah. Upon this discovery the sepoys were removed from the town to the village of Kirkee in the immediate neighbourhood. There was only one brigade of sepoys in all, but the position was admirably strong, being protected by a river in the rear and on the left, and supported on the right by the village. Moreover, there were other battalions cantoned a few miles off to the west. The Peishwa, however, took it into his dull head that the English confessed their fears by evacuating the city; and this too in spite of the evident fact that Mr. Elphinstone remained behind at the Residency. He pushed forward his confused hordes to Poonah, and drew up a plan for surrounding the English camp at Kirkee and preventing the arrival of reinforcements. Some of these Mahrattas were constantly riding round the camp and abusing our men and officers. An English officer was attacked, plundered, and wounded, and narrowly escaped being killed. It was not until these unequivocal demonstrations had been made that Mr. Elphinstone called up from Seroor a light battalion and a corps of 1000 auxiliary horse. These forces left Seroor on the 5th of November, and marched half way to Poonah. As soon as the Peishwa heard of its being in motion, he put his own unwieldy army in motion also, and threw a strong battalion between the Residency on the skirts of the town and the camp at Kirkee, for the purpose of cutting off the communication between the two. Mr. Elphinstone, who demanded the reason of this hostile proceeding, was told that the Peishwa had only anticipated the hostile movements of the English, being determined to be no longer the victim of his irresolution. And, as if to prove that he had screwed up his valour to the fighting-point, the Peishwa mounted his horse immediately after, and joined the main body of his army on a hill a little to the south-west of Poonah. The host forthwith advanced on the Residency. Mr. Elphinstone and his suite had barely time to mount their horses and cross the river towards the English camp, ere the Mahrattas took possession of the houses, from which there had not been time to remove anything. All were plundered in the twinkling of an eye, and were afterwards burned. Much valuable property was destroyed, but the most irreparable loss was that of Mr. Elphinstone's manuscripts and library. Meanwhile Mr. Elphinstone and his party made good their retreat along the left bank of the river, skirmishing with some Mahratta horse that followed them, and passing under the fire of the battalion which had been thrust between the Residency and the camp at Kirkee. Generally the civil servants of the Company were ambi-dexterous, or capable of wielding with the same hand the sword as well as the pen. As soon as Mr. Elphinstone was safe in the camp, and had been greeted as he deserved, it was resolved not to stand there on the defensive, not to wait the arrival of the troops that were marching from Seroor, but to recross the river and attack the Mahrattas immediately. The brigade, commanded by Colonel Burr, was now about 2800 strong, and the Bombay European regiment was in it; the Mahrattas mustered at the least 25,000 men, and they had many guns; but the Peishwa was a rank coward, and the mass of his force a mere armed rabble. The combat did not commence until late in the afternoon, and before nightfall it was ended by the flight of the Mahrattas, who either threw themselves into Poonah or into a fortified camp near the town. They left about 500 on the field. Our loss was 18 killed and 57 wounded. During the battle Mr. Elphinstone remained on the field in order to give Colonel Burr the advantage of his very perfect local knowledge. On the following morning, the 6th of November, the light battalion and irregular horse from Seroor joined Colonel Burr. The Mahrattas drew up in order of battle, but did nothing except mutilate some women and dependents of the Company's brigade whom they had surprised

and seized in the old cantonments.* As their numbers seemed to increase, and as the city and the old cantonments which the English had occupied afforded rather formidable means of defence, Colonel Burr and Mr. Elphinstone determined to wait the arrival of Brigadier-General Lionel Smith, who was advancing from the banks of the Godavery. Smith, who had but very little cavalry with him, and no regular cavalry at all, was molested on his march by hordes of Mahratta horse, who succeeded in plundering some of his baggage; but his division reached the English camp in front of Poonah on the 13th of November. Owing to some unexpected difficulties the British did not advance against the city and the cantonments (which were further fortified in the interval) until the 16th. A large Mahratta force which attempted to dispute their advance was discomfited after a smart combat which cost us sixty men and an officer. This decided the affair: in the course of the ensuing night the Peishwa fled, and on the following morning, when our troops marched up to the intrenched camp, they found that the tents were left standing, but that there was not a single Mahratta there.† General Smith posted his artillery and threatened the city of Poonah with a bombardment; but the only garrison there consisted of a few hundred Arabs, and these, by the persuasion or by the threats of the inhabitants, were induced to retire. The citizens opened the gates, and our troops took quiet possession of the city. In all this the far greater portion of the Peishwa's subjects saw nothing but the direct vengeance of Heaven for the horrible and sacrilegious crime committed in murdering the Guicowar Shastry within the precincts of the holiest of their temples. On the 19th General Smith, having been joined by a regiment of the Madras cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Colebrooke, started in pursuit of the Peishwa. In the course of the day Captain Turner, of the light division, succeeded in capturing eighteen guns with their tumbrils and ammunition, and a great quantity of baggage. But the Peishwa and the forces with him moved too rapidly to be caught: he threw himself into the wild and elevated country in which the river Krishna takes its rise; and, continuing an erratic course, he eluded pursuit until the following year.

Apa Saheb, rajah through the murder of his cousin, irritated against the English resident, and disgusted with the treaty he had concluded with the Company, had fully made up his mind to join the Peishwa and the Pindarrees. He was duly informed (probably by Trimbukjee) of the mighty preparations made at Poonah, and of the promises of other Mahratta princes to make common cause with their nominal suzerain; and he had been led into the belief that the British power was incapable of resisting the confederacy. Apa Saheb therefore began to collect his troops and to make new levies, protesting all the while to Mr. Jenkins, our resident, that he detested the treachery of the Peishwa and was eager to serve the Company. Yet was he but a clumsy hypocrite, for he received a dress of honour and a title from the court of Poonah, and went in state to his army to put on the dress and to assume the title in the presence of his troops. And at this time, though he might be ignorant of the facts, the Peishwa had been beaten

* After the poor women had been brutally mutilated, they were let loose to find their way to the brigade. The poor creatures had been seized before they were aware that there was any probability of a war. In other instances which occurred during the 5th and 6th of November, the Mahrattas too plainly showed with what a ferocious spirit they took the field. Two of our officers, Captain Vaughan and his brother, who were travelling with a small escort, were induced to surrender by promise of quarter, and were both hanged. Ensign Enuis, of the Bombay Engineers, who was taking a survey some fifty miles from Poonah, was shot; and Lieutenants Morisson and Hunter, of the Madras cavalry, were attacked as they were marching towards Poonah, from the Nizam's dominions, utterly unconscious of the rupture. On the first alarm they took post in a choultry about twenty miles from Poonah, and there made a resolute defence with the few men they had for escort; but they were overpowered, and carried prisoners into Poonah. Their lives were spared; but they were sent immediately under a guard to the Konkan, and shifted from one fort to another, until recaptured three months afterwards at Wusota.—*H. T. Prinsep.*

† The Peishwa had, however, succeeded in carrying off all his guns except one, which was of an enormous size, and too heavy to be removed with any speed.

and driven from his capital by the British. Mr. Jenkins called in a brigade from its cantonments, and posted it round the Residency, which was situated a little to the west of the city of Nagpoor, and separated from it only by a small ridge. The brigade was scarcely posted ere infantry, cavalry, and artillery began to gather round the Residency. On the following day, the 26th of November, some of the Rajah's infantry and artillery commenced a fire upon the ridge which was occupied by our brigade. This continued from sunset till two hours after midnight. Our troops suffered very severely: Captain Sadler, the officer in command, was killed; and Captain Charlesworth, the next in command, was wounded. But several assaults made to carry the hill were repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. When they ceased firing, our troops laboured might and main to strengthen their position, which had been taken up in haste: they had but few intrenching-tools to make artificial defences; but they placed along the exposed brow of the hill sacks of flour and wheat, and anything else capable of affording some cover. At daybreak the enemy recommenced their fire with greater fury, having brought more guns to bear upon the ridge. Masses of their cavalry showed themselves all round our position, and the Arab infantry in the Rajah's service displayed great resolution and confidence. An accident happening to one of our guns, these Arabs rushed up the hill, seized it, and pointed it with murderous effect against our next post, having first put to the sword all the wounded that had fallen round the gun. Their first shot from that gun killed Doctor Neven, the surgeon, and Lieutenant Clarke; the second, a round of grape, killed the resident's first assistant, Mr. George Sotheby, and totally disabled four men besides. The camp-followers and the women and children of our sepoys set up a wild shriek; and our position was *entamée* by the fierce Arabs: the day seemed lost and a horrible butchery inevitable, when Captain Fitzgerald made a brisk and most gallant charge with the cavalry of our brigade, which consisted of only three troops of the 6th Bengal regiment. Heading the little column himself, and dashing across a nullah and over the ridge, Fitzgerald charged one mass of the enemy, drove them from their guns, turned them upon them, and then retired towards the Residency, dragging the captured guns with him and firing as he retired. Our people on the ridge set up a joyous shout, and a detachment of them advanced against the fierce Arabs, who kept their ground though those who ought to have supported them were running away. These Arabs, however, could not stand the bayonet-charge; they were driven from the post, the guns they had captured were recovered, and two other guns which the enemy had brought up were taken. In heading this desperate charge, Captain Lloyd and Lieutenant Grant particularly distinguished themselves. Grant was wounded three times, and his third wound proved mortal. The Arabs lay thick round the guns among the British and the sepoys they had butchered. As soon as this charge was crowned with success, Apa Saheb's troops gave way on every side, and about the hour of noon they fled from the field in panic disorder, leaving all their artillery to the conquerors. Thus ended a conflict more desperate than any that had taken place in India since the early days of Clive, when handfuls of the Company's troops repeatedly sustained and triumphed over the attacks of large native armies. Apa Saheb, at Nagpoor, like the Peishwa at Poonah, had reckoned with certainty on his ability to overwhelm the small force stationed at his capital. As soon as he was undeceived in this particular he expressed the greatest contrition and endeavoured to obtain the forgiveness of the English by his prostration and a prompt submission. When the battle was over and his army well beaten, he sent vakeels to the resident to express his grief, and to disavow having himself authorized the attack. He also employed the women of his family as intercessors for pardon. Mr. Jenkins would give no answer until the Rajah's army was entirely disbanded. Anon Company's troops poured into the country from every quarter. As early as the 29th Lieutenant-Colonel Gahan

arrived at the Residency with two battalions and three troops of horse, two galloper guns, supplies of ammunition, &c. The fighting on the 26th and 27th had been so hard that our troops engaged had consumed nearly all their powder; they had only a few rounds left when the Arabs were beaten. If the Rajah's people had renewed their attack with any spirit, the conquerors must have been conquered through mere want of ammunition; but now they were safe; and the force collected round the Residency would have sufficed to beat the Rajah's army in the field over and over again. But it was of the utmost consequence that Apa Saheb should be entirely crushed with the utmost rapidity, in order that the grand campaign should proceed against the Pindarrees and their supporters, and that other vacillating allies should be deterred from following his example by learning the terrible example of English vengeance—by hearing, in one breath, that the Rajah of Nagpoor had risen in arms, that the Rajah of Nagpoor had been beaten and his power annihilated. Accordingly the Marquess of Hastings, who was himself on the Nerbudda, sent still more troops to Nagpoor. Major Pitman reached that city on the 5th of December, and Brigadier-General Doveton arrived there on the 12th. Brigadier-General Hardyman followed, but did not arrive until after everything had been settled by Doveton. On the morning of the 15th of December Mr. Jenkins informed the Rajah that the only means of saving his army from immediate attack, and himself from ruin, was to accept the following terms:—To acknowledge that by his defection he had placed his territories at the mercy of the British government; to give up all his artillery; to disband all his Arabs and other mercenaries, who were to march off and leave the city and fort of Nagpoor to the sole occupation of the British; to go himself and reside at the British Residency as an hostage for the performance of these conditions. His answer must be delivered at the latest by four o'clock the next morning; and if no answer came he was to be attacked at that hour. But he was given to understand that if he submitted to the terms proposed no very great sacrifices would be required from him.—Apa Saheb endeavoured to temporise. Mr. Jenkins extended the period from four to seven o'clock the next morning. But in the evening of the 15th General Doveton beat to arms, approached closer to the town, and there bivouacked for the night. At six o'clock in the morning the Rajah sent to say that the Arabs would not allow him to come over to the English, and to beg for a respite of two or three days. All the respite that Doveton would give was for two hours: Apa Saheb must come in by nine o'clock, or abide the consequences. As nine o'clock came, and as the Rajah came not, our army advanced in order of battle to a position close upon the Rajah's camp: and upon this Apa Saheb, giving way to his fears, mounted his horse, galloped away from the camp to the Residency, and delivered himself up as an hostage to Mr. Jenkins. He there gave orders that the artillery in the arsenal and in the camp should be delivered up. General Doveton, suspecting mischief, if not from the treachery of the Rajah, from the desperation of the Arabs and the other mercenaries, instead of sending a party to take possession of the guns, advanced his whole line by open column of companies. The arsenal, wherein were thirty-six guns, was taken without resistance; but as Doveton proceeded towards the Rajah's gardens a heavy fire of artillery was opened upon his front and right flank. Through the General's prudence and foresight he was not unprepared for this attack: his cavalry and horse artillery were with him; and, while his infantry charged in front, they made a detour, and got on the flank of the enemy. In less than an hour all the batteries were carried, and seventy-five more guns, mortars, and howitzers were in our hands: the Arabs and all who had staid to fight were put to flight, and the camp was also taken, with forty elephants and all Apa Saheb's camp equi page. But the fire of the fierce Arabs had cost us in killed and wounded 39 British and 102 native soldiers. Part of the Arab infantry fled into the city, and occupied the fort, within which were the Rajah's palaces and other strong build-

ings; and they maintained themselves with such desperation that it was not until the 30th of December that they could be driven out. Doveton's siege artillery had not come up, and in an attempt to storm the fort through an insufficient breach, he lost 90 killed and 179 wounded, including one officer among the killed and two among the wounded. With the departure of these daring Arabs resistance ceased; the Rajah and all his country were at our feet. The conduct of the Rajah had determined the governor-general to take him down from the musnud to which he had been raised by the English (for if they had not assisted him in making good his claim to the regency he could not have got the throne); but before his lordship's instructions reached the resident at Nagpoor, Mr. Jenkins, for reasons which are said to have been numerous and weighty, but which we confess we cannot understand, had promised to restore the Rajah to power under certain conditions. The fate of Apa Saheb remained in suspense for a few months.

In the meanwhile the Pindarree forces, though not yet annihilated, had been shattered and scattered in spite of all the extensive combinations made to support them as the great vanguard of the Mahrattas. The Marquess of Hastings, commander-in-chief as well as governor-general, had resolved to take the field and to direct the main operations of the campaign in person. His preparations were all on a gigantic scale. The army of the Bengal presidency, commanded by the governor-general in person, and called the "Grand Army," counted 40,000 fighting men. The Madras troops, which took the field under the designation of the "Army of the Deccan," numbered 70,400 fighting men. A part of the Bombay army was put in motion from the side of Guzerat, to co-operate in the general objects of the campaign; and, after the rupture with the Peishwa, another division of the Bombay army was employed in reducing that prince's fortresses in the Konkan. Counting the irregular cavalry supplied by the allies or dependents of the Company, the whole force brought into the field must have exceeded 130,000 men; and of these forces above 18,000 were British soldiers. No such army had ever yet marched under our colours in India. It was not possible to estimate the varying force of all our enemies; but it may be roughly stated that the Mahratta confederacy had 180,000 horse, 80,000 foot, and 580 guns, while the different fragments that remained of their Pindarree allies would form a total of about 15,000. But it was not the number of these undisciplined barbarians that was to be taken into consideration: it was the very extensive—the indefinable field of the war, the number and strength of the fortresses in Central India, in the Konkan, and elsewhere, the facilities which the Mahrattas possessed for making flying marches, and for embarrassing the movements of our columns by lighting up the flames of war at nearly the same moment and at many and distant points, that demanded the employment of a large force and of great forethought. The materiel and the military means we possessed in India at this period were stupendous; but our Indian army had still much to learn, and it was still defective in several very essential departments. It had hardly any sappers and miners, and the engineering department had only a few scaling-ladders, and a miserable supply of intrenching tools and the other tools and small stores indispensable to the proper execution of siege-work. The number both of the artillery and engineer officers was small and disproportionate; nor were the heavy battering-trains adequate to the work in hand. Great guns, in abundance, were lying useless along the ramparts of our fortresses; but, as rapidity of motion was a primary consideration in a Mahratta war, and as the fine Mysorean bullocks were not yet sufficiently increased to answer all demands, these guns could not be brought up. Through these deficiencies the sieges of this war were prosecuted occasionally at an unusually heavy cost of life and limbs, and were, some few times, absolute failures. The army, moreover, had no equipment of pontoons, or of other means for the military passage of rivers. Hence the troops, in pursuing the flitting enemy, were often delayed by the numerous small

streams which intersect part of the Deccan, and the Mahrattas were allowed to escape when their ruin seemed inevitable.*

The governor-general knew not who would prove friends or enemies as he advanced up the country; but he was determined at all costs and hazards to finish the work which had been so successfully begun, or to brave all the native powers of India rather than fail in extirpating the Pindarrees. Having connected, or brought to points of co-operation, a far more imposing force than the British had ever yet brought into the field in India, his lordship crossed the Jumna on the 26th of October, 1817. As it was necessary that a part of the forces should traverse the territories of Scindiah, and as it was hoped that that great Mahratta, overawed by the movements of our immense armed hosts, might be induced to engage to co-operate with us against the Pindarrees, Captain Close, the resident at the durbar of Scindiah, who now held his court in the strong fortress of Gualior, was instructed to press for the conclusion of a treaty which had been for some time on the *tapis*. Scindiah, who had promised to support the Peishwa, and who was corresponding not only with the Pindarree chiefs and with the Rajah of Nagpoor, but also with the Gorkhas of Nepaul, in order to excite those formidable enemies to a new war, and bring them down on the right flank and on the rear of our advancing army, hesitated, and sought all kinds of subterfuges, and did not sign the treaty proposed to him by the governor-general until the 5th of November, when two of our corps d'armée, one under the immediate command of his lordship, and the other under that of General Donkin, were within one march of his frontier. Then Scindiah engaged to afford every facility to the British troops in the pursuit of the Pindarrees through his dominions, and to co-operate actively towards the extinction of those brutal freebooters. Meer Khan and other chiefs of Mahrattas and leaders of Patan bands followed the example of Scindiah, and precisely from the same motives or the same fears of the stupendous armaments that were sweeping through the country. If the Marquess of Hastings had attempted to negotiate before marching his army, another year would have been lost. The states of the Mahratta house of Holkar stood, with reference to the Pindarrees, in a somewhat similar position to those of Scindiah; but it was supposed that there was less to apprehend from their hostility. Our old foe, the hardy adversary of Lord Lake and General Wellesley, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, died mad in 1811,* and his country had been in a state of revolution and anarchy ever since, more murders having been committed than would fill a Newgate Calendar. Attempts, however, were made to negotiate with those anarchists, but they failed.

During the rains of this year (1817) the Pindarrees, well knowing that the English were coming against them into the regions beyond the Nerbudda, made great efforts to recruit their durras, and to concert some general plan of defence. But disagreements broke out among the chiefs, particularly between Cheetoo and his old rival Kureem, and no consistent plan

* Colonel Valentine Blacker, quartermaster-general of the army of Fort St. George, 'Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India during the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818, and 1819.'

Edward Lake, lieutenant of the Honourable East India Company's Madras Engineers, 'Journals of the Sieges of the Madras Army in the years 1817, 1818, and 1819, with Observations on the System according to which such Operations have usually been conducted in India, and a Statement of the Improvements that appear necessary.'

This last work was undertaken at the suggestion of Sir John Malcolm.

One Madras engineer officer says, "As there were no pontoons, and no timber for forming the superstructure of a bridge, if it had been attempted to construct one with the common country boats, which were to be procured on the river, a flying bridge was the only resource, and this was effected by drawing a strong sheer line across the river, along which the boats plied."

* This Holkar had apparently driven himself mad by excessive drink. Sir James Mackintosh notes in his diary, in 1808—"Holkar has become so besotted a drunkard, as almost to have lost his senses. After an excessive dose of cherry-brandy, he plucks the turbans from the heads of his chiefs, and beats them like the lowest slaves. *This degradation of the only chief popular among the Hindus, would be a matter of some consequence if we were to have an European invasion.*"—'Memoir of Sir James Mackintosh,' edited by his Son.

could be formed. Sheik Dulloo, the most adventurous of all the chiefs—he who had descended into the Konkan, and had plundered the western shores of India in the preceding year—talked of joining Trimbukjee and of trying his fortunes again in the Deccan, while the English were engaged beyond the Nerbudda. Others proposed schemes that they never executed. Their superstitions were alarmed by evil omens, such as a great fire that broke out in Kureem's camp in the month of September, and destroyed all the valuables of his durra. Generally, however, the Pindarrees relied, first on their own rapidity of movement, and next on the potency of the hostile league which they knew to be forming among the Mahrattas against the English. When the rains were over they made some very unsuccessful attempts to break into our territories. They were everywhere headed back; and they were soon pressed and pursued, and driven from their haunts beyond the Nerbudda by the several corps of Major-General Marshall and Colonel Sir John Malcolm. The last-named officer, who has written the best account of the Pindarrees, and who had the most active share in the operations which destroyed them, had been absent in England, and had returned just in time to take the command of one of the corps of the Marquess of Hastings's army. Malcolm, being informed of Cheetoo's flight to the westward, resolved to follow him as the most able and dangerous of the robbers; and he accordingly marched as far as Agur. Here he learned that Cheetoo had pitched his camp close to that of the Holkar Mahrattas; that he had been received with friendship and distinction, and that those Mahrattas were fully determined to support the robber and to oppose the operations of the British. They had just received from the Peishwa an advance of a lac and sixty thousand rupees. Upon this intelligence Sir John Malcolm fell back to the neighbourhood of Oojein, a town of great celebrity in Malwa, where another corps d'armée was collected under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop. While these forces lay at Oojein, another revolution and murder took place in the Holkar camp. The young heir to the musnud was enticed away from the tent in which he was playing, and his mother, who was acting as regent, was seized at night and beheaded, as a traitress sold to the English. Having done these deeds, the Patan chiefs became clamorous for battle; and the whole Holkar army, advancing rapidly, plundered part of the English baggage. The next day (the 21st of December, 1817) they met their reward in the bloody battle of Maheidpoor. There, strongly posted on the bank of the Sepra river (into whose waters they had thrown the headless body of the regent), they were beaten, bayoneted, cut to pieces, deprived of all their artillery, amounting to seventy pieces, and of everything that gave them the character of an army. The remnant of their force fled to the large walled town of Rampoora, in the heart of the province of Malwa. Sir John Malcolm formed the plan of the battle, and headed the assault on the left flank of the enemy. Lieut.-Colonels Scott, Macdowall, and Russell, Major James L. Lushington, and other officers, greatly distinguished themselves in the action. The British casualties were unusually severe, amounting to 174 killed and 604 wounded. Among the wounded were 35 officers, of whom 15 were severely injured. In the pursuit, which was continued by Sir John Malcolm and Captain Grant along both banks of the river Sepra, immense booty was obtained, including elephants, some hundreds of camels, &c.

Sir John Malcolm advanced rapidly towards the capital of the Holkars, being joined on the way by the Bombay army from Guzerat, under the orders of Major-General Sir William Keir. Those Mahrattas now agreed to and hastily concluded a treaty of peace, placing their territories under British protection, and surrendering in perpetuity to the Company various districts, forts, and ghauts. The treaty was scarcely concluded ere some of the Patan chiefs attempted to break it; but these desperadoes were defeated and most of their adherents slaughtered in Rampoora by some detachments of infantry and cavalry under General Brown. A few more marches and two or three stormings of forts re-

duced the whole of the country of the Holkar Mahrattas to a state of obedience. These rapid successes kept Scindiah steady to the treaty which he had recently concluded, and deprived the wandering Peishwa of almost his last hope. They also enabled our troops to follow the Pindarrees, who were now flying in all directions, like sea-fowl in a storm. Some of Cheetoo's durra had followed the Patan chiefs to Maheidpoor; but after our victory there, Cheetoo fled to shift for himself, seeing that no aid was to be expected from the Mahrattas. He was closely followed by the Guzerat army of Sir William Keir, who surprised him and cut up part of his durra in the neighbourhood of Satoolla. Harassed by the activity of Sir William's pursuit, and finding that other corps were closing fast round them, the marauders endeavoured to retrace their steps to their old haunts in the valley of the Nerbudda and in parts of Malwa. Other chiefs failed, and were cut up in the attempt; but Cheetoo succeeded in baffling every effort made to intercept him or overtake him, and effected his object by penetrating through a most difficult country. He suddenly reappeared in Malwa, in the neighbourhood of the ancient city of Dhar, situated among rocks, forests, and the sources of rivers; but his extraordinary march had cost him all his baggage and most of his horses. He was now lost sight of for some time; during which the best of his fellow-chiefs with their durras were extirpated in other parts. At last his lair was discovered, and on the night of the 25th of January, 1818, a strong party of the British came upon him and utterly broke up his band. The hill robbers of Malwa, the Bheels and Grasseas (robbers by birth, education, and profession, but "petty-larceny rascals" compared with the Pindarrees), were encouraged to plunder and destroy the fugitives, and are said to have executed the commission very zealously. Cheetoo, however, escaped Bheels and Grassees, as he had so often the English, and for a short time wandered and skulked about Malwa with some two hundred followers. When in this state of hopeless misery, he was often advised by some of his followers to surrender to the English and trust to their mercy. He was possessed, however, by the dreadful idea that the English would transport him beyond the sea, and this was more hideous to him than death. These followers, who all, one after another, came in and obtained pardon, related that during their captain's short and miserable sleep at this period he used continually to murmur, "Kala Panee! Kala Panee!"—("The black Sea! Oh, the black Sea!")*

At this conjuncture it struck Cheetoo that possibly the Nabob of Bopaul might make terms for him and the remnant of his durra with the English; and rapidly acting on the idea, he suddenly entered the camp of that prince. But when he learned that the nabob could offer or promise nothing beyond a slender personal maintenance in some remote corner of India, he decamped as suddenly as he had come. While he stayed, his horses were constantly saddled, and his men slept with the bridles in their hands, ready to fly instantly. Preparations were making for the purpose of seizing him the very night he went off from the Bopaul camp. Though he got safely off, he was presently pursued by the nabob's people and by parties sent out by Sir John Malcolm. This distressed him so much, that Rajun, one of his most faithful and valuable adherents, left him, and made his submission. Yet, after all this, Cheetoo found his way into the Deccan, and made common cause with the Arabs and chiefs of the Peishwa's routed army, receiving occasional protection from the killadar of the fortress of Aseerghur, a place of great strength, the ancient capital of Candeish, and at this time included among the possessions of Scindiah. His durra was completely destroyed, and nearly all his followers deserted him, but nothing could subdue Cheetoo's spirit, or induce him to surrender. His end, however, approached, and it was tragical and singular. Having joined Apa Saheb, he passed the rainy season of 1818 among the Mahadeo mountains; and upon that Rajah's expul-

* Sir John Malcolm.

sion by the English, in February, 1819, he accompanied him to the fort of Aseerghur. Being refused admittance, he sought shelter in a neighbouring jungle, and on horseback and alone attempted to penetrate a cover known to be infested by tigers. He was missed for some days, and no one knew what had become of him. His well-known horse was at last discovered grazing near the margin of the forest, saddled and bridled, and exactly in the state in which it was when Cheetoo had last been seen upon it. A bag of two hundred and fifty rupees was found in the saddle, together with several seal-rings and some letters of Apa Saheb, promising future reward to the great robber. A search was made in the cover for the body; and at no great distance were found clothes clotted with blood, fragments of bones, and, lastly, the Pindarree's head entire, with the features in a state to be recognised. "The chief's mangled remains," says the best historian of his adventures, "were given over to his son for interment; and the miserable fate of one who so shortly before had ridden at the head of 20,000 horse, gave an awful lesson of the uncertainty of fortune, and drew pity even from those who had been the victims of his barbarity when living."*

With Cheetoo ended the last of the Pindarrees, and the spirit which had animated their vast lawless associations. Their name is all that now remains of them, for the sad traces of their devastation have entirely disappeared under re-established order, industry, prosperity, police, and good government. It is now nearly a quarter of a century since that gallant officer, accomplished diplomatist, and able writer, the late Sir John Malcolm, said of them — "There now remains not a spot in India that a Pindarree can call his home. They have been hunted like wild beasts; numbers have been killed; all ruined. Those who espoused their cause have fallen. They were early in the contest shunned like a contagion, and even the timid villagers, whom they so recently oppressed, were among the foremost to attack them. Their principal leaders had either died, submitted, or been made captives; while their followers, with the exception of a few whom the liberality and consideration of the British government have aided to become industrious, are lost in that population from whose dross they originally issued. A minute investigation only can discover these once formidable disturbers, concealed as they now are among the lowest classes, where they are making some amends for past atrocities by the benefit which is derived from their labour in restoring trade and cultivation. These freebooters had none of the prejudices of caste, for they belonged to all tribes. They never had either the pride of soldiers, of family, or of country, so that they were bound by none of those ties which among many of the communities in India assume an almost indestructible character. Other plunderers may arise from distempered times, but as a body the Pindarrees are so effectually destroyed, that their name is already almost forgotten, though not five years are passed since it spread terror and dismay over all India."*

The Mahratta wars which were waged by the Marquess of Hastings are chiefly interesting from their having led to these desirable results. If his lordship had been a votary of the restrictive, timid system, or if he had been tied down by instructions from home not to cross the Nerbudda for fear of giving offence to the Mahrattas, and not to take any steps that might provoke hostility on a large scale, the Pindarrees could not possibly have been put down, and a vast part of the population of Hindustan must have been left a prey to those human tigers, and exposed to worse horrors than those which accompanied the worst even of the Mahratta wars. The long existence of the association was disgraceful to the first government in India—which the British assuredly had been ever since the days of Warren Hastings — every honest pacific

* Henry T. Prinsep, Esq., of the Bengal Civil Service. History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813–1823.

* Memoir of Central India.

inhabitant of the country had a right to reproach us for his sufferings, and for having the power, without using it, of putting an end to his calamities by exterminating the marauders. Within two short years the Marquess of Hastings performed that service, which entitles him to the highest honour, and which will be remembered by the peoples of India for many ages to come.

CHAPTER XIII.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS CONTINUED.

THE remainder of these Mahratta wars need not detain us long. The full accounts we have given of the splendid campaigns of General Wellesley and Lord Lake will have enabled the reader to form a tolerably correct notion of this sort of warfare; and to repeat details in 1818 and 1819, which of necessity bear a close resemblance to those of 1804-5, would be tedious and unprofitable.

In these Indian wars there was very little manœuvring either on our side or on that of the enemy. The great business of our commanders was to bring the army rapidly up with the foe, and to correctly calculate, and provide for, the means of so doing. The valour of our troops, native as well as European, their steadiness, rapidity in formation, and their bayonet-points did the rest. Nearly all Lord Lake's victories were gained by a direct attack which he led himself. Yet if he rejected or was ignorant of the stratagems of war, he possessed in an eminent degree that powerful influence of character which calls forth the exertions of troops through their affection and admiration. They not only performed for him everything possible, but often offered themselves to inevitable and evident destruction in his presence, as in the forlorn assaults which were made during the terrible siege of Bhurtpoor.* Some of Lake's contemporaries and immediate successors were far better strategists than he; but the occasions rarely occurred in which they could employ their science, or in which the stratagems of war would have been of any use. They continued to aim at making direct attacks, and as quickly after taking the field as possible. In this way Hislop and Malcolm fought and won the great battle of Maheidpoor. But great was the foresight required and numerous the difficulties to be overcome, ere an Anglo-Indian army, with its amazing train of camp-followers, could be brought up with alert enemies, who were for the most part mounted. After leaving their own frontiers, they had often to march hundreds of miles before they could come within reach of a tangible enemy. On these marches the followers could never be left far behind. A very large number of attendants was considered indispensable: one man was required for every three bullocks, and many were required for the elephants and camels of the army: every horse in the army had, besides the rider, two attendants, one to clean and take care of him, the other to cut the grass and provide his forage; the palanquin and litter bearers for the sick formed another numerous and useful class; field-officers, including the people who carried or had charge of their tents, baggage, &c., had each about forty attendants; captains had twenty, and subalterns ten servants each: the bazaar people, the merchants, their families, servants, &c., formed another numerous body. Generally, while marching, there were no towns to be depended on for supplies, and the army not only carried with it most of the means of subsistence for several months, but many articles of merchandize. It was calculated that during Lord Cornwallis's second campaign against Tippoo Sultaun, the number of persons of all descriptions attached to his camp and to the camps of his allies exceeded 400,000, although the number of soldiers did not much exceed 80,000.

* Lieut.-Colonel Valentine Blacker, Quarter-master-general of the army of Fort St. George. *Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India during the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818 and 1819.*

The scene altogether resembled the migration of a nation guarded by troops, rather than the advance of an army to subdue an enemy.* In other marches the tails of our armies were almost equally long. Allowing it to be possible to diminish the numbers of officers' servants, regimental cooks, &c., there still remained serious obstacles to the reduction of other and far more numerous classes. Several attempts had been made to reduce the number of the camp-followers, but, though they had been partially successful in some instances, it had not been found easy to establish a system, or to overcome the feelings, the habits, and the wants of the native troops and those connected with them. Almost every sepoy arrived at a mature age has a family or several relations depending on him for their support. Unless these relations can be left at some secure place, in the receipt of a certain subsistence, they must be allowed to accompany him on whom they depend, or he will desert rather than abandon them. Numerous though they are, the camp-followers of the Bengal and Bombay establishments are not of so enormous an amount as those of the Madras presidency. So unremitting has been the field-service of the Madras army through more than half a century, that a large population has grown up who were born in a camp, and who are so habituated to field-service, with its marches and counter-marches, that it has become their most natural state. Multitudes, consequently, are always ready to move, with an alacrity not to be found in the sister presidencies. Being almost constantly in the field, the Madras sepoys were indulged in their habit of carrying their women to camp. Many officers of rank, who had previously served only in Europe, were, on first taking the field in India, struck with what appeared a monstrous and insupportable impediment, yet none ventured on the labour of controlling a custom which the natural course of events had produced and supported with all its apparent disadvantages. But there were advantages as well as disadvantages attending the custom. The native troops, followed by their wives, their children, all their nearest connections, and all their little property, found a home in every camp, let it be pitched where it might; they had no inducement to stray or desert, or even to look beyond the camp or the rear of their own army, which comprised their world; and they contended the more bravely for victory, when defeat would involve the destruction of all that were dearest to them. Some British officers of great experience also thought that these multitudes of camp-followers were of positive advantage, as, having no prescribed duty to perform, they had leisure to bring into the camp, from the neighbouring country and towns, supplies which otherwise would not have been procured; thus not only feeding themselves, but relieving the commissariat, which is obliged to supply the sepoy when rice cannot be had in the camp bazaar below a certain rate. But it is said that although these practices have occasionally proved advantageous to an army acting in an enemy's country, they are apt to lead to plunder and violence, and thus to scare away the native townspeople and villagers with their produce, who would otherwise have preferred the protection of our army to that of their own sovereign, and have remained to sell their produce to our troops and bazaar people. As, with its advantages and disadvantages, the custom was established, and not to be altered by any sudden process,—as the numbers of camp-followers always greatly exceeded the united numbers of the troops, commissariat, and public servants of all descriptions,—it was necessary, in commencing a compaign, to calculate accordingly, and to devise the means of moving these prodigious masses, of giving them security on the march, and good shelter from the enemy in the camp or cantonments, and, above all things, of relieving them from the terrible hazard of dying of thirst,—a hazard often occurring in the more arid parts of Upper India, and in the countries where such water as there was, was preserved in artificial reservoirs or tanks, which the enemy might previously destroy.

But in the first year of this war against the Pindarrees and Mahrattas the army

* Walter Hamilton, East India Gazetteer, &c.

of the Marquess of Hastings was assailed by a new and terrible enemy; this was the Indian Cholera Morbus, the virulence of which appears to have been increased by the crowded state of our camps. The disease first broke out at Jessore, the capital of a district in the southern quarter of Bengal, a populous and unhealthy city in the centre of the Delta of the Ganges, and near the pestiferous Sunderbunds. It began its ravages as the rainy season of 1817 set in, and cut off the majority of those whom it attacked. From Jessore it spread in all directions, showing, as it was thought, a preference for the valleys of rivers.* Ascending the valley of the Ganges, it reached the camp of Brigadier-General Hardyman about the beginning of October; but the troops, being then encamped in a dry healthy country, and being but few in number, suffered comparatively little. Continuing its course westward, it fell with extraordinary violence upon the army commanded by Lord Hastings in person, just after his lordship had concluded the treaty with Scindiah. This army, when first seized, was encamped in a low and unhealthy part of Bundelcund, on the banks of the river Sinde, a confluent of the Jumna, which has its source in the mountains of Malwa. The year was one of scarcity, and grain had been collected for the troops, through the camp-followers, with extreme difficulty, and of course of inferior quality. The water of the country, except where it could be obtained from running streams, was indifferent. The time of the year too was that at which the heat of the day is most strongly contrasted with the cold of the night. To all these extraordinary circumstances was superadded the very crowded state of the camp of so large an army. For about ten days that the disease raged with its greatest fury, the whole camp was an hospital. The mortality amounted to about a tenth of the whole number collected there.* Europeans and natives, soldiers and camp-followers, were alike affected; but the latter, being generally worse clothed and fed than the fighting men, suffered in a greater proportion. Of the Europeans fewer were seized, but those who took the disease more frequently died, and usually within a few hours. The camp was abandoned, and the army continued for some days to move to the eastward in the hope of finding relief in a better climate; but each day's march many dead and dying were abandoned, and many more fell down on the road,—so many that it was not possible to furnish the means for carrying them on, although the utmost possible provision had been made by the previous distribution of bullock-carts and elephants for the accommodation of the sick. Nothing was heard along the line of march but groans and shrieks and lamentations; even the healthy were broken in spirit and incapable of exertion; and, for the time, the efficiency of this fine army seemed to be entirely destroyed. Towards the end of November, when the army reached a healthy station at Erech, on the right bank of the Betwa river, the epidemic had visibly expended its violence.† The

* James Copland, M.D., On Pestilential Cholera, &c.

According to other accounts the first appearance of the disease was not at Jessore, but at Nuddea and Kishnagur. In June it was discovered at Mymensing, and in several villages along the course of the Brahmaputra; in July it appeared at Patna, and at Sunegoug, a town on the banks of one of the branches of the Brahmaputra; and on the 19th of August it raged with destructive violence at Jessore. The civil courts were shut, and a temporary cessation of business of every description ensued. The alarm was the greater as very little was known of the nature of the epidemic.

On the 15th of September the disease, which had broken out at Calcutta, Dinapoor, Chittagong, &c., reached from the mouths of the Ganges nearly as high as the confluence of the Jumna. Early in November it reached the Sinde, where it raged with greater violence than in any other part of India.

Frederick Corbyn, Esq., M.R.C.S.L., Surgeon on the Bengal Establishment, &c., Treatise on the Epidemic Cholera, 1 vol. 8vo. Calcutta, 1832, printed at the Baptist missionary press. James Jameson, Assistant Surgeon, &c., Report on the Epidemic Cholera Morbus, Calcutta, 1820.

* H. T. Prinsep. This gentleman adds—"The narrator himself lost seven domestic servants and a moonshee in about four days, besides twelve others who were sick and unserviceable for a month, out of an establishment of fifty-three; and others of the staff were equal sufferers. The fighting men filled the whole of the hospitals in the first two days; and for servants and followers every man's tent was his only receptacle, and himself the only doctor."

† "The dreadful pestilence," said the governor-

Fortress of Gualior.

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camp was, however, still crowded with convalescents, when it marched with its noble commander to take an active part in the war.

During the rage of the epidemic one or two of his servants in attendance sunk suddenly from behind his lordship's chair; and the noble marquess himself, seeing the probability of being attacked by the dreadful disease, gave secret instructions, in case of his dying, to be buried in his tent, lest the enemy should hear of his death and be thereby encouraged to attack his disheartened and crippled troops.* The return of health came very opportunely, for the army had been but a very short time at Erech when the marquess received intelligence that Scindiah had sent an invitation to the Pindarrees. The Mahratta prince was reported to have promised the robbers that if they would come so near to Gualior as to make his getting to them easy, he would break his recent treaty with the English, and join them with the force which he had at his capital. The Pindarrees in fact were in full march for Gualior, without meeting even a show of resistance from troops of Scindiah stationed on their route, though the co-operation of his army for the extinction of the Pindarrees was an article of the treaty. The movements of these Pindarrees and the suspicious conduct of Scindiah's troops imposed on the marquess the necessity of making a retrograde movement. "We hurried back to the Sinde," says his lordship; "but this time we chose a position nearer to Gualior than that which we had before occupied. We were within thirty miles of the city, and our advanced-guard was sent to occupy the passes through the hills, which run at some distance south of Gualior from the Sinde to the Chumbul. These passes were the only route by which communication could take place between the Pindarrees and Scindiah; and I was nearer to support my advanced-guard than the Maharajah (Scindiah) was to attack it, could he bring his men to so desperate a stake. The Pindarrees, finding their hopes baffled, and the pass, &c. stopped, attempted to retire; but they had been followed close by our divisions, were surprised, dispersed, and slaughtered in a number of small actions. In short, they disappeared. And thus our objects were completed."*

While the forces under the Marquess of Hastings, and the divisions under Hislop, Malcolm, Marshall, Keir, Adams, and other officers were chasing the Pindarrees from moor and mountain, valley and jungle, or reducing the forts in Malwa, Brigadier-General Smith, who had been reinforced at Poonah, prepared for an active pursuit of Bajee Rao, the fugitive Peishwa, who had flitted hither and thither like an ignis fatuus. Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, having organized a police and a provisional administration for the city of Poonah, accompanied General Smith's division, which began its march at the end of November. Gokla, one of the Peishwa's evil advisers, but bravest officers, attempted to defend a ghaut leading to the high land where the Kistna has its source, and where the Peishwa had found a refuge and a rallying point; but the Mahratta was beaten, and the pass was cleared by the British with great ease. No fighting, but rapid and most wearying marches ensued, the Peishwa's army flying in a sort of zigzag, and the Peishwa himself always keeping in advance of his main body. At last the Mahratta succeeded in getting round Smith's division; and then, passing between Poonah and Seroor, he moved northward as far as Wuttoor, on the road to Nassik. Here he was joined by his long-lost favourite Trimbukjee, who brought with him a considerable reinforcement of horse and foot. Trimbukjee had collected these forces in various directions, but a good part of them appear to have been Pindarrees. But for the

general and commander-in-chief, "which made such havoc in the division under my immediate command, forced me to quit the banks of the Sinde, and to seek a more favourable country for the recovery of my numerous sick. I did not find this until I was fifty miles from the river which I quitted. Fortunately the change of air was rapidly beneficial."—*Report on the Rise and Progress of the late War, &c.*

* Frederick Corbyn, Esq., Treatise on the Epidemic Cholera, &c.

* Marquess of Hastings, Report on the Rise and Progress of the Late War, &c.

good fights made in front of the presidency at Nagpoor, and within the walls of that city, Apa Saheb would have accompanied Trimbukjee with his large army and his desperate Arabs. After he had discovered the direction the Peishwa had taken, and had recruited his own worn-out cattle, General Smith, on the 22nd of September, started again in pursuit. This headlong race to the northward brought Smith close upon the rear of the Mahrattas; but, with the lubricity of eels, they slipped through his fingers, and making a flank movement behind some hills, they turned suddenly to the south, and retraced their steps towards Poonah. Colonel Burr, who commanded in that city, apprehending an attack, solicited the reinforcement of a battalion from Seroor. Captain Francis French Staunton,* of the Bombay establishment, was forthwith detached from Seroor with about 600 sepoys, 300 auxiliary horse, and two six-pounders. The distance was only two short marches. Staunton began his march from Seroor at eight o'clock in the evening of the 31st of December, and at ten the next morning he reached the heights of Corregaum, about half-way to Poonah, when, looking down upon the plain which lay between him and that city, he saw the whole of the Peishwa's army, estimated at 20,000 horse and several thousand foot. His march to Poonah was intercepted, and he himself was in great danger of being cut off. The brave officer did what the circumstances of the case required: he made a dash at the village of Corregaum (which stood on the heights, and which was composed of a number of stone houses with strong stone walls round the gardens), hoping to gain possession of it before it could be obtained by the enemy. But the Mahrattas, or rather the Arabs, who composed the main body of their infantry, were as near to the village as was Captain Staunton; and as he entered at one side and took possession of some of the houses, the Arabs entered at the opposite side and took possession of other houses. A terrible struggle ensued, at first between the Company's troops and the Arabs for the possession of the whole of the village, and then between our handful of men and nearly the whole of the Mahratta army. Unfortunately Captain Swanston, who commanded our 300 auxiliary horse, was wounded early in the day, and his weak squadrons could not show themselves in face of the masses of Mahratta cavalry. The enemy, who had been running too fast to carry artillery with him, brought up only two guns; but if there was an equality in this particular arm, their infantry exceeded ours by ten to one. Nevertheless our admirable sepoys maintained their post, and kept up an incessant fight from the hour of noon till nine in the evening, during which time they had no refreshment, and not even a drop of water to drink. Attack after attack was made under the eye of the Peishwa, who stood, no doubt at a safe distance, on a neighbouring hill. They had all failed, when Lieutenant Chisholm, the officer of artillery, with most of his men, having been killed at a post near a pagoda, and all the European officers having been disabled except three, the Arabs charged and obtained possession of one of our two guns, which was stationed at the pagoda. Our wounded were lying thick round that building, and among them were Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, Captain Swanston, and Lieutenant Connellon. The wild Arabs immediately began to massacre these helpless wounded men and to mutilate the bodies of the slain. Poor Wingate was literally hacked to pieces, as was the body of Lieutenant Chisholm, the officer of artillery. But the Arabs did not long enjoy their bloody triumph; the three undisabled officers, Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Jones, and Assistant-Surgeon Wylie,* though almost ex-

* Subsequently Colonel F. F. Staunton, C.B.

* The medical officers fought just as hard and as bravely as the other officers. With so small a force, and so very few English officers, it was necessary for every man to throw himself into the heat of the fight.

"The medical officers also led on the sepoys to charges with the bayonet, the nature of the contest not admitting of their attending to their professional duties; and in such a struggle the presence of a single European was of the utmost consequence, and seemed to inspire the native soldiers with the usual confidence of success."—*Division Orders by Brigadier-General Smith, C.B. East Ind. Military Calendar.*

hausted, and with their men fainting from want of water, headed one more charge, the last of the many that they made during the day, recaptured the lost gun, and slaughtered the Arabs in a heap. The charge was utterly desperate, for every man felt that there was nothing between him and victory except torture and death. On this occasion Lieutenant Pattinson, who had been wounded and carried into a house, appeared again at the head of his men, and continued to exert the little strength he had left until he received another wound, which proved mortal. Captain Swanston and Lieutenant Connellon were rescued; and every man of the Arabs who had penetrated to the pagoda was bayoneted without mercy. By a little after nine, the enemy were completely driven from the village and all the ground near it, and our fainting sepoys were then enabled to obtain a supply of water, the only refreshment they got during the whole day and following night. Where the desperate Arabs had failed, there was slight chance that the cowardly Mahrattas would renew the attempt. Captain Staunton and his people passed the night without any molestation. At daybreak on the following morning the Mahratta army was seen hovering about the village, but none of them would venture near; and this day also passed without any molestation. Captain Staunton had consumed so much powder during the nine hours' fighting of the preceding day, that he had only a few rounds of ammunition left; and provisions in the camp there were none, and none were to be procured in the village. Despairing therefore of being able to reach Poonah, he determined to move back to Seroor. He began his retreat in the dark on the night of the 2nd of January: he sacrificed much of his baggage in order to provide the means of conveying his numerous wounded, but he brought off not only his guns, but likewise all his wounded, and with them reached Seroor by nine o'clock the next morning, the 3rd of January. The men had had no refreshment but water from the 31st of December. Three officers were killed and two wounded; 62 men were killed and 113 wounded, exclusive of the auxiliary horse. The loss of men was most severe in the artillery, 12 being killed and 8 wounded out of a detail for two six-pounders only.*

Like the defence of the presidency at Nagpoor, this was an affair of which Clive himself might have been proud. Captain Staunton's superiors were men quite capable of appreciating his heroism, and of expressing their admiration in an eloquent and hearty manner. The Governor-general, who forthwith nominated Staunton an honorary aide-de-camp, and soon afterwards conferred on him the command of the important fortress of Ahmednughur, repeated the observation which General Smith had made in his official report to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, that the action of Corregaum was "one of the most brilliant affairs ever achieved by any army, in which the European and native soldiers displayed the most noble devotion and most romantic bravery, under the pressure of thirst and hunger, almost beyond human endurance." And, two years after the event, in presenting a valuable sword which had been voted by the Court of Directors to Captain (by this time Major) Staunton, his Lordship said, "I need say little of the conflict which has obtained you this honourable acknowledgment. It is already well known to all who take an interest in the achievements of the British arms in the East. All know the situation in which your detachment was placed, surrounded by numerous and implacable enemies, cut off from all hope of succour, and sinking under the pressure of thirst, exhaustion, and fatigue. In that hour of difficulty and danger it was your firmness that afforded to your brave companions an opportunity of displaying that devotion and gallantry which terminated in their triumph over the vast force opposed to them, and not only established for ever their own reputation, but threw a lustre over the character of their establishment, and added to the glory of the Indian

* H.T. Prinsep, Division Orders by Brigadier General Smith, C.B., dated "Camp, near Seroor 7th January, 1818," in East India Military Calendar.

army."* Furthermore the Government of Bombay, over which the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone then presided, caused a monument to be erected on the spot to commemorate the glory of the defence of Corregaum, and to preserve the memory of those who had fallen there. The foundation stone was laid in 1821; and the brass plate bears the truly noble names of "The Most Noble the Marquess of Hastings, Governor-general of India," and "The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay." Indian exploits had been too often overlooked in England, and neglected by our parliamentary orators; but, on this occasion, Mr. George Canning, on moving the thanks of the House of Commons to the Marquess of Hastings and the army in India, employed his eloquence and genius in extolling the glory of the little band which had repelled and kept at bay the Peishwa's 20,000 horse and masses of Arab infantry.

In the course of the 3rd of January, the day on which Capt. Staunton got back to Seroor, Brigadier-General Smith reached the village of Corregaum with his strong division. The Peishwa and his Mahrattas fled back to the table-land near the sources of the Kistna, from which they had descended. General Smith followed them closely, and Brigadier-General Pritzler, with another division, was moving from another point to intercept them. The Mahrattas continued to turn and twist like eels, and though Pritzler trod upon their tail more than once, and cut off part of it, they could not be so overtaken as to be brought to a general action, or even to a stand. They were very nearly caught in the neighbourhood of Satara, on the 28th of January; but they escaped by a ghaut, with the loss of part of their rear-guard. A small detachment under Colonel Boles cannonaded them out of another ghaut which they were attempting to thread; but they only changed their line of march. The troops were exhausted by this harassing pursuit, which seemed to produce no visible advantage. Mountstuart Elphinstone had the merit of recommending a better plan of operations. This was to storm the many strong places in the country, to deprive the Peishwa of the means of subsistence, to reduce Satara, which was still the nominal capital of the Mahratta empire, and to reinstate the Satara family in an independent sovereignty. The fortress of Satara surrendered to Brigadier-General Smith, on the 10th of February, the day on which he first appeared before it. Some other places were in process of reduction when the Peishwa made certain rash movements which enabled General Smith to fall upon him at Ashtee, on the 20th of February, with the 2nd and 7th regiments of Madras light cavalry, and two squadrons of his Majesty's 22nd dragoons. Bajee Rao, the dastardly Peishwa, deserted his palanquin and his army, mounting a horse, and galloping away as soon as the battle began; but Gokla, his general, seeing that he must either fight or lose the baggage and nearly everything else, made a bold stand, outflanking Smith's small force, and at one moment threatening it in the rear. But the British dragoons charged his *Gole*,* and killed him in the charge. The death of Gokla left the Mahrattas without a head. From this moment all was confusion and panic, each mass of cavalry breaking as our dragoons approached it. Some faint resistance was attempted in the camp; but our dragoons dashed in, and made good booty. Twelve elephants and fifty-seven camels formed part of this prize. General Smith was slightly wounded on the head, and Lieutenant Warrand, of the 22nd dragoons, was wounded by Gokla, who fought fiercely in the melée, and wounded several of our men before he fell; but no one was killed on our side, and only 17 or 18 of the soldiers were wounded.

The remnant of the Peishwa's army fled towards the north, being daily thinned by desertion. Brigadier-General Pritzler, General Monro, Colonels Prother and Deacon, reduced all the forts that remained; the Mahratta flag was fast disappearing, and so were the hopes of the Mahratta chiefs. Our divisions and

* Address of the Marquess of Hastings. East Ind. Military Calendar.

* A mass of Mahratta cavalry.

detachments in the field, in almost all parts of India, were too numerous and too well posted to allow of any junction being effected between the Peishwa and the forces of any of our other enemies.

After the battle of Ashtee Brigadier-General Smith repaired to Satara, in order to assist Mr. Elphinstone in setting up the Rajah. In this way the Peishwa gained a few days' respite, during which he continued to press to the north-west, with the design of throwing himself into the territories of the Nizam of the Deccan, which he hoped to find ill furnished with troops. But turning back from Satara, and making a short halt at Seroor, Smith renewed his pursuit of the Peishwa on the 10th of March. Brigadier-General Doveton, with his division, moved in another direction in the expectation of intercepting the Peishwa. Nevertheless the Mahratta traversed the Nizam's dominions from west to east, and appeared on the banks of the Werda on the 1st of April. But as his van was crossing that river with the intention of marching upon Nagpoor, it was met and driven back by a small detachment under Colonel Scott. The Peishwa then tried to cross the river at another point, but here he was met by Colonel Adams, and was informed by his scouts that General Doveton was getting close upon him. Without waiting the arrival of Doveton, Adams followed the Mahrattas, came up with them near Soonee, and with only one regiment of native cavalry and some horse artillery, gave them a signal overthrow. The enemy fled through the jungles, leaving behind them 5 guns, the Peishwa's much sunken treasure, three elephants, and 200 camels. This time Bajee Rao had a very narrow escape; for, though he began to run as soon as his people began to fight, a palanquin in which he had just been riding was taken, and was found to be perforated by a shot. More than 1000 of his Mahrattas remained dead on the field. They were knocked down by our horse artillery, or by our cavalry in their flight. They can scarcely have stood anywhere, for Colonel Adams's total loss was only two wounded. General Doveton was near enough to hear the firing of Adams's guns; but it was found necessary to halt our troops in order to wait for supplies; and then mistakes were committed as to the direction in which the pursuit ought to be continued. Nor was it easy to avoid these errors, for the Peishwa's army split up into various detachments, and each took a route of its own. Two-thirds of his people quitted his standard altogether, and were only anxious to reach their homes as speedily as might be. Bajee Rao's whole object now was to get back to the north-east; but here he found his progress stopped by General Sir Thomas Hislop, who was returning from Malwa to the Deccan. On his way Sir Thomas had resorted to a measure of unusual severity. The fort of Talnere or Thalnir, situated on the north bank, and commanding a ford over the river Taptee, was one of the places ceded to the English by Holkar, under the late treaty. Sir Thomas had in his possession Holkar's own orders for the quiet surrender of the place; yet a fire was opened upon his troops from the fort. The Mahratta killadar, or commandant, was warned that if he continued to resist the order of his master he would be dealt with as a rebel: without heeding the message, the killadar continued to fire. Upon this Sir Thomas Hislop occupied the Pettah, or open town, and turned his artillery upon the fort. The gate of the fort was blown open by two six-pounders. The flank companies of the Royal Scots and of the Company's European regiment rushed in, and came to the second gate, which was found open. At the third gate they were met by the killadar, who came out by the wicket, and surrendered to Colonel Conway. The third and fourth gates were then opened, and the storming party advanced to the fifth, which led into the body of the place. This was found shut, but part of the garrison within demanded terms, and expressed their dissatisfaction at the gate's being closed. After a very short parley, in which they were summoned to surrender at discretion, the wicket gate was opened from within, and Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Major Gordon, Captain MacGregor, and Lieutenants Chauvel and MacGregor, entered, and were followed by ten or twelve grenadiers. They

were scarcely within the wicket, when some wild Arabs, who formed part of the garrison, fell upon them with swords, spears, and knives. Major Gordon and Captain MacGregor were killed forthwith; Lieutenant-Colonel Murray was wounded in several places, cut down, and disabled; the two lieutenants were wounded and cut down also, and all the grenadiers were either killed or wounded. But the rest of our storming-party soon rushed through the wicket, drove off the murderous Arabs, and in the end slaughtered every man that was in the fort. Between Arabs, Patans, and Mahrattas, 300 men were sacrificed to the vengeance of our infuriated soldiery. On the next morning Sir Thomas Hislop had the killadar hanged on one of the bastions, on the twofold charge of rebellion and treachery. It was doubted whether the killadar had ordered, or was privy to, the onslaught of the Arabs; it was doubted (but we think unreasonably) whether the Arabs understood that the killadar had surrendered, and that the Mahrattas had agreed to submit—and the conduct of Sir Thomas Hislop, in ordering the execution of the killadar, was severely censured in several quarters; but the example was useful, and upon knowing that the commandant of Talnere had been executed, the killadars of the much stronger forts of Gaulnah, Chandore, and other places which Holkar had ceded, submitted upon summons, or as soon as they were shown Holkar's orders to admit the English.*

Bajee Rao had been running hither and thither for more than six months, but his race was now well nigh finished. North, south, east, and west, his road was cut off, and forces were moving round him from the intermediate points of the compass. Finding himself so sorely pressed, he attempted again to pass into Malwa; but Sir John Malcolm, who was himself at Mow, a town or large cantonment in the Malwa province, had so stationed some forces under Lieutenant-Colonels Russel and Corsellis as to render this movement impracticable. On the evening of the 25th of May Sir John Malcolm learned that a vakeel from the Peishwa had arrived at a place on the Nerbudda river, about 40 miles from Mow. Malcolm immediately moved towards that place, and took his troops with him. On the 27th of May he met the vakeel or ambassador, who assured him that the Peishwa was determined to come to him, and to trust to his friendship and generosity.* Sir John, being informed of the plan of disposing of the Peishwa, which had been framed by the Marquess of Hastings and Mr. Elphinstone, stated the conditions, and sent the vakeel back to his master, who was occupying a good position on a hill. The Peishwa remained irresolute for several days, during which the division of General Doveton and other troops got close into his neighbourhood. At last, on the evening of the 1st of June, he came down to a village in the plain and met Sir John Malcolm. The Mahratta did not come alone, he had an escort 2500 strong, and he brought his family with him. Malcolm, who had come to the appointed place with only a thin attendance, repeated the conditions, and demanded the immediate surrender of Trimbukjee. Bajee Rao declared that it was not in his power to give up Trimbukjee, that Trimbukjee had an army and camp of his own, that he was stronger than he was. "Then," said Malcolm, "I will attack him forthwith." "Success attend you!" replied the Peishwa. The Mahratta prince further declared that he had been involved in a war without meaning it; that he was treated as an enemy by the English, who had supported his family for two generations; that he was now in a lamentable situation, but believed that he still had a real friend in Sir John Malcolm. He was told that he ought either to throw himself at once on the magnanimity of the British Government, or prepare for further resistance. "How can I resist now?" said the Mahratta; "I am surrounded." Malcolm replied that this

* Colonel Valentine Blacker, Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India, &c. Lieutenant Edward Lake, of Hon. East Indin Company's Madras Engineers, Journals of the Sieges of the Madras Army, &c. in the years 1817, 1818, and 1819, &c. &c., London, 1825.

* Sir John Malcolm had previously received a letter from the Peishwa, full of compliments and outrageous flattery.

was quite true, but that still he might escape if he preferred becoming a free-booter and wanderer to accepting the liberal provisions which the English were ready to give him. Bajee Rao protested that Malcolm was his friend, his only friend, and that he would never leave him, but trust entirely to his good offices. Nevertheless the Peishwa, on breaking up the conference, asked for a little delay, and in retiring to the ghaut from which he had descended he took care to guard his rear and flanks with his resolute Arab infantry, and to show the muzzles of his guns over the rocks; and upon reaching his camp he sent trusty messengers to the camp of Trimbukjee to tell that favourite to beware of Malcolm. It was, however, utterly impossible for him to procrastinate very long, for he was completely hemmed in, and his supplies of provisions were failing. He informed Sir John Malcolm that he would go to his camp, and conclude the treaty as proposed to him on the morning of the 3rd of June. When that morning came, he tried one faint shuffle more. It was an inauspicious day, he had some religious ceremonies to perform; would not his dear friend Malcolm wait till to-morrow? Malcolm gave him to understand that he would not wait another hour; and this, with the not very distant firing of some English guns on one of his flanks or in his rear, had the effect of removing all further hesitation. At about 11 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd he came down to Sir John Malcolm's camp, and delivered himself up, with his family. Malcolm, like nearly all his distinguished Indian contemporaries, was a man of a large and generous heart: none knew better than he the demerits and the helplessness of the fallen enemy now before him, yet he agreed that the Peishwa's allowance should not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum, and that a most liberal provision should be made for his courtiers, Brahmins, temples, &c. The supreme government at Calcutta thought that Sir John had granted too much; but as it was done, they confirmed the grants. Bajee Rao renounced for ever the dignity of Peishwa, or supreme chief of the Mahrattas, together with all his claims of sovereignty. If Trimbukjee had not been secured in an English prison, the case might have been different; but as that turbulent felon was caught, after another hard run for it, the ex-Peishwa quietly resigned himself to a life of luxury and ease, spending his 80,000*l.* a year not in raising troops or exciting combinations against the Company, but in mere sensual indulgences. He was very anxious to have his residence fixed at Poonah; but to this the governor-general objected strongly, and for very evident reasons. To Benares, which was proposed to him as a suitable residence, he expressed a rooted aversion. He would have preferred Mutra, but as that was a frontier station it was refused. The village of Betoor or Brimatwar, on the Ganges, near Cawnpoor, was finally fixed upon for his residence. His progress through Rajpootana and the Duab to the place of his exile excited hardly any sensation among the people. When settled at Betoor, he bathed daily in the holy water of the Ganges, indulged in the highest living of a Brahmin, maintained three expensive sets of dancing-girls, and surrounded himself with low buffoons and sycophants.* The rallying-point of the Mahratta confederacy was thus broken up, and if it was not quite so easy to change the character of the Mahratta people, and to introduce peaceful, industrious habits among them—if the unchanged character of that people prognosticated future troubles in India,—still their power of doing mischief was from this time vastly reduced. To the restored family of the Rajah of Satara, whose hereditary claim to the sovereignty of the country, and to the dignity of Peishwa, was held to be much better than that of Bajee Rao, only a very limited territory was allotted upon his yielding all claim or pretension to be Peishwa; a dignity wisely and for ever abrogated. The Satara dominions occupy a surface of about 11,000 square miles, being bounded on the west by the Western Ghaut mountains, on the south by the

* Colonel Valentine Blacker. We learn from the Bombay Calendar and Almanac of 1843 that the ex-Peishwa Bajee Rao was still living and enjoying his 80,000*l.* per annum.

Warna and Krishna, on the north by the Neera and Beema rivers, and on the east by the frontier of the Nizam's dominions. The total net revenues amounted to 15,600,000 rupees; but out of this sum three lacs per annum were reserved for chiefs who had become subjects of the Company, and three lacs more were alienated. The management of the territories, and the superintendence of the Rajah of Satára's affairs, were assigned to Captain Grant, until the country should become tranquillized. Many of the hill-forts, which had been what the worst of our baronial castles were in the early part of the twelfth century (dens of thieves, cut-throats, and violators), were dismantled; and others, cleared of their occupants, were allowed to go to ruin. In 1821, when the young Rajah attained the age of 21, he was invested with the administration of his dominions, which were then tranquil and prosperous.

Upon the conclusion of the treaty with Sir John Malcolm, all that remained of the ex-Peishwa's army quietly broke up and dispersed. Not even Trimbukjee could keep a force together. This chief, knowing that the English would condemn him to imprisonment for life, fled with a few followers to the neighbourhood of Nassuck, a large town and place of pilgrimage on the Godavery, principally inhabited by Brahmins. The murderer had ever shown a preference for these holy places, and he probably hoped to escape notice among the crowds of Hindu pilgrims that were constantly repairing to the temples of Nassuck. Here, in fact, he remained concealed for some time, in spite of the active search making for him. At last, Captain Swanston, one of the heroes of Corregaum, being detached by Mr. Elphinstone from a distant station, succeeded, after a march of 50 miles in 16 hours, in discovering the murderer's hiding-place, and in surrounding the house. When the gates were forced, Trimbukjee was reclining on a cot; he fled to the upper part of the house, and concealed himself under some straw. He was presently dragged from his cover: he offered no resistance, and was sent under a good guard to Tannah, the prison from which he had escaped through the ingenious aid of the Mahratta groom and songster. After a short time he was carried to Calcutta, and put into the cage in Fort William which had previously been occupied by Vizier Ali, but he was very soon conveyed to the rock of Chunar, near Benares; and there, in the fortress to which Warren Hastings had fled on the Cheyte Sing insurrection, and around which were now assembled superabundant proofs of the empire and prosperity of the English,* whose power he had attempted to overthrow; he was visited by Bishop Heber in the month of September, 1824. "On the top of the rock of Chunar," says our accomplished and still lamented prelate, "and within the rampart is a considerable space, covered with remarkably fine English hay-grass, several noble spreading trees, and some excellent houses for the officers. . . . . Within this principal circle, and on a still higher point, are two inner fortifications, one containing the governor's house, the hospital, and the state prison, now inhabited by the celebrated Mahratta chieftain Trimbukjee, long the inveterate enemy of the British power, and the fomenter of all the troubles in Berar, Malwa, and the Deccan. He is confined with great strictness, having an European as well as a sepoy guard, and never being trusted out of the sight of the sentries. Even his bedchamber has three grated windows open into the verandah, which serves as guard-room. In other respects he is well treated, has two large and very airy apartments,† a small building fitted up as a

* Bishop Heber tells us that the whole scene round Chunar is now entirely English. There is a tall Gothic tower, belonging to the Protestant mission church, built by Mr. Corrie in imitation of the old tower of his native village church. The Mohammedan mosques and the Hindu temples are scarcely discernible. Many good European habitations, looking like English villas, arrest the eye; even the native houses, with their white walls and red-tiled roofs, look exactly like those of a small English country town; and the castle, with its Union flag, is such as would be greatly admired, but not at all out of place, in any English seaport. "And," adds the Bishop, "much as I admire palm-trees, I felt glad that they were not very common in this neighbourhood, and that there were, in point of fact, none visible, to spoil the whole English character of the prospect."—*Indian Journal.*

† In other times he would not have been quite

pagoda, and a little garden shaded with a peepul-tree, which he has planted very prettily with balsams and other flowers. Four of his own servants are allowed to attend him, but they are always searched before they quit or return to the fort, and must be always there at night. He is a little, lively, irritable-looking man, dressed, when I saw him, in a dirty cotton mantle, with a broad red border, thrown carelessly over his head and shoulders. I was introduced to him by Colonel Alexander, and he received me courteously, observing that he himself was a Brahmin, and, in token of his brotherly regard, plucked some of his prettiest flowers for me. He then showed me his garden and pagoda, and after a few common-place expressions of the pleasure I felt in seeing so celebrated a warrior, which he answered by saying, with a laugh, he should have been glad to make my acquaintance *elsewhere*, I made my bow, and took leave. He has been now, I believe, five years in prison, and seems likely to remain there during life, or till the death of his patron and tool, Bajee Rao, may lessen his power of doing mischief. He has often offered to give security to any amount for his good behaviour, and to become a warmer friend to the Company than he has ever been their enemy; but his applications have been in vain. He attributes their failure to Mr. Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, who is, he says, "his best friend, and his worst enemy," the faithful trustee of his estate, treating his children with parental kindness, and interesting himself, in the first instance, to save his life, but resolutely fixed on keeping him in prison, and urging the supreme court to distrust all his protestations. His life must now be dismally monotonous and wearisome. Though a Brahmin of high caste, and so long a *minister* of state, he can neither read nor write, and his whole amusement consists in the ceremonies of his idolatry, his garden, and the gossip which his servants pick up for him in the town of Chunar. Avarice seems at present his ruling passion. He is a very severe inspector of his weekly accounts, and one day set the whole garrison in an uproar about some ghee (Indian butter), which he accused his khansaman of embezzling; in short, he seems less interested with the favourable reports which he from time to time receives of his family, than with the banking accounts by which they are accompanied. Much as he is said to deserve his fate, as a murderer, an extortioner, and a grossly perjured man, I hope I may be allowed to pity him."*

Some other men besides Trimbukjee fell from their high estate, and were made captives by the English at the conclusion of these Mahratta wars. The Marquess of Hastings, and most people acquainted with the character and connexions of the Nagpoor Rajah, were of opinion that Mr. Jenkins, the resident, had acted unwisely in rescuing him on the musnud, and leaving him a large part of his dominions; and events very speedily proved that Apa Saheb exceeded the ordinary faithlessness of Mahratta princes, and that no reliance could possibly be placed on any treaty with him. Instead of breaking off all connexion with the Peishwa, and assisting the English to put down the Pindarrees, he connected himself more closely than ever with that enemy and with those destructive marauders. As we have seen, he corresponded with Cheetoo, and encouraged him to persevere by promising him splendid rewards. He corresponded also with the Holkar Mahrattas, with the fierce Patans, with the fiercer Arabs, with every enemy of the British Government. He first attracted suspicion by issuing orders to carry his treasures to Chanda, and other fortresses, and by having constantly in motion a set of plotting, designing men, who, conjointly, wove a web of intrigue over all Berar and Malwa, and a good part of Hindustan. But some of these wily agents betrayed

so well lodged. In another part of the fortress of Chunar there is an old Hindu palace, and in front of this palace, in the pavement of the court, are seen four small round holes, just large enough for a man to pass through; and below is the state prison of former times.

"Well is it for Trimbukjee that his lot is thrown in better days! This is a horrible dungeon indeed, with neither light, air, nor access, except what these apertures supply to a space of forty feet square. It is now used as a cellar."—*Id.*

* Bishop Heber, Indian Journal.

their employer, revealing the secrets with which they were intrusted, and pointing out the keys or clues to the whole system of mystery and machination. Upon this, being well furnished with troops, the English resident seized the Rajah and his two chief ministers, brought them to the Nagpoor Residency, which had been so treacherously attacked and so bravely defended, and kept them there in close confinement. The two ministers, who hoped to save themselves by throwing all the guilt on their master, spontaneously confessed that a multiplicity of intrigues had been going on against the English, and that Apa Saheb had barbarously murdered his blind and helpless cousin and predecessor, the Rajah Pursajee. It was expected that, in pursuance of the plan which had been concerted, the Peishwa would make a desperate attempt to obtain possession of the strong city of Nagpoor. Therefore the number of our troops in that quarter could not with safety be reduced. But when the Peishwa had made his efforts to get to Nagpoor, and had failed in so doing, and when his great Mahratta army was annihilated or scattered, our Nagpoor resident selected a strong escort, and packed off Apa Saheb for the fortress of Allahabad, which was considered the best state prison that could be provided for him. Our escort was vigilant as well as strong, yet, through the exercise of some bribery, and of a vast deal of ingenuity on the part of his own servants and adherents, the ex-Rajah contrived to escape, on the 12th of May, 1818, as the troops of the escort were halting at Rychore. This gave rise to another hard and long hunt. Though closely followed by half a dozen parties, Apa Saheb got fairly off, and reached the Mahadeo hills, behind Poonah, where Trimbukjee had so long lurked. Here he was harboured and concealed by the wild Gonds, a singular race, with broad flat noses, thick lips, and very frequently curly hair, like the African Negroes. Most of the tribes inhabiting the hills were absolute savages; but a large community, more advanced in civilization, had submitted to the Government of a Rajah or chief, named Chyn Shah. This chief joined heart and hand with Apa Saheb; and a new plan of operations was concerted between them. At the close of the rainy season of this eventful year, 1818, Apa Saheb collected round his standard some of the unemployed Mahratta troopers and wild Arabs, who had served in the Peishwa's army until it was broken up; and with these bands, and the wild Gonds of the hills, he began to commit depredations in all directions, occasionally extending his incursions as far as the British territories on the Nerbudda. No country could be better adapted for the carrying on of a desultory warfare than the one he had chosen for his asylum, for the whole of it was a succession of mountains, ravines, rivers, and jungles. Some of the Arabs were pursued by Captain Sparkes with only 107 sepoys. Finding that they were far more numerous than they had been led to expect, that the Arabs and those with them formed a host of cavalry and infantry, Captain Sparkes took up the first position that presented itself. He maintained the post for some hours, until he had lost half his men and consumed nearly all his powder. He then displayed a white flag. The signal was disregarded; it is vain to hope truce or quarter from such enemies as those; in such situations the brave man must make up his mind to die with his sword in his hand. Sparkes was shot dead in leading a charge, or in attempting to cut a way through the enemy, and every man of his detachment was literally cut to pieces by the Arabs, with the exception of nine who had been left in the rear, in charge of the baggage. In the strong country east of Nagpoor, a powerful chief openly declared for the ex-Rajah, and other jungle chiefs followed this example; but they were all reduced to obedience and punished by a detachment under Major Wilson. In the Bytool valley the Arabs levied contributions in the name of Apa Saheb, and butchered another party of our sepoys. The name of the ex-Rajah of Nagpoor was waxing almost as terrible as that of Trimbukjee. An enormous reward (a lac of rupees in hand, and ten thousand rupees a year in land) was offered for his apprehension; and, as no effects proceeded from the tempting offer, most probably because it could not

be sufficiently published in Apa Saheb's camp, or in the wild regions which he frequented, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was detached against him, in some force, at the close of the year. While Colonel Adams was establishing stations of cavalry and infantry round the country of Chyn Shah, that chief with two or three thousand of his Gonds made a bold attempt to recover for Apa Saheb some of the forts in Nagpoor; but these attempts were frustrated, and both Chyn Shah and the fugitive Rajah were obliged to seek refuge in the mountains, and to fly from place to place, as the Peishwa had been obliged to do. In the month of February, 1819, Colonel Adams entered the mountains from the Nerbudda valley, with three separate columns; and other divisions came up to co-operate with him. Upon this Apa Saheb, with whom at this moment was the Pindarree Cheetoo, fled from the hill to Aseerghur, the killadar of which, Jeswunt Rao Lar, was his friend, the friend (in former days) of the Pindarrees, and (in all days) the irreconcilable enemy of the English. In the course of a very few days Aseerghur was invested by British and native troops; fresh divisions came up to join in the siege, and such an accumulation of ordnance and other means took place as had not been witnessed in these Indian wars, except at the siege of Hatrass. Twenty-two 18-pounders, two 24-pounders, seven 12-pounders, nineteen howitzers, and fifteen mortars, were gathered round Aseerghur, which stands on a scarped hill, and is exceedingly strong by art as well as by nature. It had always been considered a place of the greatest importance, as it commanded one of the great passes of the Deccan into Hindustan. In a straight line Aseerghur was not more than sixteen miles to the north of the city of Boorhampoor. The natural strength which it received from the precipitous rock had been increased by a thick and lofty rampart of masonry, built on the very summit of the rock, and by large cavaliers mounting enormous guns, which commanded the country around in every direction. One of these guns was styled "the Lord of the Boorhampoor Bazaar," the natives firmly believing that it could reach that city, though fourteen miles off. This gun was of iron, and carried a 384-pound ball. The general height of the position above the plain was 750 feet. Counting the walls of the Pettah, or town which lay in a hollow, there were three enclosures besides the ramparts on the top of the rock. The killadar, or commandant, knew that *we* had Scindiah's order for his surrender, but *he* had at the same time Scindiah's order to hold out to the utmost. On the 17th of March the Pettah or town was carried by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser. The enemy made one or two desperate sallies from the fortress, and killed Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser; but before daylight of the 21st they were entirely driven out of the lower fort. The explosion of the magazine of one of our breaching batteries, a magazine containing 130 barrels of powder, destroyed an entire company of our sepoys, and created some confusion, during which another sally was made by the besieged. But they were driven back, and our battery renewed its fire in a very short space of time. Other batteries were erected, and began to play on the upper fort. On the 5th of April one of the angles of the upper fort, flanking a ravine, was brought down, and with it came thundering and crashing over the face of the rock one of the enormous pieces of Indian ordnance. Our storming parties were ready to act under the eyes of General Doveton and Sir John Malcolm, when, on the 7th of April, Jeswunt Rao Lar, who had consumed nearly all his gunpowder, and lost his chief artillery officer, and who possibly feared the fate of the hanged killadar of Talnere, begged a parley, and agreed to surrender at discretion. In the conference he told Sir John Malcolm that his master Scindiah would be very angry with him. "He has just cause," said Malcolm. "Yes," continued the killadar, "he will reproach me with having fought so badly with so fine a fort. He will say I ought to have died!" "But," said Malcolm, have you not an order from your master to evacuate the fort?" The killadar replied, "It may be the usage amongst Europeans, but with us Mahrattas, forts like that are not given up upon orders!"

A garrison of 1200 men, chiefly Arab mercenaries, piled their arms before Sir John Malcolm's division. Few of the besieged had fallen during the siege,* for the rock and the upper fort towered so high above our batteries that only shells could reach them with any effect. The total loss of the besiegers was one officer, nine Europeans, and thirty-seven sepoys killed; ten officers, seventy-three Europeans, and one hundred and eighty-one natives wounded. At first the flag of Scindiah was hoisted over the captured and battered walls of Aseerghur, which stands in the midst of that Mahratta's territory; but as it was discovered that Scindiah had ordered the killadar to shelter Apa Saheb and resist the English to the utmost, the foul Mahratta rag was pulled down, and our union-flag hoisted in its stead. The fortress, with a small surrounding tract of jungle, productive of little else than tigers and wolves, has been retained by the Company ever since.† The possession of Aseerghur, among other advantages, enabled the Company's troops to restrain the excesses of the Bheel tribes who inhabited the neighbouring range of hills. The place was also advantageously situated as a depôt. It had been taken from the Mahrattas during the brilliant campaigns of Wellesley and Lake, but had been very unwisely restored to Scindiah.

On taking possession of the fortress, Sir John Malcolm confidently expected to find Apa Saheb in some part of it; but that ex-Rajah had effected his escape either during the siege, or before the place was invested: he, or those who aided him, having had a genius for escapes. Months passed before it could be known what he was doing, or whither he had gone. In the interim the Gonds were severely chastised; several of their chiefs were killed, and Chyn Shah himself was seized, deposed, and carried off prisoner to the Company's fortress at Chanda, where he died of the cholera morbus, in 1820. Parts of his territories were assumed by the Company as the best means of protecting their country on the Nerbudda. Some few forts and positions were permanently occupied, and the Company's sepoys levied the pilgrim tax at the Mahadeo temple, and in the passes which lead to it. This tax or toll had formerly been divided among many Gond chiefs, who raised it or lowered it according to circumstances, or according to their own strength or relative weakness of the pilgrims; but a regular rate was now fixed, and the money collected was divided among the chiefs by the English collectors. Even in this poor, hungry, savage district, a rapid improvement followed the Company's occupation: the Gonds left off thieving and took to honest labour. After many false reports had been spread about his whereabout, accurate intelligence was received of Apa Saheb's having fled to Lahore, to seek refuge with Runjeet Sing. He had arrived in that country disguised as a fakir, or holy mendicant and stroller. The Seik chieftain would not receive him publicly at his durbar, lest such conduct should give offence to the English; but he ordered that a place of concealment, with the bare means of subsistence, should be furnished to the once powerful, but now dispossessed Rajah of Nagpoor. In the meanwhile the governor-general had declared Apa Saheb dethroned, and had proclaimed as his successor the son of a daughter of the Rajah Ragojee, who died in 1816, and appointed the widow of Rajah Pursajee, whom Apa Saheb had murdered, to be regent for the minor. Every department of government was, however, placed under the direct control of British officers; and the whole country of Nagpoor, with its resources, was virtually annexed to the Company's dominions.

The capture of Aseerghur was the last operation of the Pindarree and Mahratta war; a war which had witnessed an unprecedented number of sieges, an unprecedented number and complexity of movements, and some of the most remark-

* Only forty-three killed and ninety-five wounded.

† Colonel Valentine Blacker, Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India during the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818, and 1819, &c. &c. Lieutenant Lake, Madras Engineers, Journals of the Sieges of the Madras Army, &c. &c. H. T. Prinseps.

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able forced marches that were ever made in any country. The sieges were too remarkable to be passed over without notice. The reserve division alone performed three sieges—those of Singhur, Belgaum, and Sholapoor. Lieutenant-Colonel Macdowall's detachment and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams's division reduced the Peishwa's numerous and strong fortresses in Candeish. The most famed of these places were Radjeir, Trimbuk, Mallegaum, and Chanda, which were all in the south of Candeish—a curious country abounding in detached hills, and every hill being crowned by some defensive work. Let the reader imagine a series of hills rising very abruptly from 600 to 1100 feet, and connected with each other, and with the range of which they form part, only by very low and narrow necks of land: let him still further imagine occasional bluff rocks, perfectly perpendicular, and varying in height from 80 to 100 feet, rising from the summits of these abrupt hills—and then he will have some notion of the sites of these Candeish hill-forts. The range is primitive; the bluff rocks rising from it are basaltic, and so beautifully and regularly scarped as to have the appearance of being formed by the chisel; and the number of them, which is much greater than could be required for the defence of the country, is the only fact which makes the supposition of their having been formed by art incredible; for the excavation of the ditches at Dowletabad, out of the same species of granite rock, is a proof of the amazing perseverance of the old natives of India, and of the difficulties it could surmount. Such of these Candeish hills as contain water on their summits had been fortified by the natives in the most remote period of antiquity, there being no record of their first occupation. The space contained within the rocky scarp constituted the interior of the fort. There was seldom much work raised on them, or indeed anything done further than to cut flights of steps out of the solid rock, and to construct a number of gateways over them; but great ingenuity had been exerted to render these as intricate as possible. Nothing was wanted but a determined garrison to render such positions perfectly impregnable. "Nature intended these hills for other men and other deeds. . . . . It was from these very hills that Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta power, first endeavoured to break the iron bonds in which his countrymen were held by Aurunzebe. It was amongst these hills that his enterprises were planned, and from them that his 'living cloud of war' was poured forth. It was here that he laid the foundation of that power which, in after-times, retaliated upon the fallen emperor of Delhi the injuries which the intolerant spirit of that prince's ancestors had inflicted on the Hindu world; and here the last Mahratta sovereign might have made an effectual struggle for independence: but the spirit was wanting with which the great founder of the tribe had armed his people for conquest. THIRTY hill-fortresses, each of which might have defied the whole Anglo-Indian army, fell in the course of a few weeks; and this vast Mahratta empire, which had overshadowed the East, and before which the star of the Mogul had become pale, was annihilated."* Some of these hill-fortresses, however, made a stout resistance, being garrisoned by Arab mercenaries, who were always formidable adversaries when fighting under cover. These Arabs were very expert marksmen with their matchlocks, and they picked off our men as they exposed themselves in the trenches, or as they advanced to the assault. Owing to the defects in our engineering department, the trenches were seldom well made, or sufficient to afford protection to those who were posted in them. At Malligaum the Arabs certainly made a very gallant defence; and their humane consideration in allowing the British to carry off their dead and wounded, and their rare respect for flags of truce, did them no less honour. All this was properly appreciated by their conquerors. After these Arabs at Malligaum had laid down their arms in front of our troops, Lieutenant-Colonel Macdowall restored to them their side-arms; and at this act

* Edward Lake, Lieutenant of Madras Engineers. 'Journals of the Sieges of the Madras Army.'

of kindness and honour, those bearded, rugged-hearted men were so much touched that they all wept.* Thus even the most ferocious of all the combatants in India could be softened and humanized by generous and humane conduct. Cruelty and retaliation would only have rendered them the more cruel.

We have said that in several of the sieges and assaults of places we experienced either repulses or unnecessary sacrifices of life; and that this was owing to the deficiencies of our engineer and artillery departments. During the Spanish campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, the inefficiency of a body of good scientific officers when unassisted by men trained to siege duty, was most fully displayed; and it was not until the close of that eventful war, and in consequence of the earnest and frequent representations of the Duke, that a corps was raised, and an establishment formed for their instruction, under the superintendence of one of the ablest and most distinguished officers in that very distinguished body the Royal Engineers.† On the whole, the history of our sieges in the Peninsular War is but a sad and humiliating chapter in our military annals. Now, in consequence of the excellent system pursued at Chatham, every man is made practically acquainted with the nature of his duties before he is sent abroad; and the corps of Royal Sappers and Miners is inferior to none of the older established ones of the same description, in the French, the Austrian, the Prussian, or any other service. But our Indian armies in the days of the Marquess of Hastings had no sappers and miners at all. Sir Thomas Hislop, the commander-in-chief of the army of the Deccan, had only thirty European and fifty native pioneers; and these and some few Madras pioneers were the only men at the immediate disposal of the engineers who had to direct so many sieges! So deficient was the number of our artillery officers that there never were enough employed in the same siege to afford a relief. At the siege of Aseerghur, in particular, the officers of the Madras artillery actually lived in the batteries. This incessant service was so severe, that several of our officers died of sheer fatigue, or were worn out and invalided.

After the siege of Aseerghur the armies of the three presidencies returned to their several stations and cantonments in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and the regions which had been crossed and recrossed, and traversed in all directions by immense hosts of combatants, by British and native troops, Peishwa Mahrattas, Holkar Mahrattas, Nagpoor Mahrattas, Pindarrees, Patans, Arabs, Gonds, and others, became quiet as a bay of the ocean after a storm; quieter and happier than they had been for many ages. In the territories assumed by the Company, or taken under its immediate protection, able men were left by the Marquess of Hastings to improve this tranquillity, to establish permanently the reign of peace and law, and to better the condition of all the native inhabitants. For more than thirty preceding years, the province of Malwa, and the whole of Central India had been oppressed, pillaged, and laid waste by the Pindarrees, by the Mahrattas of all tribes, by the Rajpoot princes, and by the Puars: these different powers acted sometimes in combination, but more frequently in opposition to one another: they were all equally cruel and rapacious in the moment of success and conquest, and about equally incapable of giving that stability to their conquests which would have given relief to the poor oppressed people, whose greatest calamity was the frequent change of masters. To Sir John Malcolm, who had assisted so potentially in subduing the sanguinary anarchists, and expelling the Pindarrees, was assigned the equally difficult duty of restoring order and repairing the frightful mischiefs which had been committed in so long a series of years. He was appointed by the Marquess of Hastings to the military and political command of Malwa, which had perhaps suffered more than any other part of India. Hundreds upon hundreds of its villages were deserted and roofless; the ferocious tigers of the jungles literally usurped the country, and fought with the returning inhabitants for their

* Lake, Journal of Sieges, &c.
† Id. Id., and Wellington Dispatches.

fields. In the state of Holkar alone, of 3701 villages, only 2038 were inhabited; 1663 were "without lamp"—were wholly deserted. Under the wise rule established by Malcolm, more than two-thirds of these deserted villages were restored and repeopled before the end of 1820; and in less than five years from the time our army first occupied the country, Sir John could boast with an honourable pride, and with perfect correctness, that Malwa and the rest of Central India were tranquil and contented, and rapidly advancing in population and prosperity. "It may be asserted that history affords few examples where a change in the political condition of a country has been attended with such an aggregate of increased happiness to its inhabitants, as that which was effected within four years in Central India; and it is pleasing to think that, with the exception of suppressing a few Bheel robbers,* peace was restored, and has hitherto been maintained, without one musket being fired." . . . .† Accustomed to the extremities of military violence, the inhabitants of the country, on the English first entering, betrayed feelings of doubt and alarm. These were by some mistaken for dislike to our supremacy; but they arose only out of fear of insult or outrage, and they were speedily removed by the strict discipline preserved by our troops, whether stationary or marching. In a very short time, wherever troops or individuals moved they were received with cordiality, as the friends and protectors of the people. To organize the country honourable and intelligent British officers were sent into every part of it. "The result has been fortunate beyond anticipation. These agents, within their respective circles, have not only, by their direct intercourse with all classes, established great influence, but spread a knowledge of our character and intentions, which has increased respect and confidence; and they have in almost all cases succeeded, by the arbitration of differences, and the settlement of local disputes, *in preserving the peace of the country without troops.* The most exact observance of certain principles is required from these officers, and their line is very carefully and distinctly prescribed. The object has been to escape every interference with the internal administration of the country, beyond what the preservation of the public peace demanded."* In other parts of India the change was equally beneficial—the blessings derived from the conquest of the Mahrattas and the extirpation of the Pindarrees were equally apparent. As Bishop Heber was travelling through the country in 1824, he overheard a conversation among some villagers, who were comparing the present peaceable times with those in which "Ameer Khan and Bappoo Scindiah came up with their horsemen and spoiled all the land, and smote all the people, and burned the cities through Mewar and Marwar, till thou comest unto the salt wilderness." He also heard them say that corn had been gradually getting cheaper, and notwithstanding a late unfavourable season, was still not so dear as it used to be in the years of trouble. The kind and warm-hearted prelate adds, "When such have been the effects of British supremacy, who will refuse to pray for the continuance of our Empire?"†

* The Bheels, inhabiting the hilly countries, had all been robbers and cattle-lifters time out of mind. We believe they had never been known as anything else, since the Rajpoots first conquered their country and drove them to the hills, as the Sassenach drove the Gael. "The first measure I took for the reform of the Bheels," says Sir John Malcolm, "was to raise a small corps commanded by their own chiefs; and before they had been in the service one month I placed them as a guard over treasure, which had a surprising effect, both in raising them in their own minds, and in those of the other parts of the community. I found an equally good impression was produced by my taking, for a period, as my constant attendants, some of the most desperate of the plundering chiefs west of the Chumbul." —*Memoir of Central India.*

† Id., id.

* Memoir of Central India.

† Indian Journal. See also Sir John Malcolm's carefully drawn up Instructions to his Officers in Malwa.

CHAPTER XIV.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS CONCLUDED.

THE reputation of the British in India has never stood higher than at the conclusion of the Pindarree and Mahratta war; and during the four remaining years of Lord Hastings's government the face of Central India was changed to an extent which would have appeared almost incredible to any one who had not contemplated upon the spot the rapid progress of the change, and studied the causes by which it was produced. No war had begun in a higher motive, or had ended in a more positive good to mankind. "The campaign which had just terminated," says Malcolm, "was not an attack upon a state, or upon a body of men, but upon a system. It was order contending against anarchy; and the first triumph was so complete, that there ceased, almost from the moment, to be any who cherished hopes of the contest being either prolonged or revived: the victory gained was slight, comparatively speaking, over armies, to what it was over mind. The universal distress, which a series of revolutions must ever generate, had gone its circle, and reached all ranks and classes. The most barbarous of those who subsisted on plunder had found that a condition of continued uncertainty and alarm could not be one of enjoyment. The princes, chiefs, and inhabitants of the country had neither national feelings, confidence in each other, nor any one principle of union. When, therefore, the English Government, too strong to be resisted, proclaimed every district to be the right of its proprietor, on condition of his proving himself the friend of peace and good order; and when men found that the choice between such a course, and that of continuing the promoters of anarchy, was an option between its friendship or hostility, all concurred in submission. There appeared in a few a difficulty to conquer habits, but in none a spirit of opposition. The desolated state of the country was favourable to the change, for it presented an ample field for the revival of industry in peaceful occupations; but the paramount influence which the results of the war gave to the British Government over several of the native states, was the principal cause of that peace and prosperity which ensued. Our officers were enabled to give shape and direction to the efforts of these states, which became an example to others; and a tone of improvement was given to every province of Central India."*

The inhabitants of the wild provinces subject to Scindiah started into prosperity as soon as his numerous, restless, and marauding army was broken up. And Scindiah himself was as great a gainer as his subjects; for this army, and the insolent rapacious chieftains who raised and commanded it, in reality oppressed him as well as the people, and rarely left him at liberty to use his own judgment, or act according to his own will. The most dangerous of these chieftains were now destroyed; and, aided by the presence of English armies, by the universal discouragement which had fallen upon the Mahrattas, and by the confirmed conviction that their old trade of war had become an unprofitable trade, Scindiah was enabled to disband immense corps commanded by insubordinate chiefs, and to reduce his army to 13,000 regular infantry, and 9,000 horse. The saving in actual expenditure, from reductions alone, was estimated at twenty lacs of rupees per annum. At the same time the revenues were raised forty per cent. by

* Memoir of Central India.

the restoration of tranquillity and order. Even the disbanded soldiers returned to their native districts, and to their former occupation, as cultivators of the soil. The lamp had been altogether extinguished in only a few villages in Scindiah's dominions, but many of these villages had been reduced to four or five families. The voids were rapidly filled up. In 1817 there was not one district belonging to Scindiah that was not more or less in a disturbed state; in 1821 there existed not one enemy to the public peace in any of these districts. All the districts which had been wrested from this chief by the Pindarrees were restored to him: the loss of the fortress of Aseerghur was nearly all he lost by the war. In the dominions of Holkar, where the anarchy and devastation had been greater, the change to good was the more striking. Our victory at Maheidpoor had scattered for ever the overgrown army of this state; those battalions were never re-embodied, and 200 men to guard the palace were all the infantry left in the service of this Mahratta dynasty. Three thousand obedient cavalry were retained for the police of the country, together with a small park of artillery. In less than four years the revenues of the state were nearly quadrupled; and the expenses of collection were brought down from forty to fifteen per cent. The rapid restoration of the roofless and deserted villages has been mentioned. The increase of population in the towns was surprising. Within the short space of three years, Indore, a city in the province of Malwa, the capital of the Holkar family, was changed from a desolate town to a flourishing capital, containing eighty or a hundred thousand inhabitants; for not only did those families return which had fled in the troublous times, but the inhabitants of other towns and districts migrated in large numbers, and settled in Indore. The young prince, who was secured on the musnud by British power, abandoned the custom of his predecessors, of always residing in camp, and fixed his residence in this thriving capital. Other states and territories participated in these advantages. The Grassias, the Sondwarrees, the Gonds, as well as the Bheels and other hereditary and professional robbers, were rapidly suppressed. When the British armies first entered Central India, and even in 1818, the country along the banks of the Nerbudda, and in the Vindhya mountains, which stretch from the province of Bahar to Cape Comorin, was not safe for even troops to pass; and till the end of the same year, when a British cantonment was established at Mow, the robbers continued their depredations. All these bands were repressed, and the most vicious and depraved among them were gradually made sensible of the blessings attending a better course of life. From the territories of Bopaul to those of Guzerat, along the right bank of the Nerbudda, and from Hindia to the country of Burwannee, on the left bank of that river, a spirit of industry and improvement was introduced. New villages rose everywhere, and forests which had long been deemed impenetrable were fast cleared, on account of the profit derived from the timber required to rebuild villages, towns, cities. Between Jaum and Mandoo the Bheels began to cultivate every spot, and their hamlets rose with a rapidity that promised an early and complete change in the whole face of that district, and in the manners of its inhabitants.* Bishop Heber thought that he discovered a hankering among the "hill people" after their old modes of life, and that there were many of the Bheels who still sighed after their late anarchy, and exclaimed, amid the comforts of a peaceable government,

> "Give us our wildness and our woods,
> Our huts and caves again."

An English party travelling from Mow observed some Bheels looking earnestly at a large drove of bullocks which were drinking at a ford. Upon being asked whether those oxen belonged to him, one of the Bheels replied, "No; but a good part of them would have been ours by this time, if it were not for you English, who will let nobody thrive but yourselves!"† But in proportion as an efficient police was established, and roads (those grand means of civilization) were opened through the country, the wild

* Malcolm, Memoir of Central India.
† Indian Journal.

mountain Bheels were kept in check, and gradually brought within the pale of law and civilized life. But for the advance of British armies into Central India, these very Bheels would soon have attracted notice as a substantive power, for they had already acquired an ascendency over several petty native states, and neither Mahrattas nor Patans, neither Arabs nor any other kind of force at the disposal of the native potentates of Central India would have ventured to attack them in their mountains, where no booty was to be expected, where nothing was to be got but hard blows.

Sir John Malcolm completely succeeded in clearing the country of Arabs and Meckranees, a desperate set of adventurers from Meckran, in Persia, who, in many instances, had made themselves perfectly independent of the native Indian chiefs whom they pretended to serve; and all the petty chieftains were warned that to retain any of these desperadoes as mercenaries, or to attempt to bring any of them back to the country, would be considered as equivalent to a declaration of hostility against the British Government. All other classes of mercenaries, or of ruffians, who looked only to sword and spear for their support, were dismissed. Never was the reign of terror and anarchy more complete than in 1817. No contrast can be greater than what was presented in 1821. The natives were happier then than afterwards; for the recollection of the dangers and miseries they had recently endured increased the enjoyment of present security and good government. "Take it all in all," continues Malcolm, speaking of the period of 1821, "there never was a country where the industrious classes of the population were better pleased with their condition than they now are; nor is this feeling much checked by the moody turbulence of the military classes, who have been deprived of their occupation. Almost all those who were actually natives of the country have been, in one way or other, considered; while a great proportion of the foreign mercenaries, who constituted the chief part of the disbanded armies, have been compelled to leave it; nor will these mercenaries ever return to disturb its peace, while the measures and principles by which the salutary change has been effected are preserved and supported."*

At Poonah, and generally in the dominions of the ex-Peishwa, Bajee Rao, changes and reforms equally salutary were introduced, principally through the management of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had the genius of a true legislator, and all the generous sympathies of a philanthropist. By the conquest of the Poonah territory, the British dominion and possessions were extended along the western coast from the northern boundary of the small province of Goa to the mouths of the Taptee; and inland to the long-established western frontier of the Nizam, from the junction of the Wurdah and Toombudra to the junction of the Wagoor and Taptee. Such places in Candeish belonging to the Holkar Mahrattas as fell within these bounds were ceded to the British by the treaty of Mundissoor, which Sir John Malcolm had concluded after the splendid victory at Maheidpoor. Some other territories south of the Sautpoora range of hills were also yielded. By exchanges with the Guicowar Rajah, and by arrangements with some minor princes, a continuous, uninterrupted dominion was obtained from Bombay to Calcutta and from Madras to Bombay. The former Mahratta war having been attended with the similar advantage or continuous dominion between Madras and Calcutta, the communication between the three presidencies might now be considered as complete.† Mr. Elphinstone continued as Commissioner at Poonah until 1819, when he became Governor of Bombay.‡ This elevation,

* Memoir of Central India.

† Colonel Valentine Blacker.

‡ The office of Governor of Bombay having become vacant by the resignation of Sir Evan Nepean, Mr. Canning, as President of the Board of Control, intimated to the Court of Directors his readiness to confirm the selection of one of those eminent servants of the Company who had so highly distinguished themselves. The Directors appreciated this mark of confidence, and made choice of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was nominated Governor of Bombay in October, 1818.—*Auber*, 'Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.'

however, did not deprive Poonah and the ceded districts in that direction of his valuable services, for those new possessions were wisely annexed to the Bombay presidency, to the territories of which they are adjacent. On quitting Poonah Mr. Elphinstone addressed to the supreme government at Calcutta a comprehensive report on the affairs of that country, reciting what had been done, and what there remained to do; contrasting the present condition of the native inhabitants under the rule of the Company with their condition under the Peishwa, and in a most enlightened and most generous spirit urging the supreme government to persevere in the good work which had been begun.* This report is one of the many admirable state papers which ought to be diligently perused by every European servant of the Company, whether military or civil. No servant of that Company, no governor or governor-general, that had yet visited the shores of India was so well qualified as Mr. Elphinstone to govern the natives, or so full of truly liberal and lofty principles of government. He went to India a stripling, and he never once quitted the country (except to go into Afghanistan) for the long space of thirty years, during the whole of which time he had been constantly and successfully employed, either in public business or in adding to his store of knowledge. Nor was there, we believe, in all that time a single individual that approached him, native or European, but was impressed with a sense of his ability, genius, humanity, generosity, and most manly honesty and urbanity.† May his shining example tend to destroy all that remains of two monstrous and vulgarizing fallacies:

* See 'Report on the Territories conquered from the Peishwa, by the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.'

† To bestow eulogiums on a contemporary—and long may Mr. Elphinstone live to deserve them and to disregard them—is apt to excite invidious remarks. But Bishop Heber, who knew Mr. Elphinstone better than we do, and who was more capable of estimating his merits, is no longer a living contemporary, and may be quoted on this point. The following passages were written in his Journal when the bishop was taking leave of Bombay and of its noble governor, but they were not published until after the grave had closed on the writer of them.

"I have enjoyed, in the unremitting kindness, the splendid hospitality, and agreeable conversation of Mr. Elphinstone, the greatest pleasure of the kind which I have ever enjoyed either in India or in Europe.

"Mr. Elphinstone is, in every respect, an extraordinary man, possessing great activity of body and mind, remarkable talent for and application to public business, a love of literature, and a degree of almost universal information, such as I have met with in no other person similarly situated, and manners and conversation of the most amiable and interesting character. While he has seen more of India and the adjoining countries than any man now living, and has been engaged in active political, and sometimes military, duties since the age of eighteen, he has found time not only to cultivate the languages of Hindostan and Persia, but to preserve and extend his acquaintance with the Greek and Latin classics, with the French and Italian, with all the elder and more distinguished English writers, and with the current and popular literature of the day, both in poetry, history, politics, and political economy. With these remarkable accomplishments, and notwithstanding a temperance amounting to rigid abstinence, he is fond of society; and it is a common subject of surprise with his friends at what hours of the day or night he finds time for the acquisition of knowledge. His policy, so far as India is concerned, appeared to me particularly wise and liberal; and he is evidently attached to, and thinks well of, the country and its inhabitants. His public measures, in their general tendency, evince a steady wish to improve their present condition. No government in India pays so much attention to schools and public institutions for education. In none are the taxes lighter; and in the administration of justice to the natives in their own languages, in the establishment of Punchaets, in the degree in which he employs the natives in official situations, and the countenance and familiarity which he extends to all the natives of rank who approach him, he seems to have reduced to practice almost all the reforms which had struck me as most required in the systems of government pursued in those provinces of our Eastern empire which I had previously visited. His popularity (though to such a feeling there may be individual exceptions) appears little less remarkable than his talents and acquirements; and I was struck by the remark I once heard, that 'all other public men had their enemies and their friends, their admirers and their aspersers, but that of Mr. Elphinstone everybody spoke highly.' Of his munificence—for his liberality amounts to this—I had heard much, and knew some instances myself.

"With regard to the free press, I was curious to know the motives or apprehensions which induced Mr. Elphinstone to be so decidedly opposed to it in this country. In discussing this topic he was always open and candid, acknowledged that the dangers ascribed to a free press in India had been exaggerated; but spoke of the exceeding inconvenience, and even danger, which arose from the disunion and dissension which political discussion produced among the European officers at

1. That a Governor must have the manners of a pasha, or that a man high in office must support his dignity with coldness, reserve, and haughtiness. 2. That the love and pursuit of literature are incompatible with the spirit and proper conduct of business. Warren Hastings did not live to be gladdened by the intelligence of these happy results, dying in the month of August, 1818, before the Mahratta and Pindarree war was quite finished; but he lived long enough to know the bold and successful course the Marquess of Hastings was pursuing, and to rejoice in the brightening prospect that was opening throughout India. Down to the very last moments of his life, the recluse of Daylesford busily occupied his mind with these subjects, and the destinies of the empire which he had so long governed and in part created; and the nearest of his friends, who best knew what would please the octogenarian, continued to talk or correspond with him about the great events that were taking place in Hindustan almost to the very day of his death. These friends seem to have felt that nothing pleased him better than hearty praises of the conduct of the Marquess of Hastings.*

The Marquess of Hastings had no more saved money by being governor-general

the different stations; the embarrassment occasioned to government by the exposure and canvass of all their measures by the Lentuli and Gracchi of a newspaper; and his preference of decided and vigorous to half measures, where any restrictive measures at all were necessary. I confess that his opinion and experience are the strongest presumptions which I have yet met with in favour of the censorship. . . . . Mr. Elphinstone is one of the ablest and most amiable men I ever met with."—*Indian Journal.*

* We have before us an unpublished letter written from the India House, Leadenhall Street, by Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, and dated the 15th of July, 1818, only a month and eight days before Warren Hastings's death. Halhed's eccentricities, and his temporary monomania about Brothers, the prophet, had not affected his genius or his learning, or his kindness of heart. In this letter he says, and we think very touchingly and beautifully:—

"The immoderate heat of the present season affects me with feelings which I can compare to nothing but the overpowering influence of the tropical sun when I landed in Calcutta, in July, 1784—four and thirty years ago! You were then at Lucknow, occupied on the most important state concerns, to which the present prosperity of the Company's empire owes its principal foundation; and your country—however ungrateful its executive government may have proved—testifies, in the universal respect, esteem, and admiration of all its wisest and worthiest members, its full conviction in the sagacity of your measures, and its gratitude for the everlasting obligations you have conferred on it. *Then, as now,* I looked towards you, from the distance at which I was placed, as the Cynosure of all my worldly wishes; you then—almost unsolicited—showered down on my unworthy head the blessing of a comfortable independence—the summit of all my hopes and desires; you now, by the magnanimity of your self-resignation, and the high example of a most dignified retirement, under a conscious superiority to the ordinary objects of human ambition—rank and power, teach me from afar to bear disappointments with patience, and to look within for that peace of mind and unrepining indifference to external things which the world cannot give, and which is worth incomparably more than all it has to bestow. So far, therefore, you and I, my dear Sir, stand precisely in the same comparative relation to each other, as when I had all the fervour of youth, and you not a symptom of age but what arose from unusual powers of intellect matured by uncommon opportunities of experience. *Here* we still are, with the beloved partners of our existence—the dear and sympathetic sharers of all our vicissitudes, still, thank God! both in the inclination and capacity of doubling our comforts, of alleviating our griefs, and of brightening our autumn of life with the invaluable sunshine of conjugal affection! But when we look around us—Who or what is there remaining of that remote period, to whom or which a similar observation will apply? We almost *alone* can say—'Tempora mutantur—*nos non mutamur* in illis.' Where are the members of *your* council, where the contemporary judges and all the higher functionaries? Gone with the century we have left behind us, or sunk into perpetual oblivion. The great and potent of the present day, both here and in India, are juniors to us both. Even the Marquess of Hastings (O nomen nunquam satis venerandum!) was a schoolboy under me at Harrow. Yet to that period and to all its concomitant circumstances, my memory carries me back with a fidelity that makes it seem but as yesterday; and thus it continues its exactitude down to the epoch of February, 1786—when *we both*, but you *preceding*, qualis *semper*, left the regions of eternized in the Mahabhárat, for ever! All the subsequent lapse of years affects me but as a dream. Its very calamities are almost become visionary, and I would fain persuade myself that even the iniquities of the impeachment itself are little short of problematical, but there, alas!—

'Pudet hæc opprobria tanta
Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli!'"

—From a collection of unpublished letters and other manuscripts in the possession of J. Grant, Esq., of the East India Company's service (Medical Department).

Mr. Grant derived this collection from Halhed's

of India than had the Marquess Wellesley. The splendid appointments of the office he had spent in supporting its dignity, in contributing to the public service, or to the welfare of the inhabitants. As some acknowledgment for the glorious issue of the Pindarree and Mahratta war, the East India Company voted his lordship 60,000*l.* for the purchase of an estate, to be settled in such manner as might perpetuate the memory of his great services.* Before that war came to an end a measure was adopted by the home government which flattered the feelings of the officers in the Company's service, and which went somewhat to destroy the jealousy which had so long existed between them and the officers of the king's troops. Hitherto officers holding the Company's commission had been treated as an inferior class of men, and had been excluded from most of the honours of the military profession. But the Prince Regent, in giving extension to the Order of the Bath, so as to include within it more claimants than formerly, "having taken into consideration the eminent services which have been rendered to the empire by the officers in the service of the Honourable East India Company," was pleased to order that fifteen of the most distinguished officers of the said service might be raised to the dignity of Knights Commanders of the Bath, and that certain other officers of the Company should be eligible to be appointed Knights Companions. The Marquess of Hastings had the pleasure of investing with his own hands the veteran General David Ochterlony with the insignia of Knight Grand Cross of the Bath. The ceremony took place in camp at Terwah, during the progress of the Mahratta war, on the 20th of March, 1818. "Sir David Ochterlony," said the governor-general, "you have obliterated a distinction painful for the officers of the Honourable Company, and you have opened the door for your brothers in arms to a reward, which their recent display of exalted spirit and invincible intrepidity proves could not be more deservedly extended to the officers of any army on earth."*

His lordship did not dispatch so many embassies to Eastern potentates as Lord Minto had done, yet he sent missions to Siam and Cochin China, under Mr. John Crawfurd, formerly an assistant-surgeon on the Bengal establishment; Doctor Finlayson, the naturalist, accompanying the mission. And, like the preceding missions, if this one did no other good, it produced us some curious and good volumes of travels, and an addition to our knowledge of this part of Asia.† Many of our embassies in Europe have been attended with less solid advantages.

During this administration other measures were carried into execution which were not so much to the taste of the governor-general. The natives of Java and of the other islands of the Eastern Archipelago, of which we had taken possession, were beginning to improve, and to enjoy happiness under our dominion, when our ministers and diplomatists in Europe agreed to give them back to the

widow. It contains some very interesting and characteristic letters written by Warren Hastings in his old age, together with a great many very curious letters, essays, poems, and other papers written by Halhed at different periods of his life. Halhed's range of subjects is very wide, including Oriental mythology, Oriental astronomy, Oriental law, English topics of the day, sonnets on Warren Hastings's birthdays, &c. &c. We regret that we were not sooner acquainted with the existence of these papers. They afford several materials for completing the character of Hastings; and, for any future biography of Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, whose strange character is a study for the metaphysician, they ought to be consulted.

* His lordship died at Malta, as governor of that little island, on the 28th of November, 1826. Soon after his death the Company voted a further sum of 20,000*l.* for the benefit of his son and successor.

* 'Calcutta Government Gazette.' Ochterlony had merited the distinction by his brilliant conduct in the Nepaul war, and by his very long and uninterrupted service in the country. He had at this time been considerably more than forty years in India, and had served under Colonel Pearce, Sir Eyre Coote, and the adventurous Popham.

† The Mission to Siam and Hué, the capital of Cochin China, in the years 1821-2, from the Journal of the late George Finlayson, Esq., Surgeon and Naturalist to the Mission; with a Memoir of the Author, by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Bart., F.R.S. London, 1825. And Mr. Crawfurd's own account of the embassy, or 'Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China, exhibiting a View of the actual State of those Kingdoms,' London, 1828.

Dutch in the re-settling treaties which followed the downfall of Bonaparte. Many of the islanders implored to be allowed to remain under our flag; many vowed that they would emigrate, quit houses and lands, and undergo any extremity rather than submit again to the harsh rule of the Dutch; but nothing was left to the discretion of the governor-general or of Sir Stamford Raffles, the able governor of Java: the sense of the treaties was clearly expressed, and they were bound to obey them to the letter. It was, as we have said, expedient and just that England should give back some of her conquests, and that Holland should be restored to some of her former colonial greatness; but still it was hard to transfer the natives of these islands, who had a right to expect that some provisions would be made for their interests, to their hard taskmasters the Dutch, without one stipulation being made in their favour. It is true that such articles of treaties are apt to be disregarded by the party put in possession of the sovereignty, yet still there is a grace in good intention, and a propriety in making them.

During the five years that he had been governor of Java, Raffles had really done wonders for the country, which he more than any other man had annexed to our empire. He had courted the society of the natives, inviting them to his house, and treating them with consideration, kindness, and confidence. Hence, wherever he went he obtained the best local information from the best sources, and there was nothing these people would not do for him. He entered heart and soul into whatever he considered likely to advance the civilization of the natives, and never considered his own success, or even the prosperity of the establishment intrusted to his management, apart from the prosperity of the people. Six millions of inhabitants were benefited by his wise and liberal rule. The onerous monopolies, the invidious restrictions on trade, the system of slavery, received many a shake at his hands, though the time had not yet come for the abolition of these things. He chanced to be in England when he learned that Java was to be restored to its former masters and oppressors the Dutch, whose illiberal policy speedily undid all the good he had done. He pleaded the cause of the Javanese as long as there was any hope of being of service to them, or of convincing the Dutch that a more gentle government and increased profits from the colony would go hand in hand; and when every hope of this kind was gone, he constantly and deeply regretted the hard fate of those islanders.* Conquest is not so hard to a people as the being transferred against their will from one power to another by a piece of parchment. But the Javanese had not been conquered by our arms; it was only the Dutch in Java that we had conquered; and in the short war the Javanese had assisted us, mainly out of dislike to their old masters, but partly through our assurances that they should enjoy more happiness and prosperity under our rule. It being, however, determined, at Sir Stamford's recommendation, to keep possession of Bencoolen in Sumatra, he was himself named governor of that settlement. He arrived at Sumatra in the spring of 1818, and forthwith began to explore the interior of the island—a wilderness, abounding in elephants, rhinoceroses, tigers, and other wild beasts, and hitherto little known to Europeans. Here also he devoted his attention to the erecting of schools for the natives, and to the devising such laws

* Sir Stamford Raffles, being in England in 1817, visited the Continent, chiefly for the purpose of obtaining an interview with the King of Holland, and making some representations to his majesty in behalf of the natives of Java. He met with great attention, and had the honour to dine with the king. "But," he adds, "although they were very communicative regarding their Eastern colonies, I regret to say that, notwithstanding the king himself, and his leading minister, seem to me wealthy, they have too great a hankering after profit, and *immediate* profit, for any liberal system to thrive under them." It was this rage for *immediate* profit, their low opinion of the natives, and their consequent preference of coercion to persuasion, that made the Dutch about the very worst of colonists. And other nations or peoples besides their subjects in the Indian archipelago may complain that—

"In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much."

See Mr. Canning's Rhymed Dispatch, to our minister at the Hague, on the Reciprocity System.

and regulations as might extend their trade, give security to their property, put an end to the horrible system of piracy, and induce habits of industry and social order. But what he had predicted to the governor-general in India and to our ministers at home, came to pass: the restored Dutch not only ground the faces of the natives, but also obstructed our trade and threatened to shut us out of those Eastern seas altogether, which they were almost enabled to do, as Malacca had been restored to them, as well as the islands, and they thus held the keys both of the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Sunda. This was intolerable to a man who was ardent for the good of his country and for the extension of free trade, and who had devoted the primest years of his life to the study of the native resources and capabilities of the Eastern Archipelago. Raffles determined to go to Calcutta, and there confer with the governor-general. He embarked in a very small country vessel, the first which was ready, and which swarmed with centipedes and scorpions: the crazy craft was upset in the middle of the night upon a sandbank at the mouth of the Hooghly, and he narrowly escaped drowning. After some hesitation, arising out of the nature of our treaties with the King of Holland, the Marquess of Hastings agreed in the expediency of ceding to the Dutch some of our pretentions in Sumatra, and of taking up a new position which should secure a free trade with the Archipelago and China through the Straits of Malacca, leaving to the Dutch the exclusive command of the Straits of Sunda. The marquess moreover, who had previously censured some part of Raffles's spirited conduct in a collision with the Dutch governor of Java, now declared that conduct "to have been dictated by the purest spirit of patriotism, and to have been such that, in the circumstances in which he was placed, he could not well have acted otherwise." There was no time to lose; if the two only passages to the Eastern Archipelago were once secured by the Dutch, nothing but actual force would obtain for the British trader ingress to its thousand isles, and even our passage to China might be impeded. Raffles wanted neither people nor territory; all that he asked was permission to anchor a line-of-battle ship and hoist the English flag at the mouth of the Straits of Malacca; and by this the trade of England would be secured, the monopoly of the Dutch broken. A better ship than that which had brought him to Calcutta was placed at his disposal, and, proceeding to Penang, and thence down the Straits of Malacca, Sir Stamford, on the 29th of February, 1819, hoisted the British flag at Singapoor, an island in the Straits of Malacca off Point Romania, in the direct route to China.* On the 26th of February full possession was taken of the little island under a treaty concluded with the Tomogong, or native chief. It does not appear that the Dutch ever had any settlement or exercised any authority over the island. On examination it was found to be larger than our maps and charts indicated,† yet the total population of the isle did not exceed one hundred and fifty persons, of whom one-fifth were Chinese. There were, however, remains of temples and other structures, which indicated that it had once been thickly peopled.‡ Sir Stamford had visited the place before, and his quick eye had caught at a glance all the advantages which it afforded, and all the benefits to commerce, to free trade, and civilization, which might be derived from its permanent occupation.

Independently of the free access it gave to the Malays and to the varied and enterprising population of the Archipelago, the situation of Singapoor was peculiarly favourable for its becoming the entrepôt to which the native mariners of Siam,

* Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, &c. By his Widow.

† Our settlement consists of the island of Singapoor, and about fifty little islets dispersed in the sea south and east of the principal island, or in what is called the Straits of Singapoor. Altogether the territories of the settlement embrace a circumference of about 100 miles, including the straits, &c.—*Penny Cyclopædia.*

‡ Walter Hamilton, 'East India Gazetteer.' Six hundred years before the British flag was hoisted, Singapoor had been the flourishing capital of a Malay sultan.

Sir Stamford Raffles informs us, that but for his Malay studies, and his intercourse with the Malay people, he should hardly have known that such a place existed; not only the European, but the Indian world also, being ignorant about it.

Camboja, Chiampa, Cochin China, and China itself might annually resort. It is to the Straits of Singapoor that their merchants are always bound in the first instance; and if on their arrival in them they find a market for their goods, and the means of purchasing what they want, they have no inducement to proceed to the more distant, unhealthy, and expensive Dutch port of Batavia. The passage from China can be made in less than six days, and in the favourable monsoon the passages to the coast of Borneo, to Penang, &c. are proportionately short.* The harbour of Singapoor affords safe anchorage at all seasons. Charmed with his new infant colony, Sir Stamford wrote—"The lines of the old city and of its defences are still to be traced, and within these ramparts the British union now waves unmolested. Singapoor is everything we could desire; it will soon rise into importance; and with this single station I would undertake to counteract all the plans of Mynheer; it breaks the spell; and they are no longer the exclusive sovereigns of the Eastern seas..... This place possesses an excellent harbour, and everything that can be desired for a British port..... We have commanded an intercourse with all the ships passing through the straits. We are within a week's sail of China, close to Siam, and in the very seat of the Malayan empire."† The founder clearly foresaw the future fortune and the rapid rise of his little colony. It had not been established four months ere it received an accession of population exceeding 5000, principally industrious Chinese, whose numbers kept constantly and steadily increasing. "It is a child of my own," said he, with honest pride, "and I have made it what it is. You may easily conceive with what zeal I apply myself to the clearing of forests, cutting of roads, building of towns, framing of laws, &c."‡ "It bids fair to be the next port to Calcutta; all we want now is, the certainty of permanent possession, and this, of course, depends on authorities beyond our control. You may take my word for it, this is by far the most important station in the East; and, as far as naval superiority and commercial interests are concerned, of higher value than whole continents of territory."* His law-making and his regulations for trade were all in a high and generous spirit, calculated to introduce the general principles of good government, to benefit the neighbouring peoples, to check slavery and destroy monopoly, and to elevate the character of the British nation. If he could not do all he wished, it was no fault of his, nor owing to any lack of exertion. "The utmost possible freedom of trade," said he, "and equal rights to all, with protection of property and person, are the objects to be attained, and I shall spare no pains to establish such laws and regulations as may be most conducive to them. In Java I had to remodel, and in doing so to remove the rubbish and incumbrances of two centuries of Dutch mal-administration; here I have an easier task—and the task is new."† In little more than three years Singapoor grew into a large and populous town, containing 10,000 inhabitants of nearly all nations, and nearly all actively engaged in commercial pursuits. Two years after this, or at the end of 1824, the fixed inhabitants numbered 12,000, about 5000 being Malays, 4000 Chinese, and 1000 natives of the Deccan or of Hindustan. In the course of this year Raffles's fears that he might be robbed of his "political child" were ended. The Dutch had claimed the island, and had made a loud outcry against our taking possession of it. In a portion of the British cabinet there was an inclination to defer to the King of Holland, or an indifference (resulting from ignorance) as to the new colony, where the flag of free trade floated as conspicuously as our national banner; but Mr. Canning, then president of the Board of Control, was more sensible to the value of Raffles's creation, and at his instance a select committee was appointed to enable him

* Hamilton, East India Gazetteer.

† Letter from Sir Stamford Raffles to Mr. Marsden (the late venerable historian of Sumatra and able editor of Marco Polo's travels), in Memoirs of Sir Stamford, by his Widow.

‡ Letter to the Duchess of Somerset, in *id.*

* Letter to ——, in *id.*

† Letter to the Duchess of Somerset, in *id.*

to meet the Dutch commissioners, to put an end to uncertainty and to angry discussions, and to conclude a treaty which should at all events establish our undisputed right to Singapoor—a right which was fully acknowledged in a treaty concluded with the Sultan of Malacca, under whom the Tomogong, or native chief, had held the island. And, after protracted negotiations, the business was settled by the treaty of 1824, by which the old and poor Dutch settlements on the continent of India, with Malacca, and the undisputed right to Singapoor, were ceded to the British government, in exchange for Bencoolen, together with all our other possessions or pretensions in the island of Sumatra, an island 1050 miles in length by 165 of average breadth, a country rich in all the bounties of nature, and requiring nothing but a good and wise government to be converted into a most flourishing empire. In this treaty of the 17th of March, 1824, we recognised the odious and unwise Dutch monopoly in the Spice Islands. Whatever was secured to Great Britain in the Indian Archipelago was mainly owing to the perseverance and discernment of Sir Stamford Raffles, who found the means of compensating his country for the abandonment of our former conquests.* After this treaty his political child thrived and grew more than ever. In January, 1826, 870 Chinese emigrants arrived and settled in Singapoor, and in February of the same year these were followed by 1050 more, the passage-money from China being only about five or six dollars a head.† In 1836 the entire population was very nearly 30,000, and the increase of trade was fully proportionate. In this same year (1836) the shipping of all kinds that entered the port amounted to 203,574 tons. In fact Singapoor has become the London of Southern Asia and the Indian Archipelago. All the nations that inhabit the surrounding countries resort to it with the produce of their agricultural and manufacturing industry, and take in exchange such goods as are not grown or produced in their own countries. All of them find a ready market for what they bring, and a well-stocked market of European goods.* A brighter nucleus of civilization was never formed in so brief a space of time. The Singapoor Institution, established by Sir Stamford Raffles, though not yet carried out on the extensive plan he contemplated, contained three years ago three schools, one English, one Malay, and one Tamul. Since then a large Chinese school has been opened, in which Chinese youths receive instruction both in English and in their own language and literature. Previously to this there were several native schools in the town. Properly directed, Singapoor may be made the basis of operations far more glorious and far more enduring than those of military conquest—it may be made the basis of operations for the conquest of ignorance, anti-socialism, and superstition. The productions of its printing-press are already widely diffused in the Malay peninsula, in Sumatra, and in other islands of the Archipelago. On the whole it may be considered as the least questionable and purest part of our Eastern empire: it was acquired without blood and without intrigue, and it has owed all its importance to the advantages it conferred upon the natives and upon free trade. It will give immortality to the name of its founder Sir Stamford Raffles.

If, during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, rich islands were given up in the east of the Indian ocean, in the west the conquest of one great island—the reduction of the whole of Ceylon—was completed; and although the anomaly of which the Marquess Wellesley had complained continued to

* Auber, Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.

† Walter Hamilton, E. Ind. Gazetteer.

* Article 'Singapoor,' in 'Penny Cyclopædia'—a work particularly distinguished by the excellence of its geographical articles.

"This effect has partly been produced by the wise policy of declaring the harbour of Singapoor a free port, in which no export or import duties, nor any anchorage, harbour, nor lighthouse fees are levied. The effect of this policy was evident even at the beginning of the settlement. In the first year the exports and imports by native boats alone exceeded 4,000,000 of dollars; and during the first year and a half no less than 2889 vessels entered and cleared from the port, of which 383 were owned and commanded by Europeans, and 2506 by natives."—*Id., id.*

exist; and although the king's governor of Ceylon was independent of the Company's governor-general of India, still the Marquess of Hastings had contributed to the achievement by advice and by other assistance; and even if this had not occurred, the history of Ceylon could not well be separated from that of Continental India.

The Dutch were quite as unpopular in Ceylon as in Java, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands, and for precisely the same reasons. The people dwelling on the coast had rejoiced at the conquest of their settlements by the English, and this favourable leaning to us continued, although our king-appointed governors were generally far from being such able men as most of the Company-appointed governors on the continent, and were very far indeed from anticipating the liberal policy and the free trade system of a Wellesley or a Raffles. These governors of Ceylon had not torn up the cinnamon-trees by the roots, as their Dutch predecessors had done (in order to keep the production down to the mark of the immediate demand, or in order to make cinnamon dear by making it rare in the European market), but they had laid enormous duties upon the produce of the interior, which could not be exported without passing through their custom-houses; and, among other evil things, they had clapped a duty upon salt, which was from 800 to 1000 per cent. above the cost of its production.* The interior of the island, into which neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch had ever been able to penetrate, was occupied by the Kandyans, who lived under an independent monarch, and who differed essentially in race, language, and habits from most of the people who dwelt along the coasts.† The people of this inner kingdom were more fierce and courageous than the majority of the peoples of Continental India; the king was very absolute; the nobles or chiefs held their lands by tenure of service, like our barons under the feudal system; they were bound when called upon to join the king at the head of their vassals or followers, each follower or soldier being provided with a musket and fifteen days' provisions, together with a chatty, or small earthen vessel in which to dress his rice, &c. In the eastern side of the kingdom, where muskets were yet rare, these vassals were frequently armed with bows and arrows or with rude spears. A few cakes made of the meal of the natchenny (a species of millet), a small quantity of rice, and a few cocoa-nuts composed the whole of a Kandyan soldier's stock of provisions for a campaign of fifteen days. At the end of this period, the army was recruited by a new requisition. The smiths of the country had learned to make efficient firelocks and the natives manufactured tolerably good gunpowder. Saltpetre is found in abundance in the island, and the sulphur was procured by importation. Instead of lead bullets, they frequently made use of pieces of iron rod about an inch long. Their tents were lighter than their provisions: a leaf of the talipot-tree, which grows nowhere so luxuriantly as in Ceylon, and which the natives apply to as many uses as the Chinese apply the bamboo, protected a Kandyan from the heat of the sun during the day, and two men, by placing the broad end of their gigantic leaves together, might, with the aid of a few sticks, form a tent that would completely defend them against rain, and shelter them during the night.* The best character of these Highlanders is that which was drawn of them more than a century and a half ago by an English mariner, who passed nineteen

* Ceylon abounds with salt; everywhere along the coasts extensive formations of it are found; it crystallizes spontaneously in shallow lakes near the sea; but our governors turned this necessary of life into a monopoly, and the natives could obtain no salt without paying their price for it.

† The word 'kandy' means a hill or mountain, and the term 'Kandyan country,' in a physical sense, means highlands, or a mountainous region. All the interior of the island is mountainous and very woody; and it was in the inaccessible nature of their country, and in their ingenious mode of defending it by wickets and stockades, that the Kandyans had been enabled to maintain their independence during the nearly three hundred years that different European nations had had a footing on the coasts.

* Manuscript Historical Sketch of the Conquest of Ceylon by the English, by Henry Marshall, Esq., Deputy Inspector General of Military Hospitals, &c.

years of captivity among them.* "In carriage and behaviour the Kandyans are grave and stately, in understanding quick and apprehensive, in design subtile and crafty, in discourse courteous, but full of flatteries; naturally inclined to temperance, both in meat and drink, but not in chastity; near and provident in their families, commending good husbandry; in their dispositions not passionate, neither hard to be reconciled again when angry; in their promises very unfaithful, approving lying in themselves, but not liking it in others; delighting in sloth, deferring labours till urgent necessity constrain them; neat in apparel, nice in eating, and not much given to sleep." These people had a literature, and a regular succession of historical annals reaching back through many centuries, and far more truthful than the historical records of Eastern nations usually are. All civilization must advance or retrograde; theirs, like that of all the nations of India, had unhappily taken the latter course; except in the use of arms borrowed from the Europeans, they had acquired nothing that was new, and had lost much of what was old: when we came in contact with them, they could scarcely be said to be in a better condition than that of semi-barbarism. Their government had been frequently convulsed by civil wars and sanguinary revolutions: the Adigars or chiefs often rebelled, the throne was often disputed, and mercy was never shown to the unsuccessful party. Their common mode of inflicting death was to pound their victim in a mortar; and when they wished to superadd tortures and horrors, they made the wife and children, the brothers and sisters, or the father and mother of the victim perform the horrible office. There was a part of the lowlands occupied by a perfectly savage race called Vedas or Vaddas, who lived by hunting, and there were other portions in which our occupancy was scarcely discernible; but, roughly, it may be estimated that the English territories, in the year 1800, covered about 12,000 square miles in a broad belt, and that the dominions of the King of Kandy included within this belt covered a like number of square miles. Consequently the island was pretty equally divided between the British government and the King of Kandy. One of the main objects of the English government appears to have been to injure the prosperity of the Kandyans by checking their little export trade, and to prevent all foreigners from having intercourse with them. The Kandyans often retaliated by making incursions into our possessions, or by quarrelling with our officers and refusing to sell them elephants. A kingdom within a kingdom, a territory occupied by semi-barbarians, entirely surrounded by Europeans, and cut off from all external communication, could not possibly stand. The absorption of the Kandyan country into our dominion became an inevitable necessity from the day we dispossessed the Dutch and occupied the coasts and the great belt between them and the hills. The dissensions of those highlanders of Ceylon only hastened the crisis. In the year 1798, when the English were scarcely settled in their conquests on the coast, the King of Kandy died without issue and without having nominated a successor. In such cases, according to the custom of the court (a custom which was almost sure to lead to civil war), the right of naming a successor belonged to the first Adigar. The man who now held that dignity was an able, ambitious, and intriguing courtier. He named a youth, the son of a sister of one of the queens dowager. This youth was, according to usage, proposed to the chiefs and people, and their acceptance of

* Robert Knox, the author of 'An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon in the East Indies.'

Knox was taken prisoner on the coast, and carried up the country, in 1660. He escaped in a marvellous manner in 1679. He published his account of Ceylon and his adventures the year after he arrived in England. It is an astonishing book, considering the poor captain's education and circumstances. The natural history of the country, its government, laws, manners, and customs, its agriculture, &c., are all fully and accurately detailed. Gentlemen who have resided many years in Ceylon, and who were engaged in the English expedition to the interior of that island, have declared that they found everything precisely as Knox had described it; and that, after considerable research and long acquaintance with the country, they were convinced that there was nothing to correct in, and very little to add to, our honest sailor's account of it.

him being publicly avowed, he was raised to the throne by the name of Sree Wikrimè Rajah Singha. Shortly after this election, Mootosamè, a brother to one of the queens dowager, and a pretender to the throne, fled from the interior of the island, where probably his life was not safe, and solicited an asylum from the British government. He was placed under the protection of Colonel Barbut, commandant of Jaffnapatam. The chief Adigar of course made himself prime minister, and forced the young king to do his bidding: being jealous of two other Adigars, he caused one of them to be assassinated and the other to be thrown into prison. In the course of the year 1799 this prime minister of Kandy solicited and obtained two conferences with the Hon. Frederic North, then governor of the English part of the island, and, with a little circumlocution, he requested our governor to assist him in taking away the life of the young king and placing himself on the throne. He intimated that he had a better right to the throne than the boy who sat on it, being one of the aboriginal race, whereas the royal stock descended from foreign conquerors. As a price for the governor's assistance, he promised him that he would acknowledge the superiority or suzerainty of the English over the kingdom of Kandy. We need scarcely add that Mr. North rejected the proposals. The chief Adigar returned to court and commenced a system of duplicity and intrigue, exciting his countrymen to make preparations for war, fomenting disturbances in our territories, and occasionally forwarding to Mr. North false or ambiguous reports, with the view of inducing the English to declare war against the young king. He fancied that if war were once commenced he could easily find an opportunity of dispatching the king without exciting suspicion, and that by offering high terms to the English, he might secure his own power and aggrandizement. The governor, it is said, made several attempts to open a correspondence with the king through a less suspicious channel than the Adigar, but without success. The chief Adigar and prime minister held the keys of the passes through the forests and mountains, and without his assent no living being could get through those most intricate and vigilantly watched labyrinths, or approach within fifty miles of the court; and all letters and dispatches were received and opened by the said minister, who now suspected and hated Mr. North. Early in the year 1802, the Kandyans made preparations for war; every man capable of bearing arms was ordered to hold himself in readiness to take the field. But instead of attacking an English outpost or making an attempt on one of our forts, the men of the hills merely plundered a party of coast merchants, subjects of the British government, who had been up the country to purchase areka nuts. The capture they made was valued at 1000*l.*, and it consisted principally of the areka nuts which the merchants had bought in the Kandyan country and of the cattle used for the conveyance of the nuts. After reparation had been repeatedly demanded, Mr. North determined to march an army to Kandy in order to enforce restitution or indemnification, and to exact security against similar acts of violence for the future. Three thousand men were selected for the service, and were formed into two divisions. The first or Colombo division marched on the 31st of January, 1803, under the command of Major-general Macdowall; the second left Trincomalee on the 4th of February, under the command of Colonel Barbut. Neither of the divisions met with any serious resistance on the march, and they both reached the Mahavilliganga or 'Great River,' at a point about three miles from the town of Kandy, on the 20th of February. The Colombo division had performed a march of 103 miles, and the Trincomalee division a march of 142 miles, both going through a most difficult country.* On the morning of the 21st of February some of our troops crossed the Mahavilliganga, and occupied the town of Kandy, which was found totally deserted by its inhabitants. The head-quarters of the 19th and 51st regiments were also fixed at Kandy on the 24th and 25th. Shortly

* Cordiner (Reverend James), 'Description of Ceylon, &c.' Lond., 1807.

after our troops had thus taken possession of the capital, Mootosamè, the pretender to the crown, who had been living under our protection at Jafnapatam, and who had accompanied Colonel Barbut on this campaign, was conveyed into Kandy by a large detachment of British troops, and was crowned in the palace with all the forms and ceremonies in use among the Kandyans, save and except the recognition of the Adigars and people. No sooner had Mootosamè been crowned than articles of convention were settled between his highness and the governor of the British settlements in Ceylon. Large concessions were of course made to the English. By one of the clauses of the convention the new king engaged to receive an auxiliary force from the British settlements. Hitherto every attempt to this end had failed. But the new king met with no adherents among his own countrymen, and he remained in the palace surrounded only by his own domestics, and supported by no other power than that of the English. The chief Adigar now opened a correspondence, under the mask of friendship, with the commander of the British forces, who was credulous enough to become his dupe. In this correspondence the wily Kandyan completely cajoled *Macdowall*; he promised that he would assist in delivering the other king into our hands, and he urged the general to send troops through the wilderness to attack the Kandyan army. At this time the fugitive king and his army were at Rangaremketty, a post about two days' march from Kandy. The Adigar pointed out the lines of march by which access might be gained to this post, and requested that two strong detachments might be sent by different routes. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th of March, 1803, two detachments, each amounting to about 500 men, were marched off by different routes. The country between Kandy and Rangaremketty is excessively strong by nature, and great pains had been taken to strengthen it still more by art. Batteries were erected on every eminence which commanded the paths through which our soldiers were to pass; and marksmen were placed in ambush in the thickest coverts of the jungle, and wherever they could do us most injury with the least risk to themselves. Though thinned in their numbers by an enemy they could hardly ever reach, both our detachments reached the place of their destination on the evening of the 14th; but instead of finding the fugitive king and his army there, they found nothing but rocks and trees. On their return towards Kandy they were harassed by the natives as they had been on their advance. The loss incurred in killed and wounded was considerable. The Kandyans now hovered round our outposts in the neighbourhood of the capital, a neighbourhood which was a series of complicated woods and jungles and wild ravines, where a stranger might lose himself at midday. Concealed in the woods and thickets, the Kandyans fired upon our guards and sentries; and whenever any unfortunate stragglers fell into their hands, they put them to a cruel death. They never showed themselves during the day, or in any place where a considerable number of our soldiers were collected. A reward of ten rupees was given them for the head of every European, and five rupees for the head of every other class of soldiers in our service. Every night some of our people were brought down by the concealed and covered marksmen, or were butchered by fellows that crept through the jungles and pounced upon them like tigers. It was felt by the officers in command, and by Mr. North, our governor, that we had embarked in a difficult enterprise. This was certain: but unsteady and disgraceful were the means adopted to extricate us from the difficulty; and scarcely less disgraceful was it not to have foreseen the real nature of the enterprise.

The chief Adigar now wrote to the governor, and this led to an interview between the second Adigar and General Macdowall, wherein it was agreed that the fugitive king should be delivered over to the British government, that the new king should be set aside, that the chief Adigar should be invested with supreme authority in Kandy, that he should pay annually thirty thousand rupees to Mootosamè, and cede to his Britannic Majesty the road leading to Trincomalee, and

several districts, some on the frontiers and some in the interior of the Kandyan country. It was further agreed by the high contracting parties, that a cessation of hostilities should immediately take place. On the faith of this treaty, made with a convicted and self-avowed traitor, General Macdowall left Kandy for Colombo, on the 1st of April, taking with him the 51st British regiment, the Ceylon native infantry, and a detachment of Bengal artillery, and sending off part of the 19th British and part of a Malay regiment for Trincomalee. The garrison thus left in Kandy consisted of seven hundred Malays, and three hundred Europeans of the 19th regiment, and Bengal and Madras artillery. A number of sick and wounded were also left behind in this semi-barbarous little capital.* Starvation stared them all in the face, for no proper mensures had been adopted for securing magazines and depôts of provisions.

The return troops accomplished their respective marches to Colombo and to Trincomalee without molestation. On the 15th of April Capt. Madge marched from Kandy to a ceded fort, styled Fort Macdowall, with only 55 of the rank and file of the 19th regiment; nearly at the same time a letter was received at Colombo from the first Adigar, soliciting an interview with the Governor, for the purpose of arranging a definitive treaty. Mr. North went into the Kandyan country, and on the 1st of May arrived at a place of rendezvous, named by the Adigar. This worthy kept the English governor waiting for two or three days; but at last he presented himself, and fully agreed to the terms of the treaty which had been drawn up in Kandy by General Macdowall and the second Adigar. With a degree of credulity and folly scarcely conceivable, Mr. North trusted with confidence in the sincerity and influence of his perfidious confederate and ally; he consequently adopted no adequate means to reinforce the weak, and by this time sickly, garrison of Kandy, or to supply those troops with provisions; and to the capital omission of anticipating the wants of those troops may, in no small degree, be attributed the melancholy catastrophe which followed. It was subsequently ascertained that the real object of the first Adigar in soliciting this interview with Mr. North, up the country, was to take him prisoner; and it appeared that he was deterred from the attempt by the force of his excellency's escort, and the unexpected arrival of a detachment of Malays, under the command of Colonel Barbut, who had come down from Kandy to pay his respects to the governor. The journey proved fatal to Barbut: he was attacked with fever on the 4th of May, while Mr. North was amicably conferring with the first Adigar, and being sent to Colombo, he died there on the 21st. The command of the garrison of Kandy now devolved upon Major Davie. At the urgent request of the chief Adigar, General Macdowall was again sent up to Kandy, which place he reached on the 23rd of May. The Adigar, who had kept his excellency the governor waiting for two or three days, did not keep his appointment in any way with Macdowall, informing that general by letter on the 2nd of June, that he could not wait upon him without the permission of the king—the young king—the king he had proposed to assassinate. While the chief Adigar thus kept aloof, the supplies from Colombo and Trincomalee, intended for our troops in Kandy, were taken by the Kandyans, and many of our coolies who were carrying the stores were murdered in the woods. The garrison of Kandy was now greatly reduced by the sickness or death of officers and men; nearly all the European soldiers were in the hospital. The deluging rains which accompany the setting in of the south-west monsoon swelled the rivers, inundated the low country, and rendered any communication between the garrison and the coast excessively difficult. General Macdowall, his brigade-major, and his aide-de-camp, were all attacked with endemic fever, and returned to Colombo with a strong escort. The command at Kandy again devolved upon Major Davie. It could scarcely have fallen to a more incompetent officer. The dreadful fate of the garrison was rapidly advancing. The Kandyans began to approach very near to the capi-

* Cordiner.

tal, to entrench and stockade themselves in strong positions, and to tamper with our Malay soldiers. Eight Malays, and the same number of Madras lascars, went over to the enemy, and others soon followed their example. English soldiers, devoured by the foul fever and scarcely able to stand, were brought out of the hospital to do garrison duty. One of the native chiefs announced to the governor at Colombo, through a confidential agent, that the first Adigar was a perfidious villain who had deceived the whole world; and that the second Adigar had quarrelled with him. The perfidy and the villainy ought to have been no secret to Mr. North, to whom the first Adigar had opened his plan of treachery and assassination. That chief, however, continued to act as if he believed that there were no limits to English credulity and imbecility. He wrote a most friendly, flourishing letter to Major Davie, telling him that he was using all his endeavours to serve the English, and inviting him to undertake another expedition to Rangaremketty. The English soldiers continued to die fast, and the Malays to desert. Paddy, or rice in the husk, was almost the only article which remained for the subsistence of the garrison; and so sickly and weak were our people, that they were unable to perform the labour of clearing it of the husk. The Kandyans were now preparing to storm the place; and, just as the position became untenable, and an advance to Kandy or a retreat from it equally difficult and almost impossible, the Honourable Mr. North began to think that Kandy ought not to have been occupied at all, and that our troops there ought to be withdrawn. His excellency, however, was an easy, procrastinating man, and nothing effectual was done. If only a few troops had been marched only part of the way to Kandy, the retreat of the garrison might have been somewhat facilitated. On the 23rd of June the Kandyans carried two of our posts, which were garrisoned by Malays. On the morning of the 24th they attacked a post on a hill immediately adjoining to the palace in which the British troops were quartered, and succeeded in making the guard prisoners. The palace was next attacked; and after a struggle of six or seven hours Major Davie held up the white flag, and the firing ceased on both sides. A conference with the Adigars ensued, when it was stipulated that the town should be immediately given up to the Kandyans; that the British should march out with their arms, on the road leading to Trincomalee; that Mootosamè, the king they had set up and pulled down, should be permitted to accompany them; that care should be taken of our sick and wounded until they could be removed to the coast; and finally, that our retiring troops should be provided with the means of crossing the river. This nicely worded treaty being signed, our troops evacuated Kandy at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th of June. Their entire force consisted of 14 European officers, 20 British soldiers, 250 Malays, and 140 gun-lascars. They were accompanied by Mootosamè and his attendants. On reaching the Mahavilliganga river, about three miles on the road to Trincomalee—a river at that season both broad and deep—they found, what they might have expected to find, that neither boats nor rafts had been provided to carry them across. The men huddled together round a large tree which grew on a green hill near the river, and there they remained for the whole night exposed to the heaviest rain. Next morning they made some fruitless attempts to form rafts, or to get a rope across the stream; but no materials could be obtained; and the river, still further swelled by the rain of the night, was broader and deeper, and more rapid than before. The sun again went down, and the rain again descended during the whole night. On the 26th a flag of truce was sent by the chief Adigar to propose that Major Davie, together with the two officers next in rank, should meet him and two other Kandyan chiefs at a place about half-way between the river and Kandy, for the purpose of finally arranging the measures which were required to carry our troops across the river, and assist them through the Kandyan territory towards Trincomalee. Major Davie instantly complied with the proposal; and, accompanied by Captains Rumley and Humphries, and a

Malay officer named Udeen, proceeded to the place appointed for the conference. There they met three chiefs, but not the Adigar. The chiefs informed them that the king desired to have an interview with them at the palace, for the purpose of negotiating with them in person, and giving them his royal assurance of protection. Udeen, the Malay officer, who in all probability acted as interpreter, strongly remonstrated with the Major against proceeding to the palace, but in vain. On reaching the town the three English officers were surrounded, were made prisoners, were bound like felons, and confined separately. Our Malay officer did what our own countrymen ought to have done—he would not be bound, and died like a brave man with his sword in his hand. Udeen died on the spot, being nearly cut to pieces. Having secured Major Davie and Captains Rumley and Humphries, the Kandyans dispatched a half-caste drummer, a deserter from our Malay corps, to inform the English officers waiting on the bank of the river, that Major Davie ordered them to give up their arms, and to return forthwith to Kandy, whence they were to be sent by another route down to the coast, an agreement to this effect having been made between the Major and the king. As Englishmen we blush all over for what followed—we blush at every part of this dishonouring business—at the opprobium heaped upon the national character! Wretched and of long operation must have been the system of misrule under which British officers had been brought into such an abyss of degradation, imbecility, inanity! They listened to the half-caste drummer, to this Malay deserter, as if he had been the honoured envoy of a civilized sovereign, and they forthwith held a council to decide whether they ought not to give up their own arms, and order their men to give up theirs. At this council Mootosamè, whom we had made a king only to unmake him, was present. His knowledge of his countrymen and his despair made him bold, and for once pusillanimous Englishmen were rebuked by a desperate Hindu. If their fears had not deprived them of their senses, these Englishmen ought to have seen, as clearly as Mootosamè, that to give up their arms was to give themselves up to torture and an ignominious death. "Will you, the brave English," said the Kandyan prince, "you, who have conquered all India, give up your arms and put yourself in the power of the cowardly treacherous Kandyans, who, the moment they can do it with impunity, will put you all to death? Rather march back to Kandy. A few discharges from your muskets will disperse that rabble and give you possession of the town. You have provisions for a day or two. During that time the river may become fordable, and that will enable you to pursue your retreat to Trincomalee." The un-English officers determined otherwise, and ordered the troops to give up their arms. As soon as this fatal order was spoken the native troops all went over to the enemy and joined them in a body. Mootosamè was seized by the Kandyans, who conveyed him back to the town, and forthwith put him to death. The British officers and men (31 individuals in all) were marched along the road to Kandy for a short distance, when they were led into a small hollow or dell, and there cruelly beaten to death with the butt-ends of muskets or with heavy clubs. Only one of the whole number escaped to tell the frightful tale. This was Corporal Barnsley of the 19th regiment. He was knocked down in the place of slaughter by the butt-end of a gun, he was desperately wounded across the back of the neck by a large Kandyan knife, but he rolled over a precipitous bank into the watercourse of a rice-field, and was left for dead. Here he lay for some time, hearing distinctly a loose fire of musketry in the town of Kandy. Having so far recovered as to be able to move, he crawled into the jungle, which was not far off in any part of the interior of the island, where the cultivated places were as mere dots in a wide wilderness. He lay perdu in the jungle until night, when he proceeded to the river. By the time Barnsley reached the ferry, the flood in the river had so far subsided, that the ordinary ferryman had resumed his occupation with his small canoe. Thus, if our infatuated officers had only kept their arms and waited a few short hours,

they might have got across the river,* and have reached Fort Macdowall, which was only thirteen miles from the bank of the river, and on the direct road from Kandy to Trincomalee. To the honour of human nature the heart of the Kandyan ferryman melted with compassion upon seeing the ghastly, miserable spectacle our gashed and bleeding, but true English-bred corporal presented; and, at the risk of his own life, he not only ferried Barnsley across the river, but also gave him the small portion of food which he had in his canoe. Twelve years after the event (in 1815) the poor ferryman was with some difficulty found out by the English, who had then succeeded in conquering the whole of the Kandyan country. He was rewarded by the Governor-general Sir Robert Brownrigg. But some lasting monument, with inscriptions in Cingalese and in English, ought to be erected on the river bank, close by the ferry where the kind-hearted Kandyan earned his daily bread, saved the life of his English foe, and fed and comforted him, and speeded him on his way.†

Fort Macdowall, which was held by Captain Madge of the 19th regiment, had been three days besieged and completely surrounded by a part of the Kandyan army. Repeated offers had been made of a free passage to Trincomalee, with assistance for carrying the sick and the baggage, if the English would only evacuate the fort; but Captain Madge was not infatuated like the rest of our officers, and he rejected proposals which were meant only to deceive him, and to render easy the slaughter of his little garrison. When Corporal Barnsley approached the post, he was discovered and seized by the enemy. The poor fellow must have expected death at their hands; but they preferred availing themselves of his services, by sending him into the fort with a flag of truce, in the hope that his communication of the capture of Kandy and the destruction of the English would induce Captain Madge to accept their terms and surrender the fort. Captain Madge was thunderstruck at the corporal's intelligence:* he was in the midst of an enemy's country, unsupported, and without provisions. If he stayed, all must perish. He therefore resolved to retreat with such as were capable of marching; and that very night—the night of the 27th of June—while the enemy were expecting he would remain quiet and capitulate on the morning, he cleared silently out of the fort with thirteen Europeans and about seventy Malays. These men were all more or less sick and disabled; but unhappily nineteen other Europeans were left behind in the fort to the mercy of the Kandyans, being utterly unable to march or even to stand on their feet. The distance from Fort Macdowall to Trincomalee was one hundred and twenty-six English miles; the greater part of the country was mountain, or forest, or jungle; and Captain Madge and his handful of men were followed and often surrounded by large bodies of the enemy; yet, notwithstanding all these difficulties, they re-

* All the rivers and rivulets in the interior provinces of Ceylon rise and fall with wonderful rapidity. What is almost a dry channel in the evening, is often a rapid and dangerous torrent before the morning; and what is a broad deep stream in the morning, is often a mere rivulet before noon. At times an insignificant rill swells into a river in an hour, and in another hour subsides and becomes a mere rill again. Major Davie and those with him ought to have known the capricious character of these mountain-streams.—*Lieutenant De Butt's Rambles in Ceylon*, London, 1841.

† MS. Historical Sketch of the Conquest of Ceylon by the English. By Henry Marshall.

"The above information," adds Mr. Marshall, "respecting the means adopted to entice Major Davie to leave his men at the ferry, and the fraud exercised by the Kandyan chiefs to make our officers believe that Major Davie had ordered them to surrender their arms, together with the fatal result, was communicated to Mr. Simon Sawers, judicial commissioner in Kandy in the year 1823, by one of the three chiefs who prevailed upon Major Davie to return to Kandy; and the information of this chief was confirmed by the family of another of the three chiefs."—*Id.*

* Barnsley's deposition or declaration has been published in an Appendix to Captain Johnstone's 'Narrative of the Kandyan War.' The corporal must have been an illiterate man, his deposition being marked with the sign of a cross. Some other mode of rewarding him ought to have been found, for a man that cannot write can never make a good serjeant. He was, however, promoted to the rank of serjeant;—and, shortly after his promotion, he was reduced by the sentence of a court-martial.—*Marshall, MS. Historical Sketch.*

jected every idea of surrender, and succeeded in reaching Trincomalee on the 3rd of July.

Another Kandyan fort or post, situated about sixty miles from Kandy, on the Colombo road or path, was garrisoned by a few invalids, under the command of Ensign Grant, a very young officer, who had distinguished himself by his gallantry and activity during this war. He was repeatedly summoned by the Kandyans to give up the post upon condition of a safe and unmolested return to the British territory; but, like Captain Madge, he declined to listen to their proposals. Unlike Madge, Ensign Grant had plenty of provisions. He strengthened his fortifications with bags of rice and with the bags and barrels that contained the rest of his stores, and for ten days he bade defiance to several thousand of the enemy, who kept up an almost incessant fire upon the post. On the 2nd of July the gallant ensign and his little invalid garrison were brought safely off by a body of our troops from Colombo. Wherever common sense and common English courage were displayed the Kandyans were foiled: whenever our officers were insane enough to trust to a treaty or a truce with them, torture and murder followed, and hardly a man escaped. The post which Ensign Grant had so nobly maintained, was the last of our posts in the Kandyan country: not an inch of ground now remained to us beyond our original frontier. Dreadful was the fate of those who had been left behind! Of the one hundred and twenty sick and wounded abandoned in the hospitals in Kandy none escaped—they were tortured and butchered as they lay, incapable of resistance.* The nineteen sick left at Fort Macdowall were treated in the same manner. Twenty European soldiers were massacred at Wattepaloga ferry during the retreat. In all, 11 British officers and 189 British soldiers were butchered by the Kandyans. Through bad climate and bad provisions 128 had died in hospital between the 1st of April and the 24th of June. Thus, out of 300 British troops which had been left at Kandy with Major Davie, only 13 men escaped to Trincomalee with Captain Madge! Nor did the mischief to the European troops end here: hundreds of those who had been marched up the country, and who had been countermarched by General Macdowall, brought back with them the germs of the jungle fever, and died of the effects of that disease either in the present or in the following year.* It was admitted by our medical officers that the susceptibility to disease and the mortality were greatly heightened by the badness and insufficiency of the provisions, and by the negligent execrable manner in which the commissariat department had been managed. The whole campaign was nothing but a congeries of blunders and rascalities: yet, the Honourable Mr. North being so easy a man and so amiable a governor, and having so much to answer for himself, not one officer, that we can discover, was brought to a court-martial; not one individual, that we can hear of, was visited with punishment of any sort.

It remains to mention the fate of the three British officers who were made prisoners at Kandy, namely, Major Davie, Captain Rumley, and Captain Humphries. The two captains died soon after they were made prisoners: how they died remains a secret, but we may imagine that, if they were not murdered or tormented out of their lives by the savage enemy, they died of broken hearts or of the torture occasioned by reflecting on their own un-officerlike and un-Englishlike conduct. As for Major Davie, the most responsible and the most culpable of the three, he was clearly not a man to die of

* Cordiner. According to the statement of General Brownrigg, the sick massacred in Kandy amounted to 150.

* The mean strength of his majesty's 19th regiment of infantry was, at the beginning of the year 1803, not less than 643, of which number 338 died during the year. In the following year the mean strength of the regiment was 642, and the deaths 128, or in the proportion of 200 per 1000. —*Marshall, MS. Historical Sketch.*

The loss in the 51st regiment was still more dreadful. When it returned from Kandy to Colombo, in the month of April, 1803, about 400 of its men appeared under arms on parade. In little more than two months 300 of these poor fellows were in the grave, having died chiefly from jungle fever, and the effects of bad and insufficient food, clothing, and accommodation.—*Id.*

an excess of feeling or a reproachful conscience: he lived on for years with what honest Robert Knox styled "a Cingulay's clout" about his middle. So stupendous was the amount of his cowardice and imbecility, that people could not believe in it, but attempted to account for his conduct by taxing him with deliberate treachery. A story was circulated, and for some time believed, that he had become enamoured of a Kandyan princess, that the king and the chief Adigar had promised him the hand of this lady, together with the rank of a prince or Adigar, and an extensive territory, and the command of the troops. There was nothing of the sort: Davie was no traitor; he was only an ass or an old woman with a soldier's coat on his back and a major's commission in his pocketbook.* For some time he was detained a close prisoner at Kandy; but, it is said, under such strict surveillance that he could not make his escape. But it may be doubted whether he ever had the spirit to risk his skin in an attempt; and, if he had escaped from the Kandyans, he could scarcely have escaped a British court-martial. He took to himself a black wife, and began to live like a native. He was afterwards removed to the province of Doombera, and in the year 1810 a plan was concerted by some Kandyan Malays, who had been engaged in a conspiracy against the king, and had therefore been outlawed, to carry off the major through the Vedda woods to the fort of Batticalao, where, no doubt, they expected to be well rewarded by the British government. This plot being discovered while it was yet in embryo, Davie was brought back to the capital, and there he died a few days after his arrival—*it is said*, of the jungle fever. It is also alleged that Mr. North and the governors who followed him had made several attempts to negotiate with the court of Kandy for the major's liberation; but as the king demanded as the ransom of his prisoner a good seaport and a town on the coast, the British government, not thinking Davie worth so much, had constantly refused the terms.*

It was not to be expected that the Kandyans, elated by success, and by the not irrational conviction that the English troops were commanded by a set of blockheads, should remain quiet in the interior of the island. More especially as they knew of the jungle fevers which were daily thinning our very small Ceylon army, and of the disaffection and mutiny which had been allowed to grow up among the native part of our forces. As pioneers, or as the vanguard of their army, the Kandyans sent down spies and secret agents to seduce the native subjects of the British government, and to foment disturbances in various parts of the country. Towards the end of July all our frontiers were threatened, nearly at one and the same time, by warlike assemblages. In the months of August and September they poured down from the mountains, and, by ca-

* Major Davie was a native of Edinburgh. He obtained a lieutenantcy in the 75th King's regiment in 1787, and in 1793 he was promoted to a company in the same corps. Having been employed recruiting in Edinburgh, he did not join the 75th regiment until he had obtained the rank of captain; consequently he was not present with the corps during its distinguished services in India. In fact, he appears never to have seen any active service at all. While in India he had been brought to a court-martial. Having obtained a short leave of absence from the headquarters of the 75th, then stationed on the Malabar coast, and being at Bombay, he asked and obtained from the commander of the forces of that presidency a longer leave of absence and permission to proceed to Europe, without any reference having been made to the commanding-officer of his own regiment. He embarked at Bombay for England; but as the ship touched at one of the ports on the Malabar coast, he was taken on shore and placed under arrest by the commanding-officer of the 75th. The court-martial tried him for "absconding." He was, however, acquitted; and not long after—in 1801—he was promoted to a majority in a Ceylon regiment styled "Champagne's Infantry." He was described by those who knew him in Ceylon as being a well-disposed inoffensive sort of man, without the slightest practical experience of active military operations.—*Henry Marshall*, MS. Historical Sketch of the Conquest of Ceylon.

* "Major Davie spent the remainder of his life at Kandy, and at last adopted the dress and habits of the natives. A half-caste son of his still lives in the place, supported by a small pension from our government. A large flat stone, elevated on lesser ones, was shown me as the place whence the king beheld the massacre; and a tree, near the spot where the negotiation was held, still bears the name of Major Davie's tree."—*Bishop Heber, Indian Journal.*

joling some and intimidating others, they drew to their side many of the inhabitants of our settlements; and this emboldened them to proclaim that their intention was to expel the English from every part of the island. On the 20th of August they captured a small fort distant only twenty miles from Colombo, the seat of government, and the centre of our trade and prosperity. The next day they advanced five miles farther in the direction of Colombo, carrying terror to the hearts of the burghers who inhabited the suburbs, and obliging many of them to take shelter in the fort. But reinforcements arrived both from the Cape of Good Hope and from the Bay of Bengal; and the Kandyans, after doing great mischief, retreated to their mountains and almost impervious forests. But there seemed to be an evil spell upon the king-appointed governor of Ceylon and all the officers serving under him. Such measures were adopted as gave to conquests a disgrace as indelible as that of our recent defeats. It was absolutely necessary to clear our frontier, to follow the fugitives into their own territories, and to strike some blow which should restore our character and revive the awe due to our arms; but it was resolved to make the war a war of retribution and revenge—a war of devastation—and this, though mentioned with cold indifference, if not with approbation, by a divine of the Church of England, a courtly historian, who seems to think that no government could do wrong which patronized him, was unnecessary, unwarrantable, atrocious. It was not by such means as these that the Clives, and the Hastingses, and the Wellesleys had built up our empire on the continent of India. The system was, however, carried out to a great extent. Detachments of British troops were sent into the Kandyan country for the avowed purpose of laying it waste wherever they penetrated. In the comparatively rich province of Saffragam one detachment of British soldiers was employed (we quote the words of our reverend historian) "in burning and destroying all the houses, stores, and gardens."* We have the same authority for the fact that many other parts of the country were exposed to similar horrors. This well-fed chaplain and complaisant guest of the Honourable Mr. North really appears to be so insensible of the fundamental doctrine of his faith as to believe that these enormities were sanctioned by the plea of vengeance, and that the English were bound to retaliate upon the savage Kandyans for the unspeakable cruelties of which they had been guilty!

Our army having been further strengthened by the arrival of the 65th regiment from Europe, and by reinforcements from Madras and Bengal, it was resolved by the local government, in 1804, again to invade the interior and to take possion of Kandy. Six separate columns or divisions were to march from different stations on the coast, and to penetrate the Kandyan territory by different routes so as to concentrate in the vicinity of the capital. General Wemyss, who had succeeded General Macdowall in the command of the forces, made, in the month of August, a tour of the maritime parts of the island, in order, as he said, to ascertain by personal inspection the state of the detachments at the different stations, and to inquire into the practicability and eligibility of the different routes from the coast to the interior. At Batticalao he explained to Captain Johnston, an officer selected to command one of the six columns of invasion, the meditated expedition, and his views respecting the combined attack on Kandy. From Batticalao General Wemyss proceeded to Trincomalee, and from Trincomalee to Jafnapatam. From the two last-named stations Captain Johnston received two letters, one dated the 3rd of September, and the other the 8th. According to his interpretation of them, the purport of both these letters was to direct him (Johnston) to proceed into the enemy's country, so as to be prepared to co-operate with the other divisions, which were expected to form a general junction on the heights of Kandy on the 28th or 29th of September for the purpose of *destroying* the enemy's capital.* Cap-

* Cordiner.

* The second of these letters, or that which

tain Johnston forthwith completed his preparations, and on the 20th of September he marched from Batticalao for Kandy with 81 Europeans and 224 native soldiers (Malays and Bengal sepoys), and 350 pioneers and coolies. After dreadful toil and much hard fighting in the woods and mountains, he reached Kandy on the 6th of October. To his astonishment he found that there was not so much as a single red-coat anywhere thereabouts, and that no satisfactory information could be obtained respecting the march of any of the other five divisions. He remained in the deserted capital three days; but on the 9th of October he began his retreat upon Trincomalee. While he had been staying in Kandy, the Kandyans had been most busily employed in preparing to cut off his retreat. The Atgalè pass and the whole line of road through the jungles of Mately, extending for sixty or seventy miles, were barricaded, in some places with breastworks, and in others by means of large trees cut down and laid across the road. In forcing the Atgalè pass Johnston lost 5 Europeans, 8 sepoys, and 30 pioneers and coolies. At nearly every other barricade there was a fight, and in nearly every thicket there was an ambuscade of keen marksmen. With admirable gallantry and military skill Johnston fought his way out, and reached Trincomalee on the 20th of October; but 2 British officers, 14 British soldiers, 7 Malays, 54 Bengal sepoys, and a still greater number of coolies had perished in the wilderness.*

When he was close to Trincomalee, Johnston met some English officers who told him, to his exceeding great surprise, that it was not intended that he should proceed to Kandy; that the general, on arriving at Jafnapatam, had found obstacles to the combined attack which he considered to be insurmountable; that the second of the two letters he had received was intended as a countermand of the original plan; that his having gone to Kandy was deemed a disobedience of orders; that it was merely meant that the divisions should enter those parts of the enemy's territory adjacent to their respective districts, and return after laying waste the country; that the other five divisions had accordingly made their incursions, and had long since returned;

Captain Johnston received from Jafnapatam, contained the following passage, which might very well have been written by a Massena or a Davoust—"*You will, in junction with the other detachments, concert such measures as may best tend to effect the greatest devastation and injury to the enemy's country.*"

* Narrative of the Operations of a Detachment, in an Expedition to Kandy, in the Island of Ceylon, in the year 1804, by Captain Johnston. London, 1810.

It is not often that a British officer has been exposed to more intense sufferings. He says, in concluding his very interesting narrative—"In common with the rest of the detachment, I had performed the greater part of the retreat barefooted. Had I possessed, indeed, changes of boots and shoes, I could not have used them, my feet having swelled, and become so tender from constant wet, that I could not without considerable pain put them to the ground.

"In this condition, emaciated by fatigue, and labouring besides under a severe dysentery, I was, for the last two days, obliged to be carried in my cloak fastened to a stick.

"These bodily sufferings, however, severe as they were, were only shared in common with many of those around me, and fell far short of the anguish of my mind. Whilst I witnessed the melancholy state of my brave companions, I could not help reflecting that perhaps my precipitate retreat from Kandy had brought all this distress and misery upon them; that the other divisions were possibly now in Kandy, carrying into execution the general's plans; and that in such case I must, by my premature retreat, incur the censure of the general, and perhaps of the whole army.

"On the other hand, in the event of our troops not coming up, I was satisfied, that had I remained a single day longer in Kandy, the river, from the constant rains which we had experienced, would have become completely impassable; that our provisions would have been expended, without the possibility of procuring any fresh supply; and that, though determined not to capitulate under any extremity, we must, in the end, have been overpowered, owing to the want of ammunition, as well as from the pressure of sickness and famine."

Captain Arthur Johnston was a native of Ireland. He entered the army in 1794, and in 1795 was appointed to a lieutenantcy in the 19th regiment. In 1804 he obtained a company in the 3rd Ceylon regiment, and in 1811 he was promoted to a majority in the same corps. Not long after this he was removed to that active and excellent corps the Corsican Rangers, of which the late Sir Hudson Lowe was for some time Colonel. In 1814 he became Lieutenant-Colonel by brevet, and in 1816 he retired on half-pay. After this he was for some time employed as a professor in the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. He was one of the claimants for the Annandale peerage. He died in 1823 or 1824.

and, finally, that the government, having learned from the Cingalese on the borders of his (Johnston's) detachment being in Kandy, had despaired of its ever returning! With this easy despondence, or with the pleasant conviction that this brave officer and the whole of his column would be destroyed on their retreat, this good easy government sat down to their dinners or went to their beds without sending any troops to facilitate the retreat, without doing anything to avert the doom of the division!

A desultory warfare between the Kandyans and the English continued for many months. It was conducted on both sides with execrable barbarity: numerous villages were burned, and large tracts of country reduced to desolation. Our soldiery, whether British or native, were infuriated by the treachery and cruelty which had been perpetrated at Kandy in 1803, and from the effects of which many of their comrades in the present campaigns were not exempted; and the government and the commanding officers, instead of exerting themselves, as they were bound to do, in restraining this fury, encouraged it, and expressly ordered the continuance of acts of vengeance. The disaffection of the native inhabitants of our own territories was visited with fearful retribution by martial law. At a fishing village on the southern coast, all the boats were burned and all the houses destroyed; one man was hanged, and five others were sentenced to receive each 1000 lashes—a favourite number with courts martial at that period, and for a long time afterwards, though happily these courts are not now authorized to condemn any man to receive more than 200 lashes.

In February, 1805, a general invasion of our territories by the Kandyans took place. Out of their own woods these people were but contemptible combatants. They were completely routed, and they retired from all the maritime provinces with great loss into their country. Indirect advances were soon afterwards made by the Kandyans, and tacitly accepted by the English, for a cessation of hostilities.

In the month of July, 1805, a man more fitted for the post, the Honourable Sir Thomas Maitland, assumed the government of Ceylon. Before Maitland arrived, jealousies and intrigues among the chiefs, and insurrections among the people, had broken out in the kingdom of Kandy. The chief Adigar quenched the insurrections in blood, and cut off some of the troublesome Adigars. This war in the interior was scarcely over ere another broke out between the chief Adigar and the king. For a time the struggle seemed doubtful, but in the end the king prevailed, and the chief Adigar, who had very nearly succeeded in getting the king assassinated, was brought a prisoner to Kandy and sentenced to die with his nephew. He and his nephew were beheaded, and six inferior chiefs were hanged and impaled at the same time. The son of the chief Adigar, who had been seized and imprisoned at a distance, was also condemned to die; but not arriving until after the execution of his relations, and then arriving on a great holiday, his life was spared. His lands and his rank were, however, forfeited. This catastrophe of the chief Adigar happened in 1812.

During the long civil war in the interior Sir Thomas Maitland had diligently applied himself to improve the condition of our maritime possessions, and to undo the mischief which had been permitted to be done by his easy predecessor. Sir James Mackintosh, who visited Ceylon in 1810, says, "It is impossible for me to do justice to General Maitland's most excellent administration, which, I am convinced, never had an equal in India. By the cheerful decision of his character, and by his perfect knowledge of men, he has become universally popular amidst severe retrenchments. In an island where there was in one year a deficit of 700,000*l.*, he has reduced the expenses to the level of the revenue; and with his small army of 5000 men, he has twice in the same year given effectual aid to the great government of Madras, which has an army of 70,000 men."* Instead of making pre-

* Diary in Memoirs of the Life of the Right Hon. Sir James Mackintosh, edited by his Son, Robert James Mackintosh, Esq. &c.

mature attempts to conquer the whole of the island, Maitland left the Kandyans to their dissensions, and endeavoured to raise the value of the territories we possessed, and to constitute a system of government and laws suitable to the character and habits of the native populations. In these great objects he, and still more the Cingalese, were indebted to the learning, the industry, the genius, and even the eccentricity of Mr. John D'Oyly, who was the only good Cingalese scholar in the Ceylon civil service, and who, with infinite labour, compiled a code of laws in the Cingalese language. The qualifications necessary to this arduous task had been acquired by our otherwise accomplished scholar partly in a life of seclusion, toil, and abstinence, and partly in a life spent among the natives of the country. And in order to obtain a perfect familiarity with their language, laws, manners, and customs, D'Oyly had put on their dress, and had for years lived among them as one of themselves.*

In 1812, much about the time that the chief Adigar lost his head, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Brownrigg succeeded Sir Thomas Maitland as governor of Ceylon. And nearly at the same time one of the chief Adigar's nephews succeeded his uncle in his post of prime minister, and in all his other dignities. This was done with the consent of the king; but Eheylapola had scarcely been established in the highest office in the state, ere the king began to suspect him of designs against his life and throne, and of pursuing the same system of intrigue and the same treasonable practices for which his uncle had suffered death. The king prepared to cut him off, and the people of his district prepared to resist the royal forces. In the hope of strengthening himself, Eheylapola opened a correspondence with Sir Robert Brownrigg. The king now deprived him of all his offices, and threw his wife and children, whom he had left behind in the capital, into prison. Next his majesty appointed another chieftain to be chief Adigar, and sent him with part of his army to suppress the rebellion. Passing over the lofty and precipitous summit of Adam's Peak, this new chief Adigar got into the disaffected province, and soon routed his opponents. Eheylapola fled to a British post, whence he was conveyed to Colombo, with some of his adherents. This was in March, 1814. His rival and conqueror returned to Kandy with a number of prisoners he had taken, and forty-seven of these unhappy victims were impaled. This was but a beginning; seventy other head men were flogged almost to death, and were then dispatched. From a mere spirit of vengeance the king sentenced Eheylapola's wife and children, and his brother and his brother's wife, to death—the brother and children to be beheaded, and the females, according to Kandyan usage, to be drowned. All these prisoners were brought to an open space in front of the queen's palace, and there delivered over to the executioners. The hapless wife of Eheylapola comforted her eldest son, a boy about eleven years old, and bade him submit to his fate. By one blow of a sword the boy was decapitated. The head was then placed in a large rice mortar, and the pestle forced into the mother's hands. She must pound the head of her child, or be treated, in public, with the last indignities! To avoid the ignominy in question, the wretched mother lifted the pestle and let it fall on the head of her beloved boy. The other children were decapitated in succession, and then pounded in the same manner. After thus witnessing the execution of all her children and of her brother-in-law, the mother, her sister-in-law, and the wife of another chief were led to a little tank in

* Mackintosh, in a letter to his wife, has left a pleasing picture of our learned Cingalese recluse.

"Among the society (at Colombo) are three old Westminsters—Twisleton, Coke, and D'Oyly. . . . . D'Oyly, you recollect, was one of the party who rowed us, in 1799, from Cambridge to Ely. He is the only Cingalese scholar in the Ceylon civil service, and, like many Orientalists, has almost become a native in his habits of life. He lives on a plantain, invites nobody to his house, and does not dine abroad once a year; but he is generally esteemed, and seems an amiable and honourable, though uncouth, recluse. When I saw him come into dinner, at Mr. Wood's, I was struck with the change of a Cambridge boy into a Cingalese hermit, looking as old as I do."

As some acknowledgment of his merits and the value of his services, our Cingalese hermit was afterwards made a baronet.

the neighbourhood of Kandy, and there drowned.*

The widowed and childless Eheylapola was provided with a house in the neighbourhood of the Fort of Colombo, and was maintained at the expense of Government. He was maddened by the thirst for vengeance—he could promise partisans and co-operation — he would agree to any terms that the English might propose, if they would only aid him in destroying the destroyers of his family. For some considerable time, however, General Brownrigg would not enter into his views, nor even admit him to an audience. While his excellency was expecting some hostile visitation from the troops of his Kandyan majesty for his having given shelter to a rebel chief, intelligence was received that ten native cloth-merchants, subjects of the British government, had been seized in the Kandyan country, had been sent up to the capital, and had there been frightfully mutilated, by having their noses and ears and their right arms cut off. This, the severest of the Kandyan secondary punishments, had been inflicted by order of the king. Seven of the poor cloth-merchants died on the spot; the remaining three reached Colombo in the state above described. It is affirmed that a party of Kandyan thieves, who had previously plundered the poor cloth-merchants, in order to conceal their own villainy, had carried them to Kandy, and accused them of being spies of the English; but even if this were true, the conduct of the king and the Kandyan government was not to be tolerated. The dismal results of every former attempt to subjugate the Kandyan kingdom had rendered the invasion of the hilly country an unpopular service both with the army and with that class of the native labouring population who were usually pressed to accompany the troops as coolies. During the month of November, 1814, a detachment of troops was, however, organized at Colombo for service in the field, and placed under the immediate command of Major Hook †. On the 19th of December, 1814, Major Hook's division marched for Rangwell, a small English post about eighteen miles from Colombo, and twelve from the Kandyan boundary. The fugitive Eheylapola, who was now admitted to figure as our ally, accompanied the troops, together with a few Kandyans who had followed his fortunes or had been induced to join him. During the stay at Rangwell all the English officers dined with Eheylapola; but by this time the perfidy of Kandyan allies had become proverbial with our army, and Major Hook took especial care not to admit any considerable number of Eheylapola's followers within our cantonments. The division remained at Rangwell until the beginning of January, 1815, when it moved forward to the banks of the Sittawaka, a river which divided the maritime or British district from the Kandyan territory. Here Major Hook was joined by Mr. John D'Oyly, who could speak and write the Cingalese language like a native, and who remained with the troops as the commissioner of his excellency the governor. Mr. D'Oyly conducted the negociations which were in progress with Eheylapola and other disaffected chiefs; and his sanction was required before Major Hook was authorized to advance into the country. This sanction was not given until the 9th or 10th of January. In the interval a hostile encounter took place in the Kandyan territories between some of Eheylapola's adherents and a party of the king's troops; and the king's party being victorious, pursued the defeated party into the English territory, and there burned a cottage. On the 11th of January Major Hook's division crossed the boundary river, and began their march up the country towards a post on the Kalaneganga river, where the enemy were assembled in force. The road was rugged, the march most fatiguing; the river Kalaneganga was of considerable breadth, and was then from four to five

* Dr. Davy, An Account of the Interior of Ceylon, &c. &c. 1821.

† Our much respected friend, Mr. Henry Marshall, was attached to Major Hook's detachment as chief surgeon; he accompanied it on its march into the interior, and was an eye-witness of most of the circumstances which he describes in the Historical Sketch, which he has kindly placed at our service.

feet deep; the banks were precipitous, and the enemy fired gingals across the river; but after four or five discharges of a six-pounder the British troops rapidly descended the precipitous bank, forded the river, and ascended the opposite bank, from which the enemy fled in confusion.* A proclamation in the Cingalese language was now issued, setting forth the causes of hostilities, and declaring the object of the war to be—"for securing the permanent tranquillity of our settlements, and in vindication of the honour of the British name: for the deliverance of the Kandyan people from their oppressors; in fine, for the subversion of that Malabar dominion, which during three generations has tyrannized over the country."

In the meantime seven other divisions were getting in motion from different parts of the coast, in order to co-operate with the advanced division of Major Hook, and to concentrate round Kandy.

The progress of these several divisions towards the interior of the island was but feebly resisted by the enemy. In Major Hook's division, which was always foremost, not a man was either killed or wounded. An attempt was made by these troops to surprise Mollegoddy, the new chief Adigar, who commanded the enemy posted on this line of road. His palankeen was captured; but during the skirmish he escaped into the jungle, after having been wounded in one of his legs by a musket-ball. The wound must have been exquisitely painful, and one which must have rendered walking exceedingly difficult, for the ball had passed through the leg between the ankle joint and the tendo Achilles. From the wild wherein he concealed himself the wounded chief solicited the king to permit his wife and children to join him from the capital, where they were tacitly retained as hostages. The king complied with the request, calculating that a chief who had been wounded by the English would regard them with implacable hatred, and that consequently he would not play false to his majesty. Mollegoddy must have possessed considerable fortitude; for, only a few days after he had received his painful wound, he came to Major Hook's camp on foot, late in the night, and disguised as a messenger from Mollegoddy, i. e. from himself. He had a companion with him; and the deference with which he was treated by this man convinced the Major he was not what he professed to be. After this interview, numerous communications were made to Major Hook, who continued to advance, by Mollegoddy and other chiefs, who all professed their dissatisfaction with the king, and their willingness to promote the advance of the British troops, provided they could do so without openly renouncing the Kandyan government. Major Hook was much puzzled how to act, knowing the perfidy and cunning of these people, and apprehending that they meant to lead him into some fatal snare. When, however, a messenger from one of the chiefs volunteered to conduct him to the night quarters of a body of Kandyans, who had been lurking in the thickets and firing on our troops, the Major risked a detachment of Malays and sepoys in a camisade, or midnight surprise. The guide proved true to his engagement; the enemy's sentry was found asleep and secured; the house occupied by the sleeping Kandyans was surrounded, and the doors being strongly barricaded, the thatch of the house was set on fire. To escape from the flames the Kandyans threw open the doors, and were then met by a hedge of bayonets, through which they endeavoured to penetrate. The number of men in the house was stated at, or about 75; but how many perished in the flames, or were killed or wounded by the Malays and sepoys, was not ascertained. After this experiment, somewhat more confidence appears to have been placed in the chief Adigar Mollegoddy, and in the other chiefs, of whom some were really disaffected and disgusted with the suspicious and sanguinary temper of their king, and some were only looking for security to their persons and possessions by siding in time with the stronger party. From the amount of the force employed, and from the superior

* On the 12th of January, after the two rivers had been crossed, his excellency the governor joined the first division, and dined with the officers in a hut constructed of cocoa-nut leaves. Next day he returned to Colombo.

manner in which our operations were conducted, it was clear that his Kandyan majesty had not a chance. Our divisions were gradually closing round him with impenetrable hedges of bayonets. On the 2nd of February our 2nd Colombo division got well up the country and encamped on some heights, where it was joined by General Brownrigg, and where it staid for a few days to allow time for the two divisions from Trincomalee, the two divisions from Point de Galle, the division from Batticalao, and the division from Negombo, to approach nearer to Kandy, so as to intercept the retreat of the king on every side. Mr. D'Oyly and Major Hook had continued to hold communications with Mollegoddy, and on the 8th of February that chief Adigar came into the British camp on the heights in solemn procession with several elephants, and was introduced to his excellency the governor. He excused himself for not having joined the expedition sooner; but this, he said, had been solely on account of his family. If he had declared himself while his family were in the hands of the king at Kandy, they would all have been drowned, or decapitated and pounded in a mortar, like the family of Eheylapola. On retiring from his audience of reception, Mollegoddy, of his own accord, proposed paying a visit to his late rival Eheylapola, who was at this time in General Brownrigg's camp. The proposition seemed strange, for it was through Mollegoddy that the wife and children of the ex-chief Adigar had been drowned and beheaded, and that 117 of his adherents had been impaled or otherwise tortured and put to death: but the governor agreed to it, and the tragical interview took place in the camp. The visitor introduced himself with the exclamation "I am a ruined man!" "What then am I?" said the bereaved Eheylapola. Both chiefs burst into tears.*

Intelligence being received that the king had left Kandy, our troops moved forward: on the 14th of February the second division with General Brownrigg took possession of the capital, which was found nearly deserted by the inhabitants; and on the 15th the first division under Major Hook encamped in the immediate vicinity of the town.

"Shortly after the tents of the first division had been pitched," says Mr. Marshall, "I was addressed in English by a brown-cloured man in the native costume. Upon inquiry I ascertained that his name was Thomas Theon, that he was by birth a German, that he belonged to the Bengal Artillery, and accompanied the expedition to Kandy in 1803; and that he was a patient in hospital when Major Davie capitulated to the Kandyans. When he was asked how he had retained a knowledge of the English language, having for such a number of years associated with none but Kandyans, he replied —"I, being a foreigner, never could speak the English language correctly; but, having found a few leaves of an English Bible, I read them occasionally, and by that means preserved some acquaintance with the language."* He was forthwith conducted to the palace, now General Brownrigg's head-quarters, and was introduced to his excellency. General Brownrigg appointed the poor German to a suitable situation on the coast; but he died at Point de Galle soon after his liberation from the Kandyans.†

* Henry Marshall, MS. Historical Sketch of the Conquest of Ceylon.

* It was by daily draughts at the same pure source of "English undefiled" that poor Robert Knox kept up his English during the nineteen years of his captivity. An old Cingalese brought him an English Bible, which he had picked up on the coast. Poor Robert, in his eagerness, would have given his little all for the book, but the old man was contented with a cotton cap.

† The German's narrative of his escapes from death at the time of the massacre is very curious. He was, with the 120 or 150 sick, left in the hospital on the capitulation, and he was the only one of the number that did escape. He received a blow, along with the other patients, from the butt end of a musket, which deprived him of his senses. When he came to, he found himself lying among the dead. He crawled to a drain behind the hospital, but being discovered next day, he was hung up to a tree. The rope broke, and he fell to the ground. He was again suspended, and the people left him, thinking that this time the rope would do its duty; but again the rope broke. He contrived to find his way to a deserted hut, where he continued for ten days without any other sustenance than the green grass that grew near the door of the hut, and the rain which dropped through apertures of the roof. At last, an old Kandyan

It was by this time ascertained that the fugitive king was still in the vicinity of the capital. No time was lost in adopting means to seize him. A detachment of troops, accompanied by Mr. D'Oyly and Eheylapola, discovered the house in which his Majesty had taken refuge with his mother, his wives, his children, and a few of his most faithful adherents. Eheylapola's followers made the attack on the house, the door of which was very strongly barricaded. The party within resisted, and one or two were killed on both sides; but in a short space of time the front wall of the house was thrown down, and the king, exposed to the fire of the assailants, implored protection for himself and his wives. He was taken to the nearest village. Next morning Mr. D'Oyly found him surrounded by his mother, his wives and family, who were all in the deepest consternation and affliction, fearing, no doubt, that they would be sacrificed to the manes of the butchered and drowned family of Eheylapola. Mr. D'Oyly removed these horrible apprehensions, and assured them all that they should be treated with respect and kindness. The king was at first silent and reserved: but after being convinced that he would be well treated, he betrayed evident signs of tender emotion; and taking the hands of his aged mother and of his four wives, he presented them successively to Mr. D'Oyly, and recommended them in the most solemn and affecting manner to his protection.

woman came to the hut and entered it, but, apparently surprised and alarmed at seeing a European, she instantly disappeared. To his great comfort, however, she soon returned, bringing with her a dish containing a quantity of dressed rice, which she left on the ground, and went her way. Next morning some Kandyans came to the hut and took our poor German before the king, who, struck with the singularity of his fate, observed that it was not for man to injure one who was so evidently the favourite of Heaven. The king then ordered him to be supplied with food, giving him at the same time in charge of one of the chiefs, with strict injunctions to treat him with kindness. A house was allotted to him in Kandy, and he, after some time, married the daughter of a Moorman, a circumstance which contributed greatly to his comfort. He was never allowed to see Major Davie; and it was said that a woman who had conveyed a message from him to the Major was put to death.—*Henry Marshall, MS. Historical Sketch.*

The report of the capture of the king reached General Brownrigg on the 19th, while he was at dinner with a small party of officers. His excellency was greatly affected; and, while the tears rolled down his cheeks, he shook hands with every one present, and thanked them for their exertions in furtherance of an object which now seemed to be nearly accomplished, and which had been vainly attempted for nearly three centuries by three European powers in succession—the conquest of the Kandyan country.

The royal prisoners and their attendants were forthwith sent down to Colombo, in charge of Major Hook, and under a strong escort. They arrived at our little capital on the 6th of March, and were received by Colonel Kerr, the commandant of the garrison. A spacious and handsomely furnished house was set apart for their residence. They all seemed to be delighted with their residence. "As I am no longer permitted to be a king," said the fallen tyrant, "I am thankful for all this kindness." Before he arrived at Colombo, his dethronement, or the unequivocal right of conquest, was acknowledged by all his great chiefs.

On the 2nd of March a solemn conference or convention was held in the audience-hall of the palace of Kandy, between his excellency the governor, on behalf of his Majesty George III. and of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent on the one part, and the Adigars, Dissauvas, and other principal chiefs of the Kandyan provinces on the other part, on behalf of the people, &c.: and, then and there, a public instrument of treaty being produced and publicly read in English and in Cingalese, was unanimously assented to. By this treaty it was declared that the late Rajah by his evil deeds had forfeited all claims to the sovereignty, and that his family and relatives of all degrees were for ever excluded from the throne; that the dominion of the Kandyan provinces was vested in the sovereign of the British empire, to be exercised through his accredited agents, leaving to the native chiefs, appointed by authority, the rights and privileges of their respective offices, and to all classes of the people the safety of their persons

and property, with all their rights and immunities, according to the laws, institutions, and customs established and in force among them; and finally that the religion of Budha, professed by the chiefs and inhabitants of the Kandyan provinces, should be and was declared inviolate, its rites, ministers, and places of worship to be maintained and protected, &c. During this conference Eheylapola and Mollegoddy sat side by side; and there was at least this great good secured, if not by the treaty, then by our conquest, that such savage feuds and rivalries as theirs should no longer be allowed. All the Kandyan chiefs complimented General Brownrigg on the success of his arms, and declared that he had rescued them and their country from tyranny and oppression. "No people in the world," says Mr. Marshall, "can excel the Kandyans in paying compliments." Mr. D'Oyly, without whom our army would not have been quite so soon in Kandy, and without whose services in the audience-hall the present business must have limped, interpreted for the chiefs and for General Brownrigg, and explained to the natives the treaty which he had himself composed, or at least translated into Cingalese. After the treaty had been signed by the chiefs, Mollegoddy, Eheylapola, and the other Adigars proceeded to the great door of the hall, where the subordinate headmen of the different districts of the country were attending; and these head men being requested by Mollegoddy to range themselves in order according to their respective districts, the treaty was again read in Cingalese, and at the conclusion of the reading the head-men expressed their assent, and the British flag was hoisted, and a royal salute was fired to announce that his Majesty George III. was sovereign of the whole island of Ceylon.

It was thought that Eheylapola had expected to be raised to the throne under British protection and suzerainty, and that he cruelly felt his disappointment. But if it were so, he conducted himself with much dignity and decorum: he declined official employment, preferring, he said, to live in retirement, and asking for nothing but the title of "The Friend of the British Government." He fixed his residence in Kandy, and married again. He lived in considerable state, and continued to be regarded by the natives as the great chief of the country. He had certainly displayed more talent than any of the other chiefs.

The deposed king remained at Colombo until the 24th of January, 1816. He declared that until he was made a prisoner by the English, he had never retired to rest without the dread of assassination. Fear produces cruelty, and cruelty excites fear. He never could trust any of his courtiers, and it is doubtful if any one of his chiefs deserved his confidence. He was passionate as well as suspicious. "Your English governors," said he to Major Hook, "have an advantage over us in Kandy: they have counsellors about them, who never allow them to do anything in a passion, and that is the reason you have so few executions; but, unfortunately for us, the offender is dead before our resentment has subsided." Some of his most sanguinary mensures were ordered when he was drunk, he having become very liable to paroxysms of intemperance.* The predominating passion of his mind after he became a prisoner was indignation at the treatment he had received from his own subjects, more especially the chiefs. "Take heed of Eheylapola and Mollegoddy," said he, "they deceived me, and they will deceive you." He gave our government an account of the places where his treasure was hidden, observing, with great bitterness, that it mattered little what became of the money, provided only his chiefs and people did not benefit by it. In a conversation with Mr. Marshall, who has done more than any man to preserve his name from oblivion, he said, "Had my people behaved as they ought to have done, I would have shown you whether I was a man or a woman. Twice during my reign have you obtained possession of the town of Kandy, and twice have you been very glad to get out of it." Mr. Marshall agreed that his people, on the

* From the great quantity of Hoffman's cherry-brandy bottles found in the palace at Kandy, it was inferred that he was very fond of that liquor.

whole, had made but a feeble resistance. "True! but it is of no use to talk of the taste of food after it is in the belly," responded his Majesty. After putting a number of questions to his interlocutor, he asked him whether he should not like to be at home. Mr. Marshall replied "Yes." The king then said, "Think what is the exact form of your house; is it square or round?" Mr. Marshall replied that his house was square. "Then," said the king, "you are at home, your thoughts being there. The mind of man is of the first moment, the body being of comparatively little importance. You now are where your mind is, though your body be absent." Upon some allusion being made to the severity of the punishments he had inflicted, he rather testily replied, "I governed my kingdom according to the Shasters!" On the 24th of January, 1816, he and all his relatives, dependents, and adherents, about one hundred individuals in all, were transported as state prisoners to the peninsula of India. At first they resided in Madras, but they were finally transferred to the fort of Vellore, where the family of Tippoo Sultaun had once resided. Nearly two years after their departure a most formidable insurrection broke out.

Mollegoddy retained the dignity of chief Adigar, which his rival had refused to accept. The name of the second Adigar was Kappawatta. All the chieftains soon discovered that their feudal-like power was gone. Nothing offended them more than our impartial administration of justice, by which a mean, poor man obtained redress as readily as a proud and wealthy chief. They had been accustomed to treat the common people as negro slaves are treated in the American slave-holding states; and they could not be brought to understand how all men were to be equal before the law. The jealousies and hatreds which continued to rage among these Adigars alone prevented the formation of a formidable conspiracy for the purpose of expelling the English. Notwithstanding the antipathy with which they regarded us generally, the people were not at all disposed to submit to the control of one of their own chiefs. The people made no complaint of oppression or misrule, they acknowledged that their condition was far better than it had been, yet still they wished us gone. They indeed wondered at our stay, for they entertained a superstitious notion that the English could not live in the Kandyan country. A head-man said to an English officer, that to unite Kandyans and Englishmen under one government was as incompatible as to yoke a buffalo and a cow to the same plough! These people had been so long segregated in their mountains and forests, that these feelings were natural and unavoidable, although they were sure to give way before the force of time, experience, and a familiarity with our manners. The most civilized part of the inhabitants of the newly acquired territories were pleased with the change of government, and easily reconciled to our manners. These were the Velassy Moors or Moormen, an active enterprising body of Mohammedan merchants, the descendants of some Arab tribes who had settled in Ceylon some two or three centuries after the Hegira, when the Arabs carried on an extensive trade with the island and with most of the neighbouring parts of the Indian continent. They became immediately useful to the English, more especially by furnishing cattle to our commissariat for the purpose of conveying stores and provisions from the coast stations. They formed an intermediate link between the traders in the maritime districts and the traders in the interior provinces which we had conquered. They were capitalists, and had long conducted all the trade in salt, a trade which required capital, as salt was a government monopoly, and enormously taxed. Under the Kandyan regime, although they had been allowed petty head-men of their own faith, they had been subjected to the rule of the Adigars and other Cingalese chiefs, who had cruelly oppressed them, taking from them whatever salt they required for their own use at their own price, or, more frequently, without paying any price at all. The Moormen now solicited General Brownrigg to defend them from these Kandyan chiefs, and to place them under a chief or head-man of their own race and faith. The governor complied, and Hajji,

or 'the Pilgrim,' so named and revered from his having made a pilgrimage to Mecca, received the appointment. Hajji was a man of substance, of superior intellect, and highly respected among his own people. The Moormen forthwith practically renounced the authority of the Kandyan chiefs, and withheld the dues which they had been accustomed to pay them either in kind or in money. The incensed chiefs very soon resolved to cut the Hajji's throat, and at their instigation he was assassinated by a party of Veddas, or wild men, near to the Moorish village of Kattabawa. Two or three Moormen, who were with the Hajji, made their escape, and through them intelligence of the murder was conveyed to Mr. Wilson, agent of government for the eastern provinces. Mr. Wilson lost no time in pursuing the murderers. Taking with him fifteen men belonging to the Malay Ceylon rifle regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Newman, he proceeded, on the 17th of October, to the village of Kattabawa. Upon entering the Velassy district, he found all the villages deserted; and some of the poorer people, who kept at a distance, called out that the whole country had risen against the British government. The people refused to hold any further communication with our agent. The poor Hajji's head was found stuck upon a pole near to the spot where he had been assassinated. Seeing that nothing could be done with so small a force, Mr. Wilson determined to retrace his steps to Badulla, the station from which he had started. During the retreat small parties of Kandyans occasionally appeared on the hills, using very insulting language, and shouting "Beef-eating slaves, begone!" Unfortunately Mr. Wilson halted by the side of a spring or fountain, for the purpose of quenching his burning thirst. Two of his domestic servants remained with him, but Lieutenant Newman and the detachment moved on. Mr. Wilson had scarcely stooped to the refreshing stream ere an arrow, discharged by a viewless hand, flew from the neighbouring jungle, and was followed by a whole flight of arrows. Mr. Wilson was killed, and one of his servants was wounded; but both the servants ran after the detachment, calling upon it. Lieutenant Newman halted, faced about, and was back at the fountain in a very short space of time; but short as the time had been, the murderers had decapitated Mr. Wilson, and had disappeared with his head.* It was vain to

* Mr. Wilson's head was not discovered until several months after. It was then found stuck upon a pole, like the poor Hajji's. The skull and brain had been penetrated by two arrows. It was conjectured that he, as well as the poor Hajji, had been murdered by the wild men of the jungle, or the Veddas, who now, as in the days of Robert Knox, were very dexterous in the use of the bow and arrow. They are divided into two classes,—the *village* Veddas, who build huts and live in small communities, and the *forest* Veddas. The first class is considered as a link in the chain that connects their wilder brethren with the Kandyans. The tract of country stretching from the base of the hills that terminate the range of the Kandyan mountains to the eastward, unto the commencement of the civilised belt of land that skirts the eastern coast of the island, is solely occupied by Veddas, who consider it their birthright and fatherland. They are supposed to be the descendants of the aborigines of the island, who, on the invasion of Ceylon by the Malabars, retired into these deserts, and there found shelter from the fierce conquerors. Even the village Veddas go perfectly naked, and live for the most part on the spontaneous productions of the earth, and on the flesh of such animals as they can kill or ensnare. They, however, plant and cultivate the cocoa-nut tree. These village Veddas rank high in the scale of civilisation, compared with those roaming and savage children of the trackless wilderness, the forest Veddas. The forest Veddas never associate with their brethren of the village, who regard them with enmity and disgust. Like the beasts of the forest, they live in pairs, and, except on some extraordinary occasion, never assemble together. The woodcraft of these savages, on which they mainly depend for their support, is extremely rude. The bow and spear are their sole weapons. Their arrows are headed with iron, which they receive from the Cingalese in exchange for the skins of deer and elk. With this feeble instrument they kill game, and wage an incessant war with the wild beasts, especially the elephants, that abound in their territories, and dispute with them the dominion of the wilderness. Their arrows would rebound from the body of the elephant; but in the act of walking, the animal raises his foot so as to expose the whole of the soft and vulnerable sole; and the Vedda, aware of this peculiar action, cautiously follows his victim until he gets sufficiently near to discharge with effect an arrow at the vulnerable part. When the wounded foot is placed on the ground the arrow breaks, leaving the barbed point deeply buried in the flesh. The elephant seems scarcely to notice the trifling injury when first received, but the pain arising from the inflamed parts soon puts him *hors de combat;* and his persecutors now approaching close, contrive

think of following the invisible enemy into the jungles. As soon as an account of Mr. Wilson's death reached Kandy, Mr. Sawers, the revenue commissioner, proceeded to Badulla, taking with him his own Lascar guard and a sergeant's party of the 1st Ceylon regiment. About six miles from Kandy, Mr. Sawers met a party, consisting of one corporal and two privates, carrying a dispatch to Kandy; these poor fellows were all murdered by the inhabitants a few hours after. Mr. Sawers, however, saw no appearance of insurrection until he entered the province of Ouva, about twelve miles from Badulla; but then he found that most of the villages were deserted, and that the few inhabitants that remained would hold no communication with him. For the purpose of ascertaining the feelings of the people in the province of Matelé, Sir John D'Oyly, now resident at Kandy as civil governor, authorized Eheylapola to proceed from his usual residence in the capital to that part of the country, where he (Eheylapola). had large estates and great influence. At this time the governor and Lady Brownrigg were travelling through the country. In the month of August, before there was any sign of insurrection, Sir Robert and his lady visited Kandy, being met on the road by a large concourse of Kandyan chiefs, with their numerous retainers. No reception could be more flattering. Having remained in Kandy transacting business until the 26th of September, the governor and his lady continued their journey to Trincomalee, where they arrived on the 3rd of October. On the 20th of October they quitted Trincomalee to return to Kandy, and it was not until they reached Kandelé, a place about twenty-seven miles from Trincomalee, that they received the first information of the insurrection. As they went on, by the hilly country, the accounts they received became more and more alarming. They found by the road-side a Kandyan chief who professed great devotion to the English, but who, notwithstanding, had been disgraced and ill-treated by Eheylapola, although, as the chief said, he was proceeding to pay his respects to his excellency the governor when he fell in with the ex-chief Adigar. The number of Eheylapola's followers was now reported to be alarmingly great, and fears were entertained that Eheylapola intended to head the insurrection, and to take the governor and Lady Brownrigg and all the party prisoners as they travelled through the forests. His excellency's escort was very small. Fortunately, however, there was no such plot. At a post about thirty miles from Kandy, Eheylapola, who appeared in great state, with several elephants and 2000 or 3000 people, waited upon the governor and escorted him into the capital, where the whole party arrived safe on the 26th of October.

In the meanwhile, with the sanction and approval of Mr. Sawers, and Major Macdonald, the commandant of Badulla, a Kandyan chief, named Kappitapola, proceeded to Velassy and the districts where the insurrection had first broken out, with the alleged purpose of tranquillizing the province and bringing the people back to their allegiance to the British government. As soon as he reached the seat of the insurrection this Kappitapola joined the insurgents; but his twelve followers (the only force he took with him) returned to Badulla, with the English muskets and ammunition they had received from the government store. Eheylapola was now removed from Kandy and confined as a prisoner at Colombo; and other chiefs, in spite of their compliments and protestations, became objects of suspicion to the English. The hospital at Kandy was again crowded with sick. There were generally from three hundred to five hundred men in the

to dispatch him with their arrows and spears. They believe in evil spirits, but have no notion of a God or of a state of future rewards and punishments. Sir Edward Barnes, whose government of Ceylon was a series of benefits conferred, or attempted to be conferred, upon mankind, made an attempt to civilise the wilder tribe, by having some of them brought into the plain, giving them food, clothes, &c., and prizes to their best bowmen; but the experiment seems to have failed altogether; and, until a vast increase shall take place in the thinly scattered population of Ceylon, and cause a partial emigration in the direction of the wastes of the Vedda country, slight hopes can be entertained of any considerable change in the character and habits of a people infinitely wilder than the Bheels of the Indian continent.

hospital: and they were regularly supplied with arms and ammunition at sunset in order that they might be able to defend themselves if the hospital should be attacked. Notwithstanding the most energetic measures on the part of the English government, the insurrection extended over nearly all the Kandyan country. In the month of December Mr. Kennedy, assistant-surgeon to the first Ceylon regiment, left Kandy to proceed to a station some thirty or forty miles off, with an escort consisting of one Malay corporal, two Malay privates, and eight Caffres. He was also accompanied by a party of native Coolies, who carried rice and his baggage. On reaching a mountain pass, about 24 miles from Kandy, Mr. Kennedy was attacked by a large body of Kandyans, who butchered him and every man with him, except one or two of the Coolies. The Malay soldiers, of whom we had many in our service, were the most vindictive of human beings: they vowed to avenge their three countrymen, and too truly did they keep their oath. By the month of March, 1818, nearly all that country was in arms against us, and nearly every chief of consequence had either joined the insurgents, or had been put under arrest upon suspicion of favouring the insurrection. The governor remained up the country; but Lady Brownrigg left Kandy and proceeded to Colombo. Fears were entertained that her ladyship and her escort might be cut off on their journey; nay, even that the head-quarters, together with all the troops, would have to fight their way out of the country, with all the unfortunate results of former retreats from Kandy. But her ladyship and escort reached Colombo unmolested; the insurgents shrunk from any decisive encounter, and jealousies and quarrels soon broke out among them. A Budhist priest, a reputed relation to the deposed king, had been brought forward by the insurgents of Velassy as a candidate for the crown. The name adopted by this pretender was Durrasamé. Kappitapola accepted the office of first Adigar to the pretender. This gave great offence to another insurgent chief, named Madugalla, who had more followers than any of them. An angry conference ended in Madugalla's clapping both Kappitapola and the pretender in the stocks. The pretender contrived to escape from Madugalla, but his party was completely broken up, and he found himself under the necessity of flying and seeking refuge among the Veddas, or wild men. Although a large reward was offered for his capture, he succeeded in concealing himself for nearly twelve years. He was finally captured in 1829, in consequence of information given by a Budhist priest who knew him. He was tried and convicted in Ceylon, but pardoned by orders from England.

There was no confiding bond of union among the chiefs; and the people grew weary of a war which exposed them to extreme misery. In some of the provinces the whole of the population, men, women, and children, had lived for a whole year in the woods and on the tops of mountains; their grounds had been left uncultivated, they had lost two crops, many of their cattle had been killed, and their small stores of grain were exhausted, having been in many places seized or destroyed by the British troops. The monsoon rains were approaching, and the people had no other prospect before them but an increase of misery and famine. On the 30th of October, 1818, Kappitapola and another chief were surprised, and taken by a detachment of our troops. Madugalla, who had become reconciled to Kappitapola, and who had lately been acting in concert with him, was taken on the 1st of November, and with his seizure the insurrection terminated. Kappitapola and Madugalla were tried, and sentenced to suffer death by a court-martial; and both were beheaded on the 25th of November. Kappitapola died with a sort of heroism, Madugalla died like a coward. Several other chiefs suffered death.* Eheylapola,

* At Kappitapola's request, Mr. Marshall visited him several times after conviction. The chief was usually in tolerably good spirits. His cloth, or upper covering, being both coarse and foul, he spread it out one day between his hands, and smiling, said, "You know this is not the way I used to dress." He was not unwilling to converse on the subject of the insurrection; and although he sometimes admitted that he was concerned in many of the hostile attacks made upon our troops,

"the friend of the British government," was kept a close prisoner at Colombo until 1825, when he was transported to the Mauritius. A considerable number of petty chiefs were also sent out of the island.

The war was now entirely ended, but dreadful and disgraceful had it been during its progress. Execrable cruelties had been practised, as well by the native

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he wished to explain away, or weaken at least, the force of any inference which tended to criminate him. He repeatedly and earnestly expressed a desire that the sentence of death might be commuted to banishment, and wished that Mr. Sawers might be requested to use his influence with Sir Robert Brownrigg. He remarked that, although life was full of trouble, existence was still desirable. In the course of conversation he frequently observed that he was an unfortunate man, and was unwilling to admit that his unhappy condition was an obvious consequence of the policy he had adopted and the ill success which attended it. Being a zealous Budhist, he considered his present misfortune as the result of delinquencies committed during a former state of existence—a belief which repudiates responsibility for crimes committed in this life.

Early in the morning of the 25th of November, Kappitapola and Madugalla were, in compliance with their own request, taken to the Dalada Malegawa, or Temple of the Sacred Relic (the tooth of Budh). At the request of Kappitapola, and by permission of his Excellency Sir Robert Brownrigg, Mr. Sawers, the revenue commissioner, met him at the temple. Kneeling before the priest upon the threshold of the sanctuary, the repository of the sacred relic, the chief detailed the principal meritorious actions of his life, such as the benefits he had conferred on priests, together with the gifts he had bestowed on temples, and other acts of piety. Kappitapola then pronounced the Pioptannawah, or last wish, namely, that at his next birth he might be born on the mountains of Himalaya, and finally obtain Neerwannah, a state of partial annihilation. The chief having concluded his devotions, he was addressed by the priest, who, in an impressive tone and manner, acknowledged that his merits were great, and concluded his address by pronouncing a benediction; the last words of which were as follow:—"As sure as a stone thrown up into the air returns to the earth, so certain will you, in consideration of your religious merits, be present at the next incarnation of Budha, and receive your reward." The scene between the chief and the priest was most solemn and impressive. The chief, who had continued kneeling, rose, and turning round to Mr. Sawers, addressed him in the following words:—"I give you a share of the merit of my last religious offering;" and forthwith unwinding his upper cloth from his waist, he presented it to the temple, jocularly observing, that although it was both foul and ragged, "the merit of the offering would not on these accounts be diminished, it being all he had to give." He then requested Mr. Sawers to accompany him to the place of execution, which was kindly and respectfully declined.

Madugalla's devotions were conducted in a similar manner; but he was quite unnerved and much agitated. When the priest had given him his benediction, he sprang forward and rushed into the sanctuary, where he loudly craved mercy for the sake of the relic. He was instantly dragged from behind the Dagobaw by Lieutenant Mackenzie, the fort-adjutant, with the assistance of some of the guard. Kappitapola, who conducted himself with great firmness and self-possession, and who was greatly surprised at the pusillanimity of his fellow-prisoner, in the coolest manner observed that Madugalla acted like a fool. He then, in a firm and collected manner, shook hands with Mr. Sawers and bade him farewell.

The prisoners were then taken to the place of execution, which was about a mile distant from the temple. Here they requested to be provided with water for the purpose of ablution, which was brought to them. Kappitapola then begged to be allowed a short time to perform the ceremonies of his religion. This request being granted, both the prisoners washed their hands and face. He then tied up his hair in a knot on the top of the head, and sat down on the ground beside a small bush, grasping it at the same time with his toes. From the folds of the cloth which encircled his loins he took a small Banna-book (prayer-book), and after reciting some prayers or verses, he gave the book to a native official who was present, requesting him to deliver it to Mr. Sawers as a token of the gratitude he felt for his friendship and kindness while they were officially connected at Badulla, Mr. Sawers as agent of government, and Kappitapola as Disanava of Ouva.

The chief continued to repeat some Pali verses, and while he was so employed, the executioner struck him on the back of the neck with a sharp sword. At that moment he breathed out the word Arahaan, one of the names of Budh. A second stroke deprived him of life, and he fell to the ground a corpse. His head being separated from his body, it was, according to Kandyan custom, placed on his breast.

Madugalla continued to evince great want of fortitude, and being unable to tie up his long hair, that operation was performed by the Hearigha Kangaan, the chief over the public executioner. The perturbed state of his mind was shown by the convulsive action of the muscles of his face. He earnestly begged to be dispatched by means of one blow, and then faintly pronounced the word Arahaan. In consequence of his not having sufficient resolution to bend his head forward, it was held by one of the executioners. After the first blow of the sword he fell backwards; but he was not deprived of life until he received a second stroke.

Kappitapola's cranium was presented by Mr. Marshall to the Museum of the Phrenological Society of Edinburgh.—*Henry Marshall, MS. Historical Sketch.*

troops in our service as by the Cingalese; and we blush to add that our British born and our Irish soldiers had, in many cases, turned the contest into a war of retaliation and extermination.* The sufferings of our European troops were indeed excessive, the conduct of the enemy most aggravating; but still it behoved the British officers in command to moderate the fury of their men, and this, with a few exceptions, our officers did not sufficiently attend to. The chief fault lay in very high quarters. By general orders our troops were commanded to burn and destroy, and to quench the flames of insurrection in blood. The troops were employed in following the insurgents into their fastnesses. The dwellings of the inhabitants were burned, and their fruit-bearing trees, their cocoa-nut trees, were often cut down, and their rice-grounds were often laid waste by breaking down the immense mounds or embankments constructed to retain the water, so essential to the cultivation of this grain. The whole country was scoured in every direction by military parties, who burned and destroyed whatever provisions and other property they could not carry away. Women and children were sometimes captured and sometimes murdered by the vindictive Malays. The men were hunted down like wild beasts, tracked to their dens and holes in the hill-sides (after the fashion in which the bloody Duke of Cumberland, of ever execrable memory, put down our Highland insurgents in 1745). On one occasion a party of fifty or sixty Kandyans were surprised in a cave near the top of a mountain. They set up a hideous yell and rushed from the cavern. Twenty of them were killed by our troops; the rest threw themselves over the precipices. During the whole of the war the natives avoided meeting our troops openly in the field, being sensible that their strength lay in stratagem and bush-fighting. Through the closeness of the woods and jungles, and the almost impenetrable nature of the country, our military parties were greatly exposed to the missiles of the enemy. Detachments were frequently dodged by three or four Kandyans, who, knowing all the by-paths, could fire upon the party occasionally, and keep up with it in a march. When one of our men was killed, the party halted, wood was collected and the body burned; and this caused delay. The body was burned to prevent mutilation and the practice which the enemy had adopted of impaling the heads of the killed close to some British post. When a man was wounded, so as to be rendered unable to walk, it was necessary to carry him; and this operation was effected by bearing him in a country blanket suspended under a bamboo. These and other circumstances sadly retarded the march of our troops, and exposed them long to the ambushed fire of the Kandyans. And in addition to the natural impediments which occurred, such as deep rivers —mountain torrents—rugged, precipitate paths—slippery rocks, morasses, &c., the enemy constructed many artificial modes of obstruction, some of them of considerable ingenuity. Few countries so long resisted the arms and the policy of powerful neighbours as the kingdom of Kandy, and few conquests have been more dearly purchased. Our losses were tremendous, considering the number of troops employed. A vast many more fell by disease, fatigue, and bad or insufficient provisions, than by the arms of the foe; and the fevers caught in the jungles continued to thin the ranks both of our native and British regiments many months after the war had ceased. Including those who died of famine and disease, it is supposed that 10,000 of the

* The reader will look in vain for any adequate notion of the horrors that were committed, or for any indignant censure on their commission, in Doctor Davy's book about Ceylon and the splendid conquest achieved by General Sir Robert Brownrigg. The Doctor in Medicine shows himself as good a courtier and panegyrist as Cordiner, the chaplain of the Honourable Mr. North. His aim was almost solely to laud the governor (General Brownrigg), in whose family he resided. His attempts to screen the governor from the imputation of knowing and tacitly sanctioning the barbarities that were committed by some parts of our army upon the Kandyans, are absurd; and are refuted, contradicted, and exposed in the most glaring manner, by letters, general orders, instructions emanating from the government house at Colombo or at Kandy, and other documents which exist, and are open to the inspection of the world.

wretched natives perished. As all their turbulent chiefs were executed, or captured and shipped off the island, the survivors everywhere submitted quietly to the British government.

Before quitting Kandy General Brownrigg issued a proclamation or new constitution for the Kandyan country. With the exception of the temples and religious establishments, the entire administration of the public affairs of the provinces, which had been conducted by the Adigars and Dissauvas, was wholly transferred to English functionaries. The few chiefs who were not suspected of having favoured the insurrection had their former titles confirmed, and received a fixed stipend from the English government, together with a continuation of the envied privilege of being preceded by running-footmen cracking loud and heavy whips. The personal services of the common people were abolished, except for making and repairing roads and bridges; and in lieu of personal services a tax of one-tenth of the annual produce of cultivated lands was imposed. For the administration of justice, courts were appointed, to be conducted by officers named by government. The chiefs or Dissauvas holding the governor's commission were prohibited from inflicting any severe punishment on the people: they might inflict twenty-five strokes with the *open hand*, and they might imprison an offender for seven days, but not longer.

Since the close of the year 1818, no active resistance or opposition has been made by the Kandyans to the British government. At this time the rich and beautiful island, the outwork and bulwark of our empire in India, appears to be tranquil and prosperous. Fine roads have been opened through the wilderness, and other and numerous important improvements have been planned and executed. During the government of the late General Sir Edward Barnes (a name held in affectionate reverence by the natives) a splendid road was constructed from Colombo to Kandy, and from that city to Newera Ellia. The whole length of this fine carriageable road exceeds 200 miles.*

* Lieutenant De Butt's 'Rambles in Ceylon.'

The plains or table-lands of Newera Ellia are from 5000 to 6000 feet above the level of the sea, and the country between them and Colombo is naturally wild and rugged in the extreme. Two other good roads run from Trincomalee, and from Badulla, to Kandy and the centre of the island. Other roads have been opened in various directions, numerous rest-houses have been erected in the lonelier parts of the country for the accommodation of the traveller; and the English officers and colonists now drive their chaises, or travel in comfortable stage-coaches, through regions which were almost impenetrable wildernesses as late as 1818. The Mahavilliganga river, where Major Davie halted in despair on account of the breadth and depth of the water, is now spanned by a beautiful single-arched bridge, constructed by Colonel Fraser, deputy quartermaster-general to the forces in Ceylon.* A tunnel,

"The new road from Colombo to Kandy has been recently opened by Sir Edward Barnes. . . It is a noble work, and has been executed with immense labour, as well from the nature of the country, as the almost impenetrable jungle through which it passes. Captain Dawson was three months in tracing the line, and frequently gave up the work in despair. He had often to creep along the beds of torrents, to enable him to make any progress through the mass of underwood with which the mountains are covered."—*Bishop Heber, Indian Journal.*

* Lieutenant De Butt's 'Rambles in Ceylon,' London, 1841.

"The breadth of the stream is here somewhat contracted, and, by the aid of projecting buttresses, the span of the arch has been reduced to 205 feet. The bridge is entirely built of the beautiful satin, a wood almost peculiar to the forests of Ceylon, where it grows in great abundance. The arch is composed of four treble ribs; the interval between which is five feet. Every beam used in the construction of the bridge is so inserted as to admit of removal without endangering the safety of the fabric. This is of the utmost value in a tropical clime, where wood is found to decay much more rapidly than in lower temperatures. The Kandyans, relying on their ancient tales and legends, had formed an opinion that the bridging of the 'Great River' was impracticable. With this persuasion, they were in the habit of daily assembling to gaze on the gradual progress of the work, and laugh to scorn the vain and impotent labours of the *pale faces*. But when, to their amazement, the bridge was found to stand without the supporting framework, their admiration knew no bounds, and they looked with fear and wonder on the Europeans, who had brought to a successful termination an undertaking con-

540 feet in length, has been cut through one of the mountains that encircle the Kandyan capital, and the road through this tunnel unites itself, at the foot of the Kandyan hills, with the principal road to Colombo. By taking this circuitous route troops advancing on Kandy can turn certain heights on which the native chiefs used to place great reliance for the defence of their capital. It is said that the opening of this tunnel gave the finishing blow to their dying hopes of independence; that an ancient legend told them that their country would never be subdued until the invaders could bore a hole through this mountain; and, that the impossible feat being performed, they resigned themselves to their destiny. The country round Kandy is cultivated like a garden; from an unhealthy place, or one fatal to the European constitution, it has become one of the most salubrious stations that we have anywhere in the East. A splendid mansion or palace, built by Sir Edward Barnes, stands in the town; and the banks of a neighbouring and very picturesque lake are studded with bungalows and European villas. There is a botanical garden; and a garrison library, a printing-press, and other signs of European civilization are not wanting. The antipathies of the native chiefs and their families to the English appear to have been almost entirely overcome; they pay and return visits, and the Kandyan ladies even attend the balls given by the governor or by our officers. On the whole it may be said that there is now no part of India where the population is more pacifically inclined than that of Ceylon; and that, from the most persevering, fierce, and indomitable foes that Europeans have encountered in the East, the Kandyans have become among the most tranquil and contented subjects that Britain controls in her far-extending Oriental possessions.*

sidered by them beyond the power of man. . . . In ordinary cases the crown of the arch of this bridge is 67 feet above the level of the Mahavilliganga; but this stream, in common with all others which have their sources in the alpine regions of the interior, is liable to extreme fluctuations during the rainy season." In 1834 the waters rose to within 7 feet of the crown of the lofty arch, or 60 feet above their ordinary level.—*Id., id.*

* Lieutenant De Butt's Rambles in Ceylon, Bishop Heber, Indian Journal.

CHAPTER XV.

ADMINISTRATION OF EARL AMHERST.

Upon the resignation of the Marquess of Hastings, Mr. Canning, who had presided for some time over the Board of Control, to the great satisfaction of the Court of Directors, was nominated by that Court to be governor-general of India. The resolution was unanimous, and was passed in the month of March, 1822. The melancholy death of the Marquess of Londonderry on the 12th of August following, led to some important changes in the ministry, and rendered it indispensable that the governor-general elect should remain in England. On the 18th of September Mr. Canning was nominated secretary of state for foreign affairs; and he consequently resigned into the hands of the Court of Directors the high appointment which they had conferred upon him in so flattering a manner. Two candidates now presented themselves: the one Earl Amherst, who had been employed some few years before in an embassy from England to China; the other, Lord William Bentinck, who had been governor of Madras, and who represented to the Company that he had rendered them good and faithful services. Earl Amherst was preferred, and that nobleman proceeding to Calcutta, assumed the office of governor-general on the 1st of August, 1823. The Marquess of Hastings had quitted Bengal in January, 1822, and between his departure and the arrival of Lord Amherst, Mr. Adams, senior member of the Supreme Council, had presided over the government of India.

The new governor-general had been but a very few months in his office ere he found himself under the necessity of entering into a new war with an entirely new enemy. The Burmese, elated by some recent conquests which they had made, and being brought in more immediate contact with the British frontiers, began, towards the end of the year 1823, to make sundry attacks upon us. Without notice given, and without any attempt at negociation, they claimed possession of Shapuree, a small muddy island in the province of Bengal, but close to the coast of Arracan, which the Burmese then possessed. Making a sudden night attack, they drove away a small guard of British troops stationed on the island, killed several of them, and took forcible possession of the island. This, coming close upon other outrages, was not to be tolerated. Our government, however, resolved to consider the forcible occupation of Shapuree as the act of the local authorities of Arracan, and addressed a gentle declaration to the Burmese central government, recapitulating the past occurrences, and calling upon the court of Ava to disavow their officers in Arracan. The court of Ava, as might have been anticipated, considered this gentle declaration as a pusillanimous attempt to deprecate the resentment of the Burmese. They triumphantly appealed to the paper as a proof that the British government of India dreaded to enter upon a contest with them; and they intimated that unless their right to the island of Shapuree was distinctly admitted, the victorious Lord of the White Elephant and the Golden Foot would invade the Company's dominions. In the meanwhile two companies of the 20th regiment landed on the disputed island, drove off the Burmese, and stockaded themselves. And on the other side the commanding officer and some of the crew of the Company's cruiser Sophia were seized on the mainland and carried up the country. Both sides now actively prepared for war, the

Anglo-Indian troops on the frontier being, however, ordered to maintain a strict neutrality for the present. More and more confirmed in their idea that we were afraid of them, from 4000 to 5000 Burmese and Asamese advanced from Asam into the province of Cachar, and began to stockade themselves at a post within five miles of the town of Sylhet, and only 226 miles from Calcutta. The town of Sylhet was on our frontier, and the whole of Cachar was under our protection, yet the Burmese claimed that province as their own, and called upon the Rajah of the adjoining province of Jinteea to submit to the government of Ava. Major Newton, the officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, concentrated his detachment and marched against the invaders. It was at daybreak on the 17th of January, 1824, that he came in sight of their stockade and of a village adjoining, of which they had taken possession. The Burmese in the village presently gave way, but those in the stockades made a resolute resistance, and were not driven out until they had lost about a hundred men, and had killed six of our sepoys. They then fled to the hills. Shortly after this action Mr. Scott, our commissioner, arrived at Sylhet, and from that point he advanced to Bhadrapoor, in order to maintain a more ready communication with the Burmese authorities. On the 31st of January Mr. Scott received a message from the Burmese general, who justified his advance into Cachar, and declared that he had orders to follow and apprehend certain persons wherever they might take refuge. In reply this Burmese general, who held the chief command in Asam, was told that he must *not* disturb the frontiers of the Company, or interfere in the affairs of its allies, and that the Burmese invaders must evacuate Cachar, or the forces of the British government would be compelled to advance both into Cachar and Asam. To this communication no answer was received, the Burmese commander stating that he could give none until he had received instructions from his court at Ava. The messengers sent by Mr. Scott were detained in the Burmese camp under different pretexts. It was clearly the object of the Burmese to procrastinate the negociations until they had strengthened themselves in the advanced positions they had occupied. The Rajah of Jinteea, who had been imperiously summoned to the Burmese camp, and commanded to prostrate himself before the shadow of the Golden Foot, threw himself upon the British government for protection; and various native chiefs whose territories lay between the frontiers of the Burmese empire and the frontiers of the British dominions, called loudly for English aid. This, the south-east frontier of Bengal, had in fact been kept in constant dread and danger of invasion for more than a year, while the adjoining and friendly territories had been exposed to the destructive inroads and the overbearing insolence of the Burmese and Asamese for many years.*

Major Newton did not follow the Burmese he had routed, but, after driving them from their stockade, he returned to Sylhet, and withdrew the whole of his force from Cachar. Almost as soon as the Major was within his own frontier the Burmese advanced again into the country from which he had driven them, and stockaded some stronger positions. They were joined by another considerable force, while another detachment, 2000 strong, collected in their rear, as a reserve or column of support. Still advancing, and stockading as they advanced, the main body of the Burmese pushed their stockades on the north bank of the river Surma, to within one thousand yards of the British post at Bhadrapoor. Captain Johnstone, who commanded at that post, had but a very small force with *him*, yet he succeeded in dislodging the invaders from their unfinished works at the point of the

* Horace Hayman Wilson, Esq. (the distinguished Orientalist, Professor of Sanscrit, Oxford, &c.), "Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, with an Introductory Sketch of the Events of the War, and an Appendix." Calcutta, 1827. Major Snodgrass, military secretary to the commander of the expedition to Ava, and assistant political agent in Ava, "Narrative of the Burmese War, detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell's Army, from its landing at Rangoon, in May, 1824, to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo; in February, 1826." London, 1827.

bayonet, and in driving them beyond the Surma. This was on the 13th of February. On the following day Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen joined and took the command over Captain Johnstone, and instantly marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy. They were found stockading themselves in a strong position on the opposite bank of the Jetinghi river, a deep and rapid stream. The only difficulty encountered was in getting across this stream. As soon as our troops were over, and had fixed their bayonets, the Burmese cleared out of their stockade and fled to the hills. But there was another division of the army of the Lord of the White Elephant, which had stockaded a much stronger position at Doodpatlee, where their front was covered by the Surma river, and their rear rested on steep hills. Each of the exposed faces of this intrenchment was defended by a deep ditch, about fourteen feet wide; a strong fence of bamboo spikes ran along the outer edge of the ditch, and the approach on the land side was through jungle and high grass. Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, however, marched against this formidable stockade and attacked it. The Burmese remained passive till our troops advanced to the bamboo spikes, when they poured upon them a destructive and well-maintained fire, which completely checked their advance, although they kept their ground. When Lieutenant Armstrong had been killed and four other officers wounded, and about one hundred and fifty of our sepoys killed or wounded, Bowen called off the attacking party and retired to Jatrapoor, at a short distance. On the 27th of February Colonel Innes joined the force at Jatrapoor with four guns and a battalion of fresh troops, and assumed the command. But in the meanwhile the Burmese had retreated from their formidable position and retired into their own country, evacuating the whole of Cachar.

But before this time the great Burmese chief, the Maha Bandoola, then high in favour at the court of Ava, and the projector of a scheme for the conquest of Bengal, had collected a great army near the southern extremity of our frontier, and had marched into Arracan, provided with golden fetters, in which the governor-general of India was to be led captive to Ava.* This Maha Bandoola had convinced the king that, with 100,000 men, which he said his majesty could assemble with ease, the conquest of Bengal might be achieved; and his majesty had consulted with a foreign residenter at Ava, as to the means of driving the English out of India.† The Lord of the Golden Foot laid claim to all the territories east of Moorshedabad, as having formerly belonged to the kingdom of Arracan, which he and his ancestors had conquered.‡ Exaggerated reports of the strength and ferocity of the Burmese troops carried alarm even to Calcutta; the peasants on our frontier fled in dismay from their villages, and every idle rumour was so industriously magnified by timid or designing people, that the native merchants of Calcutta were with difficulty persuaded to refrain from removing their families and property from under the very guns of Fort William.§

But the British Lion was rousing himself, and preparing to put forth his mighty strength; and hardly ever, or in any part of the world, was his bound so rapid or more terrible. As the two states might now be considered as actually at war, Lord Amherst declared war in form, and promulgated the grounds of our quarrel in a declaration addressed to the Court of Ava and the different powers of India, and in a public proclamation dated the 5th of March, 1824. Orders had been previously given for the equipment of a force of from 5000 to 6000 men at the presidencies of Calcutta and Madras. It had been wisely determined to act upon the offensive, and not to commence operations either on the barren mountains of

* Major Snodgrass.

† Id.

‡ Deposition of Henry Gouger, Esq.

§ If we rightly understand a passage in Bishop Heber's correspondence, other inhabitants of Calcutta besides the native merchants were in great alarm, asking leave to send their property into the citadel, packing off their wives and children across the river, and expecting to see the war-boats of the Burmese on the salt-water lake, or the golden umbrellas of their chiefs mounted on the top of St. John's Cathedral.—*Letter to R. J. Wilmot Horton, Esq.; Correspondence in Appendix to Bishop Heber's Indian Journal.*

Arracan, or in the pestilential jungles of Chittagong; but in the great river which leads through the heart of the Burmese Empire (and is the highway of the trade of the country), where no attack was expected. The plan of the campaign, in short, was to ascend the Irawaddi and to begin by capturing the city of Rangoon, the principal port and trading place of the Burmese Empire. Good arrangements, considering the ignorance that prevailed, were made by General the Honourable Sir Edward Paget, our commander-in-chief in India. The two divisions, from Calcutta and Madras, were directed to assemble at Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andaman Island—an island occupied, as in the days of Marco Polo, by downright savages, if not cannibals—from which the combined forces, under the command of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, were to proceed to the Irawaddi. Between the 12th and 17th of April, the Bengal division, consisting of the king's 13th and 38th regiment, and two companies of artillery, were embarked at Calcutta. They were detained for some days at the Great Andaman, waiting the arrival of the division from Madras. But by the 4th of May the greater part of the troops from Madras, consisting of his Majesty's 41st regiment, a Company's European regiment, and seven battalions of native infantry, with artillery, gun lascars, &c., reached the place of rendezvous; and on the following morning the united forces left the Andamans, under the protection of his Majesty's ships "Liffy" and "Larne," the former commanded by Commodore Grant, and the latter by Captain Marryat. The transports were also accompanied or followed by several of the Company's armed cruisers, and by the "Diana" steam-boat. In nearly all parts of the operations which were now about to begin, the land troops were greatly indebted to the co-operation of the Navy, and to the services of the steam-vessel, the first which had ever floated in those waters. Our ships anchored within the bar of the Rangoon river on the 10th. The arrival of our fleet was wholly unexpected; the town was unprepared for its reception, and the civil authorities were thrown into consternation. Our arrival was, however, quickly announced by numerous beacons, prepared at the mouth of the river; and in the course of the night the signals were repeated and extended by blazing fires in every part of the surrounding country. It was, therefore, desirable that no time should be lost in appearing before the town. On the very next morning the fleet proceeded up the river, being wafted on its way by a fair wind, and led by his Majesty's ship "Liffy." A few harmless shots from the guardhouses on the banks were the only impediments offered to its progress. At 12 o'clock the "Liffy" anchored close to the principal battery at the king's wharf in Rangoon, the transports anchoring in succession in her rear. Having furled sails and beat to quarters, a pause of some minutes ensued, during which not a shot was fired. On our side humanity forbade that we should fire into an almost defenceless town, crowded with inoffensive people; and the Burmese, on their part, were unwilling to begin the unequal contest. They stood for some time inactive at their guns; but at length, being urged by the threats of their chiefs, they opened their feeble battery on our shipping. The frigate's fire soon silenced the battery and every gun on shore: the enemy fled from their works, and our troops, being landed, took quiet possession of a deserted town. Proclamations had been previously issued promising British protection to the inhabitants, and prompt and liberal payment for whatever the troops might want of them: but the Burmese governor had given orders for driving the whole of the inhabitants into the neighbouring jungles, where the men were to be organized into corps, and the women and children to be strictly guarded as pledges for the good conduct of their fathers, husbands, and brothers; whose desertion was to be punished by the sacrifice of their children or nearest female relatives. And, with the population, nearly everything which the town contained had been removed into the inmost recesses of the jungle, or carried far up the river Irawaddi. As the people of Rangoon were very aquatic, and as the river was known to swarm with boats, our commanders had calculated

upon finding more than a sufficient number of boats to carry the troops up the river to Ava, the capital; but not a boat was to be found—everything had been removed that was at all likely to be of use to an invading army—oxen, horses, were no more to be found than boats—there was nothing left in the neighbourhood of Rangoon except a little paddy. It was evident that all this was only the prelude to a plan of laying waste the whole country in our front, in the hope of starving us from their shores. Even the few British merchants, and American missionaries,* who were known to be residing at Rangoon, had disappeared, and their too probable fate excited general commiseration throughout the army. It appeared, from the testimony of a few of the inhabitants who had concealed themselves in the town, that, as soon as the approach of our armament was known, all foreigners were seized, fettered, and confined in the custom-house, from which they were repeatedly marched up to the hall of justice to be interrogated by the governor. Not one of these individuals knew or had the means of knowing before-hand anything of our expedition; but the governor would not believe their protestations, and their death was soon resolved on. In their prison, their guards took a savage pleasure in parading and sharpening the instruments of execution before their eyes, in strewing the sand before the door, and in making the usual preparations for a series of executions. In this dreadful state of suspense the English and American prisoners remained for many hours, but fear at last did what prayers and pity could not do: the governor dreaded a retaliation, he suspended the final order of execution from hour to hour, and until a 32-pound shot fired by the "Liffy" entered the prison, suspended the bloody deliberations of the authorities there assembled, and broke up the meeting. The chiefs fled from the city; and their prisoners, strongly fettered, but under a weak and timid guard, were marched a short way up the country. Immediately after landing, part of our troops were pushed a short distance in advance of Rangoon, and thereat the guard which accompanied the prisoners became alarmed for their own safety, and took to their heels, leaving their charge in two houses near a great pagoda, where they were next morning found by our advanced patroles.*

* The American missionaries at Rangoon were, George Hough and —— Wade; the English merchants or traders were, Alexander Tainsh, a man of Crief; William Roy, a Perthman; and —— Trill.

* Some other British and Americans who were in the interior of the country were not quite so fortunate. Mr. Henry Gouger, merchant and native of London, who had been residing at Ava for nearly two years, and who had become a great favourite at court; a Scotch skipper of the name of John Laird, who had gone up the country to purchase timber; Mr. A. Judson and Mr. Price, American Baptist missionaries, were seized and conveyed to the condemned prison of Ava, being loaded with five pairs of irons each. For many weeks they were kept in constant apprehension of being put to death by some excruciating torture. The prison was filthy to the last degree of filthiness, and crowded with criminals and with our sepoys who had been taken prisoners near the Sylhet frontier, or were taken afterwards on the Irawaddi. After lying for nearly twelve months in this condemned prison, they were removed to a still worse place of confinement, in a solitary spot about ten miles from Ava and about four from Amarapoora. This place was called Aongbonlee, or the Field of Victory. Here they were threatened with being buried alive, and were exposed to other and more terrible threats, and to a general treatment unutterably brutal. As they were not released until the close of the war, they suffered in all nearly twenty-one months' captivity and torture. Their clothes rotted away on their backs, and they could procure no change; both the prisons swarmed with lice and other vermin. The government, which had seized all their property, allowed them no provisions; they were often two or three days together without any food, and all the food they could procure through the compassion of the natives, or through a little money they had secreted, was a little rice or an occasional handful of stinking dried river-fish. The captivity of Robert Knox in the interior of Ceylon, though of longer duration, was not equal in suffering to Mr. Gouger's imprisonment in Ava; and if our much esteemed friend could be induced to draw up a full narrative of all his adventures and sufferings in the Burmese territories, he might produce a book that would rival in interest Knox's truly admirable volume. In addition to the charm of adventure, he might convey a fund of useful information about the state of the country and the manners of the people. Down to the moment of his arrest, which took place at Ava three days after the king had received information that the English had landed at Rangoon, Mr. Gouger had been an especial favourite with the king.

Judson, the missionary, and his wife, had been living in the Burmese dominions ever since the

Our commanders had greatly miscalculated the importance of the capture of Rangoon, the means which that capture would put at their disposal for carrying on the war, the internal strength of the Burmese government, the nature of the country, and the character of the people. They thought it very probable that the war would end at Rangoon, whereas it only began after the capture of that place. As in the Nepaulese war, the first campaign in the Birman Empire was a war of experiment, or a fighting in the dark. It is true that in this country, as well as in Nepaul (though in a much less degree), there were obstacles to the acquisition of correct information: but it should seem that, with a little previous forethought, expense, and preparation, an amount of information might have been obtained which would have saved us from many serious blunders. If Lord Amherst, or Sir Edward Paget, our brave commander-in-chief, had taken council of a man like Sir Stamford Raffles, or of any person of activity, energy, and ability, that had previously devoted some months to the acquisition of information respecting the Burmese Empire, as Raffles had done with regard to Java and the other islands of the Eastern Archipelago, before the expedition was decided upon, the war, instead of dragging on for nearly two years, might possibly have been terminated in two months. In the too confident hope of finding all that they wanted at Rangoon, our troops had come unprovided with proper equipments for advancing either by land or by water; their supplies of provisions were scanty, from the same miscalculation; and they now found themselves cut off from all supplies, except such as, in course of time, came by sea from Calcutta. To increase their embarrassments, the rainy monsoon was just setting in. Nothing remained but to take up a long residence in the miserable and filthy hovels of Rangoon, situated in the midst of swamps and rice-grounds. The filthy town was surrounded by a wooden stockade from 16 to 18 feet high, which effectually shut out all view of the fine river which runs past it, and gave the town a confined and unhealthy appearance. Everything in and about the place was in ruins, except the lofty golden Dagon Pagoda. The houses were built of wood, or more frequently of bamboo; the floors were raised some feet above the ground, which might have contributed to their dryness, healthiness, and comfort, were it

year 1813. Mrs. Judson, though put under strict surveillance, was not thrown into prison. Parts of their adventures are very generally known to the world through their various publications in missionary magazines, &c. They were esteemed a right-hearted, devout, and conscientious couple, though not free from the errors usually attending Protestant missionaries in the East. Mr. Judson appears to have commenced a translation of the Scriptures into the Burmese before he properly understood that language. He complained that in four years no Burman had renounced idolatry—that they were "mad on their idols, and their whole soul seemed engaged in idolatry;" and in ten years' time he baptized only four natives. He was, upon petition, admitted to the Golden Foot, and even to behold the Golden Face; but as soon as his sublime majesty of Ava discovered that the honest American Baptist was no conjuror, and did not possess the philosopher's stone, or any other wonderful secret which might secure *him* from all disease and make him live for ever, he sent Mr. and Mrs. Judson, and "brother Colman," back to the coast. The missionaries, however, had been permitted to return to the capital, and Price and Judson were seized at Ava on the same day as Mr. Gouger.

There was another English-born prisoner, and by far the strangest being of them all. *His* name was Rodgers. He had formerly been a petty officer on board one of the Company's ships; but while his ship was lying in the Hooghly he had quarrelled and fought with another petty officer, had left him for dead, and had taken to flight in order to save his own neck. According to his own account to Mr. Gouger while in prison, he had not taken any unfair advantage of his foe, and he had ascertained that the man had not really died. But the latter fact at least seemed very questionable, and Rodgers evinced great fear of falling into the hands of his countrymen. He had been living upwards of forty years in the dominions of his Burmese Majesty, and he was now a grey old man, with a long thin beard. He had assumed the dress and nearly all the habits of a native Burmese; and great was Mr. Gouger's surprise when he first went to court to hear himself addressed in good sailorlike English by such a figure! Rodgers's adventures and vicissitudes had been very numerous. At one time he had been receiver of the king's customs in the port of Rangoon; at another time he had been loaded with irons and thrown into prison as a conspirator. He was tolerably prosperous when his last misfortune fell upon him, and when the king seized all his property. Still haunted by the dread of the gallows, Rodgers would not approach the English camp when the war was over. He preferred staying in Ava and taking his chance again among the Burmese.

not that the space beneath was always a receptacle for dirt and stagnant water. Herds of meagre swine, the disgusting scavengers of the town, infested the streets by day; and at night they were relieved by packs of hungry dogs, that yelled, howled, quarrelled, and barked all the night long, depriving the soldiers of their rest. To this dismal town of Rangoon, and to a range about three miles beyond it, our troops were destined to be confined for several months. For many days after the disembarkation a hope was entertained that some of the inhabitants would return to their homes, and afford some prospect of local supplies; but the people were all kept in check by the powerful measures adopted and the terrible threats used and often carried into practice by their government; and every day's experience only increased our disappointment, and proved how little we knew of the character of the nation we had to deal with.* There was no passing the swamps and inundated rice-fields, or the thick jungle beyond them, which was intersected only by a few narrow foot-paths, like the jungles and forests of Ceylon; and behind this screen the unseen enemy plied their work, raising their levies, and gradually collecting them so as to form a cordon round our cantonments. "Hid from our view," says the historian of this war, "on every side in the darkness of a deep, and, to regular bodies, an impenetrable forest, far beyond which the inhabitants and all the cattle of the Rangoon district had been driven, the Burmese chiefs carried on their operations and matured their future schemes with vigilance, secrecy, and activity. Neither rumour nor intelligence of what was passing within their posts ever reached us. Beyond the invisible line which circumscribed our position all was mystery or vague conjecture."* A series, a perfect continuity of stockades was erected, and was pushed nearer and nearer to Rangoon. Like the Nepaulese, the Birmans rarely met an enemy in the open field: their conquests had all been made through the system of stockades. Instructed and trained from their youth in the formation and defence of these works, they had attained to great skill and judgment in the use of them. By gradual approaches, and by carefully stockading all their positions as they advanced, their wars had for many years been an uninterrupted series of conquests; and at the time of our landing at Rangoon they had subdued and incorporated into their Empire nearly all the petty states by which it was surrounded. Their spirit was therefore high, and their confidence in a system of warfare, which had been productive of so many conquests, was confirmed. They quickly saw the difference between our disciplined troops and those of the native powers with whom they had been hitherto engaged; but this knowledge only made them the more cautious and the more attentive to the number and strength of their stockades.

The long and gilded war-boats of the Burmese, and the skill and spirit of the Irawaddi boatmen, were not altogether unknown at Calcutta when our expedition was planned. Every town on the river, according to its size, was obliged to furnish a gilt or a common war-boat, and to man and keep it in constant readiness. These boats carried from forty to fifty men each, and the Lord of the White Elephant and the Golden Foot could muster from 200 to 300 war-boats. In actual war these boatmen were about the most respectable part of his majesty's force. In a time of peace they were as turbulent and overbearing as the Galionjees of the Turkish sultan used to be in former times. Receiving little pay, and living chiefly by rapine, they were in a state of constant hostility with the rest of the people, and were audacious and prompt to execute any orders of government however cruel or violent.* They were more particularly attached to, and dependent on, the crown than any other class of men in Ava; and they had proved their devotion to their king by removing every boat that was likely to be useful to the English. At the royal mandate the Irawaddi above Rangoon was speedily covered with warriors from the towns upon its

* Major Snodgrass.

* Captain Cox's Journal, as quoted by Major Snodgrass.

banks. At the same time the war tocsin was sounded in every part of the country; and every town and village within 300 miles of Rangoon sent its complement of armed men to drive the strangers back into the ocean from whence they came. As their troops rapidly increased in numbers, the enemy that were making the cordon round Rangoon became more daring; and gradually approaching nearer and nearer, they commenced stockading themselves in the jungle within hearing of our advanced posts. Sir Archibald Campbell did all that he could to encourage this boldness, for he could not undertake any distant operation, and the monsoon rains were now beginning to deluge the country. On the morning of the 28th of May, when they had stockaded an advanced corps within little more than musket shot distance from our picquets, Sir Archibald thought that it was time to punish their temerity, and that an opportunity was offered for cutting up part of their army. With four companies of Europeans, two field-pieces, and 400 sepoys he moved against the foremost stockade. The works being incomplete, the Burmese quitted it, and retired through the wood after firing a few shot. Sir Archibald and his column continued to advance through the wood by a winding and very narrow pathway, at every turn of which there was some breastwork or stockade. These works, however, were all hastily abandoned, the Burmese not having had time sufficient to finish them. After an advance of five miles our troops, emerging from the jungles, suddenly entered a wide open field, intersected by a morass and rivulet, across which there was a long narrow bridge. Here the retreating enemy faced about, and attempted a formation for the purpose of defending the passage of the bridge; but they soon gave way before the fire of our two field-pieces, and then continued their retreat towards other woods and jungles. At this juncture a terrible storm began; the rain fell in torrents, and our two field-pieces could be dragged no farther. Sir Archibald Campbell, however, determined to proceed, hoping by a very rapid advance to be able to liberate the Rangoon women and children, being well assured that their release would be followed by the speedy desertion of their male relations, for whom they were held in pledge. Therefore, leaving the 400 sepoys to guard the guns, Sir Archibald pushed on rapidly with the four companies of British troops. After traversing another jungle he reached the edge of the extensive plain of Joazoang. In the midst of this plain, and at a short distance from each other, stood two villages closely flanked by jungle on either hand. The rain descended more violently than ever; the English soldiers were knee deep in water, but they cheerfully marched on. On approaching the villages they observed that they were defended in front by two stockades, filled with men who seemed confident in the strength of their position, and who shouted and cried "Lagee! Lagee!" (Come! Come!) At the same time large bodies of the enemy were moving from the rear of the villages and forming by the side of the jungle. Leaving one company to keep this force in check, Sir Archibald, with the three other companies, made a dash at the stockades. The enemy within them commenced a heavy fire, to which, from the wet state of their muskets, our troops could at first make but little return. But the works were not above eight feet high, and our men, forcing their way over them, brought their bayonets to bear upon a crowded, dense, and confused living mass. The conflict was now short, but very sanguinary. The works had only very narrow ways of egress, and the foremost fugitives, getting wedged in them, blocked them up and prevented the flight of the rest. When they could run away, they ran; but the Burmese never gave and never expected quarter. Lowering their heads to a butting position, they blindly charged upon our soldiers' bayonets. They were killed in heaps, for our people had dried their muskets, and could now pour in volleys as well as use the bayonet. Few or none were spared, as from the barbarous and treacherous mode of warfare practised by the Burmese death alone afforded safety.* During the attack upon

* "The experiment," adds Major Snodgrass, "was tried but tried in vain. Humanity might

the two stockades the enemy in the plain, whose force was roughly estimated at from 4000 to 5000 men, made no movement in their defence; but as soon as they saw that our troops were in possession of the works they set up a horrid yell and began to move towards the stockades. The single company which Sir Archibald had left on the plain sufficed to keep them in check; and as our other three companies rapidly moved out of the works and formed, the Burmese host wavered and fell back. The British then collected their killed and wounded and carried them from the field; and, as the day was drawing to its close, they marched back to quarters, slowly and without any molestation. The enemy left 300 dead in the stockades and adjacent fields, and many more were wounded. On our side Lieutenant Alexander Howard was killed, and Lieutenants Mitchell and O'Halloran were very severely wounded: two rank and file were killed and about twenty were wounded. In going and returning the enemy's advanced stockades were all destroyed.*

The sharp lesson they had received shook the confidence of the Burmese commanders in their troops and stockades. Hitherto every effort to open communications with them had failed, but they now sent two deputies to the British general. They had no intention whatever of agreeing to terms, or even of entering upon the discussion of a treaty; all that they wanted was to lull their adversaries into inactivity, and to gain time for strengthening their own works and increasing the number of their own army. Sir Archibald Campbell was making arrangements for attacking one of their strongest posts on the Irawaddi river when, on the morning of the 9th of June, a request was sent in from their camp that passports might be furnished to two men of rank who were desirous of conferring with the English general. The passes were instantly granted, and in the course of the forenoon two war-boats made their appearance and landed the two Burmese deputies at Rangoon. These native chiefs conducted themselves with much ease and boldness, and with still more cunning and address. Having entered the house, they sat down with all the familiarity of old friends; they paid their compliments to the British officers; and made their remarks upon what they saw with much freedom and apparent good humour. The senior—a stout old man, in a long scarlet robe, and with a red handkerchief tied round his head—then opened the subject of their mission with the question, "Why are you come here with your ships and soldiers?" following up the question with professions of the good faith, pacific intentions, and friendly disposition of the Burmese government. The provocations they had given by invading our neighbours and dependants, by attacking our own territories, &c. were fully explained as being the causes of the war, and the nature and extent of the redress we demanded was plainly stated. In spite of all their address their real object was discovered, and they indeed betrayed it themselves when they refused to remove the barrier placed in the way of communication and reconciliation and asked for a few days' delay. Sir Archibald Campbell gave them to understand that no delay would be granted—that their post on the river would be attacked forthwith. He, however, gave, and they condescended to take back to their camp, a declaration of the terms upon which peace would be restored. The two chiefs stepped into their war-boats with an air of defiance; and the boatmen went off with great speed, rising on their short oars, and singing in chorus "Oh, what a happy king have we!"* The very next morning the post on the river

prompt a British soldier to pass a fallen or vanquished foe; but when he found his forbearance repaid on all occasions by a shot, the instant that his back was turned, self-preservation soon taught him the necessity of other measures; and it consequently happened that our first encounters with the troops of Ava were sanguinary and revolting, especially to soldiers whom feeling and the customs of war alike taught to treat with kindness and forbearance those whom their valour had subdued."

* Major Snodgrass. Sir Archibald Campbell's Dispatch, in H. H. Wilson's Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c.

* Major Snodgrass. The boatmen wore broad Chinese hats. Their features were harsh, bold, and strongly marked.

was attacked by our troops. It was at the village of Kemmendine, a war-boat station only three miles above Rangoon. The enemy laboured incessantly, day and night, to strengthen this position: the ground behind the village, elevated and commanding, was surrounded by a thick forest in the rear; the heights had already been strongly stockaded and abbatised in front; and the approach on the land faces was rendered difficult by a thick jungle, while the swampy nature of the ground towards the Irawaddi strengthened the work on that side. But these defences were not tenable against two divisions of vessels which proceeded up the river to attack the stockade in that direction, and nearly 3000 men, who marched to the attack by land, with four 18-pounders and four mortars. In a few minutes after the attack commenced a great part of the extensive work was carried, and the enemy there stationed were driven into the jungle, leaving behind them 150 dead. At the rear gate of this stockade were found the gilt umbrella, sword, and spear of a Burmese commander of high rank; the umbrella, which chiefly denotes the rank, being shattered by a shower of our grape. The body of the chief himself was found a few yards farther in the jungle, and was recognised to be that of the stout and cunning old deputy who had visited our quarters the preceding day. This night—a night of storm and pitiless rain—was spent by our troops, under arms, under the dripping trees of the jungle or in the inundated rice-fields; but on the following morning, when they marched to storm the rest of the works, they found that they were entirely deserted, and that the Burmese had gone off in a panic to another stockaded post a good many miles in the rear of Kemmendine. The most desperate crews of the king's war-boats had fought in the stockades at Kemmendine and had joined in the retreat. Sir Archibald Campbell's loss in killed and wounded was very inconsiderable.

For a time there seemed to be a general pause and terror on the side of the Burmese, who had now evacuated every stockade in the neighbourhood of Rangoon. Their recent losses made them keep at a safer distance from our lines, and our troops ceased to be annoyed by their nightly visits to their posts; but beyond these temporary advantages no favourable change took place, either in the present condition or in the future prospects of our army. Not an inhabitant returned to his home; and so far from any desire of peace being manifested by the court of Ava, it was made evident that the war would be carried to the last extremity. Our very successes, in convincing the enemy that they could not stand against us even in their best stockades, convinced them also of the necessity of removing all means of transport and of subsistence still farther from our reach; and accordingly the plains for many miles round were swept of their herds, the rivers of all their boats and canoes; all the towns and villages were deserted, and everywhere beyond our outposts we found a solitude and a waste.

Other operations had taken place in the meantime in other directions. Two small forces detached by Sir Archibald Campbell had captured the islands of Cheduba and Negrais, the first lying off the coast of Arracan, and the second near one of the mouths of the Irawaddi river. The Maha Bandoola, the royal favourite who had planned the conquest of Bengal and collected the large army in Arracan, had commenced offensive operations and had crossed our frontier, with a number of gilt umbrellas, some days before Sir Archibald Campbell's armament reached Rangoon. With a force of from 6000 to 8000 men he surrounded a small British post, which made an honourable, but ineffectual resistance. Some of the officers and sepoys effected their escape, but others fell into the hands of the Burmese, who barbarously put all the English officers and most of the sepoys to death, only reserving a few of the latter to send as prisoners and trophies to the Golden Foot. The arrival of these captives at Ava tended to confirm the arrogant confidence of that court. But the progress of Bandoola's forces was very soon checked; they were beaten out of all their advanced stockades by a few hundred sepoys, and by the end

of July they were driven back into Arracan; and all the country near our south-eastern frontier was completely cleared. In this short and desultory, but difficult war—for it was carried on with mere handfuls of sepoys and in the midst of the rainy season—Colonel Shapland and Colonel Innes greatly distinguished themselves.

We return to Rangoon. Sir Archibald Campbell's forces were already much diminished by sickness and death, brought on by hard service during an inclement season, by defective provisions, and by the ordinary casualties of war.* But the opportune arrival of the 89th British regiment from Madras, and of parts of the two detachments which had subdued the islands of Cheduba and Negrais, raised the effective strength just at the critical moment. By the end of June the Burmese in this quarter appeared to have somewhat recovered from their dismay. Chiefs of the highest fame, who, until they came in contact with our troops, had always been victorious, were sent down the Irawaddi from Ava and from Prome with orders to slay or torture and mutilate every Burmese soldier that did not fight to the utmost, and one of the brightest of golden umbrellas, Sykya Wongee, minister of state, was appointed commander-in-chief, with positive commands from the Golden Face to attack and drive the British at once into the sea. On the last day of June all the woods in Sir Archibald's front again exhibited bustle and commotion; 8000 men had crossed to the Rangoon side of the river; the jungles around all seemed animated; clouds of rising smoke marked the encampments of the different corps of the Burmese army in the forest; and their noisy preparations for attack formed a striking contrast to the still and quiet aspect of the British line.* The Shoodagon, or Golden Dagon Pagoda, was the key of the British position. This splendid edifice—in itself a fortress—is about two miles or two miles and a half from the town of Rangoon: in shape it resembles an inverted speaking trumpet; it is 338 feet high, and is surmounted by a cap made of brass 45 feet high; the whole is richly gilded. The base of this Pagoda is a conical hill, flat at the top, and rising about 75 feet above the road. Here Sir Archibald placed a whole battalion of British troops. The two roads running from the Pagoda to the town were occupied by our forces, native and European, the minor pagodas, bonze houses, and pilgrims' houses along those two roads affording good shelter to the troops against the inclemency of the season, and some shelter from the attack of an enemy whose artillery was but light. Two detached posts completed our position—one at the village of Puzendown, about a mile below the town, where the Pegu and Rangoon rivers meet; the other at Kemmendine, about three miles above the town; this second post being chiefly intended to protect our shipping against the descent of the enemy's fire-rafts. On the morning of the 1st of July the enemy issued in dense masses from the jungle to the right and front of the Great Pagoda. Detaching to their left a column which succeeded in setting fire to part of the village of Puzendown, their main body came boldly up to within half a mile of Rangoon and commenced a spirited attack upon part of our line. But two field-pieces, served with grape and shrapnel, presently checked their advance, and then a brilliant charge by the 43rd Madras native infantry put them all to flight. In a very few minutes not a man could be seen of the Burmese host except the killed, nor could anything be heard of them except a wild

* All the supplies of fresh provisions, even for the hospitals, were exhausted by the middle of June, from which period to the end of October the English troops had nothing to subsist on but salt beef and biscuit of very inferior quality, and were without vegetables of any kind to counteract the effect of such a diet. Between the month of June, 1824, and the end of March, 1825, out of an average strength of 2716 British troops, 1311 perished, or very nearly one-half of the whole force of king's troops. Matters were not much mended in the following year. Almost the only fresh meat that could be procured was pork.—Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Alexander M. Tulloch, 'Statistical Reports on the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding among Her Majesty's Troops, &c., prepared from the Records of the Army Medical Department and War-Office Returns. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty.'

* Snodgrass.

screaming which proceeded from the depths of the forest and jungle.

Sykya Wongee was recalled to court and degraded, and a still higher minister of state, named Soomba Wongee, who had arrived with reinforcements, took the command, and commenced stockading his army in the most difficult and intricate part of the forest, at Kummeroot, about five miles from the Great Pagoda, intending, chiefly under cover of night, to carry on such a system of desultory warfare as would harass, and ultimately destroy, our sickly, worn-out soldiers. He also fortified a commanding point on the river above Kemmendine, in communication with his stockaded camp, hoping by this means not only to obstruct the navigation of the river, but also to construct and employ numerous fire-rafts. But this new commander-in-chief had scarcely finished his works ere he was driven from them with a terrible slaughter. On the 8th of July Sir Archibald Campbell embarked with one column for the attack of the position upon the river, and Brigadier-General Mac Bean, with a land column, marched upon the forest stockades at Kummeroot. The works on the river were found to be so formidable that it was judged necessary to employ breaching vessels; and a brig and three Company's cruisers, manned by seamen of his Majesty's and the Company's navy, under the superintendence of Captain Marryat, soon opened a heavy cannonade, and silenced the enemy's guns. Our troops then pushed across the river in boats, entered the practicable breach which the firing of our seamen had made, and carried all those works with comparatively trifling loss. The Burmese suffered severely in killed, and many of them were drowned in trying to escape across the river. The operations of the land column, under Mac Bean, were equally successful. It was unprovided with artillery; but the storming parties, who escaladed stockade after stockade, consisted entirely of British troops. Here again the slaughter was dreadful. Soomba Wongee, and several chiefs of high rank, with 800 men, were killed within the stockades; and the neighbouring jungles were filled with the unhappy creatures who were wounded, and left to die, from want of food and care. Some of these poor Burmese were found by the English soldiers and brought into our hospitals. But unfortunately none of them recovered. The monsoon rains were now at their height, the adjacent country was almost wholly under water, nothing was to be obtained from it, and the sickness of our troops increased to an alarming extent.

An expedition, consisting of his Majesty's 89th regiment and the 7th Madras native infantry, under the command of Colonel Miles, was detached from Rangoon, with a considerable naval force, to subdue the maritime possessions of his Majesty to the eastward, in the hope that their loss might induce him to sue for peace. The success of the expedition was complete: Tavoy surrendered, Merguí was taken by storm; and the people all along the coast of Tenasserim gladly placed themselves under British protection. But these achievements occupied some time, and when the result was known at Ava it seemed to produce no effect on the determined temper of that court.

Towards the end of July Sir Archibald Campbell attempted to release such of the inhabitants of Rangoon as were desirous of returning to their houses; and by means of the sudden, unexpected, and to the natives, inexplicable movement of our steam-boat, a few families, who had been driven to the villages at the heads of the numerous creeks which branch off from the Rangoon river, were released from their guard, and joyfully took the opportunity of returning to their city. It was to the report of these people of the kind treatment they met with, our army was afterwards indebted for the return of the great body of the people, whose services and exertions contributed to the final success of the war.* By degrees our foraging parties were enabled to take a wider range, the enemy were obliged to

* At first the number of families liberated was very small. In every village up the creeks there was a small party of military police, who, upon the appearance of our steam-boat, drove the people, men, women, and children, from their houses to the jungle, there to remain exposed to the incessant rains.—*Major Snodgrass.*

draw their resources from a more distant part of the country, and more of the people of Rangoon and the neighbourhood escaped from their guards, and returned to their homes.

The Lord of the White Elephant now sent his two brothers, the prince of Tonghoo and the prince of Sarrawuddy, with a whole host of astrologers, and a corps of "Invulnerables," to join the army, and to direct the future operations of the war. The astrologers were to fix the lucky moments for attacking: the Invulnerables had some points of resemblance to the Turkish Delhis; they were the desperadoes or madmen of the army, and their madness was kept up by enormous doses of opium. The corps of Invulnerables consisted of several thousand men, divided into classes; the most select band of all being called the King's Invulnerables. It was soon found that they were as susceptible of wounds and death as the astrologers were incapable of interpreting the stars. The prince of Tonghoo established his head-quarters at Pegu, and the prince of Sarrawuddy took post at Donoopew upon the great river, about sixty miles from Rangoon. In the beginning of August the prince of Sarrawuddy sent down a force to occupy a strong post at the mouth of the Pegu river, a few miles below Rangoon, giving his people strict orders to block the channel of the river in our rear, that not one of the "wild foreigners" or "captive strangers" might escape the punishment that was about to overtake them. Sir Archibald Campbell presently detached a small corps, under Brigadier Smelt, to dislodge Sarrawuddy's warriors. Our land troops were brought to a standstill when within musket-shot of the place, by a deep and impassable creek; but a party of sailors from his Majesty's ship "Larne," under Captain Marryat, soon threw a bridge over the creek; and as soon as the column of attack pushed forward, the enemy began to fly, leaving eight guns and a quantity of ammunition in their stockade. A strong pagoda with a numerous garrison, and with cannons pointing down every approach, was next carried with equal facility. Other posts on the rivers and creeks were successively and successfully attacked. Such of the enemy as had had any experience of our way of fighting seldom stopped to fight in their stockades; but a new set of people from the interior made a good stand in a succession of stockades on one of the rivers, and cost us the loss of a good many brave men. These affairs of posts were very numerous. At last the astrologers told the prince of Sarrawuddy that the stars had told them that the moment was come for a decisive action; and on the night of the 30th of August a body of the King's Invulnerables promised to attack and carry the Great or Golden Dagon Pagoda, in order that the princes, and the sages and pious men in their train, might celebrate the usual annual festival in that sacred place—a place now crowded not with Bonzes, but with English grenadiers. And true, so far, to their promise, the Invulnerables, at the hour of midnight, rushed in a compact body from the jungle under the Pagoda, armed with swords and muskets. "A small picquet, thrown out in our front, retired in slow and steady order, skirmishing with the Invulnerables until they reached the flight of steps leading from the road up to the Pagoda. The moon was gone down, and the night was so dark that the Burmese could be distinguished only by a few glimmering lanterns in their front; but their noise and clamour, their threats and imprecations upon the impious strangers, if they did not immediately evacuate the sacred temple, proved their number to be very great. In a dense column they rolled along the narrow pathway leading to the northern gate of the Pagoda, wherein all seemed as silent as the grave. But, hark! the muskets crash, the cannons roar along the ramparts of the British post, drowning the tumult of the advancing column; and see!—see by the flash of our guns, the column reels back, the Invulnerables fall, mortally wounded, and the rest turn their backs on the holy place and run with frantic speed for the covering of the jungle. Our grape-shot and our musketry seemed to have broken the spell—those Invulnerables ventured no more near any of our posts. But a far more terrible enemy had gotten within our lines—

the dysentery broke out among our troops, killing many of them, and reducing more to a most emaciated and feeble state. Scarcely three thousand duty soldiers were left to guard our lines. Floating hospitals were established at the mouth of the river, bread was now furnished in sufficient quantities, but nothing except change of season or of climate could restore the sufferers to health. Mergui and Tavoy, portions of our recent conquests on the sea-coast, were represented by the medical officers who visited them as admirable convalescent stations; and thither a number of our people were sent, and with the most beneficial result.*

As all kinds of gilt umbrellas had been rolled in the dust—as fire-eating chiefs, ministers of state, princes royal, had all failed—the Golden Face determined to call down from the mountains of Arracan his prime favourite, the Maha Bandoola, who had promised to sack Calcutta, and to carry off the governor-general in golden chains. Bandoola obeyed the call, and instead of making another and more formidable attack along our Chittagong frontier (which he would have made, but for the defeats which Sir Archibald Campbell had inflicted on the Burmese at Rangoon), he led his reinforced army from the mountains of Arracan to the Irawaddi river. He began his march about the end of August, at a season of the year when none but Burmese could have kept the field for a week, much less have attempted to pass the unhealthy jungles and the pestilential marshes of the country. The distance, by the shortest route, was more than 200 English miles; and numerous rivers and mountain torrents, and even deep inlets of the sea obstructed the progress. But all these difficulties were overcome, and Bandoola, gathering fresh forces in the latter part of his long march, reached Donoopew before Sir Archibald Campbell knew that he had left Arracan.

Happily our troops, though wofully reduced in numbers, were now fast recovering their health and strength; and two fresh British regiments, some battalions of native infantry, a regiment of cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and a troop of rockets, arrived from Calcutta and Madras, together with admirable draught cattle of the true Mysore breed. Five hundred native boatmen came round from Chittagong and were busily employed in preparing boats for river service.

Before relating the grand struggle and final catastrophe of the Maha Bandoola, we must turn to the south-east, and relate some spirited proceedings which took place in Siam. An inveterate enmity and an almost constant state of war had existed for many years between the Siamese and the Burmese. Being by far the more warlike people, the Burmese had defeated their neighbours in many bloody conflicts, and had conquered wide tracts of their country. In fact, the Burmese empire was in good part composed of territories torn from the kingdom of Siam. The landing of the British at Rangoon seemed to open to the Siamese a favourable opportunity for vengeance and recovery of dominion; but that court regarded the vicinity of a British force with much jealousy and dread, and were indisposed to our alliance by our seizure of Mergui and Tavoy, which places, together with nearly the whole of the coast of Tenasserim, had once belonged to Siam. Moreover, the court of Ava set on foot negotiations with his Siamese Majesty, making promises of friendship and restitution, and endeavouring to show that the British were equally the enemies of Siamese and Burmese, and that the two neighbouring peoples ought to unite their forces against the common enemy. It was imagined, and it was afterwards proved by abundant testimony, that the King of Siam firmly believed that the English must fail in conquering Ava, or in bringing its government to sue for terms; and it was thought that the situation of Bankok, his capital, open to an attack by our much dreaded shipping, alone prevented him from making common cause against us. What the King of Siam did, was to make friendly declarations to both parties, and to intimate to each of them that he was anxious for its

* Men who had for months continued in a most debilitated state at Rangoon rapidly recovered on arriving at Mergui, and were soon restored to their duty in full health and vigour.

success, and would soon join it. When, however, the Siamese began to collect a considerable army on his frontier, Sir Archibald Campbell thought it expedient to checkmate him, and at the beginning of October he resolved to detach a small force for the purpose of reducing and occupying the town of Martaban, from which a direct communication could be opened with the Siamese army, and all their motions watched. The city of Martaban, at the bottom of the gulf of that name, and about a hundred miles from Rangoon, was a frontier fortress of the Burmese, a dépôt of military stores, the place where the Burmese armies usually assembled in their wars with the Siamese, and from which they had made their annual irruptions into the territories of the King of Siam, to plunder the country, and carry off the inhabitants as slaves. It was a place difficult of access, and of very considerable strength; but the inhabitants of the town and of the neighbouring districts, which had not long been annexed to the Burmese empire, detested their conquerors. On the 13th of October part of his Majesty's 41st regiment and a regiment of Madras light infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, sailed from Rangoon for Martaban. Owing to light and contrary winds the little expedition did not reach its destination so soon as was expected; and thus, instead of taking the enemy by surprise, Colonel Godwin found them fully aware of his approach, and prepared to give him a warm reception. The Burmese governor had fortified every commanding eminence about the town, and its distance from the coast (from 15 to 20 miles) offered many serious obstacles. By land, difficult forests, marshes, and inundated rice-fields presented themselves; by water, the intricate navigation of a shallow, winding, and little-known river presented almost equally serious impediments. It was, however, resolved to proceed by water, and after great toil and perseverance our lighter vessels were anchored nearly abreast of the town of Martaban. As the Burmese governor showed no disposition to come to terms, our guns opened, and an assault took place. The Burmese were soon driven with severe loss from the town and all their defences; and the inhabitants, being chiefly Talicns or Peguers, received the British troops with every appearance of satisfaction and joy. Having settled matters at Martaban, Colonel Godwin detached a party against another frontier fortress of the Burmese, and Yeh, situated between Martaban and Tavoy, fell into our hands.* In all this part of the country the native population —the descendants of the subjects of the once powerful, but now ruined and extinct dynasty which ruled the ancient kingdom of Pegu—were eager to be released from the iron sceptre of Ava, and to be included among the subjects of the British. Their feeling of affection towards us improved during the eighteen months that they remained under our government. It was an act of cruelty and of dishonour to give them up to their old oppressors and cruel tyrants; but this was done at the conclusion of the war.

By the end of October the rains had entirely ceased at Rangoon; and reinforced as he was, Sir Archibald Campbell was completing his preparations for the ascent of the Irawaddi, and for an attack upon Prome, when he learned that the Maha Bandoola had reached Donoopew with 60,000 fighting men, a considerable train of artillery, and a body of Cassay horse, the best cavalry of this part of Asia. Bandoola's musketeers were estimated at 35,000 men. Other numerous bodies were armed with gingals, which carried an iron ball of from six to twelve ounces, and were mounted on a light carriage easily dragged about by two men; and great numbers were attached to the guns, which were transported on the backs of elephants. The rest of the host were armed with swords and spears, and all were well provided with implements for stockading and intrenching. Scattered through the army, there were also some more of the "Invulnerables," who had not yet tasted the sour grape of English guns, and who were amply provided with charms, spells, opium, bang, and betel-nuts. As the Maha proclaimed on all sides his intention of going at the head of his invin-

* Snodgrass. H. H. Wilson, Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c.

cible army, with horses and elephants, and all manner of warlike stores, to capture and destroy the English at Rangoon, it was deemed proper to wait for him there. This would save our troops much fatigue, and a great, decisive battle might bring the court of Ava to reason.

As a great part of the country was still under water, the Burmese, for the most part, came down to the neighbourhood of Rangoon in boats. Our force was still but weak for the extensive line it was necessary to defend. But, to remedy this evil as far as possible, posts, consisting of redoubts and fortified pagodas, were speedily constructed, connecting the great Golden Dagon Pagoda by two distinct lines with Rangoon and the river, and leaving a disposable force for moving to the support of any point that might require support. The post at Kemmendine was also strongly occupied, and was supported on the river by his Majesty's sloop "Sophie." Captain Ryves, a Company's cruiser, and a strong division of gun-boats.* On the 30th of November Bandoola's great army assembled in and behind the dense forest which almost touches at one point the conical hill and the great pagoda; and his line, extending from the river above Kemmendine in a semicircular direction towards Puzendown, might be distinguished by a curved line of smoke rising above the trees. "During the ensuing night the low, continued murmur and hum of voices proceeding from the enemy's encampment suddenly ceased, and were speedily succeeded by the distant, but gradually approaching sounds of a multitude in slow and silent movement through the woods; and we soon became aware that the enemy's masses had approached to the very edge of the jungle, within musket-shot of the pagoda, apparently in readiness to rush from their cover to the assault at the break of day. . . . . The day had scarcely dawned on the 1st of December, when hostilities commenced with a heavy fire of musketry and cannon at Kemmendine, the reduction of that place being a preliminary to any general attack upon our line. The firing continued long and animated, and from our commanding situation at the great pagoda, though nearly two miles distant from the scene of action, we could distinctly hear the yells and shouts of the infuriated assailants, occasionally returned by the hearty cheer of the British seamen, as they poured in their heavy broadsides upon the resolute and persevering masses. The thick forest which separated us from the river prevented our seeing distinctly what was going forward; and when the firing ceased, we remained for a short time in some anxiety, though in little doubt as to the result of the long and spirited assault. At length, however, the thick canopy of smoke which lowered over the fierce and sanguinary conflict gradually dissolving, we had the pleasure of seeing the masts of our vessels lying at their old station off the fort—a convincing proof that all had ended well on that side.

"In the course of the forenoon Burmese columns were observed on the west side of the river, marching across the plains of Dalla towards Rangoon. They were formed in five or six different divisions, and moved with great regularity, led by numerous chiefs on horseback—their gilt umbrellas glittering in the rays of the sun,—with a sufficiently formidable and imposing effect, at a distance that prevented our perceiving anything motley or mobbish, which might have been found in a closer inspection of these warlike legions."*

Opposite Rangoon the leading column of five or six Burmese divisions commenced intrenching and throwing up batteries, while their main body were stockading in the jungle. In the course of the day several heavy columns issued from the forest, and successively took up their ground along a woody ridge, gently sloping towards Rangoon. Here they commenced operations with their intrenching tools, and with such activity and good will, that in the course of a

* This post at Kemmendine was of great importance in preventing the enemy from attacking Rangoon by water by means of their war-boats, or launching from a convenient distance the formidable fire-rafts they had prepared for the destruction of our shipping.—*Snodgrass.*

* Snodgrass.

couple of hours their whole line was covered, their flags and banners, which had been flying in profusion, all disappeared, and nothing was seen but a parapet of fresh-turned earth, gradually increasing in height. "The moving masses, which had so very lately attracted our anxious attention, had sunk into the ground; and by any one who had not witnessed the whole scene, the existence of these subterranean legions would not have been credited. The occasional movement of a chief with his gilt umbrella, from place to place, superintending the progress of their labour, was the only thing that now attracted notice. By a distant observer, the hills, covered with mounds of earth, would have been taken for anything rather than the approaches of an attacking army; but to us, who had watched the whole strange proceeding, it seemed the work of magic or enchantment."* But, thus working like moles in the earth, the Burmese could no more see than they could be seen, and their men on watch must have been careless or fearful of exposing their heads and shoulders by looking too often over the mounds. In the afternoon Major Sale, with his Majesty's 13th regiment and a regiment of Madras native infantry, moving rapidly forward upon the busily employed and too confident enemy, fell upon them before they were well aware of the visit, and drove the whole line from their earth cover with considerable loss. Having destroyed as many of their arms and tools as they could find, our detachment retired unmolested before the numerous bodies which were now forming on every side. "These Burmese trenches were found to be a succession of holes, capable of containing two men each, and excavated so as to afford shelter both from the weather and the fire of an enemy: even a shell lighting in the trench could at most kill but two men. As it is not the Burmese system to relieve their troops in making these approaches, each hole contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel for its inmates; and under the excavated bank a bed of straw or brushwood was prepared, in which one man could sleep while his comrade watched. When one line of trench is completed, its occupiers, taking advantage of the night, push forward to where the second line is to be opened, their places being immediately taken up by fresh troops from the rear, and so on progressively."*

During the same busy day (the 1st of December) repeated attacks were made on Kemmendine, and were all repulsed by our troops or by the seamen of our little flotilla. But it was not until night that the Burmese made their last desperate effort to open their way down the river, and so get possession of the port of Rangoon. Our wearied soldiers had laid down to rest, when suddenly the heavens and the whole surrounding country became brilliantly illuminated. The enemy had launched their fire-rafts into the stream with the first of the ebb tide, and had now applied the match to those huge masses of combustible materials, in the hope of driving the "Sophie" and our other vessels from their stations off Kemmendine; and as these fire-rafts came down, it was seen by the light of their flames that they were followed by a vast fleet of war-boats, whose crews were ready to take advantage of the confusion which might ensue if any of our vessels should be set on fire. And, as the rafts floated rapidly down to Kemmendine with the ebbing tide, columns of attack moved once more by land against that well defended post, with artillery, with gingals, and musketry. But the skill and intrepidity of British seamen proved more than a match for the numbers and devices of the Burmese; after gazing for a while at the red, and blue, and yellow, and green flames of the mighty fire-works, which might have put them in mind of the now departed glories of Sadler's Wells and Vauxhall, our sailors leaped into their boats, pushed off to meet the flaming rafts, grappled them with their grappling irons, and conducted them past our shipping, or ran them ashore to finish their short life of fire and flame upon the river-bank without injury to any one.† After

* Snodgrass.

* Id.

† Upon examination, the Burmese fire-rafts were

this it is hardly necessary to say that the land attack on Kemmendine failed completely.

If the fire-rafts could have reached the harbour of Rangoon, which was now crowded with transports and country vessels of all kinds, the effect might have been very tragical; but the English sailors said that none should pass Kemmendine point, and not one did pass. Kemmendine, where the river makes a sudden angle, was the only point from which the rafts could have been launched with effect. Fully aware of this, Bandoola ordered attack upon attack to be made, and for seven days no rest by night or by day was allowed to our troops or to our seamen there. But every effort of the enemy failed, nor were they more successful in any other part of their line of circumvallation. On the 5th of December, when the matériel and warlike stores of the Burmese left wing were brought forward from the jungle to their foremost intrenchment in front of Rangoon, and were fairly within our reach, Sir Archibald Campbell ordered a decisive attack to be made upon their army. Major Sale, with one column 800 strong, and a troop of British dragoons, who had only been landed the preceding day, was directed to fall upon their centre; and Major Walker, with 500 men, was sent to make a vigorous attack on their left wing. The operations of these two columns of troops were greatly facilitated by Captain Chads of the navy, who proceeded up the creek to within gun-shot of the rear of the enemy's line, with the man-of-war boats and a part of the flotilla, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which distracted the attention of the Burmese, and prevented their reinforcing in front. Our two columns broke through the intrenchments, and completely routed both the centre and the left with vigorous bayonet charges; but Major Walker and a good many of his gallant comrades fell. The loss of the Burmese was appalling; they were driven from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the ground behind them covered with dead and wounded, with all their guns, intrenching tools, and a great number of small arms. On the 6th of December Bandoola was employed in rallying his defeated troops. On the 7th the Burmese made their last and grand attack on the great pagoda. Here they were beaten, driven back to their intrenchments, then driven into them, and forced back into the jungle by the British bayonet. Our troops at that post, worn out by seven days and nights of incessant fighting or watching, could not pursue the flying enemy, who left in the trenches a great number of dead—nearly all stout, tall, athletic fellows, who might almost have measured with English grenadiers, and who had evidently belonged to the élite of Bandoola's army. During these seven busy and fiery days the Burmese, in addition to a prodigious loss of lives, had lost every gun they had, and the entire matériel of their army. The survivors were flying towards Donoopew; but they were stopped on their flight by some great and terrible chiefs, who had been sent down with numerous reinforcements, and they rallied at Kokeen, about four miles beyond the great pagoda. It is said that when Bandoola counted his forces, he found them reduced, from more than 60,000 fighting men, to less than 25,000. This favourite of the Golden Face was allowed to retain the chief command; he immediately began to intrench and stockade himself at Kokeen, and employed incendiaries to burn the invaders out of Rangoon, and destroy all their stores, powder-magazines, &c. The latter attempt—which very nearly succeeded*—brought down a rapid attack

found to be ingeniously contrived and strongly constructed. They were made almost entirely of strong bamboos firmly wrought together. Between every two or three rows of bamboos there was a line of earthen jars filled with petroleum, or earth-oil, and cotton: gunpowder and other inflammable ingredients were distributed in different parts of the floating infernal machine; and the almost inextinguishable fierceness of the flames proceeding from it could scarcely be conceived. Many of the rafts were considerably more than 100 feet long, and were divided into many pieces, attached to each other by means of long and flexible hinges. It was expected by the Burmese that when they caught upon the cable or bow of a ship, the force of the current would carry the ends of the raft quite round her, and envelope her in flames from the deck to her mast-head.—*Major Snodgrass.*

* On the night of the 12th of December the

upon his new position, and disgrace and ruin upon himself. On the 15th of December—three days after the midnight fire at Rangoon—1500 British troops and sepoys, unaided by artillery, under the command of Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, drove Bandoola and his mighty host from all their intrenchments and stockades at Kokeen, and strewed the position with dead and dying. Here ended the operations in front of Rangoon; the British troops returned in the evening to their cantonments, and the remnant of the Burmese army retreated upon Donoopew.

Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to advance up the country, at least as far as Prome, reducing Donoopew on his way, and to move in two separate columns, the one proceeding by water, the other by land. The land column was to proceed in as direct a line as it could, and to strike the main stream of the Irawaddi at Sarrawah, or at some other place above Donoopew and below Prome. The water column, carrying supplies for the whole army, was to ascend the Rangoon branch of the Great River, to get into the main channel below Donoopew, to dislodge the enemy from all their positions there, to clear the Irawaddi, and to give the hand to the land column at Sarrawah or some place in that neighbourhood; the country, the state of the roads, &c. being too little known to allow of the point of rendezvous and junction being precisely fixed.

On the 11th of February the British began to move. The land column, under the immediate command of Sir Archibald Campbell, consisted of 1300 European infantry, 1000 sepoys, 2 squadrons of dragoons, 1 troop of horse artillery, and 1 rocket troop; the marine or river column, under Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, counted 600 European infantry, 1 small battalion of sepoys, and a powerful train of artillery; and this column was embarked in a flotilla of sixty boats, commanded by Captain Alexander of the navy, escorted by the boats of our men-of-war. The column marching by land, and the column proceeding by the river, were so to time their movements as to reach Sarrawah nearly at the same time. But Sir Archibald Campbell, for reasons which do not seem to be sufficiently explained, pushed on much faster than Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton; and he continued to advance as if the river column, or the forces under Cotton, would be quite sufficient for the reduction of Donoopew, and could not possibly encounter either defeat or delay. Neither the country through which he passed nor the country which lay before him was in a condition to tempt Sir Archibald's advance. The land was almost wholly deserted; all the villages had been burnt down, and the inhabitants had either fled or been driven away by the retreating Burmese. A few wretched families of Rangoon were found wandering in the woods, and looking like spectres, from starvation and misery; but, with the exception of these poor people, the country seemed to be left to the dominion of the tiger and wild hog. But Sir Archibald marched on his column until it reached Sarrawah, about 30 miles beyond Donoopew, on the main stream of the majestic Irawaddi, which is here from 700 to 800 yards broad. Here he halted for four days—the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th of March—expecting to cut off the enemy's retreat from Donoopew by water, and also to prevent their rallying higher up the river. He seems never to have entertained a doubt that Cotton would not be strong enough to dislodge Bandoola from his stronghold; and his confidence was confirmed by some flying Peguers, who assured him that the Burmese chief had been defeated. Early on the morning of the 7th of March, Sir Archibald heard a heavy cannonade in the direction of Donoopew: he believed it to proceed from the marine division, and when the noise ceased he felt convinced that the place had fallen. He halted, however, where he was, for the chance of hearing from Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, until the morning of the 8th.

cry of fire resounded through the town of Rangoon, and nearly the whole of that filthy, wood and bamboo-built place seemed to be immediately in a blaze. The incendiaries had placed their matches in various parts of the town, and had set fire to them at the same moment. One half of the town was burned; but the flames were prevented from reaching our dépôt of stores and ammunition.

when, leaving a strong detachment at Sarrawuh to prevent the enemy's retreat by water, he advanced 12 miles inland, through jungles and deserted and bare tracks of country. On the 10th he advanced 14 miles farther up the country, to a town of considerable extent upon the banks of the Great River. He found that the town was wholly deserted, and that here, as well as every where else, every article had been removed that could be of use to his army. "This," says the historian of the campaign, "only made him the more eager to reach Prome by rapid marches, lest that city, the promised quarters for the rainy season, should be equally stripped." Early on the following morning, the 11th of March, as the land column were about to resume their march, official intelligence was received that the marine column had failed in their attack upon Donoopew. The news is said to have been as unexpected as it was unpleasant; but it was not very astonishing that a column which did not much exceed a thousand men should fail in reducing by a *coup de main* one of the strongest positions in the Burmese country, defended by at least 15,000 of the best Burmese troops. The whole mistake lay in Sir Archibald's dividing his forces, and attempting to reach Prome with one division, before making sure of the reduction of Donoopew, which the enemy had been strengthening for nearly a whole year. And yet it was made to appear that if Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton had begun his attack in the right direction, his single column might have sufficed to drive Bandoola out of that formidable place. The works at Donoopew consisted of three stockades which rose one above the other, and the heavy batteries of which were all pointed to the river. Instead of passing the whole fortress and taking the enemy in flank, which would have rendered his guns almost useless, Cotton attacked the first part of the works he came to, or the extremity of the stockade that was lowest down the stream. After meeting with an obstinate resistance, he carried the first stockade; but on proceeding to the second, he received by far the severest check that the European troops met with during the whole war. No fewer than 150 of our men were killed and wounded; and the retreat was so precipitate that the wounded were not carried off, although it was well known that they would all be put to a cruel death. The whole flotilla retreated ten miles down the river, being constantly assailed and tormented by the Burmese war-boats. The next day most of our killed and wounded men who had been left in the stockade were crucified and put upon rafts, which were sent floating down the river towards the flotilla.* This

* Article on the Burmese War, and Review of Major Snodgrass's volume, in Quarterly Review, No. LXX.

The writer of this article appears either to have served in the Burmese war as an officer of his Majesty's navy, or to have derived information from naval officers who were engaged in that war.

The commanding officer's own account of the operations at Donoopew is, however, entitled to consideration. In making the attack on the works, it was indispensable to prevent the Burmese from descending the river, and it appears from the brigadier-general's dispatch to Sir Archibald Campbell that this could not be done if he passed the works to take them in flank. It moreover appears from the same dispatch that, through sickness and other casualties, this marine column was reduced to about 600 bayonets disposable for the attack. "It is obvious," says Cotton, "that this small force could not be separated. Upon consulting with Captain Alexander, R.N., whether, if I passed the position for the purpose of attacking above it, he could keep open the river below us, it was his opinion that *one half* of the *force* would be requisite for this important purpose. Your dispatch of the 24th ultimo, stating that you depended upon me for the conquest of this position, devolved upon me the necessity of making the attempt; and I had no option but that of landing below the works, and attacking them in succession, while the flotilla defended the river."

It appears from the same dispatch that in the first stockade we lost only 20 in killed and wounded, while the enemy lost 450 and odd, 280 being made prisoners; and that in the second stockade our total loss in killed, wounded, and missing did not exceed 100. Captain R. C. Rose, of his Majesty's 89th regiment, led the storming party, which, according to this dispatch, consisted of only 200 men. After receiving one wound, Captain Rose fell dead from a second shot while persevering in the attack, and showing a gallant example to his troops. Captain Cannon, also of the 89th, a brave and deserving officer, was killed. It further appears from the dispatch that the troops did not run as soon as they were out of the stockades, that the retreat was orderly and was not commenced until the evening; and that 64 pieces of ordnance were taken and destroyed, as were also a quantity of ammunition,

barbarity was the more revolting as the wounded among the Burmese, taken prisoners in the first stockade, had been carefully dressed and attended to by our surgeons, and had been permitted to go whithersoever they pleased.*

Upon receiving intelligence of this disaster, Sir Archibald Campbell, who had certainly gone on too heedlessly, or in too entire a confidence, felt that there was nothing to do but to retrace his steps, and to join Cotton as speedily as possible. His land column depended entirely upon the flotilla for its supplies; and the flotilla being stopped, the navigation of the Irawaddi was so completely commanded by the enemy that not a canoe could get up the river or pass the works at Donoopew. At the time the commissariat of the land column had not two days' rations left. "No reliance could be placed upon the country for furnishing even one day's consumption: the people everywhere fled before us, and even when chance threw an individual in our way, he only answered our questions and requests by pointing towards Donoopew, and exclaiming 'Bandoola! Bandoola!' In a word, starvation stared us in the face; and the occupation of Prome, however desirable, was not to be attempted under circumstances so eminently hazardous. On the other hand, it became every day more certain that Bandoola's army was the chief if not the only force now left to oppose us; and the natives evidently looked to that alone for checking our advance."* By the 13th Sir Archibald and his land column got back to Sarrawah, where they had halted on their advance. Here an obstacle of a most serious nature presented itself. To reach Donoopew the broad and rapid Irawaddi must be crossed by an army with cavalry, artillery, and commissariat equipments, and unprovided with any means for such an undertaking, beyond a few small canoes which had been procured with much difficulty. Energy and perseverance, however, triumphed over every difficulty. In the course of the 13th the Madras infantry were carried over the river and sent to occupy a position in advance. On the 14th rafts were constructed to carry over the artillery, stores, &c.; and by labouring day and night, before the evening of the fifth day every man, and everything belonging to the division, had been safely landed on the right bank of the Irawaddi. It was, however, the 25th of March ere the land column arrived within gun-shot distance of Donoopew. In order to spare the lives and limbs of his soldiers, Sir Archibald gave orders not to attempt to carry the truly formidable place by a coup de main. It was, however, found to be much too extensive to admit of its being surrounded even by a chain of posts, by so small a force; and consequently a position was taken up from which their stockades might be cannonaded. While our people were taking up this position, the enemy, wonderfully elated by his recent success, manned his works, and opened a fire from a great many guns. Numerous golden umbrellas glittered in the morning sun, denoting how many great men were assembled within the works, which extended for nearly a mile along the sloping bank of the river, the breadth varying, according to the nature of the ground, from 500 to 800 yards. The stockading was made of solid teak beams, from 15 to 17 feet high, driven firmly into the earth; and behind this wooden wall the old brick ramparts of the place rose to a considerable height, and afforded a firm

362 muskets, 630 spears, and a great number of intrenching tools.—Dispatch of Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, dated March 9th, 1825, in Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c., compiled and edited by Horace Hayman Wilson, Calcutta, 1827.

* None of those released Burmese prisoners expressed any wish to return to their army at Donoopew; but they generally retired to villages in the southward, carrying with them wonderful tales of the moderation and mercy of the English. The blessed quality of mercy must tell in the end even with savages. We know from Mr. Henry Gouger, a person well qualified to give an opinion upon the matter, that the common people were sensibly affected. To the question—"Did the moderation of the British towards their prisoners produce a favourable effect on the minds of the Burmese?" Mr. Gouger answered—"It had no effect upon the government that I am aware of, *but it was a subject of general discourse and theme of admiration among the common people.*"—Depositions taken at Rangoon after the War, before John Crawfurd, Esq., Civil Commissioner in Ava and Pegu, in Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c., compiled and edited by Horace Hayman Wilson, Esq.

* Snodgrass.

and elevated footing to the defendants. Upwards of 150 guns and swivels were mounted on these works, and the garrison was protected from the shells of the besiegers by numerous traverses and excavations. A ditch of considerable breadth and depth surrounded the defences; and the passage of it was rendered the more difficult by spikes, great nails, holes, and other contrivances. Beyond the ditch several rows of strong railing were interposed; and in front of all, a formidable abbatis, 30 yards broad, extended round the works, except on the river face, where the Irawaddi presented a sufficient barrier. Regardless of the enemy's long shots, Sir Archibald Campbell encamped his division, and immediately commenced preparations for breaking ground, and proceeding systematically and safely against the place. The camp being pitched, the heavy fire of the Burmese entirely ceased. But the sudden calm, the disappearance of the defendants from their ramparts, the occasional patrolling of their cavalry, and the long-continued observation of our line by a party of native chiefs posted on a lofty watch-tower, foreboded a very early interruption of this tranquillity. The soldiers regarded the momentary repose as seamen do the treacherous lull which precedes the increasing storm; and as night closed in every sentinel stood upon his post prepared for the sudden appearance of the enemy, and every soldier laid down for his short rest with his musket by his side. The sentries listened anxiously for some sound that might indicate when the sortie was made, and where the attack would begin. The Burmese did not keep them long in suspense. The clock had struck ten, and the moon was fast approaching to the verge of the horizon, when sharp musketry, and the loud and wild war-cry of the enemy, roused the sleeping camp. In an instant every soldier's hand was on his musket, and in a minute every soldier was in his place. Our line was scarcely formed ere the enemy's intention became apparent: his columns were distinctly heard moving towards our right for the purpose of turning it; and at the same time he kept up a distant fire upon our left and centre, to encourage a belief that these were the selected points of attack. They reached and outflanked our extreme right, but our two regiments rapidly changed front, and kneeling, to ensure a better aim, kept up a rapid running fire, which instantly checked the advancing columns, and laid a good many of the Burmese prostrate. Having repeated their attempt two or three times more, and every time more feebly, they drew off and returned in silence to their irritated and disappointed commander Bandoola, who beat some of them soundly because they could not beat the British. The darkness of the night enabled them to carry off their killed and wounded. On our side, only two or three men were killed and about twenty wounded.

No communication had as yet been opened with Willoughby Cotton and his marine column; but, early on the morning of the 26th, a party of 100 European infantry and a few cavalry were sent to march round the enemy's works, in order to reach the flotilla at its station below Donoopew, and there request the naval commander to move up and form a junction with Sir Archibald Campbell. Forcing their way through a thick jungle by the aid of three elephants, the detached party reached the flotilla without receiving or firing a shot. Before the evening of this day, his Majesty's 47th regiment occupied an old pagoda which was about 300 yards from the outward defences of Donoopew, and which seemed the most eligible point for breaking ground—an operation that commenced immediately. In the course of the same day fifteen of the Burmese war-boats, which occasionally turned their prows round the corner of an island in the middle of the river, and fired into our camp, were dislodged and put to rapid flight by a shower of rockets, proceeding from a party of seventy of our men who had crossed over to the island in canoes.

At nine o'clock in the morning of the 27th our flotilla came in full sail up the river. This was no sooner observed by the Burmese than they sortied in great force, with infantry and cavalry, and with seventeen war elephants fully caparisoned and with armed men on their backs. This attack was directed upon Sir Archibald Campbell's right. While it was coming

on, and while our flotilla was coming up under all the fire of the fort, Sir Archibald's cavalry, covered by his horse-artillery, charged the elephants who led the van. The war-elephants stood the charge with extraordinary steadiness; but the men on their backs were mostly shot, and no sooner did they feel themselves unrestrained by the hand of their drivers, than they turned their stunted tails to our dragoons, and walked back to the fort with the greatest composure. The flotilla, having passed the fort with trifling loss, anchored close on the left of Sir Archibald's column.* On the next day (the 28th) our working parties continued making approaches towards the place, and our steam-vessel (a source of amazement and superstitious alarm to the Burmese) and some light boats pushed up the river after the enemy's war-boats, and succeeded in capturing four gilded and five plain ones. The boatmen and all people living upon the Irawaddi were almost an amphibious race: the crews of the war-boats, when about to be run down by our steamer, jumped into the river and effected their escape.

After these operations three days were spent in constructing batteries and landing heavy ordnance. On the evening of the 31st a Burmese came out of the fort to the English camp with a piece of dirty canvas, containing this laconic epistle from Bandoola:—"In war we find each other's force; the two countries are at war for nothing, and we know not each other's minds!" The bearer being questioned, declared that he was only a common soldier, and knew nothing of the matter, but believed his chief wished to make peace. He, however, afterwards confessed that there had been a grand consultation in Bandoola's house, and that it was thought in the garrison that the chief's intention was to sally at the head of his whole force the first favourable opportunity. Early the next morning (the 1st of April) our mortar batteries and rockets began the work of destruction, and continued firing at intervals during the day and part of the succeeding night. The Burmese remained close under the protection of their works, making little, then less, and at last no return at all to our fire. This excited much surprise, but on the next morning the mystery was explained. At daylight on the 2nd of April, just as our breaching batteries began to open, two Lascars, who had been prisoners in the fort, came running out, and informed our people that the great Bandoola had been killed the day before by one of our shells or rockets; that after his death was known no entreaties of the other chiefs could prevail upon the Burmese to remain at their posts, and, in short, that the whole army had fled or dispersed during the dark hours of the night. The accuracy of the information given by the two Lascars was confirmed by the discovery at this moment of the enemy's small rear-guard in full retreat towards the jungle. The British line was in consequence put under arms, and the place was immediately taken possession of. Sufficient proof remained of the hurry and confusion of the flight; not a gun was removed, and even the very large dépôt of grain which had been formed remained uninjured. Within the fort were found a number of wounded men. One poor fellow, who had both his legs shot off, related circumstantially his chief's death. "I belonged," said he, "to the household of the Maha Bandoola, and my business was to beat the great drums that are hanging in the verandah of the Woungee's house. Yesterday morning, between the hours of nine and ten, while the chief's dinner was preparing, he went out to take his usual morning walk round

* Major Snodgrass, Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell's Dispatch to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, dated Donoopew, April 2nd, 1825.

"During the heavy cannonade," adds Major Snodgrass, "which took place between our boats and the stockade, Bandoola, who was superintending the practice of his artillery, gave his garrison a specimen of the discipline he meant to enforce in this last struggle to retrieve his character and reputation. A Burmese officer being killed while pointing a gun by a shot from the flotilla, his comrades, instantly abandoning the dangerous post, could not be brought back to their duty by any remonstrances of their chiefs; when Bandoola, stepping down to the spot, instantly severed the heads of two of the delinquents from their bodies, and ordered them to be stuck up upon the spot, *pour encourager les autres*."

the works, and arrived at his observatory (that tall tower with the red ball upon it), where, as there was no firing, he sat down upon a couch that was kept there for his use. While he was giving orders to some of his chiefs, the English began throwing bombs, and one of them falling close to the Wongee, burst and killed him on the spot. His body was immediately carried away and burned to ashes. His death was soon known to everybody in the stockade, and the soldiers refused to stay and fight under any other commander." *

The grain found in Donoopew was sufficient for the consumption of our entire force for many months. Besides the ordnance mounted on the works, a considerable quantity was found concealed in a tank. Some more of the war-boats were taken, together with a vast number of other boats of an excellent description and well suited for conveying troops up the Irawaddi. That magnificent river was now entirely under our command from its broad mouths on the ocean to the valley of Ava and Amarapoora, where it shallows and contracts, and becomes unnavigable.

The confidence of the Burmese court, which was at the very highest point when the war commenced, had been for some time rapidly declining; but when the death of the great Bandoola and the fight of his army of Invincibles and Invulnerables became known in the city of Ava, almost the last spark of pride and presumption went out. The "white faces" were no longer designated as weak and effeminate soldiers incapable of standing against the warriors of the Lord of the White Elephant. It was confessed openly, and even before the Golden Face, that the Burmese were inferior to our European troops, and could not withstand them; and that to break the lines of the British or to arrest their advance in action was an impossibility.† Even as early as the time of the news of Bandoola's failure before Rangoon and his retreat to Donoopew, the queen-mother and some of the princesses sent for Mrs. Judson, the wife of one of the American missionaries, and exclaimed to her, in an agony of alarm—"The Bandoola's troops have piled up their arms for the use of the strangers. They have all dispersed, and our enemies have nothing to do but to march up to Ava clapping their hands!" They wished to know whether they ought to run away or stay; and whether, in the opinion of the white lady, there would be any chance of safety for them if they staid at Ava; and they entreated Mrs. Judson, whose husband was lying in chains in a horrible Burmese prison—to use her good offices with the English conquerors, and to extend her protection over them and their children.* The royal ladies had been told that the English soldiers ate children. Upon our first failure at Donoopew, the Burmese again somewhat recovered their spirits, and Bandoola was supported by all the strength the country could afford. An Armenian had been put to death for reporting that Bandoola could not maintain his stockades near Rangoon (and this too, although he had been sent down as a spy by the government to make a faithful report), and other individuals were afterwards punished for bringing accounts tending to discourage the troops. But it was not possible to conceal the death of Bandoola and the flight and dispersion of

* Snodgrass.

† Deposition of Henry Gouger, Esq. They likened the British troops in action to a particular class of demons called Balu. They compared the rapidity of their movements to a whirlwind, and were astonished beyond measure at their skill in the use of artillery, shells, rockets, &c. By this time they also admired the forbearance and moderation of British troops after victory. Our mode of attacking them in their stockades at the point of the bayonet, and with a mere handful of men, struck them with consternation. "They stated, that when one of the assailants was killed, another immediately took his place; and that they were not to be discouraged from advancing even by wounds, so that it was in vain to contend with such an enemy. Their imaginations were so wrought upon that, to these particulars, they added many fabulous ones; such as that the Europeans continued to advance after their hands had been chopped off in scrambling over the stockades; that the arms and legs of the wounded were carefully picked up, and replaced by English surgeons, who were represented to be as skilful as the warriors were bold."—Deposition of the Rev. Dr. A. Judson, American Baptist Missionary, taken at Rangoon by the English commissioners, after the close of the war.

* Deposition of Doctor Judson.

escaped the retiring column; and heaps of ashes, with groups of hungry, howling dogs, alone indicated where villages had been."* Meaday was found a blackened ruin, or a heap of ashes. Its old brick wall had been recently cleared and strengthened by breast-works and stockadings: but every thing was burned, and every soul was gone, so that no intelligence could be obtained as to the enemy's movements. "Indeed," adds Major Snodgrass, "to judge by the state of the country, one might have supposed that resistance was at an end; and that its population, retiring in a body to the north, had quietly relinquished the southern provinces to the invaders, leaving behind them a broad and desolate region as a future barrier and frontier." From Meaday our light column commenced its retrogade march upon Prome, following the road which runs close along the left bank of the Irawaddi. Our officers gave assurance of protection and kind treatment to a few villages that were found to be inhabited (the poor people having returned from the jungle as soon as the army of their king was at a distance from them). Other villagers were discovered, with all their cattle and property, living in the jungles, and were easily induced to return to their homes, and to commence a close and friendly connexion with the British soldiery. In Russia, the burning and desolating of the country, to stop the march of the invaders, was the spontaneous act of the people; and the Russian government have even disclaimed the foreknowledge of that mighty conflagration at Moscow, which sealed the doom of Bonaparte and the French army: but here, in the Burmese Empire, the work of devastation and desolation had been ordered by the most absolute king, and had been performed by the king's troops, forcibly and sorely against the will of the inhabitants—the mass of whom, after a short acquaintance with our habits and intentions, would have preferred living quietly under our rule, to their uneasy existence under their own tyrannical government. If the peasantry had been strong enough to oppose the Burmese troops, not a village would have been burned, not a house would have been deserted on the banks of the Irawaddi, above Donoopew. Colonel Godwin and his light column arrived at Prome on the 24th of May, and, almost immediately after their return, the persecuted and dislodged inhabitants of the town poured in from every quarter: some from the woods, bringing their families, their cattle, their waggons, and other property; and some escaped from the military escorts and disjointed corps of the king's fugitive army. These last brought nothing with them but skin and bone and hopeful hearts, for they had been plundered and stripped of every thing by their own armed countrymen. Food and covering were given to the starving and naked; and those who had houses and property were secured in the possession of them. Our British soldiers assisted them in rebuilding their wooden houses, and their bamboo huts; and in a very short time Prome had risen from its ashes, a greater town than it had been before the war. If gross mistakes were committed, through want of that information which ought to have been obtained before our armament was embarked at Calcutta and Madras, and if there had occasionally been instances of slowness and indecision in our operations, apparently incapable of any excuse, Sir Archibald Campbell, his quarter-master-general, adjutant-general, and the other superior officers serving with him, are clearly entitled to high commendation for the excellent arrangements which were made at Prome, and for the admirable discipline which was maintained in our army—arrangements so excellent, and a discipline so perfect, that the natives from other parts of the country came in and sought protection under the British flag. As the people were punctually paid for whatever they brought, plentiful bazaars were soon established, and our soldiers lived in comfort and abundance, and unmolested ease; while the ill-conducted armies of the king of Ava, unpaid, unsupplied, and driven up the country, were left to the alternative of starvation or dispersion. The towns and districts in our rear followed the example of the provincial capital; and the banks of the Irawaddi below Prome were

* Snodgrass.

soon enlivened by the presence of a contented people. An excellent dépôt was soon formed at Prome, with supplies sufficient, not only for the rainy season, but for the long campaign which possibly might follow.* The plains which our soldiers had traversed on their advance up the country without seeing a single bullock, were again covered with numerous herds; from every pathway of the deep and extensive forests which cover far more than half of the country, droves of the finest oxen—the oxen of Pegu—now issued daily. The Miuthagees, or hereditary head-men of the districts and chief towns, tendered their allegiance, and were restored to their municipal functions by the British general. A state of desolation and anarchy once more gave way to order and plenty; and from Rangoon to Prome, from Bassein to Martaban, all classes of natives not only contributed their aid in collecting such supplies as the country afforded, but readily lent their services in facilitating the equipment and movement of military detachments.* The only anxiety which the people seemed to feel was, that the English would leave them, and give them back to their old masters. In the lower parts of the country, where the inhabitants are almost entirely Peguers, who had frequently felt how sharp is the edge of the king of Ava's sword of vengeance, this anxiety was very great; and yet it did not prevent the people of the town of Old Pegu from rising against one of the great Wongees who had retreated to that town with a discomfited detachment. Having defeated the detachment, and taken a Burmese chief of rank prisoner, these people of Old Pegu carried the said chief to Rangoon, and delivered him up to Brigadier Smith.

During the season of rain and repose, (it was no season of rest at Ava!) the king, encouraged by false reports, and by Sir Archibald Campbell's own assurances that he was still desirous of negotiating, took vigorous measures for recruiting his armies, and for providing them with powder and weapons. Men were levied in all the upper parts of the country, where the nature of the war, and the quality of the invader, were not yet understood by the people. Money, which had never been employed before for that purpose, was now freely spent in the enrolling of troops. Far away to the north and to the east, gold, and the Orders of the Golden Face, were sent. The tributary Shan tribes, whose country borders on

* "The town of Prome, on the left bank of the Irawaddi, is a mile and a half in circumference, enclosed in brick walls and stockades, and surrounded by a broad shallow ditch, or rather swamp; the suburbs, however, which lie beyond the stockade, are of much greater extent, and as most of the town was burned down by the enemy, the troops were principally quartered in these suburbs. The site is low, so much so, that the ground upon which most of the houses are built is annually inundated by the overflowing of the river, and for several months, intercourse has to be kept up by boats. The Irawaddi is here about a mile in breadth, but contracts very much at a short distance above the town: along the opposite bank of the river runs a low range of hills, covered with underwood, to the distance of several miles, beyond which rises in the distance the range of mountains separating this part of the empire from the province of Arracan on the sea-coast. South of the town, several small but steep hills, crowned, in most instances, by pagodas, reach almost to the walls. On these hills are numerous groves of tamarind and Palmyra trees, and also a considerable extent of brushwood, but not of the same close dense description as in the low grounds. To the east is a plain many miles in extent, principally composed of a strong cohesive clay, much used for rice cultivation, and constantly irrigated by a stream which flows through it. In the immediate vicinity of the town the soil has a dark, unctuous appearance, and is chiefly laid out in gardens, *whence abundant supplies of vegetables were obtained for the use of the troops.*

"As most of the inhabitants returned to the town shortly after it was taken possession of, provisions of every kind became plentiful. *Good fresh meat was issued to the soldiers on five days in the week, and fresh bread was supplied to the hospitals, and occasionally also to the whole force during their stay.* Most of the corps were at first quartered in a low part of the suburbs, but as there was some danger of being swept away in consequence of the sudden rise of the river during the rainy season, two of them were ultimately removed to the adjacent heights which command the town."—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, Statistical Reports, &c.* This very active and intelligent officer served in the Burmese war with his Majesty's 45th regiment.

* In the month of August Sir Archibald Campbell went down to Rangoon and returned from that place to Prome in the steam-vessel the "Diana," with as much ease and tranquillity as we go from London Bridge to Ramsgate and back again.

China, were induced to put 15,000 men in march for Ava; and by the end of September, the whole disposable force of his majesty was estimated at 60,000 or 70,000 men. By the beginning of October, the head-quarters of the Burmese army were again at Meaday; and the breast-works and stockades, which Col. Godwin and his light column had seen in ruin and in ashes, began to raise their heads again. To oppose to these forces, General Campbell had at Prome something less than 3000 effective men: but he was to be joined by 2000 more men by the time the campaign opened. His instructions from the governor-general, Lord Amherst, bound him to neglect no opportunity of entering upon pacific negotiations; and being told by some of the people of the country that the war was highly unpopular, that the Lotoo, or great council of Ava, was much divided, and that the prince of Sarrawuddy was very anxious for peace upon almost any terms, he wrote a letter to the chiefs in command of the army assembling at Meaday, to represent the ruinous consequences to the king of a continuation of hostilities, and to offer them lenient terms of peace. Some time after this letter had been received, the chiefs sent a complimentary mission to Prome, to speak many good words to the British General, and to state that the king and his ministers were equally desirous that a lasting peace should be concluded between the two great nations. Sir Archibald Campbell lost no time in sending two British officers to Meaday to offer an armistice, and to propose a meeting of commissioners from the two armies. The two officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, deputy adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Smith, of his majesty's ship "Alligator," were received by the Kee Wongee, or prime minister, who accepted the armistice, and agreed to the proposed meeting of commissioners. The Burmese prime minister, however, tried hard to delay the meeting; but our deputies would not do more than consent to a delay of two or three days. It was, however, found necessary to allow a delay of nearly two weeks, the Wongees protesting that they must wait until full powers arrived from their court. The Kee Wongee, or prime minister, agreed to be one of the commissioners, and it was finally settled that the meeting should take place at a spot mid-way between the two armies on the 2nd of October, and that each party should be escorted by 600 men—the rank of the Kee Wongee not permitting him to move with a smaller escort. The Chinese themselves could hardly have been more punctilious than were the Burmese chiefs in arranging the forms, ceremonies, and etiquette to be observed at the conference.

On the appointed day the meeting took place, Sir Archibald Campbell being accompanied by Commodore Sir James Brisbane, commander of his Majesty's naval forces in the Indian seas, who had come up to Prome to take the direction of the operations by water; and the general and the commodore being attended by their respective staffs. The Kee Wongee was accompanied by another chief and minister, named Lamain Woon, and sundry other chiefs, arrayed in splendid state dresses, and wearing the gold chains which denote their rank. After many kind inquiries as to the health of the king and royal family of England, in which every allusion to the governor-general or East India Company was carefully avoided, the Wongees requested that negotiations should be suspended, and all business deferred till the next day, in order that a better acquaintance might be formed between them and the English chiefs before entering upon business. This was assented to, and the first day was spent in an interchange of ceremony and compliments. On the following day Sir Archibald Campbell entered upon business by recapitulating the many unprovoked aggressions which had obliged the Indian government, after many vain endeavours to obtain redress by milder measures, to appeal to arms. After referring to the success which had attended his arms, and to the imposing strength of the British, which had subdued the best half of the Burmese dominions, and which now threatened the capital, Sir Archibald stated the conditions upon which peace would be granted and the country evacuated. The Wongees confessed that many aggressions had been committed on our frontiers; but they pretended that these deeds had not been authorised by the king

or his government; and that three wicked men who had held employment in Arracan, and who had withheld the letters from our Indian government to their king, had been the cause of all the mischief. They declared that it might cost them their heads to show to the king such terms as were offered by Sir Archibald. They said that the best thing to do was to forget the past, and pledge a mutual friendship for the future; that although the dignity and sacred customs of the nation forbade the king of Ava to accede to any dictated terms, if the British troops would only quit the country every thing might be expected from the generosity of his majesty's heart, &c. They concluded by proposing that the armistice should be prolonged for twenty days beyond the 17th of October, the term fixed. Although our officers suspected that nothing was meant but to gain time in order to bring more troops down the valley of the Irawaddi, and erect more stockades, they agreed to this last proposition.* On quitting the Wongees they were assured by those double or treble faced diplomatists that peace was the object nearest the hearts of all of them, and that the Burmese would observe the armistice most scrupulously. Sir Archibald Campbell and Sir James Brisbane had scarcely reached Prome, on their return from these conferences, ere reports poured in from all quarters of the irruption of predatory bands from the Burmese army within our line, and into the districts under our protection. And these bands, continuing their inroads, burned and plundered the country almost to the gates of Prome, and cut off some of the supplies for our army that were coming up the river from Rangoon. But such is the way in which truces are always observed by semi-savages. When Sir Archibald Campbell remonstrated with the Burmese leaders, they denied all knowledge of or connexion with the marauders. With an undisciplined army like theirs, these protestations might very possibly have been true, and the chiefs might have been unable to prevent the infraction of the truce: but it appears that the most satisfactory evidence was procured of the predatory bands acting under their immediate and express commands. The armistice was on the point of expiring, and our irritated troops were eager to begin their march upon Ava, when the Kee Wongee sent the following laconic epistle to Sir Archibald. "If you wish for peace you may go away; but if you ask either money or territory no friendship can exist between us. This is Burmese custom!" This ultimatum was accompanied by a general advance of the Burmese army from Meaday upon Prom All the chiefs had received peremptor orders from Ava to surround and attac the "rebel strangers" on all sides. The Burmese advanced in three great divisions: the centre, about 25,000 strong, being commanded by the Kee Wongee in person, and being accompanied by a considerable fleet of war-boats. The right division was about 20,000, the left about 15,000 strong. And in addition to these three corps there was a reserve of 10,000 men, in a strongly-fortified post at Melloone, on the right bank of the Irawaddi. Sir Archibald Campbell, who had received his reinforcements, after providing a garrison for Prome, had a field force of about 5000 men, of whom 3000 were British. On the evening of the 15th of December, the General sent Colonel Macdowall with two brigades of native Madras infantry, to dislodge the left division of the Burmese, who had advanced to within 16 miles of Prome, and were stockading themselves at Wattygaun. Instead of succeeding in their object, Macdowall got killed, four of the junior officers got wounded, and the sepoys commenced a rapid retreat, leaving nearly all their wounded behind them to the merciless fury of the enemy. The sepoys were pursued through a thick jungle for six or seven miles, and many of them were killed and wounded in their flight. The news of this affair, which was ra-

* "Among ourselves," says Major Snodgrass, "many believed that the war was at an end, while others could not forget that we were dealing with a government proverbially false, and so completely influenced and guided by signs and omens, that an unusual grunt from the white elephant was at all times sufficient to interrupt the most important affairs, and cause the most solemn engagements to be broken off."

with his majesty's

the army at Donoopew, events which not merely alarmed the female part of the royal family, but which also alarmed the king and the princes, and threw the whole court and capital into consternation. Their remnant of pride, or their despair of obtaining mild conditions of peace, precluded all notion of submission or negotiation. Where the great Bandoola had failed, none could hope for success. The chiefs, knowing their double liability, or the double risk to which they were exposed, of being killed by the English in battle, and of having their heads taken off by the king if they failed in their attempts to drive the English back to the sea, were far from being anxious for the honour of the chief command: and the king knew not how to choose or whom to trust. At last he called up an often disgraced chief, styled the Pakan-wun, who had recently been lying in the filthy condemned prison of Ava, with Mr. Henry Gouger, the American missionaries, and the other white men seized up the country, and who, like those unfortunate gentlemen, had been loaded with irons and repeatedly threatened with torture and death. It was, however, no new thing in the Burmese empire to honour the man to-day who had been disgraced as yesterday, or to take a chief from a prison and put him at the head of the state or at the head of the army.* This was Burmese custom. The Pakan-wun, who is described as a clever and ambitious man, and who is supposed to have entertained the design of avenging himself by dethroning his majesty, assuming the government, and then making peace with the English, gladly accepted the chief command, and began to levy troops. But his fidelity was very soon suspected by a tyrant who now suspected every one; and an indiscretion in advising the king to do what never had been done, led to his destruction. The Pakan-wun advised the king to remove all the princes, whether of his own family or of the states tributary to him, from the command of their troops and subjects, so as to place all the forces under the supreme and undivided command of himself. To this the Golden Face, with a cloud upon it, replied that it was not becoming for a subject to command over princes. Next the Pakan-wun advised the king to collect all his forces in one mass, to evacuate Ava, and to send even his own household troops, consisting of about 1000 highly approved warriors, to serve with the army in the field. Becoming still more clouded, the Golden Face said, that if he left his capital another man might seat himself upon his throne; and that if he deprived himself of the protection of his own guards, he might, perchance, be murdered. The Pakan-wun, who must have been blinded by his ambition and thirst for revenge, or who must have had even more than the ordinary amount of stupidity which has been attributed to these Burmese chiefs,* instead of retracing his steps from the perilous position to which he had so rashly advanced, went on to repeat his pernicious advice, and to recommend his majesty to appoint his (the Pakan-wun's) native place as the place of rendezvous for the army, seeing that the spot bore the name of "The Field of Victory," which must be of good augury, and to accompany him thither with all the royal family. Here the Lord of the White Elephant cried—"Would you then murder *all* of us? Pakan-wun, you are aiming at my throne! Traitor, you shall die the death!" and accordingly the obtuse fool was put to death by being trodden

* Among the depositions taken after the war by the English commissioners at Rangoon, not one was more curious or more characteristic than that of Aga Mohammed, a Persian merchant, a native of Ispahan, and consequently a townsman of that pleasant rogue Hajji Baba. This supercilious Persian, who had been for some time residing in Ava, the capital, and who had been subjected to the same atrocious treatment as Mr. Gouger, Mr. Judson, and the rest of our detenus, was not, perhaps, a very impartial judge; and generally the Persians speak contemptuously of all Eastern nations except their own. When Mr. Crawfurd, one of our commissioners, asked Aga Mohammed what was his opinion of the Burmese as a people, he replied, with that toss of the head and elevation of the nostril which we can easily conceive—"They are stupid and uncivilized. Among the courtiers there is not to be found one man of common understanding!"

This curious deposition, as well as Mr. Gouger's and the other depositions we quote, is given at full length in 'Documents illustrative of the Burmese War,' compiled and edited by Horace Hayman Wilson, Esq.

and knelt upon by elephants, who, in the dominions of the Lord of the White Elephant, as well as in various parts of Hindustan, were occasionally employed as executioners.* A new chief was invited to court, and forced to accept the chief command of the forces, and every nerve was strained to recruit the army and to restore its former self-confidence. At the same time, however, it was resolved to endeavour to amuse the English commanders and delay their approach by pretending a readiness to treat with them.

In the meanwhile other successes had been gained by our arms, and Sir Archibald Campbell had resumed his advance upon Prome. Major Sale, who acquired a high reputation during this Burmese war, entered the Irawaddi by another of its mouths, called the Bassein river, and with a small detachment he cleared and destroyed several stockades without meeting with any resistance. On the 3rd of March Sale arrived at the town of Bassein, and found it abandoned and on fire, the governor of the district having retreated to Lamina, a town about six days' journey up the river. Having occupied Bassein, the town was soon restored to a comparatively flourishing state, and the population gradually returned to it. A reconnaissance was made as far as Lamina by 200 men of his majesty's 13th regiment, 100 native infantry, and 70 seamen, who proceeded up the river in boats, bivouacking at night on the banks. Sale with this party got close upon the heels of the retreating governor of Bassein, and was several times very near catching him. During the expedition Sale distinctly heard the firing at Donoopew. He encountered no opposition, although flying parties of Burmese hovered about; and although this branch of the river was in many places very narrow, and ran between lofty banks mostly covered with long grass and jungle, from which an enemy might have offered a resistance difficult to be overcome. All the villages on the banks of the river were deserted, and most of them burned. Lamina, although a large town, was found completely abandoned, the flying governor having driven all the population into the interior. Sale could obtain hardly anything beyond a golden state-boat and two war-canoes, and with this little prize he returned to Bassein, after an absence of fourteen days. He was shortly afterwards recalled to Rangoon, to reinforce Sir Archibald Campbell's main army, which had passed the point at which a diversion in the direction of Bassein was likely to be useful; but Sale left a small garrison in the town of Bassein, and that place continued to be occupied throughout the war.*

On the 4th of April, two days after taking possession of Donoopew, our main army recommenced its march for Prome. By the 12th it was again on the left bank of the Irawaddi at Sarrawah; and on the 14th it reached the spot from which it had retrograded just one month before. Along the line of march bands of fugitives were occasionally seen, but none came near. The soldiers of Bandoola's broken army were *only* anxious to get to their homes and to escape being pressed again into the service; and many of the king's new levies scoured the country as mere robbers, turning the arms that were given them to oppose the invaders of their territories against the unprotected peasantry. Passing over several abandoned camps and stockades, our troops, on the 19th, reached Huddadoon, where the blue mountains of Arracan became for the first time distinctly visible. The landscape was beautiful, but the still smoking ashes of numerous villages cast a shade of sadness over the scene. In the evening a messenger came in from Prome as the bearer of a pacific letter from the chiefs of the Burmese army now collected at that city. The messenger seemed to be a silly old man, and probably he was not

* MS. Notes by Henry Gouger, Esq.

* It was expected that Sale would have been able to penetrate by the Bassein river, which is the westernmost branch of the Irawaddi, to the upper channel of that river, and there join the main force under Sir A. Campbell. After taking possession of the town of Bassein, however, this was found impracticable, and the corps was consequently obliged to return to Rangoon about the 2nd of May, where it remained till the 20th of July. It then embarked in boats for Prome, where it arrived in September. — *Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, Statistical Reports, &c.*

a Burmese, but some half-caste who spoke some European language. He drank much too freely for a diplomatist, and when he rose to take his departure, he whispered in the general's ear, "They are frightened out of their senses! you may do what you please with them!" In reply to the letter which he had brought, Sir Archibald Campbell said that he would be very glad to conclude a proper peace, and that upon the arrival of the British army at Prome every opportunity and facility in opening negotiations would be afforded to the Burmese. And then, instead of gratifying his correspondents by halting and allowing them time to improve their stockades and receive their reinforcements from Ava, Sir Archibald moved on upon Prome, being preceded by the steam-boat and the rest of our flotilla. On the 24th of April, when he reached a point whence the heights of Prome were visible, with our flotilla lying quietly at anchor a short distance below the town, he received another letter from the Burmese authorities at Prome, who demanded that the city should not be occupied by the British troops, observing that they had an army as well as the English, and that the space between them was sufficiently large to afford a place of meeting for settling a treaty. Sir Archibald responded that the military occupation of Prome could not be dispensed with, but that he would be happy to meet deputies at any time and place next day, in order to make arrangements for the protection of the inhabitants and their property. Long before daylight the next morning our column was again in motion and in order of battle, for no reliance was placed in the pacific assurances of the Burmese. At daylight our troops were under the ridge of hills which covers Prome to the southward. Every hill was fortified to the very summit, and a more formidable position has seldom been encountered in the East. The stockades, however, were unoccupied: the enemy having evacuated every post and set fire to the town. Our column, pushing on, found Prome in a blaze, but by great exertions a considerable part of the town was saved from destruction. The cunning intentions of the Burmese chiefs were fully ascertained. The town and position in its front had been fortified with the greatest care; ever since the dispersion of the army at Donoopew all eyes had been turned to Prome as the only point at which the invaders could be stopped; the utmost energy had been employed in organizing such a force as would enable them to prevent the British from establishing themselves in that excellent and commanding position; some new generals had been appointed by the king, and fresh levies and a numerous artillery were already on their way from Ava. These troops and this artillery would have crowned the summits and have filled the stockades of all the hills; and the whole disposable force of the Burmese would have been concentrated at a spot memorable in Burmese history on account of the many sanguinary battles that had formerly been fought upon it between them and the Peguers. The advance of the British force, which disconcerted all their plans, appears to have been wholly unexpected by them. Sir Archibald Campbell was within three days' march of Prome, and not a man of the expected reinforcements had yet reached that place; but the new levies were known to be within a few days' march of Prome, and therefore it was that the Burmese chiefs in that city had pretended a wish to negotiate with the English general. It is said that if only two days' delay had been granted, it would have cost us many lives to carry Prome by assault. But it should really appear to us that Sir Archibald Campbell might easily have been at Prome a full week earlier than he was, if not a full week before the Burmese chiefs sent their messenger to him.* Being foiled at their own weapons, the Burmese deputies

* We can scarcely understand the slow progress made by the army after quitting Donoopew, seeing that the flotilla was now in full co-operation with it, and that an abundance of excellent boats had been secured for the transport of stores, &c. We find that it took the column eight days to get from Donoopew to Sarrawah. On the 16th the column marched only seven miles; on the 18th it marched the same distance; on the 19th it marched only five miles; and it seems never to have marched more than ten or twelve miles in one single day.

had thrown off the mask, and had employed the time left them in burning and destroying everything that could be of use to the English, and had then begun their flight headed by the prince of Sarrawuddy, the king's full brother, burning and laying waste the villages on their route, and driving thousands of helpless people from their houses into the woods.*

On the 25th of April, when Sir Archibald Campbell took possession of Prome without firing a musket, the rainy season was not far off. There was, however, time before it set in to send a small corps lightly equipped, to clear the inland districts of Prome of the armed bands which overran the country, plundering and oppressing the inhabitants, and driving them, with their cattle and effects, to a distance from the British troops. This lightly-equipped corps, under the command of Colonel Godwin, left Prome on the 5th of May.† The first two days' march to the north-eastward was over a rich and fertile country, abounding in rice grounds, from which an abundant harvest had lately been reaped. But the fertility, the industry, the population of the Burmese territories, are almost entirely confined to the great valley of the Irawaddi, to the banks of its various branches, and the delta which lies between its mouths on the sea and Donoopew: as the column advanced farther into the interior, these marks of industry and population rapidly diminished, the country gradually assuming the character of a luxuriant wilderness, overgrown with lofty forest, rank reeds, and brushwood jungles, with a few miserable villages scattered about at great distances from each other. Much care was taken to conciliate these poor remote villagers, who appear to have scarcely known that there was any war in their country until they saw this little column. The armies of the Golden Foot had certainly not been near them; for in almost every instance the inhabitants were found quietly occupying their huts, and gazing in wild amazement at the strange sight of white faces, red coats, field artillery, &c. In many of the villages looms were found at work, weaving the coarse striped stuff worn by the natives; and although they seemed miserably poor and devoid of comforts, these villagers were found to be a cheerful, a frank, and kind-hearted people. They soon became familiar and even friendly with our soldiers, who paid them for whatever they brought. As soon as the tents were pitched after a day's march, they were to be seen in groups bartering and selling their fowls and other articles, or gladly accepting small glasses of brandy from the English officers. The column continued its march to Tagoondine, at the foot of the Galadyet mountains. It had been intended to push the reconnaissance across those mountains as far as Tonghoo, a sequestered city about which much had been said and very little known, except that it had once been the capital of an independent state, and that it was now the jaghire of one of his Burmese majesty's brothers, who bore the title of Prince of Tonghoo. But the monsoon rains were now beginning to fall, and to swell the mountains: the Galadyet chain was most steep and rugged, without roads, and with hideous-looking, though pacific inhabitants; and beyond the mountains the country for some distance was said to be a desert and dreary waste. Colonel Godwin therefore thought it expedient to turn his back upon Tonghoo, and to move, to the north-westward to the town of Meaday, about 60 miles above Prome, and, like Prome and all the other considerable towns, situated on the banks of the Irawaddi. On this march our column occasionally crossed the track by which corps of the Burmese army had retreated from Prome. "It was painful to witness the ruinous effects of their system of warfare. Even Russia, in her memorable resistance to the armies of Napoleon, did not offer to the invading host such a continued scene of desolation. Neither man nor beast

* Snodgrass.

† Horace Hayman Wilson. Documents illustrative of the Burmese War.

We learn from this curious and valuable collection of materials that Colonel Godwin's force consisted of 800 infantry and a troop of the governor-general's body-guard with two field-pieces. Lord Amherst had sent a good part of his body-guard to the Irawaddi early in the war, and throughout these campaigns that brilliant corps attracted universal admiration by its activity and spirit.

pidly conveyed to Ava, raised the confidence of the court. The fortunate left column presently advanced from Wattygaun to a post within a short morning's walk of Prome; and the grand centre of the army, and the right division, began to close round the English positions.* For some days these were allowed to gather; but, on the 1st of December, all the three divisions were attacked simultaneously by Sir Archibald Campbell, Sir Willoughby Cotton, and Commodore Sir James Brisbane, who carried the flotilla up the river, and cannonaded the stockades in flank, while the land troops attacked them in front. Everywhere the Burmese and the Shans were defeated and dislodged, as soon as our troops got a lodgment in the interior of their crowned works. The Wongee who commanded the left division was slain; and a great many of the Shans, who did not understand the signs that were made to them to surrender and take quarter, were killed in a most desperate and most useless struggle within the stockades.† The mass of the retreating army rallied on the heights of Napadee, in front of a deep jungle a few miles higher up the Irawaddi. This new position, in which they were attacked the very next day, — the 2nd of December — was uncommonly strong. The nature of the country admitted of no approach to the main defences upon the hills, except in front, and there only by a narrow pathway. Their stockades at the foot of the hills were more readily assailable, and from these they were speedily driven. To carry the works on the hill was a slower and more costly operation: many of our people fell in ascending the steep and narrow path; but nevertheless the storming column went on under a heavy fire, and finally succeeded in expelling the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and in driving them from hill to hill, until the whole of the position, nearly three miles in extent, was entirely in our possession. Our loss during the two days' fighting, on the part of the regiments of the line, was 25 killed and 100 wounded. During the attack, our flotilla, pushing rapidly past the works, succeeded in capturing all the boats and stores that had been brought down for the use of the Burmese army. That army was now in fact utterly broken up and ruined: many had fallen in battle, more than one third of the survivors deserted, and those who remained were threatened with starvation. In the course of the 4th and 5th of December, a few weak or feebly defended stockades were carried—some by the land-troops and some by the sailors of the flotilla: both banks of the Irawaddi were completely cleared, and nothing was left to check Sir Archibald Campbell's advance upon Melloone.*

On the 9th of December our first division, accompanied by head-quarters, began its march through a melancholy, deserted country, and through jungles and swamps overgrown with reeds and elephant-grass fifteen feet high. The king's 1st regiment, or "Royals," went by water, on board the flotilla; the other regiments of the line in two divisions by land. [Two corps of native infantry or sepoys were left to garrison Prome, in which a field-hospital was established for all the sick and wounded who were un-

* In the left division 8000 men were Shans from the country bordering upon China. These Shans, who had not yet come in contact with our troops, were expected to fight with more spirit than those who had been previously engaged. In addition to their Chobwas and petty princes the Shans were accompanied by three young and handsome women of high rank, who were believed to be endowed with the gift of prophecy and foreknowledge, and to possess the miraculous power of turning aside the death-dealing balls and bullets of the English. These Amazons, in strange warlike costume, rode constantly among the Shan troops, inspiring them with ardent wishes for an early meeting with their foe, as yet known to them only through the deceptive accounts of their Burmese masters.—*Snodgrass.*

† One of the Shan Amazons received a fatal bullet in the breast. The moment her sex was recognised, our soldiers bore her from the scene of carnage to a cottage in the rear, where she soon expired. In the retreat, another of the Shan ladies was seen flying on horseback across a little river with the defeated remnant of her people. Before she could gain the opposite bank of the river, where a friendly forest promised safety and protection, one of our shrapnels exploded over her head, and she fell from her horse into the water. Whether she was killed or only frightened could not be ascertained, as she was immediately borne off by her attendants.

* Snodgrass. H. H. Wilson. Alex. M. Tulloch.

able to keep up with the army.] On the 12th the cholera broke out among the troops; and ere it could be checked, it carried off many men of the native Madras divisions, and rendered two British regiments almost unfit for duty.* The roads continued to be execrably bad, and the advance to be very slow. It was the 19th before the first division reached Meaday, where a scene of misery and death surrounded them. Within and among the stockades the ground was strewed with dead and dying Burmese lying promiscuously together, the victims of wounds, of disease, or of want. Several large gibbets stood about the stockade, each bearing the mouldering remains of three or four crucified Burmese, who had been thus barbarously put to death for having wandered from their posts in search of food, or for having followed the example of their chiefs in flying from the enemy. Beyond Meaday similar horrors presented themselves, and the country seemed to grow more and more dreary and difficult. "We appeared," adds Major Snodgrass, "to traverse a vast wilderness from which mankind had fled; and our little camp of two thousand men seemed but a speck in the desolate waste that surrounded it, calling forth, at times, an irksome feeling which could with difficulty be repressed, at the situation of a handful of men in the heart of an extensive empire, pushing forward to the capital, still three hundred miles distant. . . . . An occasional shot from the flotilla, which had got considerably higher up the river, from time to time broke the silence of the desert, and reminded us that we had still much work before us, and were fast approaching Melloone, where every effort of art and labour had been exhausted to arrest our progress on the imperial city." On the 26th of December, when the division had marched 140 miles from Prome, and was within ten miles of Melloone, a flag of truce was sent to Sir Archibald Campbell from the last-named place, with letters communicating the arrival of a high commissioner sent down from Ava with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace. On the 27th Sir Archibald encamped on the banks of the Irawaddi about four miles below Melloone, and was there joined by the flotilla. On the 28th he sent two officers to the Burmese chiefs for the purpose of arranging an immediate meeting with the new negotiator. Our officers plainly saw that the Burmese chiefs wanted to procrastinate, and that the forces they had collected behind the stockades of Melloone were numerous, and were busily occupied in improving the defences of the place.

* "For two or three days after leaving Prome, the route lay through a thick and gloomy forest, along paths so obstructed by jungle as to be almost impassable; the weather was lowering and unsettled, and, what is rather unusual at so late a period of the year, on the 11th of December the rain began to pour in torrents, and the roads soon became a mass of mud, through which it required the utmost exertions of the troops to force the artillery and commissariat waggons. So shut in was the army on every side by dense forest and jungle that when it halted for the day, a sufficiently clear space could not be obtained even for pitching the tents; those parts which were free from forest being covered with elephant-grass from fifteen to twenty feet high. In this position, surrounded by rank and insalubrious vegetation on every side, cholera broke out in the camp and committed great havoc, particularly in the 89th regiment, which lost about 30 men in less than a week from it. On the army reaching a better position, which, however, it was not enabled to do till the 15th, the violence of the epidemic somewhat abated, but cases continued to occur throughout the whole of that month.

"This visitation of pestilence was not confined to the invading army, the Burmese troops and inhabitants suffered very severely from it, as was evident from the number of dead bodies found along the road; and at Meaday, to which the main body of the Burmese army retreated on their defeat before Prome, the town and its vicinity was literally crowded with the dead and dying. The epidemic attacked both divisions of the army, though at a considerable distance from each other, and the "Royals" on board the flotilla also suffered from it, but still more from a continuance of the severe dysentery and diarrhœa with which they had been afflicted at Prome, and which was now supposed to be aggravated by the crowded state of the boats and the unwholesome character of the food.

"Along the greater part of the route the villages were found deserted, and, as at Rangoon, the enemy had carried off all the cattle, and burned and laid waste the country to prevent the army obtaining supplies; unfortunately, too, our stores of biscuit and rice had been much injured during the heavy rains, so that the troops soon began to experience the same privations as at Rangoon, and with similar consequences. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, they pressed on towards the capital."—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, Statistical Reports, &c.*

On leaving the Burmese chiefs, our officers told them that the British general would not prolong the truce, but recommence offensive operations forthwith. On the 29th Sir Archibald took up a position at Patnagow directly opposite to Melloone, and with the aid of the flotilla scattered some of the king's war-boat people, and destroyed some batteries by the river side.* The flotilla, led by the "Diana" steam-vessel, glided up until it came abreast of the town, and pointed its guns against the stockades of Melloone. Upon this the Burmese commanders gave unequivocal proof of their being anxious to treat; not a shot was fired upon our vessels, nor was a shot fired by them: a chief put off in a war-boat to compliment the commander of the flotilla, and to tell him that the new and high delegate from Ava would gladly open negotiations on the 1st of January. At the appointed day and hour the conferences were commenced on board of a large boat moored in the middle of the Irawaddi between the two armies. After four meetings, and long and most wearisome discussions, the Burmese accepted the conditions which were offered, and a treaty of peace and amity was signed. Fifteen days were allowed for obtaining the ratification of the Golden Foot and the execution of preliminaries, such as the delivery of Mr. Henry Gouger and all other prisoners up the country, and the payment of the first instalment of the money indemnity. During the interval which ensued, the Burmese visited our camp by day in the most friendly manner, and by night they worked at their stockades. On the 17th of January, the day preceding that upon which the ratified treaty was to be presented to Sir Archibald and his coadjutors, three officers of state visited the British camp, and declared that some unfortunate accident, of which they were entirely ignorant, must have delayed the arrival of the king's ratification, and the arrival of the prisoners and money. They vowed, in their way, that they had not heard from Ava since the treaty was sent up for his majesty's signature. They offered to pay on the spot a small instalment, and to give hostages for the payment of the rest of the money and the due execution of the other articles of the treaty, if Sir Archibald would only return to Prome. Having received a decided negative to this proposal and to another, they at last entreated for a delay of five or six days. This also was refused by Sir Archibald, who acquainted them that if they evacuated Melloone within thirty-six hours, and continued retiring with their forces before the British army upon Ava, hostilities would not be recommenced, and our march would be suspended as soon as the ratified treaty should be received—but not until then. The Burmese officers rejected this proposition as peremptorily as our commissioners had rejected theirs. On the next day, the 18th, three British officers proceeded to Melloone to tell the Wongees that they had broken their promises, and had rendered it impossible to trust them, and that after twelve o'clock that night hostilities would recommence. And at the midnight hour the British camp was on the alert; and by ten o'clock the next morning twenty-eight pieces of artillery were in battery, and ready to open upon the enemy's defences. Two hours of heavy firing opened the way for our storming column (formed of the 13th and the 38th British regiments), which was carried across the river in boats under the superintendence of Captain Chads, now senior naval officer, and which was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Frith, Lieutenant-Colonel Sale having been badly wounded in the boats. In a very brief space of time the column entered by escalade, and established itself in the interior of the works. This always finished the affair. From 10,000 to 15,000 armed men were driven away in a confused and helpless mass from the strongest work they had ever erected. Our other brigades, cutting in

* Here, at Patnagow, the Bengal division, while encamped on the base and slope of a hill covered with high grass, was attacked by cholera, particularly the 13th and 38th regiments; but on their removal to a hill adjacent, which was clear of grass and underwood, it immediately ceased. To the cholera, succeeded several cases of remittent fever; but during the latter part of their stay the troops were tolerably healthy.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, Statistical Reports, &c.*

upon the retreat, completed their discomfiture: the Burmese were driven with severe loss from all their stockades, and they left the whole of their artillery and military stores in our possession. Our 13th and 38th had only 5 men killed and 20 wounded. In the house of Prince Memiaboo, cash to the amount of 30,000 or 40,000 rupees was found; all his stud was likewise taken; and, what was considered of still more consequence, as affording undeniable proof of the perfidious conduct of the Burmese during the late negotiations, both the English and Burmese copies of the treaty were also found in the house, just in the same state as when signed and sealed at the meeting of the 3rd, together with other papers, some of which were written by a fanatic Budhist priest, styled the Raj Goroo, a spiritual friend and counsellor of the king of Ava, and one of the over-confident men who had urged his majesty to persevere in the war.

Prince Memiaboo and his beaten army continued to retreat upon Ava with all possible speed. Sir Archibald Campbell prepared to follow them up without delay, but before commencing his march he dispatched a messenger with the unratified treaty to the Kee Wongee, telling that prime minister, with nice irony, that, in the hurry of his departure from Melloone, he had forgotten a document which he might now find more acceptable to his government than they had a few days previously considered it. The Wongee and his colleague politely returned their best thanks for the paper, but observed that the same hurry which had made them forget the treaty had also compelled them to leave behind a large sum of money, which, they were quite sure, the British general only wanted an opportunity of returning! *

On the 25th of January the army resumed its march over a barren country and execrable roads. On the 31st, headquarters were at Zaynan-gheoun. Here Sir Archibald was met by Dr. Price, one of the captive American missionaries (who had been seized at Ava with Mr. Henry Gouger), and by Assistant-Surgeon Sandford of the Royal regiment, who had been taken prisoner some months before. These gentlemen came on their parole of honour to return again to Ava. They were accompanied by four prisoners of war, returned to the English general as a compliment from the Golden Foot. These poor fellows exhibited a sad and most uncouth appearance, for they had been shamefully treated in their prison, and their hair had not been cut nor their beards shaved since the day they were taken. Doctor Price explained that they were dispatched to express the sincere desire of his Burmese majesty for peace, and to bring back a statement of the terms that the English would grant him.

By this time the Golden Face was completely clouded with despair. Every hope and promise had failed; every day fixed upon by his star-gazers as a lucky day had turned out an unlucky day; and all his astrologers and soothsayers had proved themselves to be but cheats and liars. One ingenious experiment, from which the luckiest results had been anticipated, had been tried, and tried in vain. Some of his wise men had discovered that the British standard bore the effigies of a lion rampant. A short time before this war began the Arab Imaum of Muscat, some of whose subjects occasionally visited Rangoon for the purposes of trade, had sent a fine large lioness as an honourable and acceptable present to his majesty of the Golden Foot, in whose dominions the king of beasts was an unknown animal. Gladly did his majesty receive, and much did he pet, this present; the white elephant—the living symbol of his own greatness and dignity—was neglected, and even the most beloved wives and queens seemed to be as nothing in his affections compared with the Imaum of Muscat's lioness.* A cage almost as large as one

* Snodgrass.

* The lioness had, however, one formidable rival. When Mr. Gouger was about to return to Calcutta from his first experimental visit to the court of Ava, the king said to him—"Captain! my brother, the Prince of Sarrawuddy, possesses a large dog, bred in some foreign country, the largest dog that was ever seen in my dominions, a dog much larger than any dog that I possess. Now, it is not proper that a subject should have a bigger dog than the king. Captain! buy for

of the state apartments, and, like those apartments, gilded and decorated, was prepared for the lioness, whose growl was held to be of as solemn an import as the grunt of the white elephant. All the courtiers paid compliments to the lioness as a means of gaining face with the king; and the court poets or songsters wrote songs about the lioness. But now the wise men, who had discovered the effigies of the lion in our national standard, persuaded the king that there must be a mysterious connexion and sympathy between that artificial lion and the real, living beast which the Imaum of Muscat had sent him, and that the surest way to expel and starve out the English invaders would be to starve the lioness to death. One night the English and American prisoners, who had been removed from Ava to a solitary place up the country called the "Field of Victory," were roused from their uneasy slumbers by a loud rumbling noise, which seemed to proceed from the rough road which led from Ava to their wretched prison, and which sounded like distant thunder. The noise came nearer and nearer, and became louder and yet more loud, until it ceased altogether, apparently in the compound, or inclosed space which surrounded the prison. They could not tell from what the noise proceeded, but some of them surmised that the Burmese had brought up some heavy artillery in order to blow them from the mouths of the cannons. When they asked their jailers what it meant, those ruffians replied, with a grin, that when daylight came they would see clearly enough what it meant. At last the daylight did come, and then, the door of the prison being thrown open for a few minutes, they saw an enormous truck, and on the truck the enormous cage, and in the cage the lioness! They had been threatened with many kinds of horrible deaths before—the Burmese possessing in great perfection the art of ingeniously tormenting; but now they felt assured that the lioness—that prime favourite of the king—had been sent thither to kill and devour them one by one. That day and the next, however, passed over without any incident; but their abating apprehensions were revived and magnified when they discovered that nothing was given to the lioness to eat, and that she was becoming ferocious and desperate through want of food. The conclusion was, that this was done to render their fate the more certain when they should be thrown into the cage of the hungered beast. But more days and nights passed, and they were all left as they were in their treble fetters and their noxious dungeon, the lioness all the while growling and moaning, and beating with impotent rage the bars of her prison-house. For fourteen days the noble animal bore the agonies of hunger and thirst, but on the fifteenth day she died. On the twelfth day she was so weak and exhausted that she could not kill or touch a little Pariah dog that was thrown into the cage by a poor woman of the country. And bootless was all this torture, and the pang it had cost the Golden Foot to part with his favourite: for, while the animate lioness was starving, the inanimate lion on the proud standard of Britain kept advancing; and when she died, instead of flying down the Irawaddi, it advanced faster than ever upon the royal city and capital.

me and bring me back a dog bigger than the Prince of Sarrawuddy's, and you shall thereby gain face (favour)." Mr. Gouger bought the largest dog that he could find in all Calcutta, and took it back with him as a present to the king. Amazing was the excitement produced when the Englishman and his dog landed at Ava! Such a dog had never been seen anywhere; the Prince of Sarrawuddy's was nothing to it! Courtiers and nobles of high degree came running down to the river-side to beseech that they might be allowed to conduct the marvellous animal to the Golden Foot, and thereby gain face for themselves. But Mr. Gouger would not part company with the dog, nor lose the merit and favour to be obtained by presenting it himself; and so, accompanied and surrounded by these chiefs, and followed by half the populace of Ava, he led the dog in a leash to the palace, and there introduced him to his new and royal master. The king was in an ecstasy of surprise and delight. Forthwith he ordered a dress of the finest velvet (such as none but Wongees or princes could presume to wear) to be made for the stranger (who was but a big mongrel after all), and appointed one of his courtiers to have charge of the dog and to be answerable for its welfare. But the king's own fondness very soon destroyed the poor animal, for he fed it and crammed it until it grew fat, weazy, and unwieldy, and so died.

The wise men had again proved themselves no better than fools! *

Yet even in his despair the Lord of the White Elephant could not for a long time make up his mind to prostrate himself before the British Lion. Once, when some of his chiefs ventured to represent that submission was unavoidable, and that the terms proposed by the British general were not so very harsh or humiliating, his majesty was seized with a furious and ungovernable rage, and seizing a spear, wounded the messenger who had brought the last bad news, and threatened to kill them all. He was in a calmer mood, and better convinced that his troops could not resist the conquerors, when he liberated Dr. Price and Mr. Sandford, and sent them down to Sir Archibald Campbell. Sir Archibald assured these two gentlemen that he was desirous of peace, and that his terms would vary very little from those which had been offered and accepted by the Wongees at Melloone previous to our victory at that place. He furnished them with a statement of his terms, and promised at their request not to pass Pagahm-mew for twelve days. On the following morning, the 1st of February, 1826, the two delegates quitted the English camp to return to Ava, the American missionary being sanguine in his expectations of returning in a few days with cash and a treaty of peace duly signed by the king. Yet, in truth, his Burmese majesty was still undecided, and in the course of two or three days it became known in the British camp that he was again collecting troops, and displaying a determination to try the fortune of war once more ere he submitted. He was probably encouraged herein by a knowledge of the smallness of the force with which Sir Archibald Campbell was advancing upon his capital, and by intelligence received of the defeat of a weak British detachment before the strong stockade of Zitoung in Pegu, where the commanding officer, Colonel Conroy, and another officer were killed, and several wounded, and where the loss in men was very heavy for so small a force.

* Information communicated by Henry Gouger, Esq.

Sir Archibald Campbell continued his advance. On approaching Pagahm-mew, a town about one hundred miles above Melloone, he obtained positive information that a levy of 40,000 men had been ordered, and that the people had been induced to enrol by means of a high bounty and several honourable privileges and distinctions; that the Golden Foot had bestowed upon this new army the flattering appellation of "Retrievers of the King's Glory;" and that this army had been placed under the command of a savage warrior, styled Nee Woon-Breen, which has been variously translated as "Prince of Darkness," "King of Hell," and "Prince of the Setting Sun." Upon the 8th of February, when within a few days' march from Pagahm-mew, Sir Archibald ascertained that the Retrievers of the King's Glory and the Prince of Darkness were prepared to meet him under the walls of that city. On the 9th the British column moved forward in order of attack, being much reduced by the absence of two brigades, and considerably under 2000 fighting men. The advanced-guard was met in the jungle by strong bodies of skirmishers; and after maintaining a running fight for several miles, the column debouched into the open country, and there discovered the Burmese army, from 16,000 to 20,000 strong, drawn up in an inverted crescent, the wings of which threatened the little body of assailants on both their flanks. But Sir Archibald pushed boldly forward for their centre, threw the whole weight of his column upon that point, broke and shattered it in the twinkling of an eye, and left the unconnected wings severed from each other. The Retrievers of the King's Glory did not fight so well as those who had been accused of forfeiting his majesty's glory: they all fled as fast as their legs could carry them to a second line of redoubts and stockades, close under the walls of Pagahm-mew; but the British column followed them so closely that they had little time for rallying in those works; and as soon as a few English bayonets got within the stockades, all the Burmese went off, screaming like a scared flock of wild-geese. Hundreds jumped into the river to escape their as-

sailants, and perished in the water; and, with the exception of 2000 or 3000 men, the whole army dispersed upon the spot. The unfortunate Prince of Darkness, or King of Hell, or Prince of the Setting Sun, fled to Ava; and he had no sooner reached the court than he was put to a cruel death by order of the king.* One immediate and very gratifying result of this victory was the liberation of the people of the country from the restraint under which they had been kept by the Burmese army, and the compulsory separation from their homes. As soon as the action was over, they began to come in to the British camp for protection, and many hundred boats, crowded with people, passed Pagahm-mew downwards, on their way to their native towns and villages. By this time Colonel Conroy's disaster in Pegu had been remedied and avenged by Colonel Pepper, who, with a stronger detachment, carried the strong stockade of Zitoung, scattered a force of 3000 or 4000, and killed 300 of them within the stockade alone.†

In order to refresh his troops after their late fatigues, Sir Archibald Campbell halted for a few days at Pagahm-mew. On the evening of the 13th of February Mr. Price, the American missionary, and Mr. Sandford, now liberated, arrived in camp. The missionary, who had been selected as mediator, announced that the king and court of Ava had now given in; that the last defeat had deprived them of all hope, and that our terms had been accepted and agreed to. But the missionary neither brought the rest of the prisoners nor the first instalment of the money payment. Mr. Price, however, explained that everything demanded was in readiness to be delivered, but that the king demurred about letting the cash out of his hands, from an idea that after its payment the English would still keep his country, or would act as his Majesty himself assuredly would have done under similar circumstances. His Majesty was, therefore, anxious to know whether Sir Archibald could not be prevailed upon to accept of six lacs of rupees upon the spot, and to receive the other nineteen lacs of the first instalment on the return of the army to Prome. The king begged at the same time, that in any case the English should not approach nearer to his capital. A positive refusal was given to every part of these requests; and on the following morning Mr. Price returned to Ava to acquaint the king that all the prisoners must be liberated, that the twenty-five lacs must be paid down, and that Sir Archibald Campbell was resuming his march upon Ava.

"The country from Pagahm-mew to Ava," says the historian of this very interesting war, "is most beautiful—extensive plains of the finest land, watered by the Irawaddi, interspersed with evergreen woods, only sufficiently large to give beauty and variety to the scenery; and the banks of the river so thickly studded with villages, pagodas, temples, Budhist monasteries, and other handsome buildings, as to give, under one *coup d'œil*, all the charms of a richly varied landscape, with the more sterling beauties of a populous and fertile country."*

The army, continuing to advance, was met at Yandaboo, only forty-five miles from Ava, by Mr. Price and two Burmese ministers of state, accompanied by Mr. Henry Gouger, Mr. Judson, the American missionary and his wife, an adventurous Scotch skipper of the name of Laird, who had gone up the country before the war to make some contract about timber, and all the rest of the prisoners, whether Europeans or sepoys. A sadder spectacle has seldom been presented by living human beings than that which was offered to the English camp by these liberated captives. They were covered with filthy rags; they were worn to skin and bone, and their haggard countenances, sunken, wandering, half-maniacal eyes, told but too plainly the frightful story of their long suffering, their incessant alarms, and their apprehensions of a doom worse than death.

The sight exasperated our troops, and made them more eager than ever to advance upon the capital, and take vengeance upon the tyrant and his savage

* Snodgrass.

† Horace Hayman Wilson. Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c.

* Snodgrass.

court. Among the restored prisoners was a brave old Irish sergeant, who shed tears of rage when he learned that a treaty was to be concluded without going to Ava at all. "Ah!" said he, "if I could but get over those walls with my bayonet in my hand, I would pay off some of our old scores, and then die a happy man!" It was better that our Irishman should not have the opportunity he desired; and, besides humanity, there were other considerations which made it expedient to give at once to the Golden Foot that peace which he now most sincerely and most earnestly prayed for.

Mr. Price and the two Wongees brought the stipulated sum of twenty-five lacs of rupees, and an authority under the sign manual to accept of and sign whatever terms the English might insist upon. On the 24th of February the treaty of peace was for a second time settled and finally signed at Yandaboo, the Burmese government at the same time engaging to furnish boats for the conveyance of a great part of our force back to Rangoon. By this treaty it was agreed that there should be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and his Majesty the King of Ava—that the King of Ava should renounce all claims and abstain from all future interference with the principality of Asam and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar, Jynteea, and Munnipoor—that his Majesty should cede to the Company in perpetuity the conquered provinces of Arracan, including the four great divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandoway—that the Arracan mountains should henceforward form the boundary between the two great nations on that side—that his Majesty should also cede the conquered provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, and Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining, taking the Saluen river as the line of demarcation on that frontier—that his Majesty, as part indemnification for the expenses of the war, should pay the sum of one crore of rupees*—that henceforth accredited British ministers, with a body-guard of fifty men, should be allowed to reside at Ava, and that an accredited Burmese minister should be sent to reside at Calcutta; and that free trade should be allowed to British subjects in all the dominions of his Majesty, who should abolish all exactions upon British ships entering his ports, &c.—and that "the good and faithful ally of the British government, his Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war," should "to the fullest extent, as far as regards his Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above treaty."

The money demanded as part indemnification was far too moderate a sum. The king was rich and given to hoarding, and both gold and silver bullion abounded in Ava. The court could easily have paid three or four times the amount, and in all probability it would have paid it rather than evacuate the capital, and burn it or abandon it to the English. During his whole reign, and more especially during this war, the Golden Foot had given the most convincing proofs of his belief that his life, and the lives of his wives and children, would not be safe anywhere except in the capital; that to remove from Ava would be to leave his throne open to a usurper. A crore of sicca rupees, at par, were barely equivalent to 1,000,000*l.* sterling. The war had cost us from 7,000,000*l.* to 8,000,000*l.* With an easy liberality (for it cost them nothing, and saved the time and trouble of discussion) our commissioners waived all claims for indemnities or recompenses for the cruel sufferings of our unfortunate prisoners, or for the losses they had sustained, not only in property, but in health, by their long and torturing captivity; and although they stipulated in an article that private debts owing by Burmese to British subjects should be liquidated, they consented to consider a part of the property which had been seized by the king, at the time

* Twenty-five lacs, or one-fourth of the sum total, were paid down when the treaty was signed. Upon the further payment of a similar sum at Rangoon, within one hundred days from the date of the treaty, our army was to evacuate the dominions of the King of Ava, leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid, by equal annual instalments, in two years.

when he threw the Englishmen at Ava into prison, as *confiscated* by the laws of the country, and so removed out of the operation of any treaty of peace.*

In other respects the treaty was such as it should be. The cession of Arracan gave us an admirable mountain-frontier, and amply provided for the freedom from Burmese interference with our Indian territories on that side. Our troublesome neighbours are now confined within their ancient boundaries by the lofty Arracan chain, and their court is not ignorant that we can now march a force across those mountains from our post at Aeng, appear on the Irawaddi in eight or ten days, and reach the city of Ava within a month. The possession of the Tenasserim provinces, and of the islands that lie off that coast and off the coast of Arracan, gives increased security to our commercial navigation, opens the road to an inland commerce with the Siamese, Shans, and other distant people, places at our disposal teak-forests of enormous extent and productive of the very best timber. Moreover a variety of valuable raw produce is procurable, or may be raised, from these new territories, to be replaced by the manufactures of India or of Great Britain. Indigo, cotton, salt, spices, lac, dyeing woods, antimony, and tin are among the products of Arracan and the Tenasserim coast. The whole country of Tenasserim is known to be rich in minerals: gold is found in some of the rivers, but, like all river gold, in small quantities: iron-ore of good quality is found in abundance in the vicinity of Tavoy, and at several other places farther south; and extensive coal-measures have been lately discovered in several places on the banks of the Tenasserim river. The coal is generally of good quality, and the best kind is near the banks of the river below the last rapids, so that it can be brought to Mergui on the coast at a moderate expense. The discovery of these coal-measures must have an advantageous effect on the steam-navigation of the Gulf of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca. The provinces of Cachar and Asam, though holding out less promising prospects to commerce, helped to form a well

* Owing to this very bungling diplomacy, Mr. Henry Gouger did not recover one-half of the property he had in the country, losing several thousand pounds sterling, in addition to the loss of nearly two years of the very prime of an active and profitably employed life, and a shock to the constitution, and an amount of suffering which none but a strong constitution could have long survived. [With the exception of this gentleman, and Judson, the American missionary, all the prisoners have been long since in their graves. They nearly all died very shortly after their release, their health and spirits being destroyed by their prolonged agony in the filthy dungeons of the tyrant.] Mr. Gouger might have the more reason to complain, as his knowledge of business and India cash accounts were the means of getting for government a good round sum which would otherwise have been lost. At the crim. con. trial of Francis, when the court were giving damages, Mr. Justice Hyde called out to Sir Elijah Impey, who had named the sum of 50,000 rupees—"*make*, brother Impey!" [See vol. i. pp. 219, 220.] Mr. Gouger gave a similar admonition to our negotiators, who appear not to have known, or to have been careless about, the difference of value between Bengal rupees, Madras rupees, and *Sicca* rupees. In the English copy of the treaty presented to Mr. Judson and Mr. Gouger for translation into the Burman language, the sum of "one Crore of Rupees" was stipulated as the price of peace. The Burmese know, or pretended to know, no other rupee than that of Madras, in which the British troops had been paid throughout the war, and the value of which was then about 6¼ per cent. less than the value of the Sicca rupee. At Mr. Gouger's suggestion the word "Sicca" was introduced into both copies of the treaty, and thus a sum amounting to between 60,000*l.* and 70,000*l.* was added to the fine exacted from the conquered party.

The treaty was signed by Sir A. Campbell, T. C. Robertson, Esq., Civil Commissioner, and H. D. Chads, Captain of the Royal Navy. Sir Archibald was a plain, fighting soldier, who knew nothing of such matters, and gladly left the work to be done by his colleagues, who seem to have known little more than he knew. Captain Chads was the one that laid down the curious law about his Majesty of Ava's right of confiscation, and that threw cold water upon every proposition for obtaining remuneration and a full recovery of property to the prisoners. John Crawfurd, Esq. was not added to the commission until some time afterwards, when our army had returned to Rangoon.

Generally our land and sea commanders are but poor negotiators in matters of detail. Similar omissions and oversights have been committed all over the world; and whether the party be a Pasha of Tripoli, a Turkish Sultan, or a King of Ava, the principle appears to be admitted that he is not to be vexed and troubled by the prosecution of the claims of British merchants. The French certainly manage these matters in a different way, as the history of the Tripoli claims will show—a startling little history or episode, which ought to be made more fully known to the existing British government.

defined and strong frontier, and in the approximation they afford to Thibet and China, our trade may possibly be extended, in process of time, in those directions.

Nor was there wanting the consolation that the condition and prospects of some millions of natives were improved by the results of our Burmese war. "These countries, distracted hitherto by incessant feuds, and overrun by hostile armies or by predatory bands, regions once animated by a happy and numerous population, had been converted into wide and unwholesome thickets, and had ceased not only to be the haunts of man, but had become hostile to human life. Under their new masters, Asam, Cachar, Aracan, and the Tenasserim provinces will experience a tranquillity and security they have not known for ages, and must once more assume that character of plenty and prosperity which the latter wore when the Europeans first visited their coasts, and which tradition, and the remains of roads and towns still found in them, indicate were equally the enjoyment of all. The contracted territory of the Birman kingdom will be productive of little real diminution of its resources, on account of the desolate condition of the provinces which it has consented to relinquish. Its most valuable districts, those along the Irawaddi, and at the mouths of that river, are still untouched, and if the lesson the late war has inculcated should induce the court of Ava to forego schemes of military conquest, and in their room to cultivate the ample means of domestic wealth which the forests, the fields, and the mines of Ava, and an active and intelligent population supply, it will derive from the contest more solid benefits than if it had come out of the struggle with undiminished honour or augmented rule. The advantage to the British Empire of India is dependent upon that which its new acquisitions will realize, and will be proportionate to their increased prosperity."* This was written immediately after the termination of the war, and the progressive improvement which the writer anticipated has been gradually advancing ever since. None but visionaries and makers of theories and systems can hope for a sudden and vast change, or can expect that a wilderness may be turned into a garden and savages converted into civilized men in a single generation. Our troops stationed in the Tenasserim provinces appear to have suffered much less in sickness and mortality than is usual in tropical climates, and their experience confirms the conclusion as to the comparative salubrity of the country.* In some places on the coast of Arracan the case is very different, the climate being in the highest degree inimical to the European constitution, but better stations may be found for our troops, and the pestilential fevers may be gradually checked by clearing the jungles, opening the courses of the rivers, and draining the marshes, which now cover so large a portion of the country. In the Tenasserim provinces, an extensive territory, 420 miles in length and from 50 to 70 miles in breadth, had been for centuries past almost a desert, notwithstanding the amazing fertility of its soil and the variety of its productions. The population at the time it was delivered over to the British government did not exceed 30,000 souls in a space comprising 33,000 square miles; and with the exception of the inhabitants of the towns of Tavoy and Mergui, the people were wandering tribes subsisting chiefly on the produce of the forests, and yielding only a nominal subjection to any government. On the British taking possession, however, many thousands from Rangoon and its vicinity took refuge under our flag, and every succeeding year has brought such accessions to their number, that on the left bank of the Saluen river alone the population in 1841 exceeded 30,000, and the entire population of the provinces had risen to above 112,000,†

* Horace Hayman Wilson, Esq. Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c.

* Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander M. Tulloch, Statistical Reports on the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding among her Majesty's Troops, &c., prepared from the Records of the Army Medical Department, and War-Office Returns. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, 1841.

† Id. id.

The discovery of the tea-plant growing wild in Asam, and the subsequent attempts to cultivate the plant so as to rival the teas of China, seems to open a new field to industry and speculation. Nor must we exclude from this enumeration of immediate and prospective benefits the advantages conferred upon science by the often repudiated Burmese war. "In all these countries," says Mr. H. H. Wilson, "valuable accessions to science are already made, and must gradually accumulate. In geography alone, the dark mist that overhung so extensive and interesting a tract is rapidly clearing away, and the natural features of river and mountain which are here developed on a magnificent scale are becoming visible and distinct. Geographical knowledge may seem indeed an inadequate compensation for the cost and peril of war, but its consequences are of the utmost importance to humanity as well as to science, as a country that has been once rendered accessible to European energy is no longer excluded from the chance of being visited by the blessings of CIVILIZATION."* Time has proved that the severe lesson the court of Ava received was not thrown away upon them: since the year 1826 the Burmese have never attempted to trouble our frontiers or to disturb the peace of any of our neighbours and dependants.

The sufferings of our troops during nearly the whole of the war were excessively great, but they were equalled in magnitude by the fortitude and spirit of the men who survived. The loss by the sword was as nothing compared with the ravages of disease and the mortality caused by excessive fatigue. It was not often that a score of men fell in escalading and carrying even the strongest stockades; but they died by heaps on their marches through the pestilential jungles or in their unhealthy camp-stations. Throughout the campaigns, and all the way from Rangoon, every British soldier had to carry his knapsack, sixty rounds of ammunition, a blanket, and three days' provisions, together with his arms and accoutrements, under the scorching rays of a tropical sun. "Perhaps," adds an officer who served in the war, "there are few instances on record in the history of any nation of a mere handful of men, with constitutions broken down by many months of previous disease and privation, forcing their way in the face of such difficulties, and through a wilderness hitherto untrodden by Europeans, to the distance of five hundred miles from the spot where they originally disembarked, and ultimately dictating a peace within three days' march of the enemy's capital."*

In the month of January, 1825, while the army of Sir Archibald Campbell was cooped up at Rangoon, General Morrison, with his majesty's 44th and 54th regiments, about 200 European artillery, and several regiments of native infantry and pioneers, who had all been assembled at Chittagong, near the north-west frontier of the Burmese empire, began his march from Chittagong, with the view of taking possession of the whole province of Arracan, and then reaching the upper part of the Irawaddi, in the vicinity of the Burmese capital. This line of march upon Ava was very short and direct, compared with the course that Sir Archibald Campbell had taken, as the reader will perceive by looking at the map; and with the exception of a few mountain-passes, which might have been cleared by proper manœuvres, and a liberal employment of shrapnels, the country between Chittagong and Ava was not of a very difficult nature. In fact there was a fine road—the only good road in the Burmese empire—which traversed the mountains of Arracan and ran nearly the whole way to the city of Ava. Although this road was annually frequented by native traders—many of whom were the Company's own subjects—who went and came between the Burmese capital and our frontiers, the existence of the route does not appear to have been known to those who planned the invasion. It was afterwards proved, practically, that an army with baggage, artillery, and

* Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, with an Introductory Sketch of the Events of the War.

* Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander M. Tulloch, Statistical Report on the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding among her Majesty's Troops, &c.

all its matériel, might march from the upper part of the Irawaddi to Aeng, on our frontier, in less than twenty days, the distance being not much more than 200 English miles.* And it appears scarcely doubtful, that if General Morrison had pushed quickly through Arracan, without halting to occupy the unhealthy part of the country, he would have cleared the mountain-passes, and have reached the upper part of the Irawaddi and the denuded capital, while all the force of the empire was engaged or was concentrating in the lowest part of the river near Rangoon. General Morrison encountered none but the most contemptible opposition in his march from Chittagong to the town of Arracan, a distance of about 150 miles: but his means of transport or something else must have been defective, as it was the first of April before he arrived at Arracan, and took possession of that town with a very trifling loss. And here, in one of the most unhealthy places anywhere between the tropics, he halted to complete the occupation of the country where there was hardly anything left to subdue; and here he put his troops in quarters for the season of rain. In the month of May, as the monsoon set in, fever began to appear, and continued augmenting, both in prevalence and severity, till scarcely a man was left fit for duty. Even to the animal creation the climate seemed inimical; scarcely a single indigenous quadruped of any description was met with during the stay of our troops; and the cattle, horses, and elephants which accompanied the force, deteriorated daily after their arrival, and ultimately perished by hundreds. The mortality in the two British regiments, the unlucky 44th and the 54th, was prodigious: together they did not average above 1004 men, and 595, or three-fifths of the whole, perished at Arracan in the course of eight months. When the 44th was removed, and when it reached Madras in the end of December, the whole effective strength of the regiment was scarcely sufficient to form a guard for the colours. It was almost annihilated by disease, as it was afterwards by the sword of the Afghans. Owing to these fatalities, General Morrison's divisions never crossed the mountains which form the western boundary of the valley of the Irawaddi: his entire force was reduced to a state of inefficiency, for the sepoys suffered quite as much as the British soldiers.*

* This was proved by Captain Ross, who, in March, 1826, when our army was returning homeward, marched with the 18th regiment of Madras infantry, 50 pioneers, and all the elephants of the army, from Yandaboo to Aeng (crossing the Arracan mountains by the excellent road) within nineteen days.

After the war was over, and all our enormous, and in part unnecessary, expenses of movement had been incurred, great pains were taken to procure a knowledge of the country and of the best approaches to the capital; and a mass of most valuable and correct information was obtained, as will be perceived by a glance at the Appendix of Topographical and Statistical Notices to Mr. Wilson's 'Documents illustrative of the Burmese War.'

Better late than never. But if some of these pains had been taken antecedently to the commencement of the war, some millions of pounds sterling and some thousands of human lives might possibly have been spared.

* Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, 'Statistical Reports,' &c.

"Among the causes independent of climate which may have contributed to swell the mortality on this occasion, it may be stated that the quantity and description of medicine sent with this army was complained of as being inadequate to the wants of the hospitals, and by no means adapted for the nature of the service."—*Id. Id.*

In some concluding remarks on the Burmese war, Tulloch says—"The result of an investigation by Mr. Edmonds, actuary of one of the London Insurance Companies, into the loss sustained during the Peninsular war, as established by the adjutant-general's returns, to which he had access, has shown that between January, 1811, and May, 1814, a period of forty-one months, during which that war was prosecuted with the utmost rigour, the total deaths were 38,819, or 9900 annually, out of a mean force of 61,511, being nearly 16 per cent. of those employed. Of that mortality about 4 per cent. occurred in battle or of wounds which proved fatal within a few days thereafter, and 12 per cent. was from disease and other causes. Whereas in the first year of the Burmese war, 96 were killed in action or died of their wounds out of an average force of 2716 British soldiers serving under Sir Archibald Campbell, being 3½ per cent., and 1215 died by disease and other causes, being 45 per cent., thus making a total loss of 48½ per cent.; consequently each person employed throughout that year encountered more risk of life than in three Peninsular campaigns. In the second year of the war, the proportion of deaths in action or by disease was only about one-half of what occurred in the first; but even then the risk of life was considerably more than during

To the intrepid exertion of every branch of our forces the government of Bengal paid appropriate acknowledgments in a public order. The public thanks of the Court of Directors were given to the governor-general, Lord Amherst, to the governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro, to Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir James Brisbane, and to the officers and men engaged in the war.* His majesty's government also signified their approbation of the conduct of the governor-general by elevating him in the peerage by the title of Earl Amherst of Arracan, and Viscount Holmesdale; and the thanks of both houses of parliament were voted to the officers and men of the army and navy, whether in his Majesty's or in the Company's service. But now, as at the end of every war, however necessary in its origin, and however successful in its termination, there was no lack of murmurers and critics, who complained that hostilities had been entered upon without any sufficient reason, and that they had been concluded without any solid advantage to our Indian possessions or to the mother-country. Bishop Heber could not perceive that anybody in the Indian government was to blame. "Everybody," he says, "cried out for war in the first instance, as necessary to the honour of the government, and murmured greatly against Lord Amherst at not being more ready than he was to commence it."* For ourselves, we believe the war to have been not only necessary, but unavoidable (the Burmese, in fact, began it, by invading our territories, with fixed plans of conquest); we admire with true English warmth and with national pride the valour, fortitude, and discipline of our troops, and the steady patience and perseverance of those who had the command of them; but we cannot help feeling and regretting that the original plan of the campaign was not well formed; that there was a scarcely pardonable negligence in collecting previous information concerning the country which was to be the seat of the war, and the character and habits of the people, who as yet were untried enemies; that little was done well in the campaigns except the sheer fighting; that many and costly errors—costly in human life as well as in pounds sterling—were committed by our commanding officers; and that the service was repeatedly and visibly impeded by the quarrels, the jealousies, and heart-burnings that prevailed between the officers of the army and the officers of the navy; between the King's officers and the Company's officers. But for these last causes the conveyance of the troops and stores up the Irawaddi would not have been half so difficult as it was rendered.†

a similar period of the most severe service in the Peninsula.

"It seems essential to bring such facts as these prominently to notice, because there is no mode of estimating the severity of military service except by comparison, and it is of importance that the authorities, with whom rests the ultimate reward of the soldier, should have some means of knowing the risk of life and peril of constitution by which his pension has been earned."—*Id.*

* During the whole of the war, the Madras government, under the command of Sir Thomas Munro, had made great exertions and had given very efficient support. Sir Thomas Munro, whose health was declining through his long services in India, had tendered his resignation in 1823; but when he saw that the Burmese war must break out, he resolved to remain at his post so long as he could be useful. During the progress of the war he was incessantly engaged in discussions and inquiries and correspondence connected with its prosecution; and it has been not unreasonably concluded that this incessant toil shortened his valuable life; and that, if he had returned to England when he intended, he might have been still living.—*Auber, Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.*

Sir Thomas Munro died in 1827.

Lord Amherst and the rest of the Supreme Government at Calcutta most cordially thanked Sir Thomas Munro for his active co-operation, declaring that they were mainly indebted for the successful issue of the war to the extraordinary exertions of the Madras government.

* Letter to R. J. Wilmot Horton, in Letters written in India, forming the Appendix to the Indian Journal.

† The difficulty of obtaining information about the country and the people was indeed great, yet not altogether so great as has been represented. During the two years that the court of Ava was actually threatening us with war, the passage up the Irawaddi was open to English traders, and two or three able men, like those employed by Sir Stamford Raffles, might easily have gone up to Ava, and have acquired much knowledge of the country. Valuable information might also have been obtained from several British subjects who had been living at Ava for longer or shorter periods, as well as from the American missionaries, who appear to have had no great love for that half-savage court and no disinclination to serve the English. These persons were all well

Lord Amherst was less censurable for the neglect in obtaining information than the governors-general who preceded him; he had been but a very short time in India when hostilities commenced, and at the moment he arrived at Calcutta the campaigns in the Burmese dominions were unavoidable, unless the less honourable and far more dangerous alternative had been adopted of maintaining a defensive war on our own frontiers, with Bhurtpoor and the Jauts and other masses of turbulent or excited Indians in our rear. All the individuals who had been residing at Ava, whether British or American, positively and strongly deposed to the facts that the king, the chief queen's brother, the Maha Bandoola, and very nearly the whole court, were bent upon making the conquest of Bengal; that the chiefs and all the fighting part of the Burmese people entertained the most extravagant notions of their own prowess, and made quite sure of their armies reaching Calcutta. When Mr. Gouger translated to the Saya Wongee a conciliatory paragraph of a Calcutta newspaper respecting the original dispute about the island of Shapuree, the Wongee said that this was a proof of the timidity of the English; that he was of opinion the Birmans were far superior to the British in military prowess; and that unless every demand made upon the British government were yielded, war would certainly ensue. When asked what, according to his opinion, led to the war, Mr. Gouger replied:—"In my opinion, it may be attributed primarily to a desire on the part of the Birman court to try its strength with the British. The counsels of Bandoola, on his return from the conquest of Asam to the capital, about the month of December, 1822, hastened the event, and I believe it is chiefly owing to Bandoola's advice that the war was so soon determined upon. . . . . The Birmans had no idea of our numbers and strength. When I mentioned the amount of our military force, they would never believe me. They, in fact, thought themselves in war the most courageous and cunning people in the world. They frequently talked of their skill in stratagem;

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acquainted with the language of the country, which appears to have been utterly unknown to every person that accompanied Sir Archibald Campbell's expedition. Mr. Henry Gouger, an excellent observer, had been more than two years in the country when the war broke out, with the exception of two short visits to Calcutta, and had associated with individuals of all ranks. John Laird, the Scotch skipper, had been acquainted with the country for more than four years, and had made several journeys or voyages up and down the Irawaddi; and Mr. Judson, the American missionary, had been living for more than twenty years in the country. These individuals were all examined by our commissioners when the war was over; but no attempt was made to obtain information from them before the war began; and during the progress of the war they were all made *fast* in fetters. At the beginning, the war was not only a war of experiment, but an absolute leap in the dark. It would be hard to estimate what quantity of gunpowder was uselessly consumed by our artillery in firing at the loose earthern mounds which the Burmese threw up in making their covering-holes and entrenchments!

The writer in the 'Quarterly Review,' from whom we have already quoted, decidedly takes part with the officers of the flotilla against the officers of the army, with the king's naval officers against the officers of the Company's cruisers, whom he seems to consider as unworthy of the rank and honours of officers; and he writes with a warmth which betrays the vehemence of the quarrels that raged among men who ought to have worked together with heart and hand. He attributes a great deal of the delay and mischief to the governor-general and council having placed the entire command of the naval part of the expedition under the command of the quarter-master-general, who knew nothing of naval matters, and was probably seasick the whole of the voyage. But, as Mr. Wilson has proved by official documents, the governor-general and council never did *anything of the sort*, but left the management of the naval part of the expedition to naval men, such as Commodore Grant, Captain Marryat, &c. But if the case had actually been as it was reported by this reviewer, and if mischiefs had arisen from placing the flotilla under the orders of the quarter-master-general or Sir Archibald Campbell's staff, it ought also to have been recollected what mischiefs and failures had arisen from a conflict of authorities, and from the old practice of leaving the entire command of the land part of an armament in the hands of one man and the entire command of the co-operating fleet, squadron, or flotilla in the hands of another man. In order to know that the operations of even the Duke of Wellington himself were often impeded at critical moments by his having no power to control the movements of the co-operating squadrons on the coasts of Portugal, Spain, and the south of France, we have only to read his grace's Dispatches. Our whole history abounds with instances of disagreements and quarrels between the commanders of our land troops and the commanders of our fleets, and of the lamentable failures which have resulted from these disagreements.

they ridiculed the idea of soldiers advancing to battle with the noise of drums and music, and exposing their whole bodies. . . . I am distinctly of opinion that the war could not have been avoided on the part of the British government, except by concessions discreditable to its character and injurious to its interests." Among the concessions which would have been demanded was the cession of all that part of Bengal which lies eastward of Moorshedabad. To have yielded this territory would have been to establish the Burmese and their stockades on the very threshold of Calcutta, and to invite a universal insurrection in the rest of our Indian empire. And even this concession, as Mr. Gouger pointedly affirmed, would have satisfied the court of Ava *only for the time*. When asked whether he considered the character of the Burmese government to be faithless, he replied:—"Very faithless indeed—the Birmans pride themselves upon this character." John Laird, the Scotch skipper, who had become agent for the Prince of Sarrawuddy for the sale of his teak timber, and who had even procured a title of honour from the court, declared it to be his opinion that, "from the king to the beggar, they were all hot for a war with the English;" that "they looked upon the English as a parcel of merchants, and considered the governor-general to be of no higher rank or consequence than their own governor of Rangoon." Laird was present at court when Bandoola returned with part of the plunder of Asam, and told the Golden Face that if he desired to have Bengal, he would conquer it for his Majesty, and would only require for the purpose the foreigners settled in his Majesty's dominions—Chinese Cassays, and Mohammedan and Hindu settlers from Western India—and not a single Burmese soldier. Judson, the American missionary, who had met Bandoola on his march towards Arracan at the beginning of 1824, deposed that he was told that the destination of that army was the British frontier; that no secret was made of it, and that all the people felt assured of an easy conquest, considering themselves a superior order of men, whom the British could not withstand in battle. Judson said he had frequently heard the Prince of Sarrawuddy expatiate for half an hour together upon this subject, in language to the following purport:—"The English are the inhabitants of a small and remote island. What business have they to come in ships from so great a distance to dethrone rajahs, and take possession of countries they have no right to? They contrive to conquer and govern the black strangers with caste (the Hindus), who have puny frames and no courage. They have never yet fought with so strong and brave a people as the Birmans, skilled in the use of the sword and spear. If they once fight with us, and we have an opportunity of manifesting our bravery, it will be an example to the black nations, who are now slaves to the English, and encourage them to throw off their yoke." About a month before Sir Archibald Campbell landed his troops at Rangoon, the king's sister told Judson that it was obvious the English were afraid to fight; that their conduct on the frontier was mean and cowardly; that they were always disposed to treat and never to fight; that when the Burmese and British troops came near to each other, the British officers held up their hands to entreat the Burmese not to advance; and that the whole conduct of the British for some time past had indicated unequivocal symptoms of fear. She added—"We shall now certainly fight, and will no longer be dissuaded. The new governor-general acts foolishly; he is afraid of us, and attempts to coax us." Several officers about the court had consulted with Judson on the practicability of conquering Bengal. He had told them that it was as difficult for them to conquer Bengal as for the English to conquer Ava, which expression was viewed by the proud Burmese as affording as strong an affirmative of the impracticability of the scheme as words could convey. Their answer to the missionary was—"You do not believe just now; in a little while you will be convinced!" Judson also deposed that there was a common prediction or prophecy, firmly believed in by the people, that the Burmese were to rule over all the countries possessed by the English. Several witnesses deposed to the fact

that both before the war began and during the progress of the war the Burmese had contemplated forming alliances not only with the Cochin Chinese, but also with native states in Hindustan, and more particularly with the Rajpoots, the Seiks, and Jauts, and Runjeet Sing, who were said never to have been conquered by the English. When asked whether he had ever heard, while at the court of Ava, of any intrigue going on between the Burmese government and any of the native princes of Hindustan, the American missionary answered—"I heard on three or four occasions, that the late Bandoola boasted, that he maintained a secret correspondence with several native princes of Hindustan, who, according to him, would rise against the British, as soon as the Burmese would set them a good example. Reports of such insurrections were frequently propagated and received with avidity by the Burmese court."*

In the autumn of 1824, when the arduous Burmese war was but beginning, an alarming mutiny broke out among some of our Bengal sepoys who were under marching orders for Barrackpoor, whence they were to proceed to the Burmese dominions. Although other Hindus had gone willingly enough, and by sea, these sepoys of the 47th native infantry pretended that they should lose caste if they went by sea, and swore by the holy water of the Ganges that they would never put their feet in a ship. It should appear that these men had, or thought they had, other grievances to complain of; and it is not improbable that the spirit of discontent had been promoted among them by secret agents of the crafty Burmese, or of others of our enemies. In the month of October, when the men were ordered to appear upon parade in marching-order, they appeared without their knapsacks, and openly manifested their contempt of order and their mutinous spirit. Their commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, ordered the men back to their quarters, and hurried to consult General Dalzell. General Dalzell hastened down to Calcutta to consult the commander-in-chief. On his return, General Dalzell ordered a parade for the next day. The men appeared, but were more mutinous than ever, committing acts of violence, and utterly disregarding the voice of their officers and their non-commissioned officers, who all remained steady to their duty. In the ensuing night the mutineers slept upon their arms, appointing guards, picquets, patroles, &c. This brought Sir Edward Paget up from Calcutta. Finding that the two other native regiments at Barrackpoor were suspected of being infected, Sir Edward called up two British regiments of the king's service (the 1st Royals, and the 47th), a battery of light artillery, and part of the governor-general's body-guard. The mutinous native 47th fell in on the parade-ground, but refused to obey orders, and turned a deaf ear to the explanations and the promises of pardon that were offered to them. This left Sir Edward Paget nothing to do but to order a round of grape-shot to be fired at them. Almost at the first discharge the fellows broke and fled in all directions, throwing away their arms and accoutrements. Only a few were killed, but a good many were taken prisoners, brought forthwith to trial by court-martial, and condemned to death. The number of executions was, however, but small, the far greater part of the mutineers having their sentence commuted to imprisonment and hard labour in irons. The regiment was disbanded, and its name erased from the list of the army. The mutiny spread no further.

In the early part of the year 1825, when but little progress had been made in the Burmese war, and when much exaggerated reports were circulating all through India of the difficulties, the checks, and reverses that Sir Archibald Campbell was encountering, the attention of Lord Amherst was demanded by certain proceedings at Bhurtpoor, which did not terminate without causing great excitement and some alarm. On the 26th of February (1825), the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, the ally of the Company, died, leaving his son, Bulwunt Sing, a boy of tender years, to succeed him. Knowing that the succession to the musnud could not fail of being disputed, the deceased

* Depositions taken by John Crawfurd, Esq., at Rangoon, in H. H. Wilson's 'Documents illustrative of the Burmese War.'

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Rajah, our ally, had implored the protection of General Sir David Ochterlony for his young son; and Sir David had acknowledged the boy's right to the musnud, and had pledged his word to support him. The Rajah was scarcely cold when Doorjun Sal, cousin to Bulwunt Sing, having gained over part of the Bhurtpoor troops, murdered the uncle and guardian of the young nabob, and seized the person of the helpless boy. Sir David Ochterlony, who was at Delhi as commander of the forces and political resident, forthwith assembled troops and a battering-train, and put them in motion for Bhurtpoor, issuing at the same time a proclamation to the Jaut population of the Bhurtpoor country, in which he called upon them to rise in defence of their lawful rajah, and told them that the British troops were advancing to rescue Bulwunt Sing. Doorjun Sal now pretended that he had never had any intention of usurping the musnud or injuring his young cousin; that he had only taken him out of the hands of his maternal uncle, and dispatched that relative because he was a bad guardian and a minister odious to the Jaut people. It is not likely that these representations should have had much weight with the governor-general; but it is not unlikely that his lordship, seeing the unexpected duration and the great difficulty of the Burmese war, was desirous of finishing that conflict before entering upon another. Lord Amherst and the Supreme Council disapproved of all that Sir David Ochterlony had done, and sent him peremptory orders to recall the troops that were marching upon Bhurtpoor. Sir David, who was very severely rated in various dispatches and orders of the supreme government for having gone so far in defence of the legitimate rights of the minor Bulwunt Sing, was also commanded to recall his proclamation to the Jauts, and to tell them that an inquiry would be instituted by the British government into the transactions which had taken place in Bhurtpoor. Before these imperative instructions reached Delhi, Ochterlony had received a mission from Doorjun Sal, and had told the vakeels that their master must come to the British camp with the infant rajah in his hand, and there deliver the boy up to the care of the British resident, and pledge himself to be faithful and obedient. A very curious and in part perplexing correspondence took place between the supreme government and Sir David, between Sir David and Doorjun Sal, and between that chief and the supreme government. It was clearly manifested that Lord Amherst and the council wished to avoid any final arrangement of the Bhurtpoor question, and preferred putting up with temporary inconvenience and even temporary disgrace to the rushing into a new campaign at an unpropitious season of the year, and at a time when so large a portion of the attention and resources of government were demanded by the war on the Irawaddi. The veteran Ochterlony was too brave a soldier to be startled by the strength of Bhurtpoor or by any other obstacle, and much too high-minded a man to undo what he had conscientiously done, or willingly to abandon the boy after promising his dying father that he would protect him. Sir David tendered his resignation as resident at Delhi, declaring that he should be guilty of falsehood if he acknowledged any conviction of having acted incorrectly or with impropriety. He added—and we cannot but re-echo the feeling—that every moment's delay in settling the question was submission to disgrace. In a later communication the veteran said—"I have ever considered that the hour of necessity or the call of honour fixed the time of military operations. It was on this principle that, in my youth, we kept the field for three years against Hyder, knowing no repose but in the rains, when the country was equally impassable to the enemy and to us. It was on this principle that Lord Lake took the field in the height of the rains of 1803, and remained during all the hot winds of 1804 under canvas in the hottest country in Hindustan. According to the new doctrine, the resentment of an insult and the punishment of crime are to be suspended from March to November. In many cases vengeance, though delayed, would not be less severe or less exemplary; but there are others, and particularly those where the eyes and

minds of men have been strongly and earnestly directed, where the general effort is lessened or lost by the least delay, quite independent of the consideration of affording time to strengthen that which was weak, and thereby adding to the difficulties and obstacles always opposed to attacks, and particularly to siege operations."* Sir David further represented that Calcutta was not exactly the place to form the best judgment about these matters, or about the injury our reputation would sustain in the eyes of the natives of India by equivocation and delay. "And," said he, "it might have been conjectured that, with *fifty years' experience*, I was not a very inadequate judge of the general impression delay would cause, and how far it was wise, politic, or imperative to remove certain prevalent opinions. As a soldier, too, I might have received credit for so much common sense and discretion as would enable me to appreciate whether my means were equal to the end (the siege of Bhurtpoor), provided my hopes were disappointed as a politician in producing such apprehensions as of themselves would prevent an appeal to arms, with an equal degree of éclat and honour almost as would have resulted from the capture of the place."† Lord Amherst accepted the tendered resignation. Sir David Ochterlony retired to Merut, with a mortified and wounded spirit, and there he died very soon after. The conqueror of the Gorkhas, the man who remedied the blunders of others in the Nepaul war, the veteran who had served the Company for half a century, was honoured by the high functionaries at Calcutta with minute guns and a complimentary general order, loud sounding, but in part, at least, ridiculous; yet we cannot help thinking that the veteran was rather unhandsomely treated, and that the causes of his retirement were improperly and unfairly stated by the supreme government to the Court of Directors.‡

Yet, after all, the Calcutta government were compelled to resort to the measures which Ochterlony had recommended, and to undertake the siege of Bhurtpoor before the war on the Irawaddi could be terminated. Doorjun Sal quarrelled with his own brother, who had hitherto acted in concert with him. This brother, after an unsuccessful attempt to make himself master of Bhurtpoor, raised an independent standard in the fortress of Deeg, subjected or plundered all the neighbouring country, and invited adventurers of all kinds to join in and share his fortunes. Doorjun Sal's troops were defeated in a battle near Deeg; the Company's frontiers were thrown into a ferment. Many of the Company's subjects took up arms, some to join one, and some the other of the two contending brothers; anarchy was threatening to return to the regions from which she had been expelled by the Marquess of Hastings's successful wars against the Mahrattas and the Pindarrees. And all the while the usurper was strengthening the always formidable fortress of Bhurtpoor, and the native princes most inimical to the English were inculcating the belief that that place could never be taken, and that the Jauts were destined to be the rallying-point of India.*

* Letter from Sir David Ochterlony to Secretary to Supreme Government, 11th of May, 1825, as quoted by Edward Thornton, Esq., History of the British Empire in India.

† Id. id.

‡ In the General Order issued at Calcutta, orders of knighthood are described as being "the dearest object of a soldier's ambition." We would not underrate the value of such distinctions; but God forbid that the British officer should ever consider them in this light!

The governor-general in council said of Sir David, "that his advanced age and continually increasing infirmities rendered his retirement from the active and laborious employment which he had so long filled with the highest distinction, a measure no less desirable on the public account than necessary for his own personal relief and recovery;" and that upon these grounds they had accepted his resignation. But it does not appear that Sir David ever pleaded old age or infirmity, or ever thought of resigning until called upon to do what his conscience and sense of honour and sense of the public interest condemned. He was in his 68th year; but it does not appear that, previously to his disagreement with the supreme government, he was considered by any one as an infirm old man incapable of doing business.

* Bhurtpoor was the only fortress and the Jauts the only people in India that boasted they had never been subdued either by the Mogul emperor or the English.

"The Jauts," adds Bishop Heber, "are the finest people in bodily advantages and apparent martial spirit whom I have seen in India, and

Three members of the Supreme Council, Mr. Fendall, Mr. Harrington, and Sir Edward Paget, earnestly recommended an active and an immediate interference; but Lord Amherst still recommended delay. At last, however, the governor-general yielded to the arguments contained in an admirable state-paper drawn up by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who was removed from the court of the Nizam to succeed Sir David Ochterlony as resident at Delhi. And, on the 18th of September, just two months and three days after the death of Sir David (which death we firmly believe to have been hastened by the opposite determination), the governor-general determined to support the minor Bulwunt Sing, and to send a British army to reduce Bhurtpoor, and put an end to disturbances which threatened to produce a general commotion and to revolutionize the whole of Upper India. It was not, however, until the 10th of December, 1825, that the new commander-in-chief, General Lord Combermere, who had gained such high distinction under the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War as Sir Stapleton Cotton,* sat down before Bhurtpoor with an army of upwards of 20,000 men and a field of more than a hundred pieces of artillery. The Jauts had cut the embankment of a lake, hoping to fill the broad and deep ditch, as they had done in 1805, at the time of Lord Lake's siege; but our troops arrived before much water had flowed into the ditch, and instantly made themselves masters of the embankment and repaired the breach. When his battering-train was nearly ready and his bombs in their places, Lord Combermere, anxious to save the women and children, sent a letter to Doorjun Sal, requesting him to send them all out of the fort and promising them a safe-conduct through the British camp. His lordship allowed the garrison four-and-twenty hours for this purpose. Having received an evasive answer from the usurper, his lordship again sent to him, allowing him a further extension of the time for twelve hours. The humane offer was not accepted, and therefore, on the next day, the 23rd of December, the besiegers, under a heavy fire of the garrison, completed their first parallel; and on the morning of the 24th two heavy batteries opened upon the town. Other batteries opened in quick succession, and during the rest of the month of December a vast quantity of powder and ball were thrown away. Scarcely a roof in the town was left uninjured, but neither cannon-shot nor shells could make any impression on a tough mud wall from 50 to 60 feet thick. On the evening of the 6th of January, our engineers began to do what they ought to have done a fortnight earlier—they commenced a mine in the scarp of the ditch on the northern face of the work. This mine was sprung before it was sufficiently advanced to have any material effect upon the wall. In making a second attempt our miners were countermined by the garrison. The gallery of this mine was subsequently blown up, it being discovered that the enemy were keeping watch in it. It is very evident that our Indian armies were not yet sufficiently provided with sappers and miners and with other bodies of men properly trained to siege-work; and without these men the science and skill of our engineer and artillery officers could not have fair play, any more than they had had in the sieges undertaken during the Mahratta and Pindarree war. A shot fired by the enemy set fire to one of our tumbrils, and 20,000 lbs. weight of gunpowder blew up. On the 14th, another mine, under one of the bastions of Bhurtpoor, was exploded too precipitately, and

their country one of the most fertile and best cultivated. Having once beaten off Lord Lake from their city, they have ever since not only regarded themselves as invincible, but have been so esteemed by the greater part of the Mahrattas, Rajpoots, &c., who have always held up their example as the rallying-point and main encouragement to resistance, insomuch that even when I was passing through Malwah, 'gallantee-shows,' like those carried about by the Savoyards, were exhibited at the fairs and in the towns of that wild district, which displayed, among other patriotic and popular scenes, the red-coats driven back in dismay from the ramparts, and the victorious Jauts pursuing them sabre in hand."—*Letter to R. J. Wilmot Horton, Esq.*

Situated as we were in India, it was worth a war to put down that gallantee-show.

* Lord Combermere had quite recently succeeded Sir Edward Paget as commander-in-chief in India. He was brother to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who was at this time engaged in the Burmese war.

thus did little more than make a great smoke and a loud noise. Two more mines were immediately driven into the same work, and these being sprung on the 16th, so far succeeded that, with the aid of another day's battering, the breach was reported to be practicable. On the 17th a mighty mine was dug and crammed with powder under another angle of the works; and the following day was fixed for the storm. Early in the morning of the 18th our storming-parties established themselves in the advanced trenches. The left breach, or that which was already practicable, was to be mounted by the brigade of General Nicolls, headed by his Majesty's 59th regiment; the breach on the right was to be mounted by General Reynell's brigade, headed by his Majesty's 14th regiment: the explosion of the mine under the north-east bastion was to be the signal for the attack. With the single exception, we believe, of the tremendous explosion made under the superintendence of General Pasley for clearing the obstructions to the line of the Dover railway and opening the road to the Shakspere Cliff, no mine can bear comparison with this mine under the north-east angle of Bhurtpoor. It is lamentable to add that the construction of this Bhurtpoor mine was far from being so perfect as the explosion it made was terrible and sublime. At eight o'clock in the morning the match was applied to the train, and with terrific effect: the whole of the salient angle and part of the stone cavalier behind it were lifted into the air, which for some minutes was as dark and black as the darkest night; all the garrison there were blown to the winds or buried under the ruins. The breach was made, and more than breach enough, but, owing to the defective construction of the mine, many of the ejected stones and masses of earth fell upon the head of our column of attack, killing a number of men and severely wounding three officers. The stones fell so thickly about Lord Combermere himself, that Brigadier-General MacCombe was knocked down by his side, and two sepoys were killed on the spot within a few feet of his lordship. The troops, however, rushed on to the assault with admirable spirit and in good order, ascended the breaches, and cleared them in the teeth of a very determined opposition. On the left, where the ascent was steep and difficult, our grenadiers moved up slowly and resolutely, without stopping to draw a trigger in return for the volleys of round shot, grape, and musketry which were fired upon them. Within two hours all the ramparts and the command of the gates of the citadel were in the possession of the besiegers, and early in the afternoon the citadel surrendered. Brigadier-General Sleigh, who commanded the cavalry, had taken excellent measures outside to prevent the escape of Doorjun Sal; and when that chief with 160 chosen horse attempted to force a passage, he was made prisoner by the 8th regiment of light horse. One of his wives and two of his sons were taken with him. They were all sent prisoners to Allahabad, to be supported by the Company. Our entire loss during the siege and storming amounted to 61 Europeans and 42 natives killed, and 288 Europeans and 183 natives wounded. The loss of the garrison was estimated at 4000 men, mostly killed, and for the most part killed by the awful explosion of the last mine. That explosion alone had demolished a capital part of the works of this far-famed fortress, which had been doubly considered as impregnable by the natives since the long and ruinous siege of 1805. After the ammunition, arms, stores, &c. had been removed to places of safety, the principal bastions, curtains, and other important parts of the fortification were blown into the air. "The Bastion of Victory," built, as the Jauts had boasted, with the bones and blood of the British soldiers who fell in the assaults under Lord Lake, was now laid low, and among its destroyers were some of those very soldiers who, twenty years before, "had been permitted to fly from its eternal walls." It was left to the monsoon rains to complete the ruin of Bhurtpoor. Deeg, Biana, Kama, and all the other fortresses within the Bhurtpoor Rajah's dominions surrendered immediately, and were occupied by British garrisons; the inhabitants returned quietly to their homes, and the young Rajah was reinstated under the protection of the British

government. Lord Combermere broke up his camp on the 20th of February, and returned to Calcutta. Thanks were voted by parliament and by the Company; and the prize-money, granted to the Company by the king, was ordered by the Court of Directors to be distributed among the army.

The attention of all India was fixed on the siege of Bhurtpoor, on the issue of which, far more than on anything which might happen in the Burmese empire, the renown of the British arms and the permanency of the British empire in Asia were felt to depend. Our officers rejoiced at the opportunity offered for effacing the very injurious impression which had been made by Lord Lake's failure; yet they admitted that should our army fail again, few events would go so near to fulfil the shout of a mob which had been heard in the streets of Delhi a few months before: —"The rule of the Company is at an end!" All the surrounding principalities were in a ferment, and most of them would have been up in arms if Lord Combermere had not succeeded or had not been rapid in his achievement. "Should he fail," wrote Bishop Heber, "it is unhappily but too true, that all northern and western India, every man who owns a sword, and can buy or steal a horse, from the Sutledge to the Nerbudda, will be up against us, less from disliking us than in the hope of booty. And, still more unfortunately, it is not easy to say where another army can be found to meet them, now that Bombay is fully occupied on the side of Sinde;* and the strength of British India is in Ava."† But Lord Combermere's rapid triumph completely destroyed the prestige of the Jauts, overawed all the native chiefs, checked the disposition to revolt, and completely confirmed the supremacy of Britain over the whole of India. The fall of Bhurtpoor moreover carried dismay or discouragement to the court of Ava, and to many countries beyond the limits of India.

In the course of the following year Lord Amherst proceeded to the upper provinces. During his stay at Delhi, a final settlement took place of the relations in which the British government in India and the poor descendant of the Great Moguls stood towards each other. An end was now put to that prejudicial fiction —highly prejudicial to the English, and of no benefit to the King of Delhi or to any other party—that our governor-general was but the vassal of the Mogul Shah. Our sovereignty was now openly asserted, and an end was thus put to many causes of embarrassment and of false or anomalous positions. There was no lustre to be gained from borrowing the name or authority of so discredited a prince, and one so weak in intellect as the Shah, who gladly resigned a shadowy suzerainty for the sake of a little more hard cash. It is said that some of the Mogul family mourned over the loss of their nominal greatness, but the people evidently cared not one straw about the change, which was at most a change in phraseologies. The Duke of Wellington had said of the people of India long before this—"They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, if indifference constitute that character."

Having returned to Calcutta, Lord Amherst resigned the provisional governments into the hands of W. B. Bayley, Esq., and embarked for England at the close of the month of March, 1827. His lordship, as well as the directors at home, had been sufficiently anxious for peace, yet nearly the whole of his administration had been occupied by wars. This was unavoidable, but the Burmese war might have been better managed. During a good part of this administration the army of India was kept up to the stupendous amount of an effective force of 274,000 men!

* The Ameers of Sinde were again becoming very troublesome. During the Burmese war, and just before the siege of Bhurtpoor, they invaded Cutch, throwing everything into confusion there, and menacing the territories of the Guicowar and the Bombay presidency. Bishop Heber thought that these incursions were mainly produced by the drought, famine, and universal distress then prevailing in the always turbulent country of Sinde; but it appears to be proved pretty satisfactorily that some of the Ameers were excited by the usurper of Bhurtpoor and by the court of Ava as well. See the depositions of Missionary Judson, and Agha Mohamed, the merchant of Ispahan, in 'Documents Illustrative of the Burmese War,' by H. H. Wilson, Esq.

† Letter to Richard Heber, Esq.

CHAPTER XVI.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

THE melancholy death of Lord Castlereagh, by bringing Mr. Canning into power at home, had led to his resignation of the office of Governor-general of India just as he was on the point of sailing for the East. The somewhat unfortunate ex-governor of Madras, Lord William Bentinck, then took the unusual step of offering himself as a candidate for the governor-generalship, which an unforeseen catastrophe had induced Mr. Canning to give up; but his lordship was still rather unpopular in Leadenhall-street, and he was not as yet backed in Downing-street; and Lord Amherst was sent out. Between that appointment in 1822 and the resignation of Lord Amherst in 1827, great political changes had taken place at home, and Mr. Canning, by a partial coalition with the Whigs, had reached the uneasy seat of premier. To Mr. Canning the support of the great Whig families was now altogether indispensable, and therefore it was that he supported Lord William Bentinck, who once more offered himself as a candidate for the governor-generalship. Five years could have changed nothing either in the character or capacity of a man of Lord William's age, or in the conduct and character of his Madras administration, which had been so severely censured by the Company; yet, nevertheless, the Court of Directors now readily gratified the long and ardent wish of his lordship's heart, and, yielding to Mr. Canning's very short prevalency, they nominated Lord William Bentinck in the month of July, 1827. His lordship was scarcely sworn in ere Mr. Canning's numerous vexations in parliament and his rapidly declining health seemed to threaten a dissolution of the ministry, or the mortal dissolution of that eloquent and accomplished statesman—or, as happened, both these events. Mr. Canning died on the 8th of August; the mixed Goderich ministry which followed was broken up in less than six months; and in January, 1828, four days before the re-assembling of parliament, the Duke of Wellington's ministry was formed. Lord William Bentinck had not yet sailed for the East. It was expected by many that his appointment would now be annulled in order to make room for a nobleman of the Tory party, or, as Lord Minto expressed it, for a person in the entire confidence of government. But the Duke of Wellington did not advise the sovereign to exercise his revoking power; and in February, 1828, a few days after the accession of the new ministry, Lord William Bentinck, who had been kept so long in a state of doubt and suspense, took his departure for Bengal. His lordship landed at Calcutta on the 4th of July, when Mr. Bayley's provisional authority ceased.

The Burmese and Bhurtpoor wars had added more than 13,000,000*l.* sterling to the registered debt of India. Upon his lordship was therefore imposed the generally unpopular duty of carrying into effect measures of economy, retrenchment, and reduction. His instructions to this end were earnest and imperative. The reductions which Lord Amherst had commenced in the army were now continued with great alacrity; and a system of economy was introduced into various departments of the government, not much to the satisfaction of those who had profited by the former state of things. Murmurs were heard from all sides—a dislike, which seemed to be almost universal, was expressed; but his lordship pleaded his imperative instructions and orders from home, and consoled himself with the

conviction that he was doing his duty. "And this conviction," said he, "as I know from dreadfully dear-bought experience, is the only consolation that defies all contingencies." Several governors-general had been instructed by the Court of Directors to abolish sundry allowances made to the army under the name of batta, half-batta, &c.; but for fourteen years and more they had all shrunk from the odium and perhaps the danger attendant on this abolition. But Lord William resolved to obey his orders, and most of these allowances were abolished almost as soon as his lordship reached Bengal, much more to the dissatisfaction of the army than to the real benefit of the Company. The rupees saved were not worth the good spirit which was sacrificed, and which some men think has not yet been perfectly recovered. The conduct of his lordship was disapproved by two of the members of the Supreme Council, by Sir Charles T. Metcalfe and W. B. Bayley, Esq., both men of ability and of great experience in India, and both of opinion that the Company and the British empire in India were not to be served or saved by means of petty savings. To Lord Combermere, the commander-in-chief, this and other changes were so disiasteful, that his lordship resigned and came home. The chief command of our Anglo-Indian forces afterwards devolved upon Major-General Sir Edward Barnes, who had proved himself to be an admirable soldier in Spain, in the south of France, and on the field of Waterloo, and an enlightened and excellent governor in the island of Ceylon; but in 1833, when Sir Edward resigned, and when the Whig government of Earl Grey seemed to be firmly established, Lord William Bentinck, who had been but an unlucky general on the eastern coast of Spain, added the functions of commander-in-chief to those of governor-general. His authority could not reach to the king's troops, but his lordship abolished flogging in the native part of the army, by a general order. This, however, he did not do until the very eve of his departure for Europe. Doubts are entertained even by those who are no advocates for corporal punishment, and who reprobate the excess to which those punishments were once carried, whether the entire mass of the Indian army, European as well as native, has not been seriously injured by this regulation. The sepoy cares very little for confinement or the other punishments which have been substituted for the lash; and the British soldier feels himself doubly degraded by the lash, when he sees that while he is exposed to it the black soldier is not to be touched by it. The frequent acts of indiscipline which have broken out of late years among the sepoys—not without creating a painful alarm in England as well as in India—have been in good part attributed to this reform of Lord William Bentinck—a reform which other men (entirely, we believe, of his lordship's own political party) have held up to the admiration of the world not only as one of the most humane, but also as one of the wisest of measures.

The extremes of liberalism and the extremes of despotism often meet—the reformer that is eager and impatient in his vocation frequently adopts proceedings which look wonderfully like those of a jealous and absolute tyrant. In the civil service, every superior officer, court, or board was directed to report periodically on the character and conduct of every covenanted servant employed in a subordinate capacity. The late king of Naples, Francis I., a prince with whom, at one period of his life (in Sicily), Lord William was well acquainted, issued a similar mandate, his principal anxiety being to know from the heads of departments whether all their clerks went regularly to mass and confession. Lord William Bentinck's anxiety was to improve the morals of the civil service, and provide for the advancement of merit! But such a system was foreign to English habits, was odious to English natures—and long may it be so!—it could not be carried into execution, it fell to the ground, it was soon abolished altogether.

Happily for his fame there were other, nobler, and more enduring changes effected under this administration. From the time of Warren Hastings every governor-general, in common with every man possessing an English heart in India, had

deplored the revolting practices, the obscenity, and the cruelty appertaining to the corrupted and corrupting religion of the Hindus; and if our men in authority had somewhat overrated the difficulty of abolishing these practices, and had approached them with a timid hand, through the persuasion that any bolder attempt would lead to insurrection, universal rebellion, and carnage, in the course of half a century various experiments had been tried, and a good deal had been done, by slow degrees, towards a universal reformation. Lord Teignmouth, who was deeply impressed with religious feelings, had done much; and the Marquess Wellesley, who came after him—and *because* he did come after him—was enabled to do a good deal more. We repeat our own intimate conviction that if very much had been attempted at once, the experiment would have failed. Lord William Bentinck could do more than the Marquess Wellesley had done, *because* he came a quarter of a century after that illustrious man. The marquess had put down the horrible annual sacrifices of human life which had been celebrated for many ages on the Sagor Island; and he had laid down the principle that all such superstitious enormities were to be gradually and cautiously, yet resolutely checked.* The Suttee (*Sati*, from the Sanscrit *Sat*, good), or the act of self-immolation by Hindu widows, is described by Greek writers of the age of Alexander the Great, and it was in all probability an ancient custom in their time. Diodorus relates an instance of a Suttee which occurred in the army of Eumenes upwards of three hundred years before the Christian era; and he ascribes the zeal for this kind of self-sacrifice, in most instances, to the infamy which attached to those widows who refused to conform to the custom, or to burn themselves with the bodies of their deceased husbands. This is also the view taken of the custom by our missionaries; but Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone has observed, in the first volume of his admirable 'History of India,' that if the motive were one of so general an influence the practice would scarcely be so rare.* In modern times at least it has been exceedingly rare. In

* Marquess Wellesley, Indian Dispatches, &c.

* It has been thought not improbable that the doctrine of transmigration, generally held throughout India, may have had some influence in the establishment of the Suttee. A widow, by burning herself with the corpse of her husband, was said to be immediately released from further migration and enter at once on the enjoyments of heaven, to which, by this act, she would also entitle her deceased husband. In the most ancient code of Manu the practice is not even alluded to. Many later, but still ancient Hindu authorities recommend the practice, but by no means command it. According to a summary of the law and custom of Hindu castes, compiled by the late Arthur Steele, Esq., and printed at Bombay in 1827, by order of the governor, the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, the most virtuous mode for a woman to become a Suttee is to die of affliction and grief on the death of her husband—not to burn herself with his body or to bury herself alive.

It has been supposed that there is a connexion between the worship of the goddess Kali and the practice of the burning Suttee, of which no mention is made in the most ancient of the Hindu holy books; and it has been observed that these Suttees were most frequent in the district of Calcutta, where the worship of Kali is more common than in any other part of India. Doctor Marshman, the learned Baptist missionary, assigned more homely and sordid reasons for the prevalence of the custom; and he is likely to be as near to the truth as those who have speculated about transmigration, the goddess Kali, &c. He told Bishop Heber that extravagance and poverty made many families anxious to get rid, by any means, of the necessity of supporting their mothers or the widows of their relations. He thought that another frequent cause was the jealousy of old men, who, having married young wives, still clung to their exclusive possession even in death, and left injunctions either with their wives themselves to make the burnt-offering, or with their heirs to urge them to it. Doctor Marshman was strongly of opinion that the practice might be forbidden in Bengal, where it was of most frequent occurrence, without exciting any serious murmurs. The women, he was convinced, would be all loud in their praises of such a measure. The Brahmins, he said, had no longer the power and popularity which they had when he first remembered India; and among the laity, many powerful and wealthy persons publicly expressed their agreement with Ramohun Roy in reprobating the custom. Some of the members of Lord Amherst's government, however, thought differently. They conceived that the likeliest method to make the custom more popular than it was, would be to forbid it and make it a point of honour with the natives.—*Bishop Heber, Indian Journal. Penny Cyclopædia, article Suttee. Arthur Steele, Summary of the Laws and Customs of Hindu Castes.* This last-named amiable and accomplished man returned from Bombay to Europe with his patron and friend Mr. Elphinstone in 1828. He was about returning to India when, in the summer of 1829, he paid a visit to

A Brahmen expounding the Veda.

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Upper India, where the holiest of the cities of the Hindus abound, the practice is by no means common. Bishop Heber found it common nowhere except in Bengal and some parts of Bahar. In the year 1821, during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, a bold blow was aimed at the custom, by arresting a man who had assisted at a suttee, and by trying him for murder before an English court of justice. In 1826, during the administration of Lord Amherst, and nearly two years before Lord William Bentinck arrived at Calcutta, the evil practice was seriously circumscribed by legal enactments; the government declared the burning of a widow without the body of the deceased husband to be illegal; and all persons, whether relations or others, aiding or abetting in such an act, either before or after the death of the husband, were to be committed for trial at the circuit courts, to be made liable to the punishments inflicted for murder and homicide. Even before this time no woman was supposed to be burned without her own wish duly certified to a magistrate. And now the burning of a widow was declared to be illegal under various circumstances. In fact, only those suttees were to be considered lawful where the widow appeared in court, and solicited permission in person from the magistrate. At the same time all the property, real and personal, in actual possession of the deceased husband and widow who performed suttee (even though under the sanction of the proper authorities), was declared to be forfeited to government. Moreover, it was declared that no person should be eligible to any office or employment whatsoever under government, in whose family a suttee should take place from this time forward. All this legislation, which was quietly submitted to, and was productive of the desired effect, really left Lord William Bentinck very little to do, and rendered the execution of that little a safe and easy task. It is absolute nonsense and something worse to overlook everything that was done by his predecessors, and to attribute to his lordship the sole merit of putting down the suttees. On the 14th of December, 1829, Lord William Bentinck as governor-general, and Lord Combermere, W. B. Bayley, Esq., and Sir Charles T. Metcalfe, as members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, passed a regulation declaring the practice of suttee, or burning or burying alive the widows of Hindus, with or without the bodies of their deceased husbands, to be abominable, illegal, and punishable by the criminal courts. We believe that between the year 1826, or the time when Lord Amherst's regulations were passed, and the end of 1829, hardly any suttees had been known to occur in Bengal.

If some of the Hindus feebly complained of infractions of their ancient rites and usages, and petitioned for a continuance of the enviable privilege of burning widows (especially old ones), other Hindus expressed their deep sense of gratitude to Lord William Bentinck for completing a good work. No irritated Hindu superstition or bigotry caused any danger or commotion; but, at the end of 1831, disturbances were created in the Baraset district in the neighbourhood of Calcutta by a body of fanatical and fantastical Mohammedans, under a leader called Tittoo Meer, who had been a wrestler, or a Sudra Decoit or river robber. These fellows, whose fury was directed not so much against the British government as against the Hindus, murdered a Brahmin, seized and killed a Brahmini bull or cow, sprinkled the blood over the walls of a Hindu temple, and hung up the carcass in front of that building, to the inconceivable horror of all the Hindu part of the population. Their only quarrel with the agents of government was about a tax or fine put upon their beards, in consequence of previous misconduct. After defeating with some loss a small body of police-officers and Calcutta militia, they were attacked, in the month of November, by a more adequate force sent by the government.

some friends in Ireland, and got drowned while bathing in a little river, scarcely more than a brook. We knew him well and still lament his loss. Young, active, enthusiastic in the pursuit of knowledge, and imbued with the soundest and best principles, he bade fair to be one of the foremost men in the Indian service—a service which requires eminent men as much as ever it did.

Tittoo Meer and 50 of his followers were killed, and 300 of them were taken prisoners.

Lord William Bentinck made the tour of the upper provinces. At Buxar the Rajah Gopaul Sing presented an address, thanking his lordship for having abolished suttee. Quitting Simla in the month of October, 1831, his lordship proceeded to the territories of the protected Seiks, and halted at Ruper, a town situated on the banks of the Sutledge, just where that river quits the mountains and enters the plains of Hindustan. Here he was met by that powerful Seik ruler, the Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, the lord and lion of Lahore, who made professions of the warmest friendship, having then a fresh and lively recollection of the great English dray-horse and the other presents which Lieut. Burnes had carried to him a short time before. The governor-general had seen this very adventurous and self-confident young officer (Burnes) during his recent stay at Simla; and this ill-omened meeting contributed not a little to those frightful catastrophes in Afghanistan with which the name of Burnes must be inseparably connected. Burnes had ascended the Indus from its mouth, between Cutch and Sinde, as far as Lahore, and thought he had ascertained that for the extent of a thousand miles, from the sea to Runjeet Sing's capital, there might be an uninterrupted navigation; and that by the agency of steam that famed river might be made a valuable commercial highway: *if* the fierce Ameers of Sinde, who exercised dominion or perpetuated an anarchy along its banks, could be reclaimed from their habits; and *if* the countries to which the Indus afforded access could speedily become (what they certainly had not been for many ages) the homes of a numerous, industrious, agricultural population, with wants to be supplied by European industry and ingenuity, and with the means in their hands of furnishing what Europeans want. The high road of trade lay across the Indus, and not up that river. Lieutenant Burnes, however, proud of the novel voyage he had made, seemed to think that merely by sending a few steam-boats up the river, or framing a treaty or two with the beggarly barbarians dwelling on the banks, a great and profitable trade might be created forthwith, and that, rather than lose this chance, the Indian government ought to incur almost any expense or risk. And, far beyond the Indus and the Punjab, or the regions watered by the five rivers, in the country of the pastoral and warlike Afghans, and farther still in the wilds and deserts which lie between India and the Caspian Sea, Lieutenant Burnes had built up sundry little visions, besides the bright, innocent, and laudable one of making large additions to our geographical knowledge. His design, he says, received the most liberal encouragement from the governor-general, Lord William Bentinck—his lordship being of opinion that a knowledge of the general condition of the countries through which he meant to travel would be useful to the British government, *independent of other advantages which might be expected from such a journey.** Encouraged and aided in various ways by his lordship, Burnes, with a small party, descended the Sutledge, crossed the Hyphasis, near to the spot where Lord Lake had encamped, and where Alexander the Great was supposed to have halted; and then went on by the town of Peshawer, and the pass of Luta-Bund, to the city of Cabul, where Dost Mohamed Khan then reigned almost without a competitor. This Dost Mohamed, whom it was afterwards Burnes's destiny to assist in deposing, received him with much friendship and hospitality; and it was during his stay at Cabul, and his travels through the rest of Afghanistan, that our countryman contracted his very unsound notions as to the facility of managing the Afghans, and establishing intimate connexions in their country. They were fierce, treacherous, sanguinary, and passionately attached to their rude, half-savage independence: all this Burnes saw and allowed; yet, nevertheless, he thought that to an adroit, knowing, clever person, like himself, it would be as easy to manage those precious mountain-chiefs, as to amuse and manage so many children.

* Lieutenant Alexander Burnes, F.R.S., &c., Preface to Travels in Bokhara, &c., 3 vols. 8vo., London, 1834.

Continuing his journey, and traversing mountains, rivers, and deserts, and going through Kiz-Kooduk, Kurshee, Bokhara, Shuruks, and Astrabad, Burnes safely reached Teheran, the capital of Persia; and as he and his small party had succeeded—by means of the friendly assistance of the different rulers of the countries through which they passed, and by attaching themselves to different caravans—in crossing the hungry deserts of Tartary, and in overcoming other obstacles, he concluded that a Russian or a Russo-Persian army, strong enough to contend with the British for the dominion of India, and with all the attirail of artillery, stores, &c., might overcome those difficulties likewise; and might, possibly, by moving in the direction opposite to that which he took, reach and go through the mountain-passes of Afghanistan, cross the Punjab and the Sutledge, and deploy in the plains of Hindustan! Burnes did not create this bugbear—it existed long before he left school or put on the toga virilis; but he assuredly fed and crammed it until it became bigger and more terrible than it had been before; and hence, in good part, the tears of many hundreds of affectionate hearts, the destruction of many thousands of British and native troops, and the anguish of every Englishman capable of feeling the disgrace of his country's arms. The idle fear of a Russian invasion of India had been ably and repeatedly exposed; and, neither as a rapid talker, nor as a half-informed, self-sufficient writer, had Burnes done or said anything to entitle his opinions to be considered as oracles by cool and well-informed men. This was felt and expressed by not a few in 1834, when that unfortunate officer was lionizing in London—not without betraying that conceit and *suffisance* which led mainly, though not entirely (for others were far more culpable than he in the execution of our political and military measures), to the deplorable and humiliating reverses and massacres of 1841-2. Unhappily such opinions were not entertained by those who governed India; and Burnes, who would have been an active, an intelligent, and a valuable servant of the Company, if kept in his proper sphere, succeeded in convincing those high functionaries that he was a great statesman.

In conformity with the opinions expressed to him at Simla by Burnes, Lord William Bentinck dispatched Colonel Pottinger, in the character of envoy from the supreme government, to effect a treaty with the Ameers of Sinde—another easily-to-be-managed set of men, according to our sanguine explorer of the Indus. These Ameers, who were only a little less lawless and rapacious than the Pindarree chiefs of former days, gladly accepted the presents and promises that were offered them, and concluded with Pottinger certain agreements for allowing the Indus to be opened and navigated by our trading-vessels—whose trade was to be found hereafter. Thus were we brought into correspondence and a sort of connexion with the Ameers of Sinde. The immediate consequence was a great jealousy and alarm on the part of that older ally, Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore. His highness was for the present quieted by another British ambassador, Captain Wade, who repaired to Lahore, under the orders of the governor-general, to remove all unfavourable impressions. Runjeet Sing even engaged to adhere to the agreements which had been made between the Sinde Ameers and Colonel Pottinger, and to co-operate zealously in opening to trade the other rivers of the Punjab. But it ought to have been easy to perceive, even at this early period, that there was no dependence to be put either upon the Lion of Lahore or upon the Ameers of Sinde; and that nothing but war, conquests, and a strong and permanent military occupation, could give us what we wanted on the Indus, and in the Punjab.

After his return from his tour in the upper provinces to Calcutta, the governor-general, whose intentions and instructions continued to be of the most pacific kind, and whose treasury, in spite of every reduction and saving, continued to be at a very low ebb, found himself under the necessity of equipping an armament and undertaking a war against the Rajah of Coorg, the brother and successor of that faithful ally who had rendered such valu-

able services to the British during the last war against Tippoo Sultaun, and the siege of Seringapatam.* That chief had died in 1808, leaving his dominions by will to his daughter, Dewa Amajee, then a child, to the prejudice of his brother, Linga Rajah, and contrary to the ancient usages of Coorg, where, it was said, no female had ever held the reins of sovereignty; although in the contiguous and ancient Hindu principality of Bednore, a female sovereign, or Rannee, had always ruled, in preference to a male prince. The infant princess, Dewa Amajee, was, however, placed on the throne of Coorg. In 1810, during the administration of Lord Minto, the Bengal government received a communication from Linga Rajah, the young Rannee's uncle, stating that she had voluntarily abdicated in favour of the said uncle, Linga Rajah. By order of Lord Minto, measures were taken to investigate the whole business. The resignation of a little girl could not be considered as entitled to much attention; but at the same time the British government could not be considered as bound to support a mere testamentary device of the deceased Rajah, or to uphold an order of succession said to be hostile to the laws, prejudices, and wishes of the Coorg people. The result of the investigation proved favourable to the claims of Linga Rajah; and the inhabitants being strongly inclined to the establishment of his pretensions, these were acquiesced in by the Bengal presidency, and a dispatch announced to the Rajah the determination of the British government to recognise his title to the sovereignty. Some large sums of money, vested by the late Rajah in the Bombay and Madras funds, were secured to the young Rannee, her little sisters, and some other members of the family, by the care of the British government.† Dewa Amajee, in process of time, was married to a Coorg chieftain, named Chinnah Buswa. She had grown up a beautiful woman—at least she appears to have been considered as beautiful by the Coorgs, and the black Nairs, and by her own uncle. Towards the end of 1832 she and her husband fled from Coorg into Mysore, to seek the protection of the British resident, Mr. Cassamajor. They alleged that the uncle had attempted to violate his niece—but, perhaps, he had only attempted to violate her money-chests. His character, however, was notoriously depraved, and his government had been a foul and cruel one. Our incredulity is excited when we are told that this miserable little potentate—whose subjects for the most part lived in woods and forests, like the Vedas, or wild men of Ceylon, and whose dominions contained only one or two places that could, by any courtesy of language, be called towns—entertained the idea of pursuing his niece and her husband into the British territories, and was actually beginning to raise an army for that purpose. Yet if the Rajah were mad (and the whole tenor of his conduct renders such a suspicion far from improbable) he might have been contemplating and doing all that was said of him. Mr. Cassamajor was instructed in January, 1833, to repair to Mercara, the so-called capital of Coorg, to seek a personal interview with the Rajah, and to endeavour to bring him to reason. On his return from this not very pleasant mission, Mr. Cassamajor reported that the Rajah's reign was a complete reign of terror; that his subjects were barbarously oppressed, and often savagely butchered; that he was notoriously disaffected to the Company, and in correspondence and league with some of the Company's turbulent subjects on the frontiers of Mysore. Shortly afterwards, the Polygar of Terrikerry, who had rebelled against the Rajah of Mysore—that is to say, against the Company—fled with his family into Coorg, and was there said to be received with great honour. When Mr. Cassamajor called upon the Rajah to give up this troublesome polygar, the Rajah replied by calling upon our resident to give up Dewa Amajee and her husband, and by complaining, in no very respectful language, of the refuge given by the English to the fugitives from his territories. Some disturbances broke out, and some robberies were committed near the frontiers of the two countries: all this induced Sir Frederick Adam, now governor of Madras, to

* See ante, pp. 47, 48.
† Walter Hamilton.

dispatch another envoy to the Coorg Rajah. In the month of September, Mr. Græme quitted the coast, and proceeded towards the woods and jungles of Coorg. He was the bearer of a letter from the governor-general, who was now hastening to Madras, and who announced to the Rajah his intention of proceeding to Mysore, for the purpose of conferring with his highness, and settling every point in dispute. The perverse Rajah returned no answer to his lordship's letter, and forcibly detained the agent of Mr. Græme who presented it. On arriving at Madras Lord William wrote another letter, which was treated with no more respect. Lord William went to Bangalore, expecting to find an answer there; but none came. His lordship's next message was delivered by the convincing mouths of muskets. On the 6th of April, 1834, the miserable little capital of Coorg surrendered to a small column under the command of Brigadier Lindsay, and the Rajah delivered himself up on the 10th. He had not shown the mercy for which he now implored—the most atrocious murders had been perpetrated under his orders—not one member of the family, save himself, had been left alive. His dewan, or chief minister, who was reported to have urged him on in his mad career, was found in the jungle, hanging on a tree; but whether he had hanged himself voluntarily, or the Rajah had hanged him—whether he had fallen a victim to the vengeance of some Coorg chief, or to the universal rage of the people, could not be ascertained, and did not excite much inquiry. All the Coorg territories were assumed by the Company, and placed under direct British rule, conformably with a minute drawn up by Lord William Bentinck, at Bangalore, in the month of March.

His lordship, whose health was failing, resigned the governor-generalship, and quitted Calcutta, in March 1835. Previously to his departure, he received several addresses expressed in warm and grateful language. The mercantile community declared that his lordship's object had been the general improvement of the country, the moral and social advancement of its vast and varied population, and the development of its commercial and agricultural resources. They observed that his lordship's administration had necessarily been of a character widely different from those of his immediate predecessors. Theirs were days of war and diplomacy and profuse expenditure: to his lordship had fallen the more painful task of repairing the deep wounds inflicted in the public finances, of contending with an alarming deficit, and of enforcing the remedy of severe economy and retrenchment. This course was now as necessary as the opposite one had been in the days of Lord Amherst and the Marquess of Hastings. Some millions may have been spent through mismanagement and blunders; but if the Mahratta and Pindarree league had not been broken, and if the Nepaulese and the Burmese had not been chastised and thrown back from the Company's exposed frontiers, Lord William Bentinck, on arriving in India, would have been compelled to enter upon a series of wars, which would have left a far greater deficit than that which he found; for Mahrattas, Pindarrees, Nepaulese, Burmese, together with all the turbulent wasteful tribes and communities dwelling in Central India, must all have gained strength with time, and thus have become the more difficult to subdue, while the wasted territories of the Company and its allies must have crippled our government, and have left it the less able to prosecute hostilities on so extensive a scale. The native population of Calcutta, meeting at the Hindu College, declared that his lordship had done everything kind for them; and that his only act of unkindness was parting from them. They expressed their veneration for his lordship's person and character, and their gratitude for the enlarged spirit of justice and benevolence with which the natives of India had been treated under his administration. At a public meeting at the Town-hall a resolution was passed, requesting his lordship to permit his statue to be erected in some conspicuous part of Calcutta, the statue to be of bronze, and equestrian, and to be executed by Chantrey. The Court of Directors treated him in a manner very different from that in which they had behaved on recalling him from the governorship of Madras.

They had resolved "that this Court deeply lament that the state of Lord William Bentinck's health should be such as to deprive the Company of his most valuable services; and this Court deem it proper to record, on the occasion of his lordship's resignation of the office of governor-general, their high sense of the distinguished ability, energy, zeal, and integrity with which his lordship has discharged the arduous duties of his exalted station." His lordship arrived safely at Portsmouth on the 14th of July, 1835, but he did not long survive his return to England.

CHAPTER XVII.

HOME LEGISLATION.

It was felt very generally, even at the time of passing it, that the act of 1813, which made the first great inroad on the Company's exclusive commercial privileges, would be but the introduction to far more extensive changes in the Company's charter. From the year 1813 down to 1833, when the India trade was entirely thrown open, the advocate for free trade never rested, and there was a succession of enactments and regulations all subversive of the old monopoly. By the act of 1813, (or act 53 George III.,) power had been reserved to parliament to make further regulations for the direct and circuitous trade with places within the limits of the Company's charter. In virtue of this reservation, the Circuitous Trade Act was passed in 1814; and the Malta and Gibraltar Trade Act was passed in 1817. In 1820 committees of parliament were nominated to inquire into the foreign trade of the nation and to deliberate on the means of extending it. Among other branches of trade, that with India and China claimed a large portion of the attention of these committees. In both houses of parliament and in the country at large the notion had long prevailed that the monopoly the East India Company had of the trade of China was injurious to the interests of commerce in general. But many who entertained this notion felt at the same time that it would be difficult for any body of men less organized and experienced than the Company to carry on a trade with so strange a people as the Chinese, without being constantly involved in quarrels. In May, 1820, Mr. Canning, then president of the Board of Control, pressed on the attention of the Court of Directors the expediency of establishing an entrepôt in the Eastern Archipelago, where British ships might take in tea for foreign Europe; and he pointed out the expediency of the Company's allotting a portion of their tonnage to China to the free use of the British public. The Court of Directors alleged that without the monopoly of the China trade they could neither preserve their territories in India nor pay their dividends in England—that in fact the China trade was the main prop of the Company's financial system. They declined being parties to any change in the China trade, and expressed a hope, or rather a wish, that it might be left as regulated by the act of 1813. The committee of the Commons, in their report of July, 1821, stated that they could not concur in *all* the apprehensions entertained by the Company of the consequences of even a partial relaxation of their monopoly; but at the same time they acknowledged that the Chinese monopoly was of the utmost importance to the prosperity of the Company and of all connected with it. It was, however, unavoidable that some concessions should be made to the loud demands of free trade and political economy; and in the course of the year 1821 British ships were permitted to carry on trade between all parts within the limits of the charter, and all ports, whether in Europe or elsewhere, belonging to countries in amity with Great Britain. The Company also consented to relinquish the restriction as to the tonnage of ships engaging in the India trade. From this time down to 1827 no legislative alterations were made; but the subjects of India and China trade were several times brought before parliament, and a warm discussion upon them was kept up by means of reviews, magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers. In May, 1827, shortly after Mr. Canning had been gazetted as

first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Whitmore moved in the Commons for the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the trade between Great Britain and the East. Mr. Whitmore did not hesitate to recommend the entire dissolution of the "China monopoly." Mr. Canning was to a great extent a free trader; a large section of his present supporters were declared antagonists to monopolies and restrictions of all kinds; and Mr. Huskisson, his colonial secretary, was a leader and oracle of the free traders and political economists; nevertheless Mr. Whitmore's motion was opposed on the ground that the proper time was approaching for reconsidering the whole of the Company's charter and system of trade. Mr. Canning died in the month of August; the Goderich administration fell to pieces in a very few months; Mr. Huskisson and his friends of the free-trade school resigned; and in January, 1828, the Duke of Wellington became prime minister. In May, 1829, Mr. Huskisson presented a strong petition from the merchants of Liverpool, praying for the removal of all restrictions on the trade with India and China. He said it was humiliating to our pride and good sense that English ships should be excluded from traffic with the great and populous Chinese Empire, and that the East India Company should be allowed to monopolize the whole of that traffic. These sentiments were loudly re-echoed by a great portion of the house and by what seemed a majority of the public out of doors. Two days after this, Mr. Whitmore returned to the assault, reprobating the monopoly and insisting upon the necessity of a searching inquiry by parliament. The motion for a committee was, however, withdrawn at the instance of ministers, who urged its postponement until proper notice should have been given to the Company. But at the same time ministers spoke as if the last hour of monopoly was fast approaching. In the month of February, 1830, Lord Ellenborough moved for the appointment of a select committee of the House of Lords to inquire into the present state of the affairs of the East India Company, and the trade between Great Britain, the East Indies, and China. His lordship said that the Company had afforded all the aid in their power to increase the facilities given to the external and internal trade of India; that the most important questions for parliament now to decide were—1. Whether it would be possible to conduct the government of India directly or indirectly without the assistance of the Company? 2. Whether the assistance of the Company should be afforded in the manner in which it had hitherto been afforded, or in some other way? On the same day Mr. Secretary Peel moved in the Commons for a committee for the same purpose, stating that he proposed its appointment with the plain and honest view of having a full and unreserved investigation of the affairs of the Company, and not for the purpose of ratifying any charter or engagement previously existing between the government and the Company.* Committees were appointed by both houses. Their reports were unfavourable to the Company, whose evidence had been taken.

The death of George IV., on the 26th of June, 1830, led to the prorogation of parliament on the 23rd of July, and to its dissolution on the day following. In the month of October, about a fortnight before the assembling of the new parliament of King William IV., the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company had an interview at Apsley House with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough. His grace stated, that as the period had arrived for giving notice to the Company that their exclusive trade privileges would terminate in 1834, the government wished to ascertain what the views and intentions of the Company would be, in the event of its being con-

* No such engagement on the part of government had ever existed. But in a letter from Lord Ellenborough to Sir John Malcolm, his lordship was supposed to have written that government was prepared to *renew* the Company's charter. Mr. G. Bankes declared in the House that the word was or ought to have been *review*, and not renew. It appears to be quite certain that the Company never expected their Charter would be renewed without immense changes being made in it. Right or wrong, their arguments had all been overruled; and the free-trade current had set in so strong that no ministry could long have stood against it.

sidered expedient that the Court of Directors should continue to exercise functions similar to those now intrusted to them in the government of India, *but the Company no longer to possess the monopoly of the China trade.* The chairman, Mr. Astell, said that the Company would not be indisposed to continue their services to the public, provided the requisite means were ensured to them for administering the government consistently with their own character, and for the benefit of this country and of India; that financially speaking there was a large annual deficit, which was met principally through the profits of the Company's trade with China; that under the existing system the Indian territory had access to all the *commercial capital* of the Company, which assistance the Company had been willing to afford, so long as their trade had yielded a dividend of ten and a half per cent.; and finally that, under any contemplated change, the Court of Directors must feel it to be their first duty to secure the interests and property of their constituents, who could not be expected to consent that any portion of their capital should remain exposed to hazard, without ample guarantee and security. The Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough considered that the proprietors of East India stock had full security for their capital, and for their dividends, at the present rate, in the commercial assets, and in the fixed property in India, which might be judged to belong to the Company in its commercial capacity. The chairs laid the propositions before a secret committee of correspondence, who, in a few days, recorded a minute, declaring that they had no objection to an early consideration of the general question; but that they had not anticipated being called upon, within fourteen days of the meeting of parliament, to deliver an opinion upon the plan of ministers. The new parliament met on the 26th of October; on the 15th of November the ministry was broken up, and on the 22nd Earl Grey was gazetted as prime minister. The Right Hon. Charles Grant (now Lord Glenelg) succeeded Lord Ellenborough as head of the Board of Control. This gentleman and his family had been closely connected with the Company, and had owed much of their fortune and illustration to the Indian service; but these considerations did not prevent the newly-appointed president to the Board of Control from going along with his official colleagues. Under any government that it was possible to form, a sweeping change in the Company's charter was inevitable; but the Whig ministry of Earl Grey, perhaps, proceeded with more rapidity, and paid less attention to the representations of the Company, than the Duke of Wellington's cabinet would have done. Possibly the Whigs could not help this; for they came into power as reformers (and they could have obtained power in no other character), and they were bound by their previous and long-standing declarations to carry out, without loss of time, such a multiplicity of reforms or changes as had never been carried before (except by the Long Parliament in the time of the Commonwealth,) in half a century. Even if the amount of ability, integrity, and good intention had been tenfold what it was, it would hardly have been possible for the ministry to do all this work well.

Mr. Grant, as president of the Board of Control, moved on the 4th of February, 1831, for the re-appointment of the committee on East India affairs. This committee, however, was scarcely appointed ere parliament was dissolved. The new parliament assembled on the 14th of June; and, losing no time, Mr. Grant, on the 28th, moved again for the renewal of the committee. This was readily voted. In the course of the debate, ministers complained that the Company had not petitioned for a renewal of their charter. The free-traders wanted the trade, but did not want the sovereignty of India; and the government had no wish to burden itself with the sole management of our Eastern empire. They and the public were, in fact, so intent upon the one great question of commerce, that they hardly thought of the political government of India at all, at this moment. The Court of Directors deemed it the most prudent course to abstain from petitioning parliament, and to leave it to the Company's adversaries to make out their case first. The chairs, in a con-

ference with the president of the Board of Control, on the 7th of July, urged the necessity of being put in possession of the views of his majesty's government at the earliest possible period. In the meantime the table of the House of Commons had been loaded with petitions from merchants and others, against the renewal of the Company's charter upon its former terms. Much time was occupied in debating whether the Company could not do very well with their territorial revenues, and without monopolising trade; and whether the Company's accounts, which showed how much they depended upon the profits of the China trade, were or were not correct. Mr. Langton, a merchant of Liverpool, decidedly impugned the general integrity of the Company's accounts. "This," adds an official of the Court of Directors, "was, in fact, the only remaining point; and had it been proved vulnerable, the public might have proposed their own terms, and have placed the Company at the entire mercy of parliament, without any apparent plea of justice to rest upon in support of the interests of the proprietors."* Mr. Langton failed in convincing the house that he had made out his case. It should appear that this gentleman was very insufficiently informed as to the very complicated and difficult history of Indian administration, and as to the various political causes which had produced the accumulation of political debt. The session terminated on the 20th of October. On the 27th of January, 1832, the president of the Board of Control—still the Right Hon. Charles Grant—moved for the re-appointment of the select committee, observing that the previous committee had collected a great mass of valuable information, but that this information had been put together in a confused manner, while many important points had not been touched upon. He said that when he proposed the committee, twelve months ago, he thought it was not desirable that the government should take any leading part; that at that time, as now, there were two parties—one approving the renewal of the commercial privileges of the Company, the other disapproving of such renewal;—that he had expected that the truth would be elicited by each party endeavouring to prove its own case; but that, unfortunately, the Court of Directors had not felt themselves called upon to enter into the examination of the question at all; and those who were opposed to them had been unable to do justice to their own case. A general committee on the affairs of the East India Company being appointed, it was divided into six sub-committees:—1. public; 2. finance, accounts, and trade; 3. revenue; 4. judicial; 5. military; 6. political. Their labours terminated in August, 1832, when the several reports were all laid before the house, and ordered to be printed.*

On the whole, the reports were highly honourable to the Company. It was admitted that the old system, which had united commerce with government, and allowed of the trade-monopoly, had not been unattended with advantages; that without that system our vast empire in the East could not have been created—could never have been enlarged, as it had been, during seasons of depression and disgrace, and bad or weak government at home; that the finances of India had derived advantage from their existing connexion with the commerce of the Company, through the direct application of surplus commercial profits, and by the rates of exchange, at which the Board of Control decided that the territorial advances from commerce in England should be repaid to commerce in India. But our empire in the East was formed, and seemed to be so firmly established as to defy every attack; and our free-traders and political economists, again forgetting that we must

* Potter Auber, Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.

* These Reports filled more than 8000 pages of close print. These, with the matter previously given to parliament, made an aggregate of about 14,000 closely printed folio pages!

The Public Report touched upon the important subjects of local government, law, police, patronage, education civil and military, education of natives, liberty of the press in India, settlement of Europeans in the country, &c.

The Judicial Report sufficiently showed in what an unsettled state was the administration of justice in India half a century after the time when Sir Elijah Impey presided over the Supreme Court of Calcutta.

have the one to secure the other—that without our sovereignty the wealth and resources of India would be absorbed in a maelstroom of anarchy—were incessantly declaring that free-trade with India and China was worth more than our empire. Upon better grounds than these declamations, a death-blow had been given to the spirit of monopoly. No longer able to stand aloof, or to decline entering into negotiation about the charter with his majesty's government, the Court of Directors sent their chairman and deputy-chairman to confer with Earl Grey and Mr. Grant. This interview was followed up by a long correspondence, and an interchange of propositions and counter-propositions, which must be read in full in order to be understood. The grand change proposed by government was simply this—that the East India Company should cease to trade, and devote its undivided attention to the arduous duties of governing, in conjunction with the Board of Control, our empire in the East. On the 12th of February, 1833, Mr. Grant, in a letter, stated it to be the conviction of his majesty's ministers that, notwithstanding past defects and errors, and in spite of much remaining imperfection, the political administration of India through the Company had secured to the inhabitants of that country so considerable a measure of the advantages which it was the proper object of a government to bestow, and had evinced so much susceptibility of receiving improvement, that ministers would not be justified in lightly proposing to disturb the system in its essential elements. But that, by a careful observation of the effects of the blended system of trade and government, the Company ought, as soon as possible, to be released from commercial dealings; and that the interests of the nation would be best consulted by no longer continuing the China trade as an exclusive privilege, though ministers would not deny the value attached by the Company to the China trade, in its having supplied the deficiency of revenue, &c. With respect to the competency of India to answer all the just demands on her exchequer, Mr. Grant said that no rational doubt could exist. A revenue which had been steadily progressing during the last twenty years, which had now reached the annual amount of 22,000,000*l.* sterling, and which promised still to increase—a territory almost unlimited in extent—a soil rich and fertile, and suited to every kind of produce—great resources not yet explored—a people, generally speaking, patient, laborious, improving, and evincing both the desire and capacity of further improvement;—these, Mr. Grant thought, were sufficient pledges that our treasury in the East, under wise management, would be more than adequate to meet the current expenditure. It was admitted that "the propositions of his majesty's ministers involved a surrender," but then, it was said, "it also involved an equivalent." The Court of Directors were told, that to accept or reject the proposition rested with the East India Company. They were at the same time informed, that should the Company contemplate trading, *apart from the exercise of political functions*, and *on a footing of free competition*, such trade, in the opinion of his majesty's ministers, could not possibly be profitable. "Whatever may be the decision of the Company," added the president of the Board of Control, "I must repeat that it is not the intention of the government to recommend to parliament the renewal of the Company's exclusive privilege of trade with China. . . . I am bound to state frankly, that his majesty's ministers being, on the fullest consideration, convinced of the justice and liberality of the terms now offered, will be prepared, in the event of a rejection of them, to propose to parliament a plan for the future government of India without the instrumentality of the Company." Mr. Grant concluded by intimating that if no decision was communicated to him by the 23rd of March, he would feel himself compelled to consider that the proposal was *declined*. In a subsequent letter, however, dated the 14th of March, he stated that he had no desire to adhere to the period here specified as the limit of deliberation on the subject. The Court of Directors, after sundry murmurs, contended for a guarantee, or some collateral security, for the payment of the dividends, and ultimately (if necessary)

for the capital, to the holders of East India shares. The Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough had told the chairman of the Court, in 1830, that the proprietors had full security for their dividends and capital in the commercial assets and in the fixed property in India, which might be deemed to appertain to the Company in its trading capacity. Now Mr. Grant assured the Court that his majesty's government was willing and anxious to fortify the interests of the proprietors by a collateral security, in the shape of a sinking fund, formed by the investment of a portion of the commercial assets in the national stocks. Mr. Grant proposed, as a sufficient sum, 1,200,000*l.* He told the Court that much time could not be allowed them for deliberation—that it would not be in the power of ministers to entertain the proposal of any additions or modifications in the conditions they offered, unless the Company first agreed to adopt the plan as the government presented it to them.

Nevertheless the Court asked for further explanations, and demanded that the sinking fund, or guarantee fund, should be at least 2,000,000*l.* sterling. The Court of Directors could not give their assent to the plan of ministers without the sanction of the Court of Proprietors. Two or three years earlier such a sanction could scarcely have been hoped for, and the motion for it would have called together all the proprietors that were not bed-ridden or out of the country; but now, on the 3rd of May, 1833, it was decided in a general Court, by 477 votes, against a poor minority of 52, that, provided the guarantee fund were raised to 2,000,000*l.*, and some other money conditions complied with, the plan of ministers should be accepted, and the Company cease to be a trading Company.* On the 27th of May Mr. Grant expressed the satisfaction with which his majesty's government had learned the termination of the appeal to the ballot in Leadenhall-street. He stated it to be the anxious wish of ministers to accommodate themselves as far as possible to the views and feelings of the Company, and he agreed to increase the guarantee fund to 2,000,000*l.* Other minor points were yielded as requested by the Court of Directors or by the general Court. They had claimed to have the exercise of the same powers as the Company now possessed under their charter. To this Mr. Grant replied, that his majesty's ministers did not contemplate curtailing or impairing these powers; and that whatever changes parliament might, in its wisdom, see fit to adopt, could, he did not doubt, be made without detriment to the substantial authority of the Company. The Court of Directors had conceived that the government, through the Board of Control, intended to claim and exercise a veto on the recall of governors-general, &c. as exercised by the Court of Directors. On this point Mr. Grant said, "If the words have been inserted in consequence of the hint thrown out in the memorandum that the Board should have a veto on the recall of governors and military commanders in India, I must state that *it is not the intention of his majesty's ministers to insist on that suggestion.*" Thus the power of recall was left undisturbed in the hands of the Directors. The government also agreed that if, at the expiration of the fixed term of twenty years, or at any subsequent period, the Company should be deprived of the political government of India, it should have the option, at three years' notice, of being paid off at the rate of 100*l.* for every 5*l.* 5*s.* of annuity; and that the proprietors, whenever paid off, should be entitled to resume their undoubted right to trade, which was now to be placed in abeyance. The general Court of Proprietors had suggested that sufficient powers should be reserved to the Company to check, "*by a system of publicity to both houses of parliament, or by some other means,*" any acts of the Board of Control which might appear to the Court of Directors to be unconstitutional—to militate against the principles of good government—to interfere with substantial justice to

* The attendance in this general court was but thin, if we consider the magnitude of the question. Five hundred and twenty-nine votes were scarcely a fourth part of the proprietors, and little beyond a third part of the number who have attended to vote in favour of a candidate for the direction.—*Auber.*

our allies—or to invalidate or impair the security for the dividend. To this suggestion Mr. Grant answered that "ministers saw no plan which was not, on public grounds, liable to grave objection." The Court of Directors, in expressing their great satisfaction at the rest of the provisions, clung to the suggestion of parliamentary publicity, and now contended that the guarantee fund ought to be 3,000,000*l*. The Court thought that the measure of publicity could be exercised as a rule, if not as a privilege; and they expressed a confident expectation that parliament, taking the same view, would make suitable provision. The resolution of the Court of Directors was adopted by the general Court of Proprietors on the 10th of June.

On the 13th of June Mr. Grant, in a committee of the whole house, brought before parliament the subject of the Company's charter, and explained the changes which were about to be made in it. The whole of the transaction was to be entirely free from the finances of this country. It was proposed to establish a fourth government in the western provinces of India; to extend considerably the powers of the governor-general; to appoint a Supreme Council of Legislature, with power to make laws and draw up a code for India; to define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (a jurisdiction which required defining half a century after Sir Elijah Impey had vacated his office); to render the presidencies of Madras and Bombay still more subordinate to the governor-general, and to reduce the council of those two presidencies. Mr. W. Williams Wynne, who had filled the office of president of the Board of Control for a longer period than any other party living, sharply criticized the mode of electing the Directors, and contended that the common proprietors of East India stock were incompetent to judge of the requisite qualifications. The absence of responsibility was what he particularly objected to throughout the system. He also thought that twenty-four Directors were too many, and that the number ought to be reduced and the responsibility augmented. On the 29th of June a printed copy of the bill was submitted to the Court of Directors. That Court concurred generally, but offered some particular objections. They complained that the bill "placed the whole control in the supreme government, thereby not only interfering with the control exercised by the home authorities, but investing the governor-general with a sway almost absolute, and *rendering it scarcely possible always to select a fit person to be intrusted with authority of such magnitude.*"

[The Directors were in the right: it should appear that the Bill gave too much power to governors-general, or did not sufficiently define what that power was; and that in some particulars it is now as difficult for a governor-general as it once was for a chief-justice to discover the proper limits of his authority.]

The Court thought that there was no necessity for incurring the charge of a fourth presidency; that the councils of Madras and Bombay ought not to be reduced; and that it would be very unwise to deprive the commanders-in-chief of the armies of those two presidencies of the seats in council which had been *usually* allotted to them. The Court expressed their satisfaction that the Bill reserved to them the necessary powers regarding the laws which the Supreme Council might enact affecting the natives, and likewise the provincial courts, which laws were also to be subject to the king's approbation.

[These enactments were the more valuable and necessary, as the first individual appointed by his majesty's government to be chief member of this Supreme Council of legislature, or council of law-givers and code-makers, has declared since his return from the East that he is no lawyer—an assertion which is said to be corroborated by all our Anglo-Indians that have paid the least attention to the result of the five years of easy and indolent codification for which the right honourable gentleman is said to have received 50,000*l*. of the Company's money.]

With reference to the contemplated alteration in the number of the Directors, the Court declared that the continuance of the number as fixed by previous charters was essential to their independence, and that a reduction would be an infraction of

the privileges which the proprietors exercised, and which his majesty's government had promised to continue. Upon the proposed extension of the ecclesiastical establishment for India, which had increased from 40,000*l.* to 100,000*l.* per annum, the Court addressed a separate letter to the Board of Control; and they suggested that as the means of obtaining instruction in the Oriental languages in this country were widely extended, and as disadvantages resulted from confining the associations of youth destined for the Indian service to companions all having the like destination, it was both unnecessary and inexpedient any longer to maintain the East India College at Haileybury. They thought it would be better to appoint a test by which the qualifications of all parties to be nominated writers in the Company's service should in future be governed. They had not the least doubt that a system of public examination, sufficiently high, might be provided to secure adequately qualified parties.* The Court of Proprietors, looking at the question, as holders of all stocks are apt to do, merely with reference to their own immediate dividends, vehemently re-echoed the sentiment of the Court of Directors about the college; and they even petitioned the House of Commons to alter the act, to abolish the college, and to save their suffering pockets. The act, however, was not changed in this particular, and the East India College remains. Some other points of small importance were modified. On the 23rd of July the bill as amended in committee having been considered by the Court of Directors, they requested from the president of the Board of Control that sufficient time might be allowed to enable the proprietors to petition parliament, should they see fit, against parts of the Bill. Mr. Grant declined interfering with the arrangement which had been made for the Bill being read a third time on the 26th. On the morning of that day the general Court of Proprietors agreed to a petition, praying that the House would make provision for reporting differences that might arise between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors to parliament, and representing that the bill as it now stood would place an excess of power in the hands of the governor-general. They also urged the appointment of a lieutenant-governor for the western provinces, in lieu of a fourth presidency, and stated that the proposal to vest the executive governments of Madras and Bombay in governors without councils was open to serious objections. Besides murmuring against "the needless charge" of Haileybury College, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal of increasing the ecclesiastical establish-

* In support of the opinion that the East India College ought to be abolished, Mr. Amber, late secretary to the Court of Directors, thinks it is sufficient to quote the names of the following distinguished servants of the Company, who were all well versed in the Oriental languages, and who were all in the service before any East India College existed:—Sir George Barlow, Colonel Kirkpatrick, Mr. Webbe, the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Colonel Wilks, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir Barry Close, Sir John Malcolm, Captain Sydenham, Mr. Lumsden, Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Adam, and Sir Charles Metcalfe. But if these truly distinguished men acquired a knowledge of the Oriental languages in the country without any aids from the Company, and in some cases in despite of numerous obstacles and difficulties, their case can scarcely be quoted as a reason for doing without a proper place of instruction for young men destined for the Company's service. Either in India or at home some such establishment or establishments ought surely to exist. The languages, no doubt, may be acquired more easily and readily in the country than at home; and if the Marquess Wellesley's lofty plan for the college of Fort William had been carried out, the other branches of learning might have been taught at Calcutta, as well as the native languages. It is to be doubted, however, whether, both as regards their mental and physical development, our young men had not better pass all their years of study in their native climate, than in the debilitating climate of Bengal.

To abolish the East India College in England, without increasing the establishments in India, would have been both a pernicious and a disgraceful measure. Until our universities be very materially changed, we see little prospect of all the Oriental languages required in the Company's service being well taught in them. Besides, this great and wealthy country does not over-abound in academical institutions or in provisions for learned or ingenious laymen; and it assuredly consists with the dignity of our Indian empire to maintain some such establishments at home and on a liberal scale. If there be need for reform, let the Honourable Company reform both Haileybury and Addiscombe, but let them not abolish either.

ment in India. In the end the petitioners prayed to be heard by counsel at the bar of the House in support of this petition. A petition of precisely the same nature was presented to the House of Lords by the Earl of Shaftsbury. This appeal to the Commons had little or no effect. Various amendments were, however, made in the Lords. On the 9th of August, at the instance of the Marquess of Lansdowne, the fifth, or newly added member of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, who was to manage the law commission, was excluded from sitting or voting, except when the Council should be engaged in making laws or legislative regulations; thus removing the objection to this fifth or new member encumbering the Council in its executive capacity.

On the 12th of August the Court of Directors came to the following resolution:—That the East India Bill, having arrived at its last stage in the House of Lords, it became their duty to submit to their constituents, the proprietors, a final opinion regarding that bill:—that, although they were still impressed with the belief that the cessation of the Company's trade would greatly weaken its position at home, and consequently impair its efficiency in the administration of the government in India, and although they regarded with much anxiety the increase of powers given by the said bill to the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, and greatly regretted that parliament had not provided some rule of publicity to act as a salutary check both upon the said Board of Control and the Court of Directors; yet, reviewing all the correspondence which had passed with his majesty's ministers, trusting that the extensive powers of the Board would be exercised with moderation, and so as not to interfere with the independence of the Company as a body acting intermediately between the king's government and the government of India (an independence all parties had admitted it to be of vital importance to maintain), and relying with confidence that parliament would interpose for the relief of, any financial difficulties into which the Company might unavoidably be cast through the operation of such extensive changes, —the Court of Directors felt they could not do otherwise than recommend the proprietors to defer to the pleasure expressed by both Houses of Parliament, and to consent to place their right to trade for their own profit in abeyance, in order that they might continue to exercise the government of India for the further term of twenty years, upon the conditions and under the arrangements embodied in the same bill. Both the chairman and deputy-chairman* dissented from this resolution. William Astell, Esq. and fourteen other directors addressed a letter to the proprietors, stating at greater length the grounds upon which they had been induced to recommend the acceptance of the bill. On the 16th of August the proprietors assembled in a very thin General Court, and resolved by ballot, and by 173 balls or votes against only 64, that the bill ought to be accepted. The bill was read a third time in the House of Lords on the evening of this same day; and on the 28th of August it became law, the royal assent being given to it by commission. The rapidity with which it was carried through parliament was thought as extraordinary as the change which it effected in the character of the Company was extensive. Much of the detail must necessarily be suppressed; but the following is a brief analysis of the principal clauses of the Act 3 & 4 William IV. c. 85.

Sect. 1. The government of the British territories in India is continued in the hands of the Company until 1854. The real and personal property of the Company to be held in trust for the crown, for the service of India.

2. The privileges and powers granted in 1813, and all other enactments concerning the Company not repugnant to this new act, are to continue in force until April, 1854.

3. From 22nd April, 1834, the China and tea trade of the Company to cease, and to be opened to all his majesty's subjects.

4. The Company to close its commercial concerns, and to sell all its pro-

* Campbell Majoribanks and William Wigram, Esquires.

perty not required for the purposes of government.

9. The debts and liabilities of the Company are charged on the revenues of India.

43. The governor-general in council is empowered to legislate for India, and for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice, and for all servants of the Company; but he is not to do anything to affect the Mutiny Acts, or the prerogative of the crown, or the authority of parliament, or the constitution or rights of the said Company, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom, whereon may depend the allegiance of any person, or the sovereignty or dominion of the crown over any part of India.

44. If the laws thus made by the governor-general are disallowed by the authorities in England, they shall be annulled by the governor-general.

46. The governor-general in council, without the previous sanction of the Court of Directors, must not make any law or regulation whereby power shall be given to any courts of justice, other than the courts of justice established by his majesty's charters, to sentence to the punishment of death any of his majesty's natural-born subjects born in Europe, or the children of such subjects, or which shall abolish any of the courts of justice established by his majesty's charters.

51. This bill not to affect the right of parliament to legislate in future for India.

53. A law commission to be appointed to inquire into the jurisdiction, &c. of existing courts of justice and police establishments, and the operation of the laws.

81. Any natural-born subject of England may proceed by sea to any part or place within the limit of the Company's Charter having a custom-house establishment, and may reside thereat, or pass through to other parts of the Company's territories to reside thereat.

86. Lands within the Company's territories may be purchased and held by any persons where they are resident.

87. No native, nor any natural-born subject of his majesty resident in India, shall by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour, be disabled from holding any office or employment under the government of the Company.

88. Slavery to be immediately mitigated, and abolished as soon as possible.

89. And as the present diocese is of too great an extent for the incumbent thereof to perform efficiently all the duties of the office without endangering his health and life, his majesty may found two bishoprics, one of Madras and the other of Bombay, with revenues respectively of 24,000 sicca rupees by the year.

94. The Bishop of Calcutta to be metropolitan in India.

112. The island of St. Helena to be taken from the Company and vested in the crown.

So long as the Company was allowed to unite commercial pursuits with its political character, its power, it was thought, might have been exercised in a manner ruinous to the private traders, whose very limited trade was allowed by the Court of Directors or (by appeal) by the Board of Control. It was said that the extensive scale upon which the Company's purchases were made tended to raise prices in the country of production and to lower them in Europe; and that as it was never known to the private traders in what articles the investments of the Company were to be made, those competitors were forced to act under apprehensions of interference, which set all their calculations at defiance. And it was argued that as soon as the trade was allowed to take a more natural course, we might confidently expect that the usual good result would attend upon the employment of individual skill and enterprise; that greater regularity of prices would be experienced, and that production would be stimulated until the prices of East India produce were brought within the compass of a much larger number of European consumers than formerly. Those Indian territories are productive of nearly every article which can conduce to the enjoyment of man; and it was thought that it only required skill, and ingenuity, and encouragement, as well to European settlers as to the natives, to select everything that could

possibly be desired. On the other hand, the luxuries and conveniences of European production, suited to the tastes of the natives of India, were equally varied and numerous, and experience warranted the belief that under a regular course of trade the circle of our customers would be continually enlarged. It was thought —perhaps rather too sanguinely—that this progress must be accelerated to a sudden and marvellous degree by the provisions contained in the 81st and 86th sections of the act, which authorize the settlement of Europeans and the purchase of lands by them. Previously to the passing of this act, the Company possessed the right of arbitrary deportation against Europeans without trial or reason assigned, and British-born subjects were not only restricted from purchasing lands, but were in most cases prohibited from even renting them.* It was also thought that if the 87th section of the act were fairly carried into execution, a great inducement would be held out to the natives of India to qualify themselves for advancement in the social scale; and that the best moral effects upon their characters might be expected to result from their free admission into offices and employments.*

* As early as the year 1766 the Court of Directors prohibited British-born subjects from renting lands. The prohibition was then directed against their own servants, who were in the practice of holding public lands, it being feared that these men might make their power and influence the means of oppressing the natives. It was in evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons that the prohibition was liable, at all times, to be rendered little more than nominal, since Europeans could and did hold lands in farm in the names of natives, and in their names, also, sued and were sued in the courts. The necessity for having recourse to this indirect mode of proceeding did not deter Europeans from embarking their capitals in the establishment of indigo-factories, which were said to have had a highly beneficial influence through the employment they provide for the native population. It was thought that the chief difficulty proposed to the free admission of Europeans arose out of the defective state of the judicial establishments, civil and criminal; and that if these establishments were improved, the difficulty would be removed. Facilities of intercourse had, of late years, been greatly increased. Licence to proceed to India was said to be now never withheld, if the applicant could show any reasonable motive for wishing to proceed to India. Formerly many instances had occurred in which a refusal on the part of the Directors had been superseded by the Board of Control. The total number of licences authorizing Europeans to reside in India, granted by the Court of Directors from 1814 to 1831, was 1258. The total number of licences refused by the court during that time was 294; and the total number of licences granted by the Board of Control was 71.

The severity of the old system of exclusion had been relaxed on many occasions, and not a few of the servants of the Company had endeavoured to demonstrate that there was nothing to fear, but a great deal to hope, from an extensive European colonization, and that all parties, the Company and the national government, the natives and the Europeans, would be benefited by allowing European settlers to employ their capital and skill on Indian lands, farms, &c. Permission had been given in 1824 to some Europeans to hold a limited quantity of land upon lease, for the purpose of making the experiment whether coffee could be advantageously cultivated in Bengal, and this concession had been afterwards sanctioned by the Directors. On the 17th of February, 1829, a similar permission was granted by the government of Bengal for lands to grow indigo and other agricultural produce; and Sir Charles Metcalfe and Lord William Bentinck reasoned upon the principle and recommended the carrying of it out, in some minutes which were drawn up after the resolution had been passed. The Court of Directors, however, were not convinced by this reasoning; they disapproved of the concession, and directed the Indian government "to retrace their steps in regard to it as far as practicable."

Even now certain restrictions were deemed essentially necessary. Persons not natives of the country on their arrival were bound to make known in writing to the chief officer of the customs their names, places of destination, and objects of pursuit in India. No person was to enter the country *by land* without licence from the Board of Control, the Court of Directors, or the governor of one of the presidencies.

It was reasoned that, from the nature of the case, the colonization of India by Englishmen could not take place at a rapid rate; nor was there, indeed, any reason to apprehend that the races by whom the country was at present inhabited would ever be displaced, or even disturbed in their occupation of the soil, by any influx of their European conquerors:—that from the low rate of wages in India, no considerable immigration thither of our labouring classes could ever take place:—that what India wanted, and what England would give, was not labour, but capital, together with the skill and enterprise necessary for its effective application:—that the resources of the country, which had hitherto lain in great part dormant, would thus be called into activity; the soil would be cultivated, the people would be employed, and the general wealth of the country and its capacity of absorbing foreign commodities would in this way be immensely increased without any addition to the numbers of the people.

* Penny Cyclopædia.—Article "East India Company."

The Court of Directors, whose number was continued at twenty-four, now ceased to be merchant-princes: giving up the trade of India and China to others, they retained only their governing faculties; and it was thought that these, as applied to so vast an empire, and although exercised partly in conjunction with and partly in subordination to the Board of Control or his majesty's government for the time being, were sufficient occupation for any twenty-four men. It was confidently hoped that when they ceased to trade, they would govern better. The great mansion in Leadenhall-street is no longer a mart or place for buying and selling; hence many of its offices are deserted and closed, and something resembling the tranquillity of the cloisters prevails throughout the edifice; but it is still the spot where the stupendous machinery of the Indian government is regulated, and where administrative details are considered;—it is still the crown of the arch which supports a mighty system, and most, though not quite all, the keys are kept there which open one of the noblest and most extensive fields for the display of British energy, ability, and enterprise.* Nor can we avoid feeling that it was a blessed chance which kept the patronage of India from being absorbed and monopolized by the ministers of the crown, and thereby made dependent upon mere parliamentary influences. And it is in this reflection that consolation must be found for the evils which have happened or which may happen hereafter from the curious division of authority between the Ministers appointed by the crown and the Directors elected by the holders of East India stock.

Some of the provisions of this great India Bill seem to have fallen already into a state of sleep, and others have not produced all the good that was expected from them, or so rapidly as was expected. The addition of the fifth member of council, who is not to be chosen from the servants of the Company, and whose appointment by the Court of Directors is subjected to the approbation of the crown, does not appear to have improved the machinery of government at Calcutta; and the law commission, which was to draw up a uniform code, seems to be universally admitted to have been (hitherto) a failure.* The notion of creating a fourth presidency at Agra for the western provinces was given up by the Whig ministry who framed the bill, soon after the bill was passed.†

During the parliamentary debates on the bill, some very bad rhetoric and some worse arithmetic were employed to discredit the Company and to reprobate all its past management of India as selfish, duplex, tricky, and low-minded. This was nonsense. It would be impossible to justify, it would be base to make the attempt of justifying, large portions of the directorial policy in earlier days: but it may be generally and fairly stated that,

* "If the East India House only arrests the *eye* of the passenger, there is nothing in the building itself particularly calculated to make him pause in the midst of the busy thoroughfare of Leadenhall-street; but if he be gifted with the divine faculty of accurately delineating and colouring abstractions, then, indeed, it yields to none in the interest of the associations which cluster thick around it."—*London, edited by Charles Knight.*

* The *first* fifth councillor (who has since declared that he is not a lawyer) was Thomas Babington Macaulay, Esq. This brilliant rhetorician and reviewer was also a member of the law commission; and we are told that, in addition to his 10,000*l.* a year, as member of the Supreme Council, he received 5000*l.* a year as law commissioner. If this be the case, the Right Hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay must have received not 50,000*l.*, but 75,000*l.*!—A large sum this to be paid for nothing!

† The councils of the inferior presidencies of Madras and Bombay were not done away with. We know not what the Company's servant and historiographer, Edward Thornton, Esq., means by saying in the last volume of his 'History of the British Empire in India,' which was published only last year, that no council has been appointed for Bengal, and that the executive of that presidency is administered by the governor-general as governor, but without a council. Was not Mr. Macaulay made by the Whig government a fifth member of the Bengal or Calcutta Supreme Council? Did not Mr. Macaulay's successor claim the right of sitting in council on all occasions? And was it not one of Lord Ellenborough's first acts to quote the Act of 3 & 4 William IV. to that gentleman, and to tell him that he had no business to attend the council except when legislative matters were under discussion, when his attendance as a lawyer could not be dispensed with? Will Mr. Thornton inform us how all this could have happened if no council had been appointed for Bengal?

in proportion as the home national government became wiser and purer, and the mind of the people of England more enlightened, more humane, generous, and elevated, the policy of the directors assumed a purer and loftier character. Nay, in some very noticeable instances it may be said that the directorial policy was in advance of the national policy: but, it was not under such withering administrations as Lord North's, or the other sets of men that scuffled and shuffled for power in the days of Warren Hastings, that an immaculate spirit was to be expected in such a body as the Court of Directors. But during the same parliamentary debates many tributes of admiration were paid to the past conduct of the Honourable Court; and several assertions were made that it would be found impossible to govern India without the directors. Lord Ellenborough, who had devoted much of his time to the study of Indian affairs, who had been president of the Board of Control under the Duke of Wellington's recent administration, and who had pleaded warmly for the Company on nearly every important clause of the bill, censured the Whig government for attempting to do away with the restraint of councils and for striving to give the governor-general a too great and irresponsible power, and eulogized the system and practice of united trade and government as they had existed under the old charters. His lordship alluded to the great achievements of our predecessors in India, to the deeds they had done both in peace and in war, and doubted whether there was anything in the new theory that would produce such men or such deeds. The Duke of Wellington declared that, from what he saw during his long residence in the country, and from what he had seen since in other countries, he believed that the government of India was one of the best and most purely administered governments that ever existed, and one which had provided most effectually for the happiness of the people over which it was placed. After saying that he would not follow the Marquess of Lansdowne into the question whether a chartered company were or were not the best calculated to carry on the government or the trade of a great empire like India, the Duke of Wellington added—"But whenever I hear a discussion like this, I recall to my memory what I have seen in that country. I recall to my memory the history of British India for the last fifty or sixty years. I remember its days of misfortune and its days of glory, and call to mind the proud situation in which it now stands! I remember that the Indian government has conducted the affairs of—I will not pretend to say how many millions of people, for they have been variously calculated at seventy, eighty, ninety, and even a hundred millions, but certainly of an immense population—a population returning an annual revenue of 22,000,000*l.* sterling; and that, notwithstanding all the wars in which that empire has been engaged, its debt at this moment amounts only to 40,000,000*l.*, being not more than two years' revenue. I do not say that such a debt is desirable, but I do contend that it is a delusion on the people of this country to tell them that it is a body unfit for government and unfit for trade which has administered the affairs of India with so much success for so many years!" After urging the necessity of supporting the power and influence of the Company, the duke said—"Depend upon it, my lords, that upon the basis of their authority rests the good government of India!"* The Court of Directors and the national government had been almost constantly contemplating the happy prospect of a time when war and its expenses should cease. Under the provisions of the act of 1793, by which the possession of the British territories in India, together with the right of exclusive trading, was continued to the Company for the further term of twenty years, the Company engaged to pay to the public the sum of 500,000*l.* annually, *unless prevented by war expenditure.* But it so happened that this period was one of continued hostilities, including the last war against Tippoo Sultaun, the Marquess Wellesley's wars against the Mahrattas, the campaign against Dhoondiah, the Anglo-Indian expedition to Egypt, the conquests in the Indian Archipelago, &c.,

* Debate in the Lords, on the 5th of July, 1833.

and the state of its finances was such that the Company did not find it convenient to make more than two payments of 250,000*l.* each in the years 1793-4 and 1794-5. And, on two occasions subsequently to 1793, the Company obtained pecuniary assistance from the public, under the authority of the legislature: once in 1810, when 1,500,000*l.* was advanced in Exchequer bills, and repaid soon after by advances made for the public service in India; and again in 1812, when a loan of 2,500,000*l.* was raised by government for the service of the Company. This last loan was liquidated by annual payments, and was finally discharged in 1822.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD AUCKLAND.

For nearly two years after the passing of the great India Bill, Lord William Bentinck, whose conduct had been highly applauded by the Whig ministers who framed that bill, remained at his post as governor-general; and thus superintended, or was at least present at the preparations for, the first working of the new charter. His lordship's love of innovation and change must have been extensively gratified.

But the first governor-general appointed under the new act was Lord Auckland, a very amiable nobleman, who, since the accession of the Whigs to power, had passed through the various offices of President of the Board of Trade and Master of the Mint, and First Lord of the Admiralty, but whose qualifications for the supreme post in the India government were not generally considered as being very obvious. If the desire of avoiding all wars and cultivating relations of amity and commerce with all the powers or peoples existing in India and its neighbourhood was to be taken as an entire qualification, then was his lordship admirably suited for the situation to which he was raised. By character, and by habits of life and of thought, Lord Auckland, it was supposed, would be sure to prefer the pacific and non-interfering system to every other. And yet, alas! his lordship had not been long in India ere he was dragged into an unnecessary war—a war attended not with conquest and aggrandisement, not with an increase of security to ourselves and to our allies and dependents, but with defeat, frightful disasters, and such an amount of disgrace as never fell upon our arms in any part of the world.

On the 5th of September the Directors of the East India Company gave a grand dinner to Lord Auckland at the Albion Tavern, previously to his lordship's setting out for India. In the speeches delivered on that occasion there was little but prophesyings of prosperity and peace for India. Accompanied by his sisters, Lord Auckland arrived at Calcutta towards the close of the year 1835. His lordship appears to have immediately admitted into his entire confidence Captain Alexander Burnes and those other stirring officers of the Company who were impatient for opportunities of distinguishing themselves as soldiers or diplomatists, or as both, and who (principally, we believe, through this anxiety) had been induced to believe that our Indian empire was threatened by Russian intrigues and by Persian and Afghan arms. These stirring men succeeded in impressing the too facile mind of the new governor-general with a deep sense of their local knowledge and political talent and foresight, and eventually in making his lordship believe with them that the whole of our Indian empire was in a perilous condition, and that the black eagle of Russia, already perched on the Himalaya mountains, was looking down upon the Indus and upon all Hindustan with the confident hope of a carnage and confusion which would leave India her prey. It was, as we have already said, this Russian bugbear that was the primary cause of all the woe and of all the shame. As the Mahrattas had been thoroughly conquered, the Pindarrees extirpated, the Nepaulese and Burmese checked, driven back, and reduced to order, and as even the Jauts and Bhurtpoor had been disposed of, there was absolutely nothing to fear from any of our neighbours or old foes, and therefore it was that our unfledged Indian statesmen looked for possible foes 600, or 1200, or

more miles beyond our frontier—to the mountains of Afghanistan, the plains of Bokhara, the deserts, the frontiers of Persia, and the shores of the Caspian Sea.

For many years after the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone's mission the Afghans ceased to be an object of alarm to our Anglo-Indians. Since the days of Zemaun Shah that people had never been enabled to cross the Indus. Instead of descending towards the south, they had been driven back considerably towards the north by the Ameers of Sinde and Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore. They had proved themselves incapable of contending with Runjeet Sing and his allies; the enmity between them and Runjeet Sing was fierce and irreconcileable, and, without traversing the regions held by the Lion, the Afghans could not approach our frontier. The same state of constant war and anarchy which Mr. Elphinstone saw in Afghanistan had continued ever since, or rather, it had become much worse than it was at the time of his visit. In fact the Afghan monarchy had been dismembered and almost completely broken up. After the flight of the Shah Shujah or Sujah in 1809,* the authority of the usurper Shah Mahmood was acknowledged in part of Afghanistan, the rest of the country submitting to the rule or misrule of divers chiefs or princes. After a brief alliance with Runjeet Sing, who helped him to recover Cashmere, Mahmood quarrelled with that potentate, and was defeated by him near the right bank of the Indus. After this disaster Mahmood, by means of treachery, obtained possession of Herat, one of the principal towns of Khorassan, the extensive regions of which had long been disputed by, and were now partially divided between, the Persians and different tribes of the Afghan race. Mahmood repulsed an attack made upon Herat by the Persians, and succeeded in maintaining himself in that city. Whatever success had attended his arms or his policy was owing to his able vizier Futteh Khan. In 1818 this vizier fell a victim to the jealousy of another chief and the ingratitude of Mahmood. His murder was the signal for the breaking up of the monarchy. Mahmood's brothers revolted against him, and his authority was soon confined to Herat and its dependencies. Cabul, Candahar, and Peshawer were held by different brothers of Mahmood, who soon fell out among themselves. The Dooraunees, or that tribe of the Afghans to which this unloving royal race belonged, shaped their allegiance according to the situation of their estates, those who had lands near Cabul recognising the brother that ruled there, and those whose lands lay near Herat obeying Mahmood, &c. This obedience, however, was but partial among the Dooraunees; and as for the other tribes and clans (too many to be enumerated), they nearly all remained independent, paying allegiance neither to Mahmood nor to any one of his brothers. During this decay of the Dooraunee monarchy Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore, was rapidly improving the discipline of his army by means of European officers. The final downfall of Bonaparte in 1815 broke up the trade of war in Europe, and drove a considerable number of adventurers, Frenchmen and Italians, to the East—to Persia, and even into India. Some of these men found their way to Lahore, and under their care the troops of Runjeet Sing were trained. These circumstances would have made Runjeet formidable to the Afghans even if they had been united, but divided as those people were, the Lion became irresistible. He took Cashmere, Mooltan, Leia, Upper Sinde, and the nearest part of Damaun, and reduced all the Afghan tribes south of Cashmere. After this, taking advantage of a quarrel and war between the Dooraunee prince of Cabul and his brother at Peshawer, and of an expedition which he enabled the expelled Shah Sujah, who had long been his guest, to make against Candahar, Runjeet Sing succeeded in conquering Peshawer himself with all the level country which the Afghans had occupied between the mountains and the river Indus. The Ameers of Sinde seized upon other territories which had belonged to the Dooraunee monarchy; Balkh threw off its nominal dependence, and in other territories of vast extent and thin population which lie between India and Persia, and

* See ante, p. 174.

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which had all obeyed Zemaun Shah, various chiefs and princes asserted their independence. Dost Mohamed, however, maintained himself at Cabul, and his brother or half-brother, after a sharp contest with the Shah Sujah, remained master of Candahar. Their brother Mahmood died, or was secretly murdered, at Herat, and was succeeded by his son Khamran or Camraun, who appears to have made some fruitless attempts to recover from his uncle Dost Mohamed the dominion of Cabul. The unfortunate Shah Sujah, having failed in other expeditions and enterprises undertaken in concert with Runjeet Sing, was at one time perfidiously seized and barbarously treated by the ungenerous Lion of Lahore, whose main object was to extort from him the famous Afghan diamond called the Cohi Noor.* He was delivered from his cruel captivity by the spirit and ability of his queen. After all these adventures Shah Sujah again found a safe asylum beyond the river Sutledge, in the British cantonment of Lodiana, where another ex-king of Cabul, his own brother, the once great Zemaun Shah, who had been dethroned and blinded by Mahmood, had long been residing as a pensioner of the British. A liberal pension was granted to Sujah, and the two exiles and ex-kings appear to have lived lovingly together in the same cantonments, making moral reflections on the instability of Eastern thrones and the uncertainty of all human greatness.†

Dost Mohamed Khan appears to have confirmed and enlarged his authority at Cabul about the year 1824. In 1834 he roused the whole Mohammedan population for an attack on the Seiks, for the propagation of the true faith, and for the recovery of Peshawer and the other Afghan dominions which had been lost. Runjeet Sing, who had then an army of 25,000 men, was determined not to let go his hold on the conquests he had made, while Dost Mohamed Khan seemed equally resolved to stake his political existence on the recovery of those conquests.* Until the month of April, 1835, nothing took place except some insignificant skirmishes; but, at the end of that month, Dost Mohamed joined his army and prepared to descend through the Khyber pass. Runjeet Sing advanced to meet him, and drew up his Seiks in battle array across the line of the advancing Afghans. Dost Mohamed, finding that several of his chiefs were in correspondence with the Lion of Lahore, and preparing to betray him and the Afghans, would not risk a battle. He retreated towards Cabul, and was followed for some distance up the Khyber pass by Runjeet Sing's Seiks. Upon his retreat the Afghan Sirdars, whose territories lay exposed, tendered their unconditional allegiance to Runjeet.† But other Afghan chiefs repaired to Cabul with their armed clans, and urged Dost Mohamed to make another forward movement, in order to drive back the infidel, unclean Seiks, who were keeping possession of Peshawer. Another Afghan army, 20,000 strong, assembled at Jellalabad. Descending the Khyber pass with about half of this number, Dost Mohamed's eldest son, Afzul Bey, fell upon a Seik army about 5000 strong, and completely defeated it, after an obstinate fight

* Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Sketch of Afghanistan History, in Appendix to 'Account of the Kingdom of Cabul, &c.,' new and revised edition, 1839. Alexander Burnes, Travels. Lieutenant Conolly, Travels.

† Burnes saw both the Shahs at Lodiana in 1830. The blind Shah had become very devout, and passed the greater part of his time in listening to the Koran and its commentaries. He, however, lamented that he could not pass the brief remainder of his days in his native land, where the heat was less oppressive. He was stone-blind and could not distinguish day from night; but he was very talkative, as was also his younger brother Shah Sujah. Burnes seems to have formed a correct opinion of the inaptitude of the latter prince. "From what I learn," said he, "I do not believe that Shah Sujah possesses sufficient energy to seat himself on the throne of Cabul; and that if he did regain it, he has not the tact to discharge the duties of so difficult a situation."—*Travels into Bokhara, Voyage on the Indus, &c.*

* Letter from Captain Wade, Political Resident at Lodiana.

† Outline of the Operations of the British troops in Scinde and Affghanistan, betwixt November, 1838, and November, 1841; with remarks on the Policy of the War. By Geo. Buist, LL.D., Editor of the 'Bombay Times,' Secretary to the Geographical and Agri-Horticultural Societies, and in charge of the Government Observatory, Bombay. Bombay, 1843.

and a terrible slaughter. This was in the month of June, 1836. But the victory of the Afghans was thrown away through the feuds and jealousies of the chieftains, and Runjeet Sing, instead of losing territory, soon began to make new conquests. Ever since he became master of Cabul, Dost Mohamed Khan had been constantly seeking for the friendship of the British Government. But by the treaty made between Lord William Bentinck and Runjeet Sing, at Ruper, in 1831, Runjeet was allowed to do what he pleased in the country beyond the Sutledge, and all notion of succouring the crazy and distracted Afghan monarchy was given up. On the 31st of May, 1836, Dost Mohamed addressed a letter of compliment to Lord Auckland, the newly arrived governor-general. No answer was returned to this letter until the month of October. His lordship's letter, however, when it arrived, gave great satisfaction, as it stated that he intended to depute some gentlemen to the Court of Cabul, to discuss certain commercial topics with a view to mutual advantages, &c. It was not, however, until the 20th of September, 1837, that Captain A. Burnes reached Dost Mohamed's capital as envoy from the governor-general. In the meanwhile several fierce conflicts had taken place between the Afghans and the Seiks: the success had been various, but the celebrated Seik leader, Hurry Sing, had been defeated and slain in one of the battles. During the same interval Dost Mohamed had applied not only to the Persians and to the Tartars, but also to the *Russians*, for aid and assistance. Burnes represented to the Cabul court that the object of his mission was purely commercial.* Dost Mohamed wanted arms and ammunition and artillery wherewith to fight the Seiks, and not bales of manufactures. Nevertheless he received our envoy in a very flattering manner, and impressed him with the notion that he was the best ruler that Cabul could possibly have, and the best ally the English could find anywhere beyond the Sutledge. The Khan assured Burnes that our Indian government might rely on his cordial co-operation in any measures which tended to promote our trade in Cabul, and through Afghanistan with Bokhara, Kurdistan, Khorassan, &c.—countries of sounding names and of great extent, but far too barbarous or thinly peopled, or anarchic, to promise any significant advantage to our commerce. Dost Mohamed complained that his hostilities with the Seiks narrowed his resources and compelled him to take up money from the merchants, and even to increase the duties on merchandise; but, at the same time, he displayed a very lively anxiety to get possession of Peshawer, which had been taken from one of his brothers by Runjeet Sing. The young Shah of Persia, who had succeeded his grandfather in October, 1834, had lost no time in responding to Dost Mohamed's desire for an alliance. The court of Teheran hoped that while Runjeet Sing and the Seiks were pressing upon Afghanistan on one side, a Persian army, favoured still further by the dissensions of the Afghan rulers and chiefs, might easily make conquests on the other, recover Herat, and establish the dominion of the young Shah at least over the whole of Khorassan and Candahar.* Khamran, the Afghan ruler of Herat, on the death of the old Shah of Persia, in 1834, had made a predatory incursion into the

* In his account of the mission, this unfortunate man says—"The objects of government were to work out its policy of opening the river Indus to commerce, and establishing on its banks, and in the countries beyond it, such relations as should contribute to the desired end."—'Cabool: being a personal narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that City, in the years 1836, 7, and 8,' by Lieut.-Col. Sir Alexander Burnes, C.B., &c., London, 1842.

* Mr. Ellice, our resident minister at the Court of Teheran, had been instructed by Lord Palmerston to warn the Persian government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war with the Afghans. Mr. Ellice discovered that the young Shah had made up his mind to pursue the course which Lord Palmerston apprehended. As early as November, 1835, Mr. Ellice wrote to Downing-street:—"The Shah has very extensive schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan; and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that he has the right of sovereignty over Herat and Candahar. He proposes various expeditions for the spring of 1836—one against Herat—one against Candahar—and another against the Beloochees: the minister states that the dominions of Persia properly extend as far as Ghuznee."—*Parliamentary Papers.*

Persian territories, in concert with Turcomans, Hazarees, and other robbers, and had captured some thousands of Persian subjects, for the purpose of selling them as slaves in Central Asia. Although this wholesale kidnapping was a very ancient practice, it certainly seemed, of itself, to justify the young Shah in marching an army against Herat and the Afghan ruler Khamran. At the same time he was invited and pressed to the enterprise by most of the Afghan sirdars of Candahar, who had long been engaged in a blood-feud with Khamran, and who, for the gratification of their vengeance, were willing to bring their old enemies the Persians even into the heart of Afghanistan Proper. But when it was found, or rather suspected, by our mission at Teheran, that the young Shah of Persia had been encouraged and promised pecuniary assistance by the Russians, who, it was reasoned, must know that the conquest of Herat and Candahar by the Persians would be in fact an advance gained for the Russians towards India, if not for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorganization, great alarm was felt by our mission, and was by them communicated from Teheran to Downing-street. In short our ministers at home and our diplomatists in Persia were suddenly excited by all that jealousy and dread of Russia which had been diffused through the greater part of our Indian government by Burnes and others. The cabinet of St. Petersburg must have laughed at this groundless panic; and it was quite in keeping with the crooked policy of that cabinet to resort to sundry paltry and secret measures in order to keep up the panic, while they were publicly assuring Lord Palmerston (and so far with perfect truth) that they entertained no designs of aggrandisement on the side of India. In spite of all the remonstrances of our ambassador, the young Shah, in July, 1837, put himself and an army of 40,000 men with 70 pieces of artillery on their march from Teheran to Herat. This, we believe, would not have been done if the private intercourse between Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador, and the Persian court, had corresponded with the declarations which Count Nesselrode was making to Lord Palmerston, and which Count Simonich himself was making to Mr. Ellice and Mr. MacNeil at Teheran. Although the route of the Persian army lay almost entirely through their own country, they were unable to reach Herat before the end of November, 1837, or about two months after Burnes's arrival at Cabul. Owing to their empty treasury, defective commissariat, and want of discipline, this Persian army frequently threatened to melt away before they had seen an enemy, and when they approached Herat they were but a miserable and half-starved rabble. After some further delays they commenced what has been complimentarily termed "the *Siege* of Herat." This miserable operation occupied them for more than nine months. Before it began, and while the Persians were slowly toiling towards that part of Khorassan, Dost Mohamed, who had promised the young Shah that he would assist him, told Burnes that a Persian Elchee, or ambassador, was then at Candahar, bringing him presents and a promise of a crore of rupees from his Persian majesty. The old Khan, however, added that he did not place much reliance on Persian promises, and was easily induced by Burnes to pledge his word (it was probably not worth much more than a Persian promise) to cease all further intercourse with the court of Teheran, and to use his best endeavours to make his brothers, and all the Afghan chiefs over whom he had any authority, engage to do the same. But on the 24th of December, 1837, just as the Persian army or rabble were encompassing Herat, Captain Burnes ascertained that a Russian agent had reached Cabul, and had been honourably received by Dost Mohamed. This individual appears to have been one of those obscure, questionable agents or spies which the Russian government employ *indirectly*, and cast off, repudiate, and destroy or cause to be destroyed whenever necessary. Such adventurers are said to abound in many countries, and much of the ingenuity of Russian diplomatists is supposed to go in the selection of them: they have no credentials, rank, station, or pay from the government at St. Petersburg; they are seldom admitted to the august presence of a

Russian ambassador, or so much as to the presence of a chargé d'affaires, or secretary, or attaché, or consul; they are hired by men as obscure and unaccredited as themselves; and, therefore, nothing is so easy as for the Russian minister for foreign affairs to deny all knowledge of them, or so difficult as for the minister of any other country to prove their connexion with him. If, on the other hand, circumstances occur which render it profitable or expedient to give these mysterious agents an accredited diplomatic character, then the Russian government steps forward and acknowledges them, or some Russian ambassador or other resident in foreign parts is ready with his credentials. The mysterious agent who appeared at Cabul, to the infinite amazement and consternation of Burnes, is styled Captain Vicovich. He is differently described as an officer of Cossacks, an engineer officer, a Pole who had fought with the Russians against his own countrymen, and as a half-Italian half-Dalmatian adventurer, from the Bocca di Cattaro or some other place on the Dalmatian coast—a coast inhabited by an offshoot of the great Sclavonian family, to which Poles and Russians equally belong; and a country from which the Russians are said to have drawn many such agents. The truth appears to be that nobody either in India or in Afghanistan knew who or what the man was, or whether Vicovich were not a *nom de guerre*.* He had been sent from Herat by Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador, who had accompanied the Persian army to the siege of that place, as Mr. MacNeil had also done. He gave out that the objects of his mission were purely commercial, even like those of Burnes. Burnes wanted to find out new roads for English trade; Vicovich only wanted to ascertain the advantages and degree of security Russian merchants might expect in entering on commercial speculations with Cabul. It seems, however, to be quite certain that the new comer entertained the Afghans with surprising stories about the far-reaching power of the Czar, and at one time induced Dost Mohamed to expect Russian alliance and assistance, and, through the good offices of the Czar, a closer and more friendly connexion with the young Shah of Persia, who, as well as the Turkish sultan, was at this time united in the bonds of political connexion and dependency with the old enemies of his country, the Muscovites. The ruler of Cabul at first considered the fall of Herat and the advance of the Persians towards his own dominions as inevitable; and in this belief he was eager to secure a previous treaty with the conquerors. But he feared their success as much as he feared the success of his relative Khamran, who, if he repulsed the Persians, would gain a great accession of fame and strength, and, in all probability, turn his victorious arms in the direction of Cabul. It has been surmised that, in his doubts and perplexities, the offer of an English treaty and of some regiments of the Company's sepoys would have made Dost Mohamed break off all intercourse with the Russian agent and with the Persians; but this is but a conjecture, and it appears that he was much disquieted and indisposed towards us by the knowledge of the facts that a distinguished English officer had thrown himself into

* The name is written in various ways. Burnes writes it Vilkievitch. He also seems to call him a Pole, and to quote the inscription on his visiting card.

"In the midst of these amusements (that is to say, dining and drinking with the Nabob and others) the arrival of a *Russian* officer produced a considerable sensation at Cabul. Almost immediately on his entering the city, 'le Lieutenant Vilkievitch, *Polonois*' paid me a visit, and on the day after his arrival, which happened to be Christmas-day, I invited him to dinner. He was a gentlemanly and agreeable man, of about thirty years of age, and spoke French, Turkish, and Persian fluently, and wore the uniform of an *officer of Cossacks*, which was a novelty in Cabul. He had been three times at Bokhara, and we had therefore a common subject to converse upon, without touching on politics. I found him intelligent and well informed on the subject of Northern Asia. He very frankly said that it was not the custom of Russia to publish to the world the result of its researches in foreign countries, as was the case with France and England. I never again met Mr. Vilkievitch (or, as I see it written, Vicovich), although we exchanged sundry messages of 'high consideration;' for I regret to say that I found it to be impossible to follow the dictates of my personal feelings of friendship towards him, as the public service required the strictest watch, lest the relative positions of our nations should be misunderstood in this part of Asia."—*Cabool.*

Herat, and was assisting Khamran in the defence of that place, and that the British government was making preparations on an extensive scale for relieving the besieged city. But if Dost Mohamed hated and feared the ruler of Herat more than any of his enemies, and could contemplate with composure the triumph of the Persians—provided only he could make an advantageous arrangement with them—it was far otherwise with *his subjects* and the Afghan people generally of the Kuzzilbash sect. These men described the Persians as infidels and heretics, and the Afghans of Herat as men true to God and the prophet; they triumphantly recited every discomfiture of the Persians, and offered up prayers for the entire destruction of the besiegers with their king and all. On the other hand, the Afghans of the Soonee sect prayed quite as fervently for the success of the Persian Shah. Amidst such contradictions and conflicting opinions, such violent passions and blood-feuds, a much abler man than Burnes might have been bewildered. The whole country was one vast Bedlam. But our confident envoy fancied that he could bring these madmen to reason by writing now and then what he called "a Junius." When Dost Mohamed justified his negotiations with the Persians by pleading the necessity of making terms for himself beforehand, in case of the Shah advancing to Candahar, Burnes told him that there was no fear of any such advance, offered himself to serve with the troops of Candahar, and to assist the Sirdar with money; and he suggested to our Indian government an advance of 30,000*l*. But these proceedings were repudiated by Lord Auckland, who declared in a minute that he would not oppose the hostile advance of Persia either by arms or by money. His lordship must have known by this time that the Persians had no chance of making such advance, and that the operations contemplated by his government in the Persian Gulf would make the young Shah fly back towards his capital, even though he should have reduced Herat previously. Not being able to do more, Burnes dispatched a member of his mission, Lieutenant Leech, to Candahar, to ascertain how matters stood in that quarter. The three brothers who ruled in that part of Afghanistan—Kohun Dil Khan, Rehem Dil Khan, and Meer Dil Khan—were at this time actually in treaty with the Persians, with a view to their assisting in the attack on Herat, and in the subjugation of Khamran and their own countrymen. Here English money was again offered; but the three chiefs, jealous of Burnes's connexion with the ruler of Cabul, declined the offer, and stated that the *intent* of their negotiations had been to keep off Persia, to ruin Khamran, and make themselves masters of Herat. Like Dost Mohamed, these three Khans had no settled line of policy: what they evidently wanted was, to play off England against Russia and Persia, and these two powers against England. The prospect of advantage to themselves which they believed to be opened by a competition between states so powerful and wealthy for their good graces or attachment, divested their communications of all sincerity, and enough transpired to destroy every feeling of confidence in their good faith. From this moment our English officers, who were dabbling in diplomacy, ought to have felt that no Afghan treaty could be worth the piece of paper or parchment on which it was written. Such must have been the fact even if the Afghan chiefs had entered into a treaty with good faith, as the wild anarchic state of the country, with its blood-feuds and intrigues, rendered the power of every Khan to the last degree precarious. But none of the chiefs knew what good faith meant—they were at one and the same time making professions of the most cordial attachment to the English on one side, and to the Persians and Russians on the other.*

After passing the winter of 1837-38 in Cabul, Captain Burnes, in the spring, prepared to depart. At this moment Dost Mohamed would very willingly have agreed to accept an English subsidy. But Burnes had no money to give him, and had been rather sharply censured for having offered any. Our envoy left Cabul on the 26th of April, 1838, carrying with him abundant professions of

* Quarterly Review.

personal friendship and regard from Dost Mohamed, who was at this time doubly disappointed and more than ever perplexed, as no money came to him from Russia, and as Khamran continued to be brilliantly successful in Herat. In our case the fault might lie with Burnes, who had not been authorized by his employers to make any offer of pecuniary aid; and in the case of Russia it is at least probable that Lieutenant Vicovich exceeded his instructions; but between them, the conduct of these two agents was calculated to make the Afghans believe that Feringees were just as double-dealing and insincere as they themselves. Vicovich on his arrival had announced splendid presents from the Czar and ample pecuniary assistance to Dost Mohamed: he also spread reports in all directions that he was sent to intimate the arrival at Astrabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate with the Persian Shah's army against Herat. Now, neither presents nor money ever reached Cabul, and as for the army of Astrabad nothing could be heard of it. On the earnest, if not passionate, representations of Mr. Mac Neil, the Russian general and diplomatist Duhamel, who had superseded Count Simonich, and had journeyed to the Persian Shah's quarters before Herat, sent orders to Vicovich to quit Cabul forthwith. The Russian, Polish, or Dalmatian adventurer left the capital of Dost Mohamed a very few days after the departure of Burnes: he travelled from Cabul towards Candahar; he was traced to the neighbourhood of the latter city, but there he disappeared, and nothing more could ever be learned of him or of his mysterious mission. He is generally supposed to have been murdered; but whether he was cut off by some of the marauding Afghans, who were quite capable of killing a better man merely for the value of the gilded brass buttons on his coat, or whether he received his quietus and had his portmanteau and his pockets emptied for higher and political motives, remains matter of conjecture. It is, however, perfectly well known that the Russian government never made any stir about him, or expressed any interest as to his fate. The most probable conjectures should seem to be these—Vicovich was murdered by some Afghan robbers,—and those who employed him and sent him to Cabul were not sorry that his living evidence should be suppressed in so effectual a manner. Yet, we confess, we should not be much surprised to learn that the adventurer was not murdered at all, but is still living in some remote part of the Russian empire, if not in some European capital, like Athens or Constantinople.* It appears, however, that after the departure of Burnes and Vicovich, and notwithstanding his disappointments as to Russian assistance, Dost Mohamed still leaned strongly towards a Russian and Persian connexion, being more than ever convinced that the English would not break their agreements with Runjeet Sing, or do anything to force the Seiks to give up the conquests they had made from the Afghans.

After visiting Runjeet Sing in the most friendly manner, and feasting with the French and Italian officers at Peshawer and Lahore, Captain Burnes, in the month of July, repaired to Simla to meet the governor-general, Lord Auckland, and to take a foremost part in a council of all our north-western frontier residents and diplomatists, whose previous differences of opinion as to the course to be pursued with regard to the Seiks and Afghans had become notorious. At these conferences, held in the cool and pleasant recesses of the Himalaya, it was fully determined in

* What with surmises and well-proved facts, there is a monstrous accumulation of treachery, depravity, secret assassination, and open murders and massacres in all this Afghan story! Vicovich is shrewdly suspected of having been a murderer before he was murdered. Dost Mohamed had secretly sent a messenger, one Hussein Ali, to Russia to negotiate for the Czar's assistance. The Russian government itself declared afterwards that Vicovich had been sent to Cabul in consequence of Hussein Ali's mission. It was known that Hussein Ali and Vicovich had travelled together, and it was expected by the Afghans that they would arrive together at Cabul. But Vicovich arrived without Hussein Ali, whose non-appearance was considered badly accounted for by the pretence stated by Vicovich, that he had fallen very sick and had been left behind at Moscow. In short, the general opinion among the Afghans of Cabul was that Vicovich had murdered Hussein Ali.—*Charles Masson, Esq., Narrative of a Journey in Beloochistan, Afghanistan, &c.*

a fatal moment, by the governor-general,* that as Dost Mohamed could not be trusted he ought to be dethroned; that the exiled king of Cabul, Shah Sujah, should be called from his easy retirement at Lodiana, and be sent with an English army to recover a throne which he had repeatedly proved himself to be incapable of keeping! Captain Burnes's opinions seem to have varied according to times and circumstances, and the opinions of other men higher in office than himself. At one period he represented Shah Sujah as an imbecile prince without a party in his own country, and at another period he represented his party as being so strong that the moving of a handful of our troops into Afghanistan would place him on the throne; at one time he represented Dost Mohamed as the best ally the governor-general could find: and, not long after, he describes Dost Mohamed as an irreconcileable enemy whose factious spirit ought to be broken. He now declared that Shah Sujah had more friends in the country through which the Khyber pass runs than in any other part of Afghanistan, that the distribution of a little money among the Khyberees would convert them all into warm friends of the English, and enable Shah Sujah to advance to Cabul in triumph and without bloodshed. Studying, as he did, the newspapers, magazines, and reviews of the day, much more than the older and standard works wherein the science of politics and diplomacy is to be learned, Burnes had caught all the newest and most current phraseologies. "For my own part," said he, "I have more faith in political *agitation* for the Shah's cause than in physical force." "I attach importance to the presence of a small portion of our troops only from the prestige it will exercise. . . . It is not essential to success, but, I think, would contribute to it." This doomed man also thought that it would be very possible to effect a reconciliation between Shah Sujah and Dost Mohamed, by making the latter, who had so long sat upon the throne, if not vizier or prime minister to the former, then a governor of one of his provinces, and that it would be highly to the credit of the British government to aid in such a reconciliation and arrangement. He confidently pointed out the line of march and the line of conduct which Shah Sujah ought to follow; and finally, he thought that, with a few of our troops and not much of our money, the Shah might soon recover dominion over the whole of Afghanistan, and restore the glory of the Dooraunee monarchy.*

* "A most unwise provision in the Charter Act permits the governor-general to act alone, and on his own responsibility, when absent from Calcutta. The commander-in-chief (*Sir H. Fane*) is known to have been hostile to the war, and the Hon. Messrs. Prinsep and Bird (*two other members of council*) were universally believed to be the same: Three out of five."—*Buist.*

* Opinions as to the mode of restoring Shah Sujah, submitted by Burnes, as quoted by Doctor Buist; 'Outline of the Operations of the British troops in Scinde and Affghanistan.'

These opinions, which are dated in June, 1838, seem to differ in almost every particular from the opinions which this unfortunate man had offered to the governor-general only a few months before. It is said that a sudden change had come over Lord Auckland's political vision; that his lordship, in 1837, thought that the Afghans might be left to themselves, and that Runjeet Sing was the party to be feared and to be attacked by the British, if any war was to be undertaken in India; and that his lordship's difference of opinion, in 1838, was induced not so much by the instructions he received from the Board of Control, as by sudden partialities and influences that were nearer to him. It is added that Lord Auckland hesitated and held back as the decisive moment approached, and that his secretaries and the war party were terrified lest the whisper of the possibility of pacific arrangements should reach his ear. Mr. Masson, whose authority is questioned, though it does not appear to us more questionable than that of several other agents of government whose contradictory statements cannot be reconciled or made consistent, says that he had previously learned a strange account of the mode in which the amiable Lord Auckland had been driven into measures which his better judgment disapproved, and how he had been obliged to yield to the assaults of certain female aides-de-camp, and secretaries; and that, upon questioning Burnes on the part he had taken, particularly as regarded the expedition to Afghanistan, Burnes replied that it was all arranged before he reached Simla, and that when he arrived there to meet his lordship, two of the secretaries came running to him, praying him to say nothing to unsettle his lordship, and telling him that they had taken all the trouble in the world to get him into the business, and that even now his lordship would be glad on any pretence to *get out of* it. But if this story told by Burnes be true, it does not tell much to the honour of that unfortunate man, as it was just before meeting Lord Auckland at Simla that he submitted the reasons we have quoted in the text for supporting Shah Sujah and embarking on

Two months before Burnes met the governor-general at Simla, a mission consisting of Mr. MacNaghten, the Hon. Captain Osborne, and others, had been sent to Lahore to cement our perpetual friendship with Runjeet Sing and the Seiks, to draw up with Runjeet a new treaty, in which Shah Sujah should be included, and to pave the way for the easy advance of a British army through the Seik country to Cabul. This mission—in whose deliberations Burnes had shared—had so far succeeded in its object, that a tripartite treaty had been settled and ratified, in which the dethroned, poor and helpless Shah of Cabul was included with the Governor-General of British India and the powerful ruler of Lahore and of all the Punjab.

Our warlike preparations, or what Burnes calls "the ulterior measures," which "could only be matured at Simla," went on the while (the governor-general and his numerous party enjoying the interval among the cool hills and green woods and the refreshing waters), but it was not until the 1st of October that his lordship issued his famous Simla proclamation. At this moment, if the governor-general did not know that the siege of Herat—the first alleged great cause of our inquietude—had been raised, and the reduced Persian army forced into a disgraceful and ruinous retreat, he might at least have known that the young Shah had no chance of success, and that the British expedition sent to the Persian Gulf could not fail in its proposed object. Persia had derived nothing but disaster and shame from the rashly undertaken expedition, and ill and pusillanimously conducted siege. Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who threw himself into the place, directed the defence. The ignorant besiegers could scarcely preserve so much as a blockade; they knew nothing about regular approaches, and in all their attempts to storm they were beaten back. In one assault the Shah lost 1800 men in killed and wounded, and altogether his casualities exceeded 3000. He was as remote from his object in September, 1838, as in November, 1837, when he first came in sight of Herat. His army was short of provisions, and without clothing or pay; and rather than have continued through another winter, before a fortress which had so repeatedly defeated them, the Persians would in all likelihood have dispersed of themselves, in spite of all their Shah could do to retain them.*

Our expedition from Bombay landed at Karrack in the Persian Gulf, in the middle of June, when MacNaghten and Burnes were preparing for the Afghanistan war by negotiating with Runjeet Sing at Lahore. The possession of Karrack, an island belonging to Persia, and in the centre of the Shah's dominions, showed him how completely those dominions were within our grasp, showed him that we could disembark any force we pleased at Bushire within a fortnight of its quitting Bombay, and possess ourselves of some of the chief towns of Persia before the people at large could be made aware that hostilities were intended. It had been pointed out by a foreign writer that if all the powers of the Russian empire were exerted in equipping an army for the invasion of India, and if

the whirlpool of Afghan politics and war. Those opinions were written at Lahore, where Burnes had been in constant communication with Mr. MacNaghten, who had recently been in the secretariat at Calcutta, who had been removed from that post to be made political resident and manager on the Indus, and who was well known to Burnes and to every one else to be one of the warmest and most impatient of the war-party. After submitting these said opinions at Lahore, Burnes could hardly have required any persuasion not to speak against the war to Lord Auckland at Simla. It appears, indeed, from Burnes's own showing, that almost everything was settled at Lahore by him, MacNaghten, and others, between the 17th of June and the 15th or 16th of July,—or several days before he reached Simla and met either the governor-general or his secretaries. He tells us that he joined the diplomatic party at Lahore on the 17th of June. He adds—"*A short month's stay* at Lahore served to accomplish the ends which government had then in view. The ulterior measures could only be matured at Simla, whither I proceeded by invitation to wait on Lord Auckland, to whom I paid my respects on the 20th of July."—*Cabool, &c.* Now, it was during this short month—or on the 26th of June—that the treaty, providing for war on the largest scale, was ratified between the British government, Runjeet Sing, and the Shah Sujah!

* Buist. 'Outline of the Operations of the British Troops in Sciude and Affghanistan.'

that mighty army, overcoming obstacles that were scarcely to be overcome by any army of any size, reached the western borders of Beloochistan in safety, with its complete materiel, a descent by the British on Bushire would put us in possession of all the communications of that army, compel Persia at her peril to act against it, and place the rear of that army and the line of its advance and relief completely at our mercy.* The descent on Karrack gave practical proof of the soundness of this speculation. Moreover it had been shown pretty clearly that for Russia to send an army as far as the eastern border of Persia was *impossible*, and our own experience has now convinced the most sceptical that were the Russians *there*, the mountain tribes, without our intervention, would cut off their supplies, destroy their cattle, and seize their baggage. We could, any day, cut an expedition from the westward to pieces, by landing a force at Bushire, where the coast country, with our commanding fleets and uninterrupted supplies, would furnish a base of operations from which Europe and Asia united together could not drive us. It has further been shown that a Russian army would take twice the time to march from their farthest to our nearest Indian frontier, that the armies of England would occupy in being wafted from the bank of the Thames to the banks of the Indus; and that, during the interval, our fleets might annihilate the navy of the Czar, or blockade it and render it utterly useless in the Baltic and in the Black Sea.† From the moment that our troops landed on his island of Karrack, the eyes of the Persian Shah were turned more anxiously in that direction than upon the siege of Herat; and, at the end of September, when he gave up that siege altogether, and put his diminished and rabble army in motion for a retreat into the heart of his own country, he declared that he did so in consequence of the presence of our armament, and that if Karrack had not been seized by us, Herat would have been taken by *him*. It is true that the possession of Karrack and the descent we might so easily have effected on Bushire were calculated to induce a rapid retreat, even if the Persians had been on the eve of victory and conquest; but it is not true that our menacing attitude at Karrack was the sole cause of the Shah's hasty retreat:—his army was not on the eve of victory, but on the very brink of dissolution; after many defeats, it was half famished and was

* The British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna, Translated by H. Evans Lloyd. London, 1840.

† George Ruist.

All this was shown still more clearly in an excellent article in the 'Spectator' newspaper, published on the 27th of July, 1839.

"Herat is declared to be the key to the British dominions in India—the key which is 'to open the door to the Russians, and their allies the Persians, to Hindustan. The supposed key, in this case, is surely at a vast distance from the door. Our own army (*the unfortunate army employed in the Afghan war*) has been already five months on its march from our frontier, backed by all the resources of India, and without firing a single shot, unless at a few freebooters; and there is no trustworthy intelligence that it has yet reached the first spot where there is any probability of its meeting with resistance, viz. Candahar. . . . . From Candahar to Herat, allowing for halting-days, and supposing no interruption from an enemy, is at least a month's march. Thus, therefore, without meeting an enemy—and supposing the barren country which it had in its rear and along its line of march could afford it the same supply of food which fertile, populous, and peaceful India affords us—it would take a Russian army five months to march from Herat to the nearest British frontier, with many a key to get possession of, and many a door to unlock between; and, after that, there is a march of at least 1500 miles, farther to the chief seat of our power and resources, Lower Bengal and Calcutta; which would take at least four months more, supposing the climate, our armies, and our fortresses offered no resistance, and that John Bull (who in one-half the whole time mentioned could send an army from the banks of the Thames) were to look on with his hands in his breeches-pocket doing nothing. But to reach India is not to conquer India (never so powerful and united as under our own administration), as any one who will take the pains to read may learn from the history of its invaders from ALEXANDER to AHMED SHAH. Most of them never penetrated much beyond the frontier, and the few who established themselves in the north-west took not months or years, but from one to two centuries, to conquer the east and the south. The truth is, that a Russian invasion and conquest of India is but the dream of a troubled conscience. No man in his waking moments and sober senses *imagines* the possibility of the thing, or fancies it even probable that any nation whatever, without the command of the sea and of immense pecuniary resources, would be mad enough even to make the attempt."—*Spectator*.

wholly disheartened, and it could not by any possibility have continued its stupid operations round Herat through another winter, or so much as through another month.

Well! Herat was safe—that key to the British dominions in India could not be given by Persia to Russia, for Persia could not get it. All the dispositions for a grand campaign beyond the Indus and in the heart of Afghanistan were made (badly enough, no doubt!), and marching orders were given; but it appears that not a single regiment had yet begun to march when Lord Auckland received official intelligence of the retreat of the Persians from Herat. But this intelligence had no apparent effect on the counsels and conduct of men who had made up their minds for war, and who could not rest until the British flag should be carried over the snowy mountains and through the deep defiles of Afghanistan. These men did not see, or would not feel, what a perfect bulwark nature and fortune had opposed to the possibility of a successful invasion of British India from the westward; and that they were going to weaken by their aggression the most formidable portion of this bulwark. Long before the fearful catastrophe in which all this blindness, or rashness and obstinacy, ended, and while unthinking people were shouting for the victories our arms were obtaining, a sensible writer at home said—"We are making the false movement of a general who, finding a broad marsh between himself and his opponent, wantonly crosses it, with great loss and inconvenience, posts himself on the opposite margin, and cutting himself off from his supplies, affords his opponent, at the first favourable moment, an opportunity of driving him into the swamp, or starving him to death, or compelling him to surrender at discretion. Such is a fair view of our present adventure, nor can we see any termination, utter discomfiture excepted, to the course into which it leads, until it bring us to the very thing we deprecate—contiguity and collision with the power of Russia in Persia." *

* Spectator, July 27th, 1839.

The day is not yet come for writing anything like a history of the Afghan war. Passions and prejudices must cool, and time must be allowed for the gradual collection of authentic and dispassionate materials. We feel that we could not venture upon details without occasionally expressing very strong opinions. It is indecorous, it is savage to yell over a newly-made grave. The promoters of, and the chief actors in the Afghan war, paid for their follies with their lives, dying most of them with the troops they led to death; and their catastrophe is of so recent a date that scarcely an allusion can be made to it without wringing the hearts of numerous surviving friends and relatives. Therefore, referring our readers to Gazettes and Dispatches, and to the numerous books which have already been written by officers and others in India (the best of all these books being that of Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, late Deputy Commissary of Ordnance at Cabul), we shall pass rapidly over the disastrous campaigns, the management of which was, if possible, worse even than the original conception, or than the policy which recommended the war.

In the month of October, 1838, when Lord Auckland issued his warlike proclamation at Simla, the army of India was raised to 203,000 men. Sir Henry Fane was at this time commander-in-chief of all India. He disapproved both of the principles of policy and of the arrangement of the details of the expedition; and viewed with alarm the prospect of having our armies so far removed from our own frontier. Sir Henry was besides in indifferent health when the first campaign was announced.* As a foretaste of what might be expected from him, Runjeet Sing, in despite of the recent treaty

* Colonel Fane, the son of Sir Henry Fane, said afterwards—"I am prepared to prove that the military head in India and second member of council of that country, did oppose, or perhaps rather, point out to the governor-general, the extreme danger of this wild and unmeasured expedition. . . . . He ensured Lord Auckland of the success which did at first appear to attend us, but warned him that to maintain large bodies of troops in countries so distant, and which scarce produced food sufficient for the scanty population, was next to impossible."—Letter published in the 'Times' of 5th June, 1842.

which had been drawn up at Lahore by Mac Naghten and Burnes, refused to allow our troops to cross the Punjab. Our principal rendezvous was therefore appointed to be Shikarpoor in Sinde; and thence our line of advance was to be by the Bolan Pass, Quettah, and Candahar. At the beginning of December, and not before, the force on the Bengal side was ready to proceed without delay to Sinde. It was 9500 strong. A larger number had been intended; but is was thought that the intelligence of the raising of the siege of Herat would lessen the exigencies of the service. A reserve division was stationed at Firozepoor, under Major-General Duncan, and was 4250 strong. Runjeet Sing had engaged to maintain a Seik army of observation of 15,000 men. Another Seik contingent, about 6000 strong, was placed under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Wade, and was to move on Cabul by the eastern passes. A Bombay column, 5500 strong, under Sir John Keane, landed at Vikkur, on one of the mouths of the river Indus, and advanced into Sinde. The Ameers of Sinde had faithfully promised to provide supplies and the means of conveyance for our armies; but, on arriving at Kurrachee, about fifty miles from Vikkur, Sir John Keane found that they had provided nothing but jealousy, hatred, and enmity, and that the mass of the Sinde population were eager to attack his column. From 16,000 to 17,000 armed Beloochees occupied the Hydrabad side of the river; and so eager were these undisciplined hordes to attack us, that it was said that the Ameers in friendship and alliance with us, had to distribute from 50,000*l.* to 60,000*l.* among them to keep them quiet. It is very probable that these friendly Ameers kept the money themselves; but be that as it may, a beginning was made, thus early, to the unpromising practice of buying a passage through a country. As soon as the Bengal column reached Firozepoor, an outstation on the banks of the Sutledge, about fifty miles from Lahore, Sir Henry Fane, whose health was growing worse, resigned the command; and boats being provided for himself and staff, he dropped down the Sutledge and Indus, with the intention of remaining at Bombay and retaining the post of commander-in-chief in India until his successor should be appointed from home. Thus, at starting, and before the main body got beyond our frontier, our army was left without a commander-in-chief. Lord Auckland nominated Sir John Keane, a brave and experienced officer, but said to be headstrong, passionate, and domineering, to the direction of the whole force, and instructed him to send his own orders to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who, as senior officer, had succeeded to the command of the Bengal column as a temporary measure until its junction with the Bombay troops. This also gave the temporary command of a division to Major-General Nott, and of a brigade to Colonel Dennie. We can trace, even at this moment, some of the jealousies and heartburnings which helped to destroy the discipline of the whole army.

Sir John Keane and his Bombay column, after numerous difficulties and delays, advanced towards Tatta on the 24th of December. Here the climate was very trying both for the European and the native troops; the days were excessively hot, the nights very cold; the thermometer, which rose to above 90° in the day, descended as low as 35° in the night. The granaries had all been plundered by the Beloochees, and, as was believed, with the sanction of the Ameers. When the Shah Sujah's contingent of 6000 men (bad troops, and paid entirely by us) moved down parallel to the line of Sir John Keane's advance, and occupied Larkhana, and the Bengal column moved upon their right, the Beloochees retreated and disbanded themselves, and then the Ameers, seeing Hydrabad, their capital, open to attack, made a new agreement with Sir John Keane, and fulfilled some few of its conditions. Sir Alexander Burnes (he had been made Knight Commander of the Bath and Lieutenant-Colonel for his previous services on the Indus, in Afghanistan, &c., and, perhaps, in part for his ample contribution to the unlucky scheme now in process of execution) had been employed to collect at Shikarpoor camels for the use of the whole army. The governor-general had calculated that

45,000 camels might be obtained; and he had informed Sir John Keane that this number should be fairly and proportionately distributed among the Bengal troops, the Bombay troops, and Shah Sujah's contingent. But Burnes could never collect 20,000 camels at Shikarpoor, and the Bengal column which had just arrived took it for granted that all the camels were for them; and thought it extremely hard that Sir John Keane should order any to be appropriated either by the Bombay troops or by the Shah's contingent. The Bengal commissariat officers left at Shikarpoor managed to evade every order sent to them to forward camels to Larkhana, until Captain Outram was sent back to them by Sir John Keane. There were clearly not camels enough for all, and Colonel Dennie and other officers of the Bengal army, who had always been accustomed to assert a superiority over the officers of the other presidencies, thought it hard that their troops should be left behind for want of the means of transport, and camels be given up for the raw levies of Shah Sujah, who were almost sure to run away from the first enemy they met. But the governor-general's instructions were very positive —Shah Sujah's contingent must be sent on entire, if possible—and accordingly camels were sent after them. This produced fresh murmurs and heartburnings. The cholera morbus broke out among the reserved force of 3000 men at Kurrachee, and carried off a great many of them. Colonel Thomas Powell of the 40th regiment, and an old and experienced Peninsular officer, died of the dreadful disease. Everywhere disasters and the forebodings of calamity thickened, and warned men—who would not be warned—to stop their advance and retrace their steps. There was no dependence to be placed either upon the Sinde Ameers or upon Runjeet Sing—there was little security for our communications and supplies, and such means as were adopted for the obtaining of some such security were inadequate to the end, were slovenly, unsystematic, unworthy of British officers at this time of day. The Bengal army, the Bombay army, Shah Sujah's rabble, and the other contingent forces went on, each in its own way, and with little or no attention to the progress of all the rest; and nearly every division was accompanied by an amazing number of camp-followers, who could not shift for themselves in the countries beyond the Indus. On the 20th of February 1839, when Sir Willoughby Cotton commenced his march towards the Bolan Pass with the Bengal army, he was attended by about 80,000 camp-followers, who were all to be fed from the commissariat. Crossing a broad and hungry desert, this Bengal column reached Dadur, at the foot of the mountains of Western Afghanistan, on the 6th of March. Here supplies began to run short, so that the non-combatants of the column were put on half-rations before entering the mountain country. Yet they had scarcely left the territories of professing friends and allies, and had performed no more than one half of the journey to Cabul: they had hitherto lost little or nothing by pillage, and had never encountered an enemy, and nevertheless they were already menaced with famine. The Bombay column was at this time 9 marches, or nearly 100 miles, behind. Close by Dadur is the mouth of the Bolan Pass—a terrible chasm nearly seventy miles long, tortuous, deep, and flanked by lofty rocks. This portion of the country is inhabited by the poorest and wildest of the Afghan tribes, who live almost entirely by plunder. Fortunately they offered no opposition to the passage of our troops until they were on the point of quitting the defile, when some skirmishing took place and a few of our people were wounded. But the excessive barrenness and steepness of this line of march caused the destruction of a vast number of horses and camels. On the 26th of March, Sir Willoughby Cotton reached Quettah, a town situated in a fertile valley, and containing a population of 5000 or 6000 souls. Here supplies and other good things were expected, but none were found. The place belonged to the Khan of Khelat, or Meerab Khan, with whom Burnes had negotiated a sort of treaty before our columns were put in motion. Now Burnes was sent again to Khelat, to endeavour to reason the Khan into terms, or into the fulfilment of the

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treaty which he had concluded with him. The Khan, like most of the Afghan chiefs, seemed to entertain a morbid dread of Shah Sujah, whom the English were restoring to his throne; and Burnes could not induce him to make a short journey from Khelat to visit Shah Sujah. After a good deal of shuffling and evasion, which ought to have convinced Burnes that the treaty would be worth nothing, the Khan of Khelat agreed to receive a subsidy of 15,000*l.* a year during the continuance of our army in Afghanistan, and to supply provisions, carriage, and escorts to the extent of his ability: (but provisions, carriage, and escorts were all to be separately paid for). While they were discussing this precious treaty, the Khan of Khelat told Burnes that Dost Mohamed Khan, the ruler of Cabul, whom Lord Auckland had determined to dethrone, was a man of resource and ability, and that though we might put him down and thrust Shah Sujah in his place, we could never win over the Afghan nation.* "Wait," said he, "till sickness overtakes your troops—till they are exhausted with fatigue from long and harassing marches and the total want of supplies; wait till they have drunk of many waters, and wait too till they feel the sharpness of the Afghan swords!"† On another occasion the Khan used these words:—"You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it back again?"‡ This was the very expression which fell from the Duke of Wellington when the intimation of our advance into Afghanistan was made in parliament. It was a question which ought to have occurred to every officer in the army, and for which a response ought to have been provided by the commanding officers of that army, and by the government which sent them on their wild errand. But those officers and that government thought of nothing but how to advance; and therefore it could not but happen that we should never get the army out of the country—that their bones should whiten in Afghanistan.*

Sir John Keane brought up the Bengal column, and established his headquarters at Quettah, on the 4th of April. So scarce and dear had grain already become, that his camp-followers greedily devoured the fried skins of sheep, coagulated blood, roots, or whatever else they could procure. With a march of 150 miles before them to Candahar, they were obliged to push on, upon half-rations for the men, and none at all for the cattle. All communication between the front and rear division, even now 100 miles apart from each other, was completely cut off by the fierce tribes in the Pass. An unlooked for spirit of discontent began to make its appearance amongst the Bengal troops; and a rumour was circulated throughout the camp that an immediate retreat upon Shikarpoor was intended. Sir John Keane thought to remedy this panic (for it already amounted to a panic with a large part of the army) by ordering a forced march forward for the next morning. The camp-followers were brought down to quarter-rations, or "famine allowance," as one of our officers calls it. On the first march towards Candahar, sixty of our artillery horses were shot, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy—no more food for them being procurable. In the course of a week, one hundred and sixteen cavalry horses died, and between the 6th of April and the middle of June this arm of the service was nearly disabled for want of food! Nine hundred camels had died since the column commenced their advance. The robbers of the Pass were incessantly harassing our soldiers and pouncing down from their rocks and hills upon the baggage. Savage and unwise orders were carried into execution by our harassed and exasperated troops: they pursued, and not unfrequently overtook the marauders; and whenever these Afghans were captured, they were shot or hanged—*no quarter being, on any occasion, given them.*† It was thus that our people prepared for

* Letter from Sir Alexander Burnes to Government, as quoted by Buist.

† Dr. Atkinson, Superintending Surgeon of the Bengal Division—Expedition into Afghanistan, &c.

‡ Major Hough—March and Operations of the Army of the Indus.

* Buist. † Id.

their own destruction in the Mountain Passes—for their bloody exodus from Afghanistan! On the 26th of April the head-quarters of the army reached Candahar, the Bengal column having marched 1000 miles since quitting Firozepoor.

The Bombay column had so far gained on the advance as to be in the Kojjuk Pass only sixty miles behind, when the head-quarters of the grand army arrived under the walls of Candahar. It had endured terrible fatigues and still more terrible privations, and was reduced to 3600 men before it came to the desert. It had been intended that it should move by the Gundava Pass and Khelat; but the road had not been previously examined, and when the column came to this Pass, it was reported to be impracticable. Nothing, therefore, was to be done but to march the column through the Bolan Pass, in the already impoverished track of the leading division. The Khan of Khelat proved his steadiness to the treaty which he had concluded with Burnes, by writing to the hill chiefs—"What is the use of treaties and arrangements? All child's play! There is no relief but in death! No cure but in the destruction of the English. Their heads, bodies, and goods must be sacrificed. Strengthen the Pass. Call on all the tribes to harass and destroy!" On the 12th of April this Bombay column entered the Bolan Pass: the thermometer was at 110°, but above the Pass there had recently been a heavy snow-storm, and the cold on those heights (5000 feet above the level of the plain) was excessive and destructive, if not to the life, to all the energy of our sepoys. In the Pass the column was annoyed by the stench of dead camels and of multitudes of unburied bodies of the enemy, which marked in horrible characters the line of the advance of our first division. Numerous executions swelled the number of these Afghan dead, for the army of Bombay, like the army of Bengal, gave no quarter to the hill people! Many of our camels loaded with grain were killed, and the greater part of the camel-drivers began to desert. Although General Nott had been left behind at Quettah to keep open the communications, all our letter-bags were seized and rifled, so that from the end of March to the beginning of August, when our troops reached Cabul, the safe arrival of a single packet could never be depended on. As the Bombay column reached the heights above the Pass, the men were attacked by dysentery. Making rapid marches, they, however, reached Candahar on the 4th of May, and there found the Bengal troops. Colonel Dennie, who had been left behind with the reserve stores and carriages, and with some of the Shah's raw contingents, and the 31st and 42nd Bengal native infantry, saved, by means of some extraordinary marches, Captain Stockley, of the Bombay commissariat, who, on his way to Dadur, with cattle, grain, and stores, had been surrounded, and shut up in a small fort, by the Beloochees; saved Captain Anderson, who was commanding two newly-raised troops of the Shah's horse artillery, with tumbrils, ammunition filling fifty carriages, &c.; fought his way nobly through the Bolan Pass, and reached Candahar; but many of his men had been killed and wounded, and many had died of apoplexy, or had gone mad from the excess of heat.

The army now assembled at Candahar, exclusive of the Shah's contingent, amounted to 10,400 fighting men. The camp-followers had dwindled away through death and sickness, and the dread of the Bolan Pass, but they still amounted to nearly 29,000, of whom more than half were dependent on our commissariat. The Shah's contingent, which was entirely paid and also officered by our Indian government, mustered about 13,000 men—but we cannot call them fighting men, for they were almost entirely raw levies. Sir John Keane strongly condemned the uniting of such a force as this to the two well-appointed armies of Bengal and Bombay. It appears that this was done in the vain hope of giving plausibility to the fiction that Shah Sujah was entering his dominions surrounded by *his own* troops—when, in fact, it was too notorious to escape exposure, that he had not a single subject or Afghan amongst them, his sham army being made up of camp-fol-

lowers from the Company's military stations.*

Candahar contained a population of from 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. On the approach of our imposing force, the three brother Sirdars, who had held the city for about twelve years, fled with their families and some two hundred followers to Ghirisk, a small fortress 80 miles distant. They were pursued by Brigadier Sale, in the month of June, and they then continued their flight without interruption to Meshid, in Persia. Hajji Khan and some others of the chiefs had deserted to us, but only to desert from us and betray us at the first opportunity.

The populace of Candahar, and not a few chiefs and warriors, gave, or seemed to give, the warmest welcome to Shah Sujah; but the Shah had not been six months seated on his throne, when an insurrection commenced, which never was subdued in this quarter so long as we remained in the country. Populous as was the city of Candahar, neither money for bills upon India nor a sufficient supply of provisions could be procured for the army. By the 1st of July the whole army had quitted Candahar, and was in full march upon Ghuznee, the soldiers still continuing on half, and the camp-followers on quarter rations. The distance from Candahar to Ghuznee is about 230 miles; but on the 21st of July the army halted under the walls of Ghuznee, its wide-spread baggage covering an area of 16 square miles. The works of Ghuznee were found to be far stronger than Sir John Keane had been led to expect. The four heavy guns of our battering-train had been left behind at Candahar, in the belief that they could not be wanted. The result of a reconnoissance was a report to the commander-in-chief, that, if he decided upon an immediate attack on Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was to make a dash at the Cabul gateway (all the other gates had been built up) and blow the gate open by powder-bags.* Sir John Keane resolved to take this advice, and the artillery were ordered to make the necessary preparations. On the following day—the 22nd of July—some of the Afghan tribes collected in great force on some neighbouring hills; but being encountered by Captain Outram, with only 150 infantry and match-lock men, they were beaten and put to flight: thirty or forty of them were killed and wounded, and thirty-eight were made prisoners. According to Sir Alexander Burnes, who, as well as Mr. Mac Naghten, was constantly with Shah Sujah, as soon as the thirty-eight prisoners were brought into his Majesty's presence, and questioned about their rebellion and treason, they said that they would glory in taking his Majesty's life; that he was an infidel, and had brought an army of infidels into the country, and that they would take his life whenever they could; and one of them, suiting the action to the word, plunged a dagger into the breast of one of the Shah's attendants;—upon which the King gave orders that they should all be beheaded. Nearly every part of this story has been doubted; but there is no doubt at all that 36 of these 38 captives were immediately put to death—and that, too, in the presence of at least one British field-officer.† When the massacre

* Letter of Colonel Dennie, addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Mac Donald, military secretary to Sir John Keane, as quoted by Buist.

* Report and Memoranda, by Captains Thomson and Peat of the Engineers.

† Letter from Sir William Mac Naghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, on the subject of the destruction of the thirty-six prisoners who were put to death at Ghuznee in the presence of Major Mac Sherry, on the evening of the 22nd of July, 1839, as quoted by Buist.

Among other startling things, this historian of the Afghan war quotes the following passage from Mac Naghten's letter, which was written about a year after the event. "Towards evening, a report was brought to me that the king's people had taken several prisoners, and that his majesty had determined upon the execution of them all. On the impulse of the moment, I suggested that a selection should be made of the offenders for execution, and immediately consulted Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, through Sir Alexander Burnes, who was in his excellency's camp; and his opinion was that 'the most summary example should be made of such dastardly ruffians.' In the meanwhile, I had received several messages from his majesty, expressing his determination to put the prisoners to death, as the only safe and proper course to be adopted in the exigency of

was over. Sir John Keane is said to have sent to inform the Shah that he must not do such deeds again within the limits of a British camp. But it is also said that there was no writing of any kind upon the subject; that the butchery was seldom or never afterwards talked of or condemned by our officers in the camp or field, and that our commander-in-chief exclaimed, "The murderous and treacherous rascals deserved it." Mac Naghten certainly attempted to justify the deed a year after its commission.

Between this night of murders and the following morning, the Cabul gate of Ghuznee was blown up by 300 lbs. of powder in twelve sand-bags, with a hose 72 feet long. If this operation had failed (and it never could have succeeded if the Afghans had possessed any military science) Sir John Keane must have retreated to Candahar, and thence, by the terrible Bolan Pass, towards our own frontiers. As soon as the gate was blown open, our storming party rushed in, and commenced a fierce hand to hand conflict with the Afghans. The fighting was long and desperate. At one time a rumour was raised that the attack had failed, and the reinforcing column had sounded a retreat, and was in the act of retiring, when the reiterated shout of their comrades within the works recalled them. Brigadier Sale, who commanded the supporting column, received a severe wound on the face from a sabre; when, closing with his antagonist, both lost their footing, and rolled over together. In this extremity the Brigadier recognised Captain Kershaw, of the 13th light infantry, who at that moment came up, and having made his situation known to him, he was speedily relieved, by the Captain passing his sword through the body of the frantic Afghan, who, however, would not let go his hold until Sale cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. When the town was carried entirely, the strong fortress remained, and was expected to make a still more desperate resistance; but about five o'clock, A.M., or little more than three hours after the gate had been blown open, the British colours waved from the battlements of the citadel. Hyder Khan (one of the sons of Dost Mohamed), the governor, surrendered himself in the course of the morning, and was placed under the care of Sir Alexander Burnes, who had so recently figured at Cabul as the friend and guest of his father. Meer Khan, the eldest, and commonly known as "the fighting son" of Dost Mohamed, had come close upon our camp, early in the morning, with 5000 cavalry. He heard the firing, and only waited for daylight to discover how matters stood in the fortress. The dawn showed him the British flag on the ramparts: and he forthwith fled towards Cabul, leaving all his elephants and baggage behind him to be captured by our troops or by the Shah's contingent, who were as quick in plundering as they were slow in fighting. Brigadier Scott is said to have picked up in the fortress some cartridges of Russian manufacture, and one cartridge with the word "Paris" upon it.* In the assault about 170 of our people were wounded, but only 17 were killed: about 1000 Afghans were slain, about 1600 were taken prisoners, and the number of the wounded was estimated as about equal to that of the captives. To talk of the "genius and skill" with which the plan of the attack was conceived, is to be guilty of rhodomontade and nonsense; but the conduct of our soldiers, during the storm, and, still more, after the storm had succeeded, was rare, and in the highest degree admirable. No city taken by assault ever suffered so little as Ghuznee, and no men ever conducted themselves, under similar circumstances,

our situation. I replied that his majesty was supreme; but that I would at least strongly recommend him, if he thought a severe example necessary, to liberate some of the prisoners, in order that the retribution which had overtaken their comrades might be made known to the whole of these fanatic offenders. My recommendation was not concurred in by his majesty to the extent that I could have wished: of thirty-eight prisoners two only were released—the one on the ground of his being a Syud (*a Mussulman Saint or holy man, or Emir*), and the other because he begged his life. The remainder, who obstinately persisted in exasperating his majesty, were executed."—*Buist.*

* Views in Afghanistan, &c., from Sketches taken during the Campaign of the Army of the Indus, by Sir Keith A. Jackson, Bart.

so temperately and moderately as its captors. On this point authorities and opinions are unanimous. With the close of the fighting all violence ceased, and not one female was exposed to insult or injury.* The fall of Ghuznee opened the way to Cabul, and opened more roads than one. Colonel (now Sir Claud Martin) Wade had assembled near Peshawer 6000 Seik contingents and more than 4000 of the Shah's levies. With this force he was to move upon Cabul, by Jellalabad. Wade forced his way through the Khyber Pass, the enemy flying from a fort which was considered as the key of that Pass. Jellalabad was defended by Mohamed Akbar Khan, second son of Dost Mohamed, and afterwards famous for the vengeance he took upon the invaders. This chief had 2500 men and 14 guns; but on the fall of Ghuznee he was hastily recalled for the defence of Cabul. This at once opened the way for Colonel Wade's forces through the rest of the Passes, and placed Jellalabad in our hands. Wade was so close upon Akbar Khan that he compelled him to abandon all his artillery and camp equipage, which, together with horses, bullocks, and 7000 rounds of ball-cartridge, fell into our hands. On the 30th of July Sir John Keane, with the main army, marched from Ghuznee to Cabul. He crossed the ridge of a mountain, said to be 9000 feet above the level of the sea, and went through another deep and narrow defile without encountering any resistance. Dost Mohamed was now almost entirely deserted by his chiefs and army: quarrels and jealousies had arisen among them, and old feuds and grudges were, as usual, freshened up at the moment they ought to have been forgotten. As Sir John Keane drew nigh, Dost Mohamed quitted his throne and his capital, and fled with 600 horsemen to seek a refuge in the wide country beyond the Oxus.

But nearly at the same time that this news was received at our head-quarters, Sir John Keane learned the death of Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore, an event which materially and injuriously affected the triple alliance. Detaching a very inadequate party of cavalry in pursuit of the fugitive king, Sir John Keane and Shah Sujah marched leisurely on to Cabul, under the walls of which they encamped on the evening of the 6th of August. On the afternoon of the next day, Shah Sujah, Sir John Keane, the General officers of the army, Burnes, Mac Naghten, and other officers of the mission, or of the staff, made a pompous and triumphant entrance into the capital. The people were respectful and orderly, but cold; the chiefs were absent; there was no enthusiasm. Some of these vain-glorious Englishmen, not satisfied with riding in triumph, had put it into the restored Shah's head to create an order of knighthood, and to confer the first badges upon themselves! If this idea did not originate with poor Burnes, he certainly was a principal actor in the ridiculous scene of the investiture. On the 17th of September a Durbar was held at the dilapidated palace, wherein a dozen or two of bricklayers or plasterers were at work all the while, and never ceased their work to look at the farce. The Shah sat on a dirty old camp chair; and behind him stood two old fat eunuchs, each holding a dish, in which were deposited the crosses and ribands. The first of these senseless and unseemly baubles* was conferred upon Sir John Keane, who delivered a long speech, in which there was a great deal about hurling the usurper Dost Mohamed from the throne. This speech was made intelligible to Shah Sujah by Major Powell, Persian interpreter, who,

* Buist. This writer adds—"It may not be superfluous to add, that long before this, the commissariat store of intoxicating liquor had been exhausted, and Sir J. Keane commanded a temperance army. To the want of liquor is ascribed by the medical men the unprecedented celerity with which the injuries of our wounded were healed."

* The decoration of the order was a Maltese cross, a bad imitation of the Guelphic order of Hanover; and it was the more absurd to give a Christian's most sacred religious badge as an honour supposed to be conferred by the most bigoted petty Mohammedan government in the world; because the arabesque star of six points, which forms the ornament of the historic gates of the tomb of Mohammed of Ghuznee, would have been so peculiar and appropriate an emblem of a Douranee institution.—*Kennedy.*

not being accustomed to speak or translate in public, made but a bad job of it. The Shah grew impatient, and interrupted the interpreter; but Burnes, wishing the whole matter to be fairly driven through the imperial ears, whispered—"There is more of it," which silenced the Shah, and Major Powell went on: but, making a pause, to take breath, the Shah began again, and was again silenced: a third pause, and again the Shah commenced; and, by this time, Burnes seemed tired too, and the Shah had it all his own way, and all the talk to himself during the rest of the ceremony. Mr. Mac Naghten and Sir Willoughby Cotton were next invested; and then Burnes and Wade were told that they were created Knights Grand Crosses too, but that the goldsmith had not been able to make the decorations in time for them. A cry of disappointment and anger rose from sundry officers who were not included in the batch of Knights Grand Crosses, or in that of Knights Commanders, or in that of Companions.* While this foolery was in progress at Cabul, the Afghans were murdering every British officer or soldier that they could surprise outside of the camp.

Considering the work as done, Sir John Keane hurried back to India, and from thence to England, to be raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznee and Cappoquin (with a pension of 2000*l.* a year), and to receive the thanks of parliament and of the Court of Directors. The shouts of triumph and applause were, however, mingled with the expression of many doubts and some severe criticism: in the Lords the Duke of Wellington said that he had never doubted but that the valour and discipline of our troops would secure victory to our arms in Afghanistan; but that it was when we had completed our first conquests that our difficulties would begin: Lord Ellenborough declared the war to have been a folly, and said it remained to be seen whether it might not prove a crime. Lord Auckland, as governor-general, received his meed: he was raised in the peerage to the rank of an earl; and the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors honoured him with their vote of thanks, "for the sagacity and promptitude with which he had planned the expedition, and the zeal and vigour he had displayed in preparing the troops to take the field."

The Bombay column quitted Cabul on the 18th of September; the Bengal troops remained for nearly a month longer, but by the 20th of October all the forces, returning for the present to India, had left Shah Sujah's capital. The cold was severe in the mountain passes, thick ice was found upon the roads, the bodies of dead camels and horses lay frozen all around, and, without having to encounter any enemy, our retiring columns suffered very severely.

Seldom have troops been left in a more uncertain or more hazardous predicament than the army which was left to secure Shah Sujah on his throne. This force was large, for the enmity of the majority of the Afghan chiefs to the restored Shah was already threatening and formidable. Independently of the Shah's contingent, paid and officered by the English, about 8000 men, British troops and sepoys, were left up the country, and were stationed in the Balla Hissar, at Cabul, in cantonments near to that city, in the fortress of Jellalabad, and in various other positions. They had with them from 70 to 80 guns. Burnes, deceived by the unusual mildness of the winter of the year that he was at Cabul, had represented the climate as much milder than had usually been reported. Now he discovered his mistake, and so did the troops, to their infinite cost. In the month of January there was a fall of snow nearly five feet deep, and the thermometer fell to 13°. This was at Cabul; at another post the thermometer sank to 10° below zero, or 42° under freezing. The poor sepoys suffered cruelly, and even the British soldiers, who were only indifferently provided with clothes and blankets, shivered on those Afghan mountains and table-lands. The most desperate of the Afghans remained inactive until the return of spring; but then the Ghilzies and other powerful tribes began

* Dr. Kennedy, Campaign of the Army of the Indus.

to unite their cavalry, and to attack our outposts. At the same time the people dwelling on the hills and in the glens not only refused to pay any taxes or tribute to Shah Sujah, but also refused to sell provisions to our commissariat. As the ice and snow melted, and left the roads and mountain paths passable, a fierce war of posts commenced. Except when surprised by vastly superior numbers in some coupe-gorge, our troops always defeated the enemy, though never without some loss to themselves. This warfare alone would have worn out our army. As the summer advanced it assumed a bolder character. Dost Mohamed, after a narrow escape from being betrayed and murdered by the king, or ruler, of Bokhara, received assistance in his extremity from the Khan of Kookan, on the Persian border, and in company with one of his sons, Afzul Khan, he proceeded to Afghanistan, to stir up the country to undertake a holy war for the expulsion of the unbelieving English. Some native Afghan troops, which Shah Sujah had raised, began to desert to the Dost, who had collected a great number of Usbeg Tartars. As the expelled ruler advanced upon Cabul several severe actions were fought, in which our fine artillery practice and our grape and shrapnel gave us the victory, and inflicted terrible losses on the enemy. At last, driven from post to post, and surrounded, Dost Mohamed made up his mind to surrender to Sir William Mac Naghten, or to Sir Alexander Burnes, who were both left at Cabul, the first as ambassador or envoy, and the second as assistant to the envoy. On the evening of the 3rd of November, 1840, as Mac Naghten was returning from his evening ride, and was within a few yards of his own residence in the Balla Hissar, or citadel of Cabul, a solitary horseman galloped up to him and told him that Dost Mohamed had arrived and sought his protection. The words were scarcely said ere the chief himself appeared; and, alighting from his horse, he presented his sword to the envoy, who returned the sword, and requested him to remount. The Dost had quitted the field of battle*

* The chief's last battle—the battle of Purwan Durrah—in which some of our sepoy regiments had behaved like downright cowards, and in which Dr. Lord, one of our numerous political agents in the country, Lieutenant Broadfoot, and Cornet Crispin were killed and cut to pieces.

late the preceding evening, and had ridden straight into Cabul, a distance of sixty miles, having been twenty-four hours on horseback. Yet he showed few symptoms of fatigue, and his self-possession was remarkable. Shah Sujah, whom we had thrust into his place, could hardly have ridden twelve miles in twenty-four hours, and so far from being self-possessed, he was in a constant flurry and panic, even when far removed from any chances of danger. This was not a man to be king of Afghans. On the 12th of November Dost Mohamed was sent off for India under a strong escort. He waited at Peshawer till joined by his family, which consisted of nearly 700 persons, of whom about one-half were females. Fourteen of his sons surrendered, Akbar Khan alone holding out against us to the end. The Dost was allowed to visit Calcutta, where the governor-general received him with much respect and courtesy. Three lacs of rupees, or about 30,000*l.* a year (a sum not far short of half of his annual revenues as ruler of Cabul) were allotted to him; and he took up his residence at Mussooree, on our north-west frontier, where he remained till 1843. He told one of our officers that the majority of the Afghan tribes had never been accustomed to obey, and never would obey any prince; that we should be involved in perpetual embarrassments; that the cunning and the intriguing spirit of the chiefs would prove more dangerous than their arms, and that the very courtiers about Shah Sujah, who had been for years fattening on our bounty, would be the most forward in plotting against us. We need not say that the words of the Dost were more than verified. Shah Sujah made bad worse by selecting a low-born, rapacious old scoundrel to be his prime minister. This man's faculties were impaired by age and disease. He had grown grey with his majesty in exile, and having on some occasion incurred his majesty's displeasure, he had for-

feited his ears; a subject productive of many witticisms among the discontented about court, and little calculated to elevate a prime minister in popular opinion.* The surrender of Dost Mohamed, and the activity of our moveable columns under General Sale, Colonel Dennie, and other active and intelligent officers, brought the country all round Cabul to a tranquil state. But the calm was deceptive; it was but a lull in the storm; and although this was clearly seen and frankly stated by many of our officers, our infatuated envoy would not see it, and would not take warning.

Before the Bombay column cleared out of the country the celebrated fortress of Khelat was stormed and taken, and Meerab Khan, who had paid so little respect to the treaty which Burnes had concluded with him, and several other Beloochee chiefs, were slain. This was a brilliant operation, able to bear comparison with any exploit our troops ever performed in India: the fortifications were scarcely less formidable, and the garrison was scarcely less numerous than at Ghuznee, yet it was captured by a force (under Brigadier Baumgardt and Captain Outram) mustering little more than 1000 bayonets, without cavalry, and with only one light gun, whereas at Ghuznee Keane had had above 6000 fighting men and 40 pieces of light artillery. Little, however, was said about the reduction of Khelat, while the plaudits bestowed upon the capture of Ghuznee continued to make as great a noise as the explosion of gunpowder that blew open the gate. All through this campaign Captain Outram's conduct appears to have been most admirable.

While comparative tranquillity reigned in and round Cabul, insurrections broke out among the fierce tribes that inhabit the country to the east of the Bolan Pass. At the same time some of the Ameers of Sinde called their followers to the field, united their bands, and threatened all our communications between Afghanistan and the Punjab. Several serious disasters were sustained by our troops, and more than one of the small columns sent to put down these insurrections and combinations were absolutely beaten, if not by the arms of the enemy, by the natural difficulties of the country. Some uneasiness was felt lest the successor of Runjeet Sing should declare against us, and place his disciplined army, his numerous artillery, and his well-skilled French and Italian commanders between the Indus and our army in Afghanistan; but fortunately the new ruler of Lahore remained quiet.

Our army up the country was repeatedly reinforced. At the end of the year 1840 we had more than 16,000 men in Afghanistan; and at the first outbreak of the great insurrection in November, 1841, we had upwards of 14,000 men, besides the Shah's contingent. The number of our political agents scattered all about the country, as if it were conquered and submissive, and to be organized, like annexed provinces in Hindustan, by means of the pen, exceeded thirty. All these men (and not a few of them appear to have been young and inexperienced) were paid large salaries by the Company. Sir William MacNaghten, as envoy and minister, had 11,220*l.* per annum; his assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, 3000*l.* Among them they received more money than could be realized by taxes and duties in any one province of the Afghan empire. Everything was on a prodigious scale of expense: It was costing us more than 3,000,000*l.* a year to occupy a country for Shah Sujah, which never could render him 300,000*l.* a year. The Russo-mania had abated; we had obtained substantial proofs of the difficulty of any army traversing Afghanistan, even if it could get so far, and we ought by this time to have learned that the Afghan tribes were neither to be depended upon in their own country nor to be feared by us behind the Indus; but there our army was left, without any adequate arrangement either for its victualling or for its safe return, and there our money continued to be lavished, without any security for its repayment.* Omitting all notice of the clan feuds and

* Letter from Sir Alexander Burnes to Sir William Mac Naghten, dated 7th August, 1840.

* Buist, and MS. Journal of a Young Officer on the Bengal Establishment.

our desultory warfare, we hasten at once to the foul catastrophe.

In May, 1841, Major Pottinger prognosticated the coming storm, representing to the envoy the insufficiency of our military force in some places and the badness of their cantonments in nearly all places. The major was looked upon as an alarmist. About the end of September the roads near Cabul swarmed with predatory bands, and three Ghilzie chiefs of note quitted Cabul after plundering a rich caravan, and took up a strong position in the defile of Khoord Cabul, only ten miles from the capital, thus blocking up the Pass and cutting off our communication with Hindustan. At the same time intelligence was received that Dost Mohamed's ablest and fiercest son, Akbar Khan, was collecting troops and raising the standard of his father in various parts of the country. General Sale cleared the Pass of Khoord Cabul, but not without hard fighting and considerable loss.* This was in the month of October, and all through this month our officers were insulted in their cantonments at Cabul, and many attempts were made to assassinate them. On the 2nd of November, at an early hour, intelligence was brought to cantonments that a popular outbreak had taken place in the city, and that a general attack had been made on the houses of all British officers residing in Cabul. The envoy Mac Naghten was in the cantonments, but Burnes was in the city. At about 8 A.M. a hurried note was received from Burnes, who stated that the minds of the people had been excited by some evil reports, but who expressed a hope that he should succeed in quelling the commotion. An hour after this it was reported in the cantonment that Burnes had been murdered, and that Captain Johnson's treasury had been plundered. Flames were now seen to issue from that part of the city where they dwelt, and an incessant report of fire-arms seemed to roll through the town from end to end. It was soon ascertained that the rabble who first commenced the attack did not exceed 300 men, and that with Sir Alexander were massacred his brother Lieutenant Burnes, Lieutenant W. Broadfoot, and every man, woman, and child found on the premises.* Our generals and superior officers were all so thunderstruck as to be incapable of adopting more than the most puerile of defensive measures. Coward as he was, Shah Sujah sent out one of his own sons

* After restoring Shah Sujah to his throne an agreement was entered into with the Ghilzie chiefs, that a certain sum of money should be paid to them yearly out of the Cabul treasury, if they would keep the Khoord Cabul Pass open, and offer no molestation to our troops on their passage between Cabul and Jellalabad. Little dependence could be placed on such a bargain; but it is said that the bargain was first broken by us or by our ally Shah Sujah, and that this provoking circumstance contributed in a great measure to the disasters which followed. The Shah could get very little money beyond what we gave him, and our political agents required so much cash for themselves that little was left for the feeing, or paying of black mail to, the hill-chiefs and the clans dwelling in the dangerous Passes.

* The Military Operations at Cabul, &c., with a Journal of Imprisonment in Affghanistan, by Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, of Bengal Artillery, late Deputy-Commissary of Ordnance at Cabul.

Speaking charitably of his errors, and making no allusion to a very current report of gross and provoking misconduct, Lieutenant Eyre says—"No man, surely, in a highly responsible public situation—especially in such a one as that held by the late Sir Alexander Burnes—ought ever to indulge in a state of blind security, or to neglect salutary warnings however small. It is indisputable that such warnings had been given to him, especially by a respectable Afghan named Taj Mahommed, who, on the very previous night, went in person to Sir A. Burnes to put him on his guard, but returned disgusted by the incredulity with which his assertions were received."

Lady Sale says—"On the 20th of October the envoy wrote to Sir Alexander Burnes, in consequence of information he had received from Captain Trevor, which indicated an unquiet state of feeling among the people of Cabul. But Sir A. Burnes, *on whom the intelligence department devolved*, assured him that Trevor must be mistaken; *as he* knew nothing of any meditated rising of the people; and that all was as it ought to be. Notwithstanding this, Trevor assured the envoy that a number of Ghilzie chiefs had left Cabul for hostile purposes.

"On the 1st of November (*the very day before the outbreak*) Sir A. Burnes congratulated Sir William on the prospect of soon leaving Cabul in a perfect state of tranquillity. We might attribute his anxiety to calm the envoy's mind by assurances of the peaceful feeling of the people of the country, to an anxiety on *his* part to succeed to the situation to be vacated by Sir William; but it appeared questionable whether he would permanently have done, so as Colonel Sutherland had, it was said, been nominated for the appointment."—*Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, by Lady Sale.*

with a number of his immediate Afghan retainers and two guns to restore order; but no support was rendered by our troops. Sir William Mac Naghten thought and said that the storm would soon blow over of itself. Instead of blowing over, it increased in violence. Every minute that was lost in inaction raised the numbers and the audacity of the insurgents. The chief command of our astounded and bewildered army (bewildered much more by the inactivity and stupor of their leaders than by the proceedings of the Afghans) was at this time held by Major-General Elphinstone, a most amiable and at one time a gallant officer, but who had been suffering a long and painful illness, which had affected his nerves, and worn out his mind as much as his body. He was utterly incapable of acting in this sudden emergency with the promptitude and vigour necessary for the preservation of his troops, and the officers next in command under him seem to have been—without the same physical and unavoidable causes—as incapable as himself, and to have shrunk from all responsibility. The cantonment occupied by the army for so many months was as bad as bad could be, and the magazine of provisions was placed in the most exposed and least defensible part of it, detached from our works of strength. All the calamities which befell our ill-starred force might be traced more or less to the defects of our position; and whether we look to its situation or to its construction, this cantonment at Cabul must ever be spoken of as a disgrace to our military skill and judgment.*

On the 3rd of November, the day after the outbreak, 3000 Ghilzies rushed through the Khoord Cabul Pass towards the capital, and other numerous bands began to collect on the hills. We cannot, and we need not, narrate what followed; the fearful story, with all its horrible and humiliating details, is fresh in the memory of every Englishman. Our commanding officers continued in their imbecility until our troops were infected with downright cowardice: not merely the shivering half-starved sepoys, but our British-born soldiers cowered before a barbarous and stupid enemy whom they had so often beaten. Discipline disappeared, but never had discipline been put to a severer test! The brave soldier may be expected to bear everything except the self-evident imbecility and fatuity of his commanding officers. On the 4th of November our people ran away from the commissariat fort, and left all our stores, clothing, and provisions to the enemy, except two days' supply of provisions in cantonments. On the 5th an attack was made to recover possession of the commissariat fort; but our officers again behaved like fools and our men like cowards, and the enemy remained in possession of the rich prize they had procured. The object of the enemy was to starve the army out of its cantonment; and to this end the chiefs exerted all their influence to prevent our troops being supplied from any of the neighbouring forts. On the 9th General Elphinstone's weak state of health rendered the presence of a coadjutor absolutely necessary to relieve him from the command of the garrison; and Brigadier Shelton, the second in command, was, at the earnest request of Sir W. Mac Naghten, summoned in from the Balla Hissar, in the hope that he would rouse the sinking confidence of the troops. Shelton was scarcely in the cantonment ere a quarrel or a wide difference of opinion arose between him and Mac Naghten. The brigadier had from the first despaired of being able to hold out the winter at Cabul, and strenuously advocated an immediate retreat to Jellalabad. On the 13th Shelton made a tolerably spirited and successful sally upon some of the Afghan tribes that were now occupying all the hills which surrounded and commanded our cantonment, the said cantonment being a piece of low swampy ground: but the Afghans soon returned, and continued to annoy our troops with their unceasing fire of musketry. Major Pottinger, badly wounded, his assistant Mr. Haughton, who had lost a hand, and had been gashed on the neck, a sepoy of our Gorkha regiment, a moonshee, and

* Lieutenant Vincent Eyre. The cantonment had a low rampart and a narrow ditch; its form was a parallelogram: it had round flanking bastions at each corner, *but every one of these bastions was commanded by some fort or hill.*

another native, arrived on the 15th from a position at Charekar; and these were all that were left out of 100 men who had occupied the said post: all the rest, men and officers, had been butchered by the Afghans, who had surrounded Charekar with 4000 men. How provisions had been obtained we know not,* but our army was still motionless in its cantonment on the 22nd of November, when the terrible Akbar Khan arrived in Cabul with some hundreds of well-mounted warriors. His arrival was immediately followed by the defection of several chiefs who had hitherto professed great loyalty to Shah Sujah and much friendship to the English. On the 23rd Shelton sallied again in force in order to clear the way for our foraging parties, and was driven back with severe loss, after having committed in this one miserable, disastrous affair no fewer than six capital military errors. By this time our troops had lost all confidence in their officers; and they were starving with hunger as well as with cold. On the 26th a letter was received by Mac Naghten from Osman Khan, who proposed that the British should quietly evacuate the country, and leave the Afghans to govern it according to their own rules, and with a king of their own choice. General Elphinstone eagerly caught at this overture for retreating. On the 27th two deputies from the Afghan chiefs came into our cantonment to propose the terms. These were, that we should deliver up Shah Sujah and all his family, lay down our arms, and make an unconditional surrender; when they might perhaps be induced to spare our lives, and allow us to leave the country on condition of never returning! Mac Naghten replied that the terms were too dishonourable to be entertained for a moment; and that if they persisted in them, he must again appeal to arms. "Well," said the deputies, "we shall meet again in battle!" "We shall at all events meet at the day of judgment!" replied our doomed envoy. On the 8th of December Mac Naghten, in a public letter, requested the general to state whether the only alternative left was not to negotiate for our safe retreat out of the country, on the most favourable terms possible? The despondent, dying Elphinstone gave a fatal response in the affirmative. On the 11th of December Mac Naghten, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor, went out to meet certain great khans and heads of tribes, who had intimated that they were desirous of concluding a treaty. Among these chiefs were some who had betrayed Dost Mohamed, and who had now betrayed Shah Sujah. The terrible Akbar Khan, who had never submitted to the English, was there: and he sternly negatived every proposition that our envoy advanced, demanding little short of an unconditional surrender. During this conference in the open plain a bullet whistled over the head of Sir William Mac Naghten: but his hour was not yet come. Akbar wanted to seize his person, but this was opposed by the other khans. At last it was agreed that the British should evacuate Afghanistan, including Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, Jellalabad, and all the other stations; that they should be permitted to return unmolested to India, and supplies of every description be afforded them in their road thither; that Dost Mohamed Khan and his family should be allowed to return to their country; that Shah Sujah and his family should be allowed the option of remaining at Cabul or proceeding with the British troops, in either case receiving from the Afghan government a pension of one lac of rupees per annum; that means of transport for the conveyance of our *baggage, stores*, &c. should be furnished; that all prisoners should be released; that no British force should ever again be sent into Afghanistan, unless called for by the Afghan government; that *perpetual friendship* should be established between the two nations, on the sure foundation of mutual *good offices*, &c.

The treaty which Major Davie had made with the king and savage chiefs of Kandy was not so monstrous a piece of folly as this; and for every man that Davie sacrificed in Ceylon, 60 or 70 lives were sacrificed here in Afghanistan! The Afghans never kept, and never

* It appears that for some time provisions were obtained from the contiguous village of Beymaroo, the proprietor of which was largely bribed by our envoy.

meant to keep, one of their engagements. But this was no novelty; all the semi-barbarous nations of the East had invariably acted in the like manner ever since we knew anything of their history. Instead of sending provisions and means of transport, these Afghans murdered all our sick and wounded men that they could lay their hands upon.

On the 14th of December was commenced the most disastrous and appalling retreat that has ever been recorded in authentic history. Making allowance for the difference of numbers, the retreat of the French from Moscow was less dreadful than this. In both cases, the ice and snow, and nakedness and famine, slew more than the sword. On the 20th of December, Sir William Mac Naghten had an interview with the chiefs, who now demanded that a portion of our guns and ammunition should be given up, and that Brigadier Shelton should be put into their hands as a hostage. Lieutenant Sturt, in whom the English spirit had not become extinct, proposed to the general to break off the treaty, and march forthwith to Jellalabad, where Sale was stoutly maintaining himself. But the General called a council of war,—and a council of war never fights. On the 22nd of December, as our troops were preparing to follow the van division, Akbar Khan sent to propose a new and much more favourable treaty than the one which he had already broken, and to invite our envoy to another conference. On the following day, Mac Naghten went to the place appointed, presented Akbar with a beautiful Arab horse,—and was barbarously murdered under the eyes of that Khan, and of other chiefs. It is even said that Akbar himself did the foul deed, shooting his victim through the body with a richly mounted pistol which Mac Naghten had sent him only a few hours before. The body was hacked to pieces by the armed fanatics, who carried the head into the city, and triumphantly exhibited it to Captain Conolly, one of the prisoners who had been taken. Not an arm was raised to avenge MacNaghten's fate—nothing could re-animate our troops, or the wretched men who commanded them. All went on, as if with one accord, to complete their disgrace and seal their doom—all, except a few English hearts who murmured and remonstrated, but who had not moral courage sufficient to incur the heavy and awful responsibility of putting their commanding officers under arrest, appealing to the troops, and assuming the command themselves. There were more councils of war called, to end in more baseness and madness: it was agreed to leave behind all our guns except six; to give up all our treasure; to give up married men with their wives and families, as hostages; to pay Osman Khan, and some other treacherous villains, five lacs of rupees, in bills drawn upon India, but negotiated on the spot by a merchant of Cashmere and some Hindu bankers, the said Osman Khan engaging to escort the whole army in safety to Peshawer. In vain did Major Pottinger raise his manly voice against this useless debasement (and never were English soldiers so debased before as to buy a way out of an enemy's country!)—the rest of the officers composing the council declared, one and all, that the bargain must be struck. And, accordingly, the bills were given, and English ladies were delivered over as hostages, if not at this moment, a little later. Shah Sujah, who had remained within the strong walls of the Balla Hissar, into which the mass of our own force ought to have been thrown, showed more courage in his despair than these un-English members of councils of war. He asked Brigadier Anquetil, who had commanded his contingent, whether it were well to forsake him in the hour of need, and to deprive him of the aid of that force which he had hitherto been taught to consider as his own? Anquetil could only blush: the General and his councils of war had determined that the Shah we had reinstated should be abandoned, and that his contingent should go with the rest.

On the 6th of January, 1842, our headquarters and the rest of our army cleared out of the cantonments at Cabul, to march, in the depth of winter, through a country of perhaps unparalleled difficulty. The strength of our whole force was at this time estimated at about 4500 fighting men; the camp-followers, at a moderate computation, amounted to about 12,000

men, besides women and children. At the moment the rear-guard cleared out of the cantonments, the Afghans began to plunder the baggage, and to follow and fire upon our soldiers; and these operations can scarcely be said to have ceased until there was nothing left to plunder—*or to kill*. We will not follow this demoralized and degraded army through the horrors of the Passes of Khoord Cabul, Tezeen, and Gundamuk. General Elphinstone, almost at the point of death, gave himself up to one of the Khans. The ladies and wounded were given up; Dr. Brydon, who escaped by a miracle, was the only officer that reached the garrison of Jellalabad in safety, and a mere handful of sepoys and camp-followers entered the fortress, which Sale had held in spite of General Elphinstone's insane orders to him to evacuate.* Counting camp-followers, women and children, more than 26,000 human beings had perished on the retreat, through cold, famine, and the incessant attacks of a most faithless and ferocious enemy. A few hundreds—mostly native Indians—had been carried away captives, to be turned into slaves, or to be kept for the sake of ransoms. Woe to this Afghan war! and mercy to the souls of those who planned it, and who nearly all perished in it!

Our protégé Shah Sujah, though abandoned and left to his own resources, was not only able to maintain himself in the Balla Hissar, but also to acquire friends and allies. The Afghan chiefs, ever divided by jealousies, factions, and feuds, began to intrigue against one another as soon as the English were gone, and some of these sent open and some of them secret assistance to the Shah in the citadel, who intimated by letter that he wanted no more English troops, that he wanted nothing but a few hundred thousands of pounds of our money to enable him to preserve his throne. In the city of Candahar General Nott gallantly maintained himself; and instead of waiting for the enemy behind the mud wall and ditch of the place, he sallied, on the 12th of January, with five and a half regiments of infantry, 1000 horse, and 16 pieces of artillery, attacked the enemy, about 5000 strong, and in a formidable position, and completely defeated and routed them. Ghuznee, famed for its gate and the powder-bags that had blown it open, was held by Colonel Palmer with one native regiment and some artillery. The veteran Sale added to his well-earned reputation by his defence of Jellalabad, on the retention of which nearly everything now depended.* The Afghans were completely balked in their plans by the refusal to vacate the place, a refusal on which they had by no means calculated, for they *thought* that Sale must obey the orders of his commander in chief, and they could not be persuaded that an order from Major Pottinger would not be obeyed by Captain MacGregor, the political agent at Jellalabad, although Pottinger constantly assured them that a prisoner, like himself, however exalted his rank, could not be considered a free agent, or exercise any power or control over any other public officer of Government, however inferior in rank and station. They had entertained no doubt that General Sale, yielding to the apparent necessities of the case, would have vacated upon summons, and have forthwith retreated to Peshawer, in which case they made sure that his whole force would be annihilated in the Khyber Pass. Finding that Sale would not yield to threatening messages, Ak-

* Well might Sir Robert Peel exclaim in the House of Commons—"When had you before, in the whole cycle of your history, any disaster like that which has befallen you in Afghanistan? a disaster which I admit is not irreparable—a disaster which I trust will be speedily repaired by the spirit and vigour of your councils, and by the gallant exertions of your armies; but when did you ever read in the history of England of such a wholesale slaughter as that which has befallen your forces, and which a private individual reports in every newspaper? Here is what that individual writes:—'My life has been saved in a most wonderful manner, and I am the only European who has escaped from the Cabul army. Two natives only have reached this place, making with myself three persons out of an army of 13,000!'"

* Sale, after clearing the Khoord Cabul Pass, on the 12th of October, had *fought on, for* eighteen days, as far as Gundamuk, and had reached Jellalabad on the 12th of November, when Generals Elphinstone and Shelton, *through their* miserable indecision, were sacrificing the army in the Cabul cantonments.

bar Khan sent an army against him. By the 22nd of January the place was surrounded by a numerous but irregular army. The force varied, but at one time it consisted of about 8000 or 9000 men, including 2500 good cavalry. It was commanded for some time by Akbar Khan himself.* Fortunately Sale had provisions enough for three or four months, and his foraging parties were so well conducted, that they gathered grass for their horses and cattle in spite of the enemy, who neither knew how to blockade nor how to besiege a place. The courage of the garrison was further kept up by intelligence that a force under Colonel Wild was about to attempt marching to the relief of Jellalabad, and that General Pollock, with a fresh army from India, was crossing the Punjab. Wild could not get through the terrible Khyber Pass, either by force of arms or by force of money; but Pollock kept steadily advancing.† A long time must, however, elapse before Pollock could complete a march of 500 or 600 miles, and in the interim, Sale and his garrison must trust to their own resources—to their own artillery, muskets, and bayonets, and their own stout hearts. As the siege or blockade commenced, the old mud walls of Jellalabad were rent by a tremendous earthquake. All the parapets which Sale had built up with so much labour were shaken down, several of his bastions were injured, all his guard-houses were laid prostrate, a considerable breach was made in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawer face, the Cabul gate of the town was reduced to a shapeless mass of ruins, and about one-third of the town itself was demolished. "By Allah and the Prophet," said the Afghans, "this earthquake is sent to lay level the walls, in order that the great Akbar Khan and the true believers may enter into the city and slay the infidels!" Other shocks of the earthquake came in rapid succession. In the MS. Journal of an intelligent young officer, which is now before us, we see, for some time, two or three earthquakes noted nearly every day or night. Sale himself says, in one of his dispatches, that the city was kept in constant alarm, and that in little more than one month there were one hundred distinct shocks. Some of these were very violent. But good arrangements were adopted for securing the troops; and the injuries done to the walls and other parts of the works were speedily repaired. For many successive weeks all the men slept in their clothes and accoutrements, with their weapons by their sides, as the enemy were expected to make night attacks, and as it seemed not improbable that some awful earthquake would really lay level the defences, and either realize the expectations of the Mohammedan fanatics or swallow up the whole garrison. The Afghans, however, never had sufficient confidence to attempt a real assault on the crazy old place, and Sale frequently sent out small detachments which marched through and through the stupid ill-connected Afghan lines.

Nott still held out in Candahar, and was ready, on receiving some supplies and reinforcements, to co-operate with Pollock and Sale in an advance upon Cabul.*

* MS. Journal of a young Officer of the Bengal Establishment.

† All the hopes of our people at Jellalabad were fixed upon General Pollock; and every one there seems to have believed that he would retrieve the disgraces he had suffered.

"The address of General Pollock to his troops," says one who was with Sale, and who was at the moment looking with eager eyes for the relief, "has excited the praise and admiration of every one who has read it. Here we all hope to see better days and better doings than we have witnessed under our former commanding officers." —*MS. Journal of a young Officer.* The date of the entry is the 14th of April.

* "It is on record," says Nott, "that I informed the Indian government that I could hold the country (Candahar and Lower Afghanistan) for any time; it is on record that I informed Lord Auckland, as far back as *December*, 1841, that I could, with *permission*, re-occupy Cabul with the force under my command: there was nothing to prevent it but *the unaccountable panic which prevailed at the seat of government.*"—Letter from General Nott to General J. R. Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army; dated Lucknow, 4th April, 1843.

The Indian government, however, continued to despond. In a letter from the governor-general in council to the secret committee at home, dated February the 19th, 1842 (nine days before the arrival of Lord Ellenborough at Calcutta), it is written:—"*On the 31st of January* we expressly informed Major-General Pollock that Jellalabad was not a place which we desired to retain at all hazards, and that, after securing Sir R. Sale's

[Jellalabad.]

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The brave men were all eager to retrieve the honour of our arms and to rescue the English ladies and all the other surviving prisoners from the hands of the barbarians. Sale had a wife and daughter in captivity: it may therefore be conceived with what feeling he heard that the Indian government he was bound to obey, intended to recall all our forces, to evacuate every part of Afghanistan, and to trust to negotiation and money for the liberation of the prisoners, leaving our disgrace unremedied, our prestige broken. It is now no secret that an order to this effect was issued by Lord Auckland, who had been dragged into the war by the vanity and presumption of other men, and who was now listening to the counsels of desponding and timid men.

brigade there, and giving every practicable relief to parties from Cabul, we would wish him, rather than run extreme risks at Jellalabad, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawer." This letter is signed—Auckland—W. W. Bird—W. Casement—H. T. Prinsep.

In the meantime the Whig government which had procured the appointment of his lordship had been displaced, and succeeded (on the 30th of August, 1841) by the second and now existing administration of Sir Robert Peel. Although far from being satisfied either with the policy or the conduct of the war in Afghanistan, Sir Robert Peel did not immediately recall the governor-general who had been nominated by his predecessors. It was, however, impossible that Lord Auckland should long retain his place: Lord Ellenborough, who had been president of the Board of Control, and who had strongly denounced the impolicy of the war, was appointed on the 23rd of October, 1841, to succeed him.*

* Lord Ellenborough, it will be remembered, had been president of the Board of Control during the Duke of Wellington's administration. On the first formation of Sir Robert Peel's second administration, his lordship was destined for the same functions, being gazetted on the 4th of September, 1841, as "Her Majesty's Commissioner for the affairs of India."—*Gazette.*

CHAPTER XIX.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

His Lordship arrived in India on the 28th of February, 1842. His earliest attention was claimed by the state of affairs on the Indus, where the Ameers of Sinde continued in a doubtful attitude, and by the state of affairs in Afghanistan, where our troops were remaining in a state of uncertainty as to their future operations, and where our captives were putting up earnest, but at times almost hopeless, prayers for their liberation—a liberation which even the women of the party seem to have thought was not to be obtained by negotiation and ransom, but by hard fighting. At first his lordship adopted the notion of his predecessor; and it is said that positive orders were more than once drawn up for withdrawing all our troops, and commencing a treaty with men whom no treaty could bind.* But the clear head and high heart of the Duke of Wellington revolted at this line of policy, and the English people and, assuredly, the majority of the cabinet felt with the duke. The indignation of the country would have broken up the new ministry if Lord Ellenborough had followed the plan which he had been induced to entertain, momentarily and reluctantly, by the advice of others whose seat of sensibility was mostly in the purse.* In a happy moment his lordship in council pronounced the word "Forward;" and from that moment our prestige began to

* Some new failures and disasters contributed to depress the spirits of his lordship and his council. Ghuznee was recaptured by the Afghans: the poor sepoys left there were all frost-bitten and rendered spiritless and unfit for service; provisions were not to be obtained; relief was despaired of; and on the 6th of March Colonel Palmer evacuated the place in pursuance of a capitulation with some of the Afghan chiefs. The diminished force had scarcely marched out of the citadel ere it was attacked by the savage fanatic Ghazees. On one spot an English officer, his wife, their servants, and thirty sepoys were massacred. Native women and children, and sepoys as helpless as they—their powder being all consumed—were butchered by the Ghazee knives, or were knocked down in heaps by discharges of artillery. Colonel Palmer was put to the torture; and then he and his nine surviving British officers were thrown into a small and filthy dungeon. Nearly at the same time, General England, who was taking stores and reinforcements to Candahar, came upon the enemy in an unexpected position, and met with a reverse: and this, though trifling in its consequences and easy to be repaired, contributed to renew the panic of the Indian government. General Pollock was ordered to be ready to retreat, and Nott received orders to retreat simultaneously with him.

"Such was the state of utter hopelessness in which our affairs were plunged when Lord Ellenborough received an answer to those communications which had made England mourn 'like Rachel weeping for her children, and as one that would not be comforted.'. . . . . That word of command, at whose sound the eagles of the empire had quailed, came booming over the ocean, and echoed through the mountains of Afghanistan. The vigour and confidence of the troops were instantaneously renewed."—*Westminster Review, No. LXXXI.*

The writer of this able article, who appears to have had good sources of information, states that previously to the arrival of Wellington's word of command, there was one high-minded and thoroughly-informed adviser of the governor-general that urged energetic measures by every argument in his power, offering at the same time to provide both stores and carriages, and suggesting other arrangements which would have ensured success. We have good reasons for believing that this high-minded and accomplished individual was Mr. Robertson, formerly governor at Agra.

* It does not appear that any member of the new administration ever contemplated the recall beyond the Indus of Pollock, Sale, or Nott. At the close of the following session of parliament Sir Robert Peel, in reply to the attacks of Lord Palmerston, exclaimed:—"The noble lord says, 'Who contemplated the abandonment of Afghanistan?' *I could tell the noble lord!* Beware! I say, let the noble lord beware of indiscriminate reflections upon those now in office."

brighten, our disgraces to be remedied. We speak not of vengeance for the past: this was not, or never ought to have been, a war of retaliation and revenge; it was a war of retrieval, a war of liberation—it was a war for retrieving all that was highest and most valuable to us, our national character, the honour of our arms and the spell of our prestige, wanting which we should have had not one, but many wars to undertake in the East:—it was a war for releasing, in the only becoming manner, the sons and daughters of Britain from a foul Afghan imprisonment.

In the meanwhile Sale, in spite of doubt and uncertainty as to the orders he might receive, and in spite of many other discouraging circumstances, had continued to hold out manfully behind the shattered walls of Jellalabad. His sorties had continued to be frequent and successful. Through these sorties many of Akbar Khan's people were killed and wounded, while many more were so disheartened that they quitted the camp, and turned their faces towards their own homes. On the morning of the 7th of April Sale defeated Akbar Khan in the open field, with only a part of the troops that chief boasted he had been blockading. The defeat was signal: two Afghan standards, four guns which had been lost by our Cabul army, and nearly all Akbar's ordnance, stores, tents, &c., were taken. Next to Sale himself, the heroes of this day were Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, Colonel Monteith, Captains Broadfoot, Fenwick, Pattison, Oldfield, and Havelock, and Lieutenant Mayne. Unhappily the gallant Dennie was killed. But notwithstanding this victory, the situation of the brigade was still very precarious, for the provisions were almost all consumed. At last, on Friday, the 15th of April, Sale received the joyful intelligence that Pollock's camp was at Ali Boghan, only eight miles from Jellalabad, and that he would certainly be at Jellalabad in the course of the next morning. And accordingly, on Saturday morning, at about eight o'clock, General Pollock and his force arrived under a salute of seventeen guns.* On Sunday, the day after this opportune arrival, there were three more distinct shocks of earthquake; but they did no harm, and passed almost unnoticed by our rejoicing soldiers. Pollock had soundly beaten the Afghans in the Khyber Pass and above it; and before he reached Jellalabad the beleaguering army had dissolved, or was in rapid flight, although, only a few days before, the Afghans, to deceive and distress some of their English captives, had been waving their hands, and shouting "Shabash! (Bravo!) All is over. The Feringee army has been cut up in the Khyber Pass, and all their guns taken by Sultan Jan!"

As soon as it was known that General Pollock intended to advance and not to retreat, the people of Cabul began to desert the city in great numbers, from dread of our army, and all efforts to induce the people to meet and oppose Pollock on his march were found to be fruitless. Many of the khans either struck away for their own mountains, or agreed that some one or two of the English prisoners should be released in order to open friendly negotiations with the victorious general. Just at this crisis Major-General Elphinstone breathed his last,—"a happy release for him," says a fellow-prisoner, "from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when he resigned the home-born pleasures of his native land, to hazard the high reputation of a proud name in a climate and station for which he was constitutionally unfit. . . . . It is due no less to the memory of the dead than to the large circle of living friends and relatives who will mourn his loss, that I should record how, to the very last moment of his being, he exhibited a measure of Christian benevolence, patience, and high-souled fortitude, which gained him the affectionate regard and admiring esteem of all who witnessed his prolonged sufferings and his dying struggles, and who regarded him as the victim less of his own faults than of the errors of others."* The sirdar

* "General Pollock," says our young officer, "is very much liked in camp, as being up to his work, and not caring how the men *dress*, so long as they *fight*."—*MS. Journal.*

* Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan, &c.

The monstrous mistake was in appointing an

agreed to send the general's body to Jellalabad for honourable interment; but a set of savages interrupted the escort near Jugdulluk, broke open the rude coffin which a Cabul carpenter had made, stripped the body of the general, pelted it with stones, and would have burned it but for the remonstrances of the sirdar's men, who threatened them with the vengeance of their master. The body was afterwards repacked and forwarded on its way to Jellalabad. By this time several of the Afghan chiefs were waging war upon one another in the neighbourhood of Cabul. It was difficult, even with the best management, to occupy the country —but happily there was no longer any intention of so doing—it was easy to regain possession of Cabul and to scatter the divided, distracted army of such an anarchic people. The sirdar now offered to release the English ladies and children unconditionally; but his dispatch was intercepted and destroyed by one of the khans. One security for the lives, at least, of these interesting prisoners was in the circumstance that the women and children of Akbar's own family and of some other chiefs were in our hands, and the barbarians thought that if they murdered their captives, we should retaliate by murdering ours. The Shah Sujah was treacherously assassinated by one Sujah Dowlah, "a handsome quiet-looking man," who now tried hard to persuade the English prisoners that the Shah had played us false, and that he had committed a praiseworthy act in getting rid of him. The assassin's real motive was to avenge an attempt which had been made upon the life of Akbar by an agent of Shah Sujah; but many of these Afghan chiefs had become wonderfully anxious to prove that they had always been the friends of the English, and that it was the late Shah who made the insurrection and called upon all the mountain tribes to destroy our army on its retreat through the Passes.* Shah

officer so broken in health to such a command, in such a country: and Elphinstone's capital fault was in accepting the appointment. We have heard that his acceptance was doubtingly and reluctantly given, and that, before he left England, he expressed in a club, and in various other places, his wonder why the government should have selected him. It appears that he never had a day's health from his first arrival at Afghanistan, and that during all the Cabul cantonment affair he was suffering the agonies of cruel and complicated diseases. Such things have happened before, and will very probably happen again (unless our routine system of promotions be altered), but we hope and trust it will never happen again that a commanding officer shall be surrounded by so many imbecile inept men. Nothing short of the most positive evidence could have made us credit the fact, that such a number of British officers should have mustered among them so small an amount of energy and ability, and common attention to their routine duties.

* Strange as it may appear, it is positively asserted by various parties that Shah Sujah promoted, at least, the insurrection in the city, from feelings of personal enmity to Burnes.

"Captain Conolly had obtained convincing proof that Shah Sujah originated the rebellion with a view to get rid of Burnes, whom he detested, and of several chiefs, whom he hoped to see fall a sacrifice to our vengeance; *little anticipating the ruinous result to himself and to us.* Poor Burnes had made but few friends among the chiefs, who now never mention his name but in terms of the bitterest hatred and scorn. He seems to have kept too much aloof from them; thus they had no opportunity of appreciating his many valuable qualities, and saw in him only the traveller, who had come to spy the nakedness of the land, in order that he might betray it to his countrymen. The king considered him as a personal enemy, and dreaded his probable succession to the post of envoy on the departure of Sir W. MacNaghten."—*Eyre.*

At the same time several of the chiefs, and not a few of the people, who were attached to Dost Mohamed, could not forget that Burnes had been hospitably entertained by the Dost, whom he afterwards helped to pack off as a state prisoner for Hindustan. Had it only been for the varying parts which he had played at Cabul—now the friend and panegyrist of the Dost, and now the supporter of Shah Sujah—Burnes ought never to have been left in that city or in any part of Afghanistan. As matters went, he was always the most conspicuous and forward of all our functionaries; nearly everything was done through him, and while Sir William MacNaghten, the envoy, resided in the cantonment, he, the envoy's assistant, resided in the city, and was constantly reminding the people, by his presence, of his past history.

On the whole, we are much disposed to agree with Lord Ellenborough in the view he took of the Shah's conduct. In a dispatch addressed to General Sir Jasper Nicholls, his lordship in council says:—"The information received with respect to the conduct of the Shah Sujah during the late transactions is necessarily imperfect, and, moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have *originated with* him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has *adopted* it, and, powerless in himself, is

Sujah's youngest son, Futty Jung, was proclaimed king by one party, while the Barukzies formed another party and opposed him. From the close neighbourhood of Cabul, the civil or clan warfare was carried into the very heart of that city; and Futty Jung, who hoped to retain the treasure, if not the throne of his father, the murdered Shah, was closely besieged in the Balla Hissar. On the 6th of June a mine was sprung under one of the towers of the Balla Hissar, but the storming party was driven back with loss. On the following day, however, Futty Jung, finding his people disinclined to support him any longer, made terms with Akbar and the other chiefs, giving up a tower in the Balla Hissar to each of them, and retaining for himself possession of the royal residence. By this strange bargain the citadel was now divided between four rival tribes, the Dooraunees, the Barukzies, the Ghilzies, and the Kuzzilbashes, each being represented by its chiefs.

On the 2nd of June news was brought to Cabul that General Nott had gained a great victory under the walls of Candahar, and had killed 2000 of the Afghans. Nott also succeeded in seizing the person of Sufter Jung, a rebel son of Shah Sujah, who had fought against his own father, and had now been fighting against the English. The sirdar Akbar Khan now told the English prisoners at Cabul, that he intended shortly to march to Jellalabad, in order to pay his respects to General Pollock! But, from other quarters, the Englishmen heard that he meditated carrying them all off to the banks of the Oxus. This was the man who, after concluding the treaty with Mac Naghten, put on his boots and spurs on the morning of the departure of our army from Cabul, and told the assembled chiefs he was going to slay all the Feringee dogs: and this was the man who, on the passage of our troops through the Khoord Cabul Pass, followed with some chiefs in the rear, and in the same breath called to the Afghans in Persian (a language which many of our officers and people understood) to desist from firing, and in *Pushtoo* (a dialect of the country which none of our people understood) to continue firing at the infidel dogs. On the 29th of June there was a shock of an earthquake at Cabul, and Futty Jung, the Dooraunee chief, and youngest son of Shah Sujah, was proclaimed king by Akbar, who contented himself for the present with the title of Vizier. But it should appear that our Indian government had begun once more to lose heart and confidence, and to doubt whether the united forces should return at once to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or advance upon Cabul. As late as the 4th of July, Lord Ellenborough seemed to despond about the advance upon Cabul. Writing to General Nott from Allahabad, his lordship said that "failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin;" and that "the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our government in India." After his junction with Sale, Pollock halted more than four months at Jellalabad. During this long time the troops at Jellalabad were much afflicted by dysentery and other sicknesses, arising chiefly from bad food, improper or inadequate clothing, and the want of tents.* A great many died; and all the surviving soldiers were impatient to quit the place and march forward for the Afghan capital. If this long delay was partly owing to the difficulty of procuring cattle and forwarding supplies and reinforcements, it is

prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne."

* The young officer, whose MS. Journal we have repeatedly quoted, mentions several facts which we have not seen noticed elsewhere.

On the 18th of April, owing to the great scarcity of forage and of provisions, the horses both of the cavalry and artillery were put upon short allowance, and the men upon half rations! "I think," says our young friend, "it is very plain that we shall soon be obliged either to go on towards Cabul or to go back to Peshawer."

A good many of the men died of apoplexy; and some of cholera, and some of the small-pox. He attributes some of the sickness to the quantity of unripe grapes which the country people brought in, and which the English soldiers ate voraciously. The thermometer was at 110°.

At the end of May everybody seemed to think that Pollock was about to retreat to India, and that government would have enough to do to protect India, as all the people of the independent states were said to be eager to invade our territories.—*MS. Journal.*

pretty clear that it was partly owing to the indecision of government and to the want of proper energy and ability in the commissariat, and (*perhaps*) in some other branches of the service. At length—about the middle of July—General Pollock received instructions to advance on Cabul as quickly as possible. Pollock, however, could not, or at least did not, move until the 20th of August.* Akbar Khan declared, with an expression of savage determination in his countenance, that so surely as Pollock advanced he would take all his English prisoners into Toorkistan and make presents of them to the different chiefs of that wild country. On the 15th of August, General Nott, at the head of about 7000 men, had left Candahar for Ghuznee and Cabul—a distance of about 300 miles. Sultan Jan started to meet Nott before he should reach Ghuznee; he fancied he was going to a certain victory, but he sustained a complete defeat, and Ghuznee being retaken,† Nott continued his advance. General Pollock was equally successful, and both armies were satisfactorily proving that our soldiers, both native and European, only required proper commanders to be invincible. It was now expected that General Nott would reach Cabul early in September; and that Pollock would be only a few days after him.

On the 25th of August, Akbar kept his threat by hurrying off his prisoners towards Toorkistan. On the 3rd of September the unhappy party reached Bameean, every indignity having been heaped upon them by the way. There they were halted under a fort, until fresh orders should be received from the terrible Akbar. On the 11th the Khan who had charge of them, and who was "a man that would do anything for money," signed an agreement with five English officers, who promised to give him 20,000 rupees, and to ensure him 1000 rupees per month. After this, the Khan hoisted the flag of defiance on the walls of the fort, telling the prisoners that they had no longer anything to fear—that they should not be carried into Toorkistan—that they should remain where they were until General Pollock sent a detachment to convey them back to Cabul in honour and safety. He had told the prisoners that he had received Akbar's orders to hurry them on their journey, and to butcher all the sick and all those for whom there was no conveyance. Several neighbouring chiefs, knowing how matters were going at Cabul, and hoping to obtain some English money, came over to the fort and tendered their allegiance to Major Pottinger. Some two or three of them with much form and ceremony swore on the Koran to be faithful to Major Pottinger and his companions, who appointed a commissariat officer, and resolved, in case Akbar should send troops against them, to hold out till they should receive assistance, even though they should be reduced to eat the rats and mice, of which they had a grand stock in the old fort.* On the 15th a letter was received at the fort, stating that all Cabul had risen against Akbar the new Vizier; that Nott's and Pollock's forces were coming up rapidly; that Akbar had fled to the Toba mountains, and that other chiefs, who dreaded alike the vengeance of the English soldiers and the vengeance of the people of Cabul, had fled in various directions and with only a few followers. It was also reported that a light English force had been sent to their aid, and was making forced marches towards the fort. Upon this Major Pottinger, no longer a prisoner, but acting

* "We marched from that horrid stifling hole Jellalabad on the 20th (August)."—*MS. Journal.*

"We left Jellalabad with the intention of advancing on Cabul; but, what with the inefficiency of our commissariat, I think we shall never get there; supplies of every description are very scarce. I think it a great deal more likely that we shall make a strong demonstration on the Passes, and cover the retreat of the Candahar force, which must now be very near Ghuznee, equipped in every respect better than General Pollock's."—*Id.*

† Making every allowance for the situation in which she was placed, we cannot but hope that the following passage in Lady Sale's Journal dropped from her pen in the hurry of the moment, and without due reflection:—

"We hear that General Nott has arrived at Ghuznee, has blown up the new burj in the city, and has put to death nearly every man, woman, and child found there. We cannot be surprised at the men taking signal vengeance; *but we fear the news is too good to be true.*"

* Lady Sale, *Journal.*

as a viceroy and making grants of land and assigning revenues to the hill chiefs, to keep them in good humour, determined to quit the old fort, and return with the whole party along the road leading to Cabul. The party, attended by a number of chiefs, set out from the fort on the 16th, hoping to meet their English friends on the road, and at the same time fearing that they might encounter some of Akbar's desperate and vindictive people. As they encamped for the first evening, they received a letter stating that Pollock's force, after fighting from mid-day to midnight, had eventually forced the Khoord Cabul Pass, and had charged the enemy as far as the hills on the north side of the city of Cabul; that Nott had attacked and pursued them in another direction; that the Kuzzilbashes and adherents of the late Shah Sujah had made themselves completely masters of the city; and that Akbar Khan, Sultan Jan, Achmed Khan, and the other hostile Khans, who had all been defeated, were nowhere to be heard of. This was pleasant news; but at the same time our returning prisoners were alarmed by the report that 2000 horse were following them up to recapture them and to carry them into the deserts beyond the Oxus. But their last fears were soon removed: at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th they were roused from their slumber by the arrival of a horseman with a letter from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was coming with 600 mounted Kuzzilbashes to meet them. The party set off early, and at mid-day reached some deserted forts at the foot of a mountain pass. They were sitting under the walls of one of these forts, sheltering themselves from the sun, when, at three o'clock, Sir Richmond arrived; and was received, with *one* exception, with heartfelt pleasure.* "Our gallant countryman," says one of the party, and one of the best among them, "was greeted on our side with no boisterous cheers of triumph; for all seemed alike conscious that the utterance of such sounds would but inaptly express the deep feelings of gratitude that agitated our inmost hearts. Our joy was too great, too overwhelming for the tongue to utter. That we should have escaped unhurt, with so many delicate women, young children, and tender infants, through such numerous perils, fatigues, and privations, and, above all, from the hands of such merciless enemies as Akbar Khan and his Ghilzie confederates, seemed at first too much for the senses to realize; nor could even the most thoughtless among us fail to recognise and acknowledge, in all that had befallen us, the distinguishing grace and protecting providence of a forbearing and merciful God. We now for the first time learned that General Pollock had reached Cabul on the 15th, where one of his first acts had been to hasten the departure of the Kuzzilbashes to our aid, by a donation of 10,000 rupees."* But the party had still a long march and a diffi-

* "That *one*, General Shelton, could not forget the honour due to his rank as the senior military man; and was much offended at Sir Richmond not having *called on him first, and reported his arrival in due form.* Even were this a military duty, Sir R. was perfectly exonerated in its omission; for the greater part of the ladies, and some gentlemen, had seated themselves where he must pass, anxious to offer their acknowledgments to him for his prompt assistance."—*Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, by Lady Sale.*

This is precisely the sort of behaviour we should have expected from Shelton, who did little enough in the cantonments, and who appears to have done absolutely nothing during the march and counter-march of the prisoners, but to have left everything to be done by Major Pottinger and one or two of the *ladies* of the party.

* Lieutenant Eyre, Journal.

"The army as it advanced had some sharp work, first at the memorable Jugdulluk Pass, and afterwards a little beyond Tozeen, where they were opposed by some 10,000 or 12,000 men headed by Akbar Khan. At the two places we had on our side about 250 killed and wounded: one officer, Captain Nugent, of the commissariat department, was killed at Jugdulluk, and four or five officers were wounded. Altogether our loss was not great, as out of the whole army they had not so many killed and wounded as we had on our march down from Cabul for Jellalabad in October last; and then we had only 2500 men, and they had now about 7000. At Tezeen the enemy got a taste of the swords of her majesty's 3rd dragoons, which let them know of what sort of stuff a regiment of European cavalry is composed. The army, after having beaten Akbar's force, continued their march without the slightest molestation, and arriving at Cabul on the evening of the 15th of September, they planted the British colours on the highest peak of the Balla Hissar on the morning of the 16th. The town, I believe, was almost totally deserted."—*MS. Journal of a Young Officer.*

cult country between them and Cabul, and were not without their apprehensions that Akbar might make some desperate effort to recover his lost prey. Sir R. Shakespear forwarded an earnest request to General Pollock that more troops might instantly be sent out to their support, as the pass of Suffed Khak, through which they must march, was reported to be occupied by a band of marauders. At the same time it was determined that the party should move forward by forced marches, for which every facility was afforded by the Kuzzilbash chiefs, in supplying them with fresh horses. On the dawn of the 18th the march was resumed. On the 20th they met an English officer, who gave them the welcome intelligence that General Sale's brigade was only a few miles distant on the road to meet them. A little farther on they saw a body of her Majesty's 3rd dragoons, with a squadron of Bengal cavalry, quietly picketed in some fields.

"All doubt was now at an end; we were once more under the safeguard of British troops. General Sale was there in person; and his happiness at regaining his long-lost wife and daughter may be imagined; the gallant veteran's countenance was an index of his feelings, and apathetic indeed must have been the heart that failed to sympathize with his holy joy. The camp was still a few miles farther on, and we formed a procession of glad spirits as we moved along towards the pass of Suffed Khak, whose heights we could discern crowned with British bayonets. This we found to be a part of the brave 13th light infantry (Sale's own regiment), who, as the ladies successively ascended the hill, raised three hearty cheers to each of them: sounds never to be forgotten, producing a thrill of ecstasy through the whole frame. The mountain-guns, under Captain Backhouse, wound up the scene with a royal salute."* It was a glorious rescue—it was a scene worthy of an epic, but, alas! that the number of the rescued should be so small!† On the 21st the happy party marched with Sale's brigade to Killa-Kazee, a village close to Cabul. At 2 P.M. on the same day they started for General Pollock's camp on the plain east of Cabul. Near the tomb of the Emperor Baber they passed General Nott's camp. Thence their road lay through the city. The streets were almost empty, and an unnatural silence prevailed. A striking contrast to the noise and bustle of former days! They passed the spot where Burnes's house had stood. That house was now a heap of rubbish, and its pretty garden a desolate waste. It was here that the unfortunate man used to look forward with enthusiasm to the rapid amelioration of the country through the agency of British enterprise and skill.* An unreal, fatal vision, and awfully dissipated! The party entered General Pollock's camp at sunset. Again the artillery uttered its boisterous notes of welcome, and old friends crowded around with their hearty congratulations. For the present their cup of joy was full.† But when the first rapture was over, rest and reflection, and the scenes which surrounded them, must have brought to their recollection the thousands that had perished, and the many friends whose bones lay bleaching on the mountain-tops or in the dreadful Passes.‡

Victory was now perched upon the

* Eyre.

† Major-General Shelton, of her Majesty's 44th foot, stands at the head of the list. The total number of all that were released and recovered by Nott's and Pollock's brilliant advance to Cabul, and by Sale's forward movement from that place, was only 122. Of this number 9 were ladies and 3 the wives of non-commissioned officers or privates; 22 were children; 34 were officers, and the rest, with the exception of two or three regimental clerks, were British non-commissioned officers or privates.

* Eyre.

† Id.

‡ Some of the first sad occupations of our troops were to collect the bones of their slaughtered countrymen, and give them interment. Our young officer, whose regiment did not proceed to Cabul, but was halted near Gundamuck, has several entries in his journal about these melancholy operations.

"August 29th. The general went out this morning with 200 cavalry and two regiments of infantry to look at a hill where the remainder of the brave 44th, and the last survivors belonging to the ill-fated Cabul army, were said to have met their untimely end at the hand of the cruel and treacherous Afghans. On arriving at the hill where they expected to find the bleached bones of our people, they saw only about 100 of the

British standard wherever it was raised. One of the most confident predictions of those who had pleaded for the continuance of the Company's commercial character and monopoly of the China trade, had been verified: from the moment that that trade had been thrown open, there had been nothing but dissension and confusion at Canton, and the quarrel had led to war and to the invasion of the Celestial Empire by a British fleet and army. The victories obtained in the rivers and on the plains of China were rapidly rumoured throughout India, and produced a salutary impression among the mountains of Afghanistan, as well as in other neighbouring countries. They warned all our enemies that our enterprise, our strength, and resources were undiminished. On the 21st of September, Lord Ellenborough, being then at Simla, in the Himalaya mountains, issued an encouraging proclamation, in which he stated that he had that very day received the reports of three victories: one, obtained on the 30th of August, by Major-General Nott, over 12,000 Afghans, 38 miles to the south-west of Ghuznee; one, on the 8th of September, by Major-General Pollock, over the troops of Mohamed Akbar Khan and the Ghilzie chiefs at Jugdullnk; and one, on the 16th of June, by the expedition on the coast of China, within the mouth of the river Yang-tse-Kiang. Before the news of these victories reached them, our old foes in Nepaul and some of the Rajpoot tribes in Central India were in a state of violent excitement; and even the Burmese looked anxiously towards China, and seemed more than half determined to try again the fortune of war by invading Arracan and the Tenasserim provinces. But as soon as it was known that the Chinese were flying before our troops, that the Afghans had been beaten in every encounter, and that Cabul had been re-captured, both Burmese and Nepaulese, together with every independent state in Hindustan, gave up their warlike projects and hastened to make the most amicable professions to our India government.

We had, however, had quite enough of Afghan connexions and interferences; there was no longer a man that could be deluded by a vision like that of Burnes; we had released our captives, retrieved the honour of our arms, and by a series of well-ordered and gloriously-fought battles reduced the Afghan pride; and therefore it was felt that we had little else to do than to evacuate a country which we ought never to have entered, and leave the Khans and clans to their own anarchy. On the 1st of October Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation from Simla, the spot where Lord Auckland had declared the war, stating that the disasters in Afghanistan having been avenged upon every scene of past misfortune, the British army would be withdrawn to the Sutledge. And on the 12th of October, after destroying the fortifications, the Grand Bazaar, two mosques, and other buildings, the British troops evacuated Cabul, and marched off in three divisions for Jellalabad, where they arrived in the course of the 22nd and the two following days.*

enemy's cavalry, who presently wheeled round and fled along the Cabul road.

"8th September, Thursday. I went out with Oldfield and some others to the hills where part of the 44th were said to have perished. We found from 60 to 70 skeletons, all headless. Only a very few of the skulls were left on the spot, the Afghans having carried most of them off as trophies. Those that I saw had chiefly light hair on them. These skulls were all broken in pieces. It was altogether a most horrible sight.

"18th September, Sunday. A large party of officers and some Europeans of the horse-artillery went out to the hill where the 44th made their last stand, and buried a great many of the skeletons there, to the number of 162; and there were about 50 or 60 more left unburied. Some officers who knew poor Hamilton say that they saw his body and skull, and recognised them by some particular marks he had.

"19th, Monday. A party again went out to the hill to bury the bones that were left yesterday. They buried about 60 skeletons."—*MS. Journal.*

* It has been said that nearly the whole of the city, with the exception of the Bala Hissar and the friendly Kuzzilbash quarter, was laid in ruins. But the following is General Pollock's account of the extent of the destruction:—

"Previously to my departure from Cabul, I destroyed with gunpowder the Grand Bazar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the reign of Aurungzebe by the celebrated Ali Merdun Khan, and which may be considered to have been the most frequented part of Cabul, and known as the grand emporium of this part of Central Asia. The remains of our late envoy and minister had been exposed to public insult in this bazar, and my motive in effecting its de-

From Jellalabad they continued their long march to Ferozepoor, where, as Lord Ellenborough expressed it, they were "within our native boundaries." The governor-general was at Ferozepoor to receive and welcome them. Sale and his brigade met with the most flattering reception. They reached the right bank of the Sutledge, opposite Ferozepoor, on Saturday the 17th of December: they crossed the river by a bridge of boats which was trimmed with flags, bright-coloured cloths, and the colours of the ribbon of the Jellalabad medal, which had been liberally distributed among them. At the end of the bridge of boats, on the left bank of the river, stood the governor-general with all his staff, and a little beyond him were ladies and officers on elephants. The brigade then passed through a complete street of elephants, and came to an open space where all the troops at that station (about 12,000 men), and all in full dress, were drawn up in line, and presented arms as they passed. "It was a gay and gallant sight," says one of Sale's officers; "we were glad, and everybody seemed glad to see us back again!" Reviews, dinners, and balls ensued. In proposing the health of General Sale and the brave garrison of Jellalabad Lord Ellenborough said that it was they who had saved the name and fame of the British empire in India. At a grand review, on the 31st of December, 24,000 troops and 102 guns were mustered on this one spot.*

How, after his spirited and judicious conduct of this war, and its brilliant termination, Lord Ellenborough should have been so soon induced to enter upon another war with a people equally or more barbarous than the Afghans, and, though nearer neighbours, much less formidable, is a question not to be discussed until his lordship be heard in his own defence, and until many documents be

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struction has been to impress upon the Afghans, that their atrocious conduct towards a British functionary has not been suffered to pass with impunity. A mosque also, at one end of the bazar, and another near the cantonment, and designated the Feringee Mosque, to commemorate the events of last year, have likewise been destroyed."—*Dispatches.*

The Afghan tribes occasionally harassed the rears of our retiring columns, and made attempts upon the baggage. Some few valued lives were lost in repelling these attacks. Their fate was the more deplored as they fell when the business was ended, and when all the real fighting was over. Almost the last shot fired by the fugitive marauders, who never stopped to fight, killed Lieutenant Walter Terry, of the Bombay artillery, a godson of Sir Walter Scott, and the son of that amiable man and prime favourite of our great novelist, the late Daniel Terry. There was not an officer in the whole Indian army more respected and generally beloved than this rising young man—the pride and hope of his mother, sisters, brother; and among all that fell in the foul Golgotha of Afghanistan, there was not one whose loss could be more deplored in his own home circle of family and friends.

"He had become well known to fame in India," says the valuable friend who attended him in his last moments, and read the prayers for the dead and shed tears over his grave, "from his gallant and adventurous journey, alone, in the disguise of a native doctor, to Candahar, which had excited universal praise and astonishment. We were drawn together by our mutual love for the pencil, and while I admired his talents and his rich fund of humour, I was still more attached to him through a kindness and consideration and delicacy, which, to a man of my profession, in a scene so unusual, was peculiarly valuable. When we went together on the campaign, I only shared the universal feeling in my admiration of his gallantry. A more gallant soldier certainly never fought his country's battles! . . . Amidst the sorrows of this severe affliction, you have, my dear madam, every consolation of which the case admits. If the patriotic sentiment be admitted that it is a happy and a noble thing for a man to die for his country, then your son's was a noble death, for he received his deathwound with his sword in his hand, gallantly rushing forward *at the head of all* in the path of glory."—MS. letter from the Rev. J. N Allen, B.A., to Mr. Terry's afflicted mother.

Other particulars of the mournful event are before the world in Mr. Allen's 'Diary of a March through Afghanistan and Sinde,' London, 1843.

It appears that poor Terry, on account of his rare intelligence and intrepidity, had been selected for difficult rear-duty; that, seeing some of the savage Khyberees falling upon a few of our helpless stragglers, he rushed back to the rescue; and that the first, if not the only, shot the flying Afghans fired, hit him in the breast and mortally wounded him. This was on Sunday, the 6th of November. He lingered until the morning of Wednesday the 9th, and then died like a Christian hero. They buried him on the evening of that same day at Koulsir near the camp, amidst a large assemblage of Queen's and Company's officers, "and the eyes of many were dim with tears at his grave, who had little need to fear the charge of weakness or unmanliness." The universal feeling there was that the service had lost one of its most gallant, zealous, and accomplished officers.

* MS. Journal of a young Officer.



The Ameers of Sinde.

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laid before the public. And even then, the discussion will more properly belong to political pamphlets and reviews than to an historical sketch like the present. Neither the war in Afghanistan nor that in Sinde will be a proper subject for history until one generation, at least, shall have passed away.

The Ameers of Sinde had behaved in a treacherous manner while our troops were engaged, and suffering their unspeakable disasters, in Afghanistan; and it might be deemed proper to curb their insolence, chastise their treachery, and make them feel and remember that the power of England had only slumbered for a while, and that its wrath was not to be braved by any power in the East. Moreover, Burnes's other dream about the navigation of the Indus, and the opening of a new highway to our commerce, may have had its influence; although that river, strictly speaking, is not navigable at all for ships or boats of any tonnage, and, if it were navigable, is not worth navigating for any purposes either of war or of trade. It flows, from Attock to the ocean, through a wild, sterile country, most thinly inhabited by a barbarous people. Above Attock there are rapids and whirlpools, which cannot, at any season of the year, be passed by any kind of boats or canoes. The line of commerce, as we have said, is *across* the Indus, and not up or down that river. Another imitative, pedantic notion,—borrowed from the French, who, apparently, will never cease talking of the Rhine as their natural limit,—had unluckily filled the heads of too many of our Anglo-Indians: this was, that the Indus was the natural or proper limit, on that side, of our Indian Empire. A river, running as the Indus does, may be a good line of demarcation, and a very clear line on a map; but a river is not a good defensive frontier. The Indus, with a wild country beyond it, and a broad, sandy desert between it and our own stations and cantonments, afforded a far better defence against invasion or incursion than what we shall find by including the unprofitable desert in our dominion and by advancing our frontier to the left bank of the river. Something too may have been owing to the impetuosity of the general, who was sent with an army to bring the Ameers of Sinde to reason, and to negotiate a new treaty with them. The fierce Ameers, who knew little of treaties, except how to break them, and who had given such recent proofs that they were not to be bound by any such obligations, certainly believed at the first that Sir Charles Napier and his army were coming to conquer their country, and to attach it permanently to our empire.* They had suffered some pecuniary loss and they fancied they had suffered still more (besides a loss of honour) by the treaty into which they had been forced by Lord Auckland at the advice of Burnes. They had been obliged to renounce their transit duties on merchandise, and as yet they had seen nothing of the "hundred-fold benefit" which had been promised them in the treaty. Moreover only some of the chiefs had entered into this treaty; and all of them were excited by the apprehension that the English intended to dispossess them of their hunting-grounds which lie along the banks of the Indus, and which, besides being the source of their chief and almost only amusement, were far more profitable to them than any trade up and down the river was likely to be for many a year. Lieutenant Eastwick, assistant resident in Sinde, and one who appears to have been dazzled by Burnes's vision, said to Noor Mohamed, the most powerful of the Ameers, who complained that he saw no good to be derived by him and the other Ameers from the presence of a British army in Sinde:—"As to the benefits resulting from the introduction of a British force, they are clear and palpable: employment will be given to thousands, a vast influx of capital will encourage commerce and manufactures, and

* This impression was common to the Seiks, and to all the peoples and tribes dwelling upon or beyond the Indus. As our army, on its return from Cabul, was passing through the Seik country, the people were constantly saying to our officers—"You call us your friends and allies: you tell us you want nothing from us but our friendship; you keep your own counsels; but we know very well that you intend to take our country and keep it!"—*MS. Journal of a Young Officer.*

money will eventually find its way into the treasuries of your highnesses. The Indus, now so barren, will teem with vessels, jungles will yield to the plough, and prosperity succeed to decay and depopulation." To these fine words Noor Mohamed replied:—"All this may be very true, but I do not understand how it concerns *us*. What benefit do we derive from these changes? On the contrary, we shall suffer injury; our hunting preserves will be destroyed, our enjoyments curtailed. You tell us that money will find its way into our treasury: it does not appear so; our contractors write to us that they are bankrupt, and have no means of fulfilling their contracts; goats, camels, are all absorbed by the English troops; trade is at a stand; pestilence has fallen on the land. You talk about the people: what are the people to us, poor or rich? What do we care, if they pay us our revenue? You tell me the country will flourish: it is quite good enough for us, and not so likely to tempt the cupidity of its neighbours. Hindustan was rich, and that is the reason it is under your subjection. No! give us our hunting preserves and our own enjoyments free from interference, and that is all we require."* This curious conversation took place in the Sinde Residency as far back as January, 1839, when our Indian diplomatists were endeavouring to conciliate the Ameers, in order to facilitate our operations in Afghanistan.

These chiefs were a brave and very vain set of men, almost as self-confident and presumptuous as the Burmese had been before the appearance of our army on the Irawaddi; and hence it was surmised that they would fly to arms rather than submit much longer even to the existing treaty.

"Delusion as to the circumstances under which we retired from Affghanistan," says Lord Ellenborough, "and ignorance of our real strength, which they never experienced, would have induced a brave and barbarous people of plunderers to avail themselves of the first occasion in which we might be involved in difficulties, to endeavour *to throw off engagements which they entered into with reluctance, and to compel our retirement from the Indus.*"*

It is said, too, that the Ameers could not restrain their own people, and much less the armed retainers of their neighbours; and it is pretty obvious that our India government preferred attacking and breaking their strength now, to waiting for a future collision when they might choose their own time and possibly take us by surprise. They signed a new treaty on the 14th of February, 1843, and broke it one day afterwards by attacking the residence of the British commissioners with a large force; but then, it is alleged, that though the treaty had been signed and everything conceded that we asked for, Sir Charles Napier continued to advance, being apparently resolved to conquer Hydrabad, their capital, in spite of the treaty. On the other hand, it is said that the Ameers were tempted by the smallness of Napier's force and the magnitude of their own to attack him; and that they never intended to abide by the concessions they had made. We can well believe the last of these two assertions, but in our view of the case the concessions, so far from being worth fighting for, were not worth asking for. On the 17th of February, three days after the signing of the treaty and two days after the foul attack on our commissioners, a severe battle was fought at a place about twenty miles from Hydrabad, where the Ameers brought every man into action that they could muster. The battle has been compared to the battle of Assaye, and Napier's conduct in it to that of the Duke of Wellington in the first of his great field-days, when victory alighted upon his crest never to desert it. The resistance of the enemy was of a most obstinate and determined character, and much, no doubt, was done by the general commanding. Our troops staggered more than once, and were rallied and led on by the brave fighting old Napier in person. In the end the victory was complete as victory could be. Our army marched on, and occupied Hydrabad on the 20th.

* Correspondence relative to Sinde, 1838-43. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1843.

* Correspondence relative to Sinde, 1838-43.

The result has been the annexation of the country to our vast possessions. In a few short sentences Lord Ellenborough appointed Sir Charles Napier governor of "the province of Sinde;" abolished slavery and all duties of transit in every part of Sinde which now was or hereafter might be occupied by our army, and declared the navigation of the Indus free to all nations. It is said that, at present, an army of 16,000 men is required to keep the turbulent and *very unhealthy* country in order; and that this army costs us 1,000,000*l.* per annum, while our share of the revenue is not 250,000*l.*

Here, in order to avoid debatable ground, and for the motives which have been already stated, we conclude our narrative, which we have endeavoured to conduct throughout in a spirit of fairness and impartiality. We shall have done some good if we draw attention to a vast and most important subject, which has been too much neglected, notwithstanding the undeniable fact that every Englishman has an immediate interest in our Indian Empire. The generality of readers have been deterred by the bulk and number of the books written about India, by strange and constantly varying orthographies, and other affectations, and by the too frequently prolix, tedious style of our Anglo-Indian writers, who have made that "harsh and crabbed" which is not so intrinsically. But, as materials, these very books, or many of them, are truly excellent, having been written by men who were themselves actors in the scenes and events they describe, or who passed their lives in a country which is scarcely to be understood without a long residence in it. To the excellence and authenticity of these materials is to be added the interest of a narrative, or of a course of events full of the most startling, exciting, and romantic interest, and of the most varied character. One of the best interests of all, or that which arises out of our nationality, is assuredly not wanting: the way in which our empire in the East has been acquired, enlarged, and maintained—making allowance for every fault, blunder, or even crime—reflects the highest honour on the character, the steady perseverance, the policy, and the valour of Englishmen; and never, since the days of Clive down to those of Pollock and Napier, has a more brilliant valour been displayed in any part of the world by British troops than in our Indian Empire and the countries which border upon it. Let it never be forgotten that when our national greatness and our reputation seemed to be on the decline in Europe, and the glory of our arms was obscured in the West, that reputation and glory shone forth, through the genius of Warren Hastings and the ability and courage of the officers he employed, bright as the morning sun, in the East. And let it ever be remembered that India is the school which has produced some of our most eminent men, and which mainly helped to form the great Captain of the age, the illustrious Wellington.

CHAPTER XX.

CONTINUATION TO 1846,

AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE SIKH WAR.

THREE years have elapsed since the preceding chapter, with which we then concluded our narrative, was written. For the East these have been busy years. They have also afforded us more ample means of judging of the merits and advantages of the conquest of Sinde, as well as the means of forming an opinion on other parts of Lord Ellenborough's energetic Indian policy; this policy, and his lordship's general conduct, being, in our apprehension, much improved by an attentive study of them. They come out the better from every light which has been thrown upon them. Writing while the events were so very recent, we spoke with hesitation on some matters; but we believe we committed no very serious error.

In part through want of room, and in part through want of information and proper materials, we were, in some measure, unjust towards that first-rate Indian officer, the late Major-General Sir William Nott. We gave him hearty praise, and we quoted passages to show the manner of man he was; but we did not praise him enough, or sufficiently show how much our second and glorious advance to Cabul depended upon his firmness and conduct. When other men were absolutely craven-hearted, Nott was full of courage and of hope. When the whole extent of our disasters at Cabul and in the passes became known to him at Candahar, he wrote to the governor-general, (Lord Auckland,) beseeching him not a moment to be disheartened, and cheerfully undertaking to march from Candahar to Cabul as soon as the roads were passable, and General England's outlying brigade could join him from Quettah. During six months he reiterated his advice and his offers; in spite of repeated orders to retreat, he still maintained that there was no honour or even safety, in any course but the bold one. "He *never*," as he said himself, "*had contemplated falling back*." In the early stages of our Afghan invasion, he had been disgusted at the arrogance, self-sufficiency, insolence, and—at times—*cruelty*, of the "young politicals," who were allowed to influence the movements of the army, to interfere in everything, and to insult and oppress the people. "If," said Nott, in one of his animated letters, "an officer is too stupid or too lazy to drill his company, he often turns sycophant, cringes to the heads of departments, and is often made a political—when he, of course, puts the government to an enormous expense, and disgraces the character of his country. *This has been the scene before my eyes many times since I left Hindustan*." And he then proceeds to give an instance of ferocity in one of these pet-functionaries, which would startle our belief if it rested upon a less indisputable or perfect authority. "The day of retribution and deep revenge *will come*," added Nott. He saw, from the first, how the mad expedition would end. While others were singing Io Pæans, he declared that Shah Sujah's throne was not worth six months' purchase; that we had done nothing, or nothing well, and that discomfiture and annihilation awaited the ill-governed army up at Cabul. In August, 1841, he writes—"The conduct of the thousand-and-one 'politicals' has ruined our cause, and bared the throat of every European in the country to the sword and knife of the revengeful

Afghans and bloody Beloochees; and, unless several regiments be quickly sent up, not a man will be left to tell the fate of his comrades."

But when this consummation—or the one so very like it—was over, Nott, never for one moment, would sink into womanly despondency and despair. "What are the people in Calcutta making such a foolish noise about?" said the veteran. "Stupid blunders caused disasters at Cabul. Is that a reason for the despair of a mighty empire? I *do* greatly wonder at such deep folly! *I am ordered* by government to withdraw the garrison from Khelat-i-Ghilzie. I suppose I shall be *abused by the press* for this, though it is not my act." At a later period he says—

"A dreadful panic had seized every man, and for six long months all I could do failed to make them act as Englishmen ought to do. I was sometimes obliged to be severe and harsh, and there are men who will not forget or forgive, and I have therefore been misrepresented and abused in the public press. If there is anything praiseworthy in having asserted the honour of dear old England in Afghanistan, and in making the British arms and character feared and respected throughout central Asia, the credit is mine, and mine alone; and history will do me justice. Had I not remained sternly determined, there would have been no advance on Ghuznee and Cabul, and we should have left Afghanistan in disgrace, been laughed at by the whole world, and all India would have been up in arms. I was obliged, more than once, to tell even my own officers, that I would save their honour and their lives in spite of themselves. Our sepoys always acted nobly, and I could have done anything with them; and at the very time that the press abused and calumniated these brave men, I would in perfect confidence have led 5000 sepoys against 20,000 Afghans. But when among our own countrymen all was panic and infatuation, from Lord Auckland down to the drum-boy, what could have been expected but disaster and disgrace? When I endeavoured to uphold the honour of my country, and to save it from disgrace, I was told—mark this; it is on official record—*I* was told, 'Your conduct has been injudicious, and shows that you are unfit for any command.'"*

But, very soon after his arrival in India, Lord Ellenborough learned to appreciate Nott, and his lordship was the first that ever did so. His long urged proposal for an advance was agreed to, and Nott put himself in motion, with the entire conviction that, "one thousand sepoys, *properly managed*, will always beat ten thousand Afghans." His was, indeed, an "ILLUSTRIOUS MARCH."

By quoting, in a foot note, in the preceding chapter, a strange passage from Lady Sale's Journal, we left, on some minds, an impression which it was never our intention to leave—that horrible massacres had been committed by General Nott's troops at the recapture of Ghuznee. On that place being re-entered by the British troops, there was not a single person in the city—no man, no woman, no child! The Afghans had all fled from it, after they had fought among themselves, and unroofed and destroyed the houses for the sake of the timber. Where there were people, Nott's army behaved with exemplary forbearance and humanity. Yet were these good soldiers scarcely back on the Indus ere the Indian newspapers began to fill their columns with horrible tales of their excesses and cruelties. Nott replied to these malignant libels with "words that burn." "I ordered the fortifications and citadel of Ghuznee to be destroyed," said he; "it had been the scene of treachery, mutilation, torture, starvation, and cruel murder, to our unresisting countrymen, (the brave little garrison of Colonel Palmer.) Look at the contrast! see the conduct of the noble British soldier on our return! And are calumny and gross falsehood to rob him of the honour? They *shall not*, while I have life

* Extracts from Sir W. Nott's Papers, as published in the "Quarterly Review," No. CLVI, October, 1846.

to defend his fame . . . . . Am I to have my feelings outraged because a few people in India and in England have sent forth villainous falsehoods to the world? I will only farther say, that never did an army march through a country with less marauding and less violence than that which I commanded."*

It was not to be expected that our remarks on the conduct of Sir Alexander Burnes would give satisfaction to his numerous relatives and friends settled in the different Presidencies, and exercising, wherever they are, a great influence over the Indian newspaper press. Yet of Burnes we said nothing harshly—nothing unfairly—nothing inconsiderately—nothing but what was justified by facts and sanctioned by the judgment of experienced men, who had lived long in the East, and had not wasted their time and their energy in writing newspaper articles, and in criticising the conduct, the system, and motives of those whom they were officially bound to obey. We had no prejudice against Sir Alexander Burnes, but we knew his vanity and self-sufficiency—the two rocks on which he split—and we had carefully perused his books and his varying reports on one and the same subject; and we could not but perceive that Lord Auckland was most unfortunate, if not imprudent, in trusting to so capricious a guide. We expressed our grief at the awful catastrophe in the City of Cabul, and suppressed, out of deliency to other people's feelings, a good deal which we might have related of Burnes, upon excellent authority.

Towards Lord Ellenborough we were unwittingly guilty of some injustice. We attributed his decisive measures—his first determination to send Pollock, Sale, and Nott, back to Cabul, to the impulse given by the Duke of Wellington, and to orders sent from the Home Government; now, we are assured, upon the very best authority, that his lordship received orders from no one, and that, at that critical moment, as all through his Indian administration, he acted upon his own judgment and responsibility.

The war in Sinde, and the exploits of Sir Charles Napier, we were obliged to dismiss with the briefest notice. Without pretending to give a full account of those transactions, we will now say somewhat more about them. And, in the first place, we may say that the war in Sinde was inevitable, and was especially rendered so by those who had rushed into the Afghan war. The calamities of Cabul and the mountain passes shook the reputation of British power throughout the neighbouring nations, disturbed all India, and induced the Ameers of Sinde to form combinations against a government surrounded by enemies. They leagued themselves with the Sikh Chief of Moultan, and with other powerful leaders, and they impudently and insolently evaded the execution of positive treaties which they had entered into with us. This state of things was brought about under Lord Auckland's government; and when his lordship quitted India, he left it in confusion and dismay. We would not, in all matters, go along with the historian of the conquest of Sinde; but we believe there is little exaggeration in the following striking passages of his history: "Lord Ellenborough arrived too late to prevent, but in time to remedy, the most dangerous evils menacing India from his predecessor's impolicy, which he denounced in a vigorous proclamation, designed as a warning to future governors. The beacon burned bright, but the flame spread too wide, and scorched many whose cries have never ceased, though few men, not personally interested, regard them. Previous to his coming, the ship was rocking in the shallows; but when his strong hand was felt, she reared to strike the sands, and, answering to the helm, was steered into deep water. Nevertheless, the very men whose political iniquity had brought India to the verge of ruin, are now, with incredible effrontery, imputing all their own crimes and absurdities to him, and most especially in what relates to Sinde.

* Letter to Major-Gen. J. R. Lumley, Adjutant-General of the Army, dated Lucknow, April 4, 1843.

He found the finances embarrassed, the civil and political services infested with men greedy of gain, gorged with insolence, disdaining work, and *intimately connected with the infamous press of India*, which they supplied with official secrets, receiving in return shameful and shameless support; for, thus combining, they thought to control the governor-general, and turn the resources of the state to their own sordid profit. He found the military depressed in spirit, and deprived of their just allowances; the hard-working soldier oppressed, the idle vapourer encouraged; discipline attainted; and the military correspondents of the newspapers assuming, falsely it is to be hoped, the title of officers, constantly proclaiming sentiments cowardly and selfish, without any indication of honour or patriotism. . . . Lord Ellenborough, amidst these difficulties, steered the course becoming a brave man, conscious of danger and of his own resources to meet it."*

Our Indian empire was indisputably in danger, and it was the new governor-general's mission to put it in a situation of security; to rebuke the pride and insolence of the barbarians who had been victorious, and of the barbarians who hoped to be so. The obligation of security was a necessity paramount to all other considerations. As this was not to be obtained by treaty—as things had been allowed to come to that pass that our treaties were laughed at—there remained nothing but the ultima ratio, a stern recourse to arms.

"The Sindian war," says its historian, "was no isolated event. It was the tail of the Afghan storm." It was not entered upon precipitately. The governor-general sent a warning letter to the Ameers; and it was not until four months after sending the letter that he gave the following instructions to Sir Charles Napier:—"Should any Ameer, or Chief, with whom we have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power, it is the present intention of the governor-general to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct; but the governor-general would not proceed in this course without the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt in the person accused."

When all were found guilty, the punishment must reach all. The Ameers, faithless abroad, were tyrannical at home; they had no affection of the people to rely upon. Theirs was indeed "a government hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to the interests of the English and of its own people; a government of low intrigue, and so constituted that it must in a few years have fallen to pieces by the vice of its construction."*

The required proofs of the treachery and hostility of the Ameers were soon obtained, yet by a most rigid process. The evidence which convinced Sir Charles Napier would have convinced any jury of sensible men—would have brought down sentence of *guilty*, not only in any court in Europe, but in any Oriental court. When war was imminent, Sir Charles, like an experienced soldier, applied himself to the organization and discipline of his troops, who were for the most part inexperienced. He drew them out frequently, and accustomed them to move in masses. He introduced several improvements. He exhorted them to a subordination of which too many of them had been allowed to lose sight, and he recommended a quiet and modest conduct towards the people of Sinde. The quaintness of his humour amused and delighted the soldiery, and offended only the foppish part of the officers. Some silly young men having persisted in riding violently through the camp and the crowded bazaars, whereby accidents were rather frequently occasioned, Sir Charles issued the following amusing order:—"Gentlemen as well as beggars, if they

* *The Conquest of Sinde*, &c., by Major-General W. F. P. Napier.

* Parliamentary Paper. Letter to Lord Ellenborough.

like, may ride to the devil when they get on horseback; but neither gentlemen nor beggars have a right to send other people to the devil, which will be the case if furious riding be allowed in the bazaar. The major-general has placed a detachment of horse at the disposal of Captain Pope, who will arrest offenders and punish them, as far as the regulations permit. And Captain Pope is not empowered to let any one escape punishment, because, when orders have been repeated and are not obeyed, it is time to enforce them: without obedience an army becomes a mob, and a cantonment a bear-garden; the enforcement of obedience is like physic, not agreeable, but necessary."

Meanwhile the agitation of the country increased, and the boastful Ameers were heard to say, "We have eaten and drunk well for many years, and we have enjoyed our ameerees; if it is the intention of the English to fight with us, without a doubt they shall find us ready for them."* One sanguinary monster among them advised that in case of the British advancing, the throats of all their wives and children should be cut.

The fighting veteran was in no hurry to begin: he hurried nothing. "Nothing," he wrote to the governor-general, "is lost by delay. We cannot be too cautious in securing firm moral ground on which to rest the defence of whatever events may arise. The Ameers grow weaker, delay exhausts their treasury, and then they cheat their soldiers, who, of course, leave them. This is also the season of fever on the banks of the Indus. Were hostilities to commence now, I should lose many men, and have a large hospital."

He was most careful of the health of his people, feeling that that was one of the most important duties of every commander-in-chief. "To move on Hyderabad," he continued, "I must go by the river or by the desert. To supply the sick by the last would be difficult, if not impossible. To go by the river would augment the hospital. The Indus is falling, and when it is at the lowest the fevers will cease. Meanwhile I have a sickly camp, and I should have regretted if the Ameers had called me out before: *now they are welcome.*" He was too wise to trust to so uncertain and interrupted a navigation as that of the Indus —he saw that the line of war, like that of commerce, was rather across the river, than up it or down it. "If I am forced to take the field," said he, "I will cross the Indus, and march upon Hyderabad by land; for there are objections to dropping down the river. The water is low; boats go with difficulty when lightly laden; I cannot float more than a thousand men with guns and stores, and the vessels would even then be over laden and ground perhaps for days on the mud within reach of matchlocks. Nothing can be gained by rapidity. The enemy has no position to fortify, no works to strengthen, no stronger place to retire upon; three or thirteen days' movement will therefore be the same: but by land we go compact, to beat or be beaten all together; whereas crowded in boats straggling for miles along the river, and half of them grounded in the shallows under matchlock fire, would lead to disaster. Slow and sure is an adage suited to my position." But when a forward movement became immediately necessary, Sir Charles made it with the rapidity of lightning. The aged and often wounded soldier moved with all the alacrity of youth.

In February, 1843, he wrote to Major Outram, who was still negotiating— "This delay will not do. The governor-general's orders to disperse the armed bands belonging to the Ameers of Upper Sinde are positive. I have now no time to lose; my own troops must soon disperse from the heat; I will not lose the cold weather. Say, then, to the Ameers of Qyrpoor thus—You were told in December, 1842, to disperse your armed bands, yet you have kept, and still keep them together. Disperse them instantly, or I will fall on them. To the Ameers of Hyderabad say thus —If you permit the bands of Upper Sinde to assemble in your territory I will treat you also as enemies. And if you let them go to your fortress of

* Parliamentary Papers relative to Sinde.

Omercote in the desert, I will first assault Hyderabad, and then Omercote. You may receive your relations of Upper Sinde as guests, but not as enemies of the British." The Ameers continued to bluster, and store Omercote with grain. At the same time the villages in the vicinity of the British camp were filled with armed men, who threatened and insulted our officers; hundreds of Bellooch warriors were daily passing round the left flank of our army by the edge of the desert towards Hyderabad; and 30,000 armed men, who were said by the Ameers of Hyderabad to have been dispersed, were actually collected and occupying a position of battle at Meeanee, which they were entrenching in the expectation of being joined in eight days by 25,000 more warriors. These men were proud, fierce, haughty, courageous, resolute to fight a pitched battle, and trusting to their sharp swords and bold hearts for victory.*

The Indus was now crossed, and Sir Charles Napier threw himself between the northern and southern Ameers. The forces of the Hyderabad Ameers made a ferocious attack on the British residency outside their city. On striking away from the bank of the Indus, Sir Charles found that a great force of the enemy was gathering in his rear, while the rest kept their post at Meeanee, in his front. But he had read the Duke of Wellington's observations on Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat before the Mahrattas, and he had drawn from it this conclusion—never to give way before barbarians. He said, "Let them be sixty or a hundred thousand, I will fight." He therefore rapidly advanced; and on the 17th of February, was fought the great battle of Meeanee. Our army was now reduced to 2,600 of all arms, including officers, fit for duty in the field. The enemy's positions were formidable: they had a natural ravine in their front; they had more than 30,000 infantry, with fifteen guns, and these were supported by 5000 cavalry. Their wings rested on large woods or hunting grounds, which extended on each side of the plain in front for a considerable way, so as to flank the British lines on both sides when it should advance. These woods were very dense with jungle and trees. Yet Sir Charles Napier and his little force fell hardily upon the enemy by the front. The fighting was terrible, and as hard as fighting could be. The dead level of the plain was swept by the Belooch cannon and matchlocks; and when our troops got close up, when the ravine was crossed, our men had to ascend a high sloping bank. The following passage is equal to that in which the same eloquent writer has described the death-grip which took place on the heights of Albuera.

"The formation was still incomplete, when the voice of the general, shrill and clear, was heard along our line, commanding the charge. Then rose the British shout — the English guns were run forward into position—the infantry closed with a run, and rushed up the sloping bank. The Beloochs, having their matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, waited until the assailants were within fifteen yards ere their volley was delivered; the rapid pace of the British, and the steepness of the slope deceived their aim, and the execution was not great; the next moment the 22nd were on the top of the bank, thinking to bear down all before them, but they staggered back in amazement at the forest of swords waving in their front. Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, stood the Beloochs in their many-coloured garments and turbans; they filled the broad deep bed of the ravine, they clustered on both banks, and covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields, they shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolled like a peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they rushed forward, and full against the front of the 22nd, dashed with demoniac strength and ferocity. But with shouts as loud, and shrieks as wild and fierce as theirs, and hearts as big, and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sinde, &c.

them with that queen of weapons, the musket, and sent their foremost masses rolling back in blood. . . . . Now the Belooches closed their dense masses, and again the shouts and the rolling fire of musquetry, and the dreadful rush of these swordsmen were heard and seen along the whole line; and such a fight ensued as has seldom been known or told of in the records of war. For ever these wild warriors came close up, sword and shield in advance, striving in all the fierceness of their valour to break into the opposing ranks; no fire of small arms, no push of bayonets, no sweeping discharges of grape from the guns, which were planted in one mass on the right, could drive the gallant fellows back; they gave their breasts to be shot, they leaped upon the guns by twenties at a time; their dead went down the steep slope by hundreds; but the gaps in their masses were continually filled up from the rear; the survivors of the front rank still pressed forward with unabated furor, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in full and frequent conflict.

"Thus they fought in this fearful struggle, never more than three yards apart, and often intermixed; and several times the different regiments, ay, even the Europeans, were violently forced backwards and pushed from the line, overborne and staggering under the might and passion of the barbarian swordsmen. But always their General was there to cheer and rally them. At his voice and intrepid demeanor their strength returned, and they recovered their ground, though nearly deprived of regimental leaders; for fast those leaders had gone down, dying as British officers should, and always will do, where they cannot win."*

Honour to the ancient and illustrious house of Napier, which in our own day can produce men that can thus fight, and that can write thus!

When nearly all the European officers had been killed or wounded, and when the sepoys, wanting leaders, had several times slowly receded, a charge made on the enemy's right by our entire, but small, body of horse, under the command of Colonel Pattle, gave to Sir Charles all the glory of victory. They had kept their ground for more than three hours, but now the Belooches began to retreat in heavy masses, still keeping well together, with their broad shields slung over their backs, and their heads half turned towards their pursuers. "The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after volley until tired of slaughtering; yet those stern, implacable warriors preserved their habitual swinging stride, and would not quicken it to a run, though death was at their heels."*

Never had more personal courage been displayed by our officers and men. The greater part of the battle was a hand to hand fight. "The noble soldier Pennefather," as Sir Charles called him, fell on the top of the bank, to appearance, mortally wounded; and his place was instantly taken by Major Pool. Major Teesdale, animating his sepoys, rode violently over the ridge into the midst of the Belooches, and was instantly killed by shot and sabre. Major Jackson followed the heroic example of Teesdale, and met the same fate. Two brave havildars kept close to them, in advance of their regiment, and, like their leaders, they were killed after they had killed several of the fiercest of the enemy. Lieutenant M'Murdogh, of the General's staff, rode, like Teesdale and Jackson, into the very heart of a Belooch mass: his horse was killed under him, yet he rose instantly, and meeting Jehan Mohabad, one of the most warlike of the chiefs, slew him in the midst of his clan. Then, while engaged with several in front, one came behind and struck at him, but a serjeant of the 22nd killed this enemy so instantly, that his blow fell harmless. M'Murdogh turned, and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving the head of a Belooch, who was aiming at his back. Captain Jacob and Lieutenant Fitzgerald performed similar exploits.

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sinde, &c.

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier.

Six European officers were killed, and fourteen wounded; sixty serjeants and privates were killed, and about 200 wounded. As the sepoy grenadiers had been but slightly engaged, this loss was nearly a sixth part of our fighting force. The loss of the Belooches was enormous: a careful computation gave it at 6000: a thousand bodies were heaped in the ravine alone. "Thus in four hours, 2000 men struck down six thousand! three to each man! At Salamanca, 100,000 men, with 130 pieces of artillery, were engaged for seven or eight hours, and the loss of the British scarcely exceeded 5000! Such and so terrible was the battle of Meeanee." *

On the *following morning*, at the break of day, Sir Charles Napier sent to tell the Ameers that he would immediately storm Hyderabad, if they did not surrender. Six of these sovereign princes presently entered his camp on horseback, and offered themselves as prisoners. They yielded their fortress, and laid their rich swords and other arms at the British general's feet. "Their misfortunes," said Sir Charles, "were of their own creation, but, as they were great, I gave them back their swords." The Ameers were cowards, but the conqueror, both in his public dispatches and in his private letters, gave full honour and praise to the brave Belooches. A few words must be said of the merits of the Ameers as rulers and sovereigns. They governed by the sword, and by no other law. The Belooches were their troops; the poor Sindians and Hindus their subjects and victims. Any Belooch might kill a Sindian or Hindu with impunity. There was no security of property to the industrious part of the community. Money was extracted from Hindu and other merchants by torture and mutilation, even as it was drawn from the poor Jews in England by King John. The Ameers also restricted commerce, and hated the presence of strangers, who might draw unfavourable comparisons between their rule and that of neighbouring princes and powers. With a teeming soil, and a people willing to work, they had turned Sinde into the most wretched, poverty-stricken country in all Asia. In order to form their shikargahs, or hunting grounds, they had laid waste, in less than sixty years, a fourth part of the most fertile land of Sinde. The processes of William the Conqueror, in forming the New Forest in Hampshire, were gentle and diminutive, compared with their proceedings along the banks of the Indus. The only trade they really encouraged was that trade in human beings, which not only all Christendom, but also the present Sultan of the Turks, have reprobated; the Ameers dealt largely in the slave trade, and so did all their feudal chiefs, both as importers and exporters. Infanticide was systematized among them; the Ameers and Sirdars killed all their illegitimate children, and very commonly their *female* legitimate children, when they thought they had too many girls in their family. The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, whose opinion always carries the greatest weight, because he never hazards one without mature deliberation, and because his experience among the peoples and races of the East has been immense, had said long ago of these rulers, "They have all the vices of barbarians without their redeeming virtues."

No sincere grief can be felt at the subversion—however forcible and tragical—of a dominion like this. The expenses entailed on us by the occupancy of the country is another question. But, even here, it has been shown that if we had not conquered and annexed the country, we should have been obliged to keep, at an enormous expense, an army of observation and surveillance constantly on the frontier. By our occupancy, too, agriculture and commerce may rise from the abyss of depression in which they were kept, and, in the course of time, pour an abundant stream of revenue into the treasury of Hyderabad. As the dense woods are cleared away, or well opened to the breath of heaven, the climate will become salubrious. Care has been

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier, Conquest of Sinde, &c.

taken in selecting the sites for barracks and cantonments; and, according to the latest reports of our army-surgeons, the ratio of mortality and disease is already much diminished.

It took Sir Charles Napier another victory—that of Dubba, near Hyderabad, gained on the 24th of March, 1843—to annihilate the power of the Ameers. That over, he had nothing to do but to organize the country and clear it of the bands of robbers and murderers who infested it. But some of these bands, in the South of the Delta, were very numerous and very bold, and were not to be overtaken but by the most rapid movements, nor subdued and scattered without more hard fighting.

It is most frankly acknowledged by Sir Charles and his relative and historian, that no censure can attach to Lord Ellenborough for furnishing too few troops for this momentous conflict;—that Lord Ellenborough gave Sir Charles additional troops, offered him more, and extended his command to Cutch;—that the general refused the reinforcements, and did not even take with him to the field the Bengal Infantry when placed at his disposal, though he used them to occupy for a time the ceded districts;—that Lord Ellenborough did, nevertheless, send strong reinforcements to Sinde, the moment he could furnish them, and that they arrived most opportunely;—that, therefore, the general alone is responsible for having so few men on the bloody field of Meeanee, and that the blame is his, if blame be merited.*

From the few words we have ventured of our own, and from those we have quoted, and will hereafter quote from others, it will be seen that we entertain no high respect for the Indian newspaper-press set up (unfortunately, as we consider) of late years, under the auspices of Lord William Bentinck and other Whigs, who never sufficiently reflected on the difference between England and India; who seem to have been carried forward by that hunting after immediate popularity which has done so much mischief to the machine of government, and to have been laid upon the scent by the cry first loudly raised by that ingenious martyr to the liberty of the press in India, Mr. Silk Buckingham. A free press is a fine thing in its proper place—it may be the best and the most powerful of instruments among a united people who have morality enough to prevent its running into licentiousness, and general education and intellect enough to detect the true from the false, the declamatory and rhetorical from the real. But the best of things may become bad in a wrong place. Who would have an unshackled newspaper press on board a fleet at sea, or on shore in a camp? and, say what we will, and do what we will, the English in Hindustan are, and will be, but as in a camp. It is a fact, notorious to all who are conversant with Indian affairs, that there has been a decline of discipline in the army, and of subordination in the civil service ever since the establishment of this newspaper press; that men have neglected their duty to find time for figuring in the columns of the journals; that our prestige among the natives (so many of whom now speak and read English with perfect ease) has been weakened; that Mahommedans and Hindoos have been brought to entertain something like a contempt of the supreme government, and to consider the British in India as a divided, distracted people, abounding in feuds, jealousies, and animosities, and involved in open quarrels which must eventually end in the entire subversion of our power. Surely these editors and scribblers ought to have looked around them, and to have seen that our empire there was but an empire of opinion; that we were numerically weak, and surrounded by countless millions who were only submissive and attached to our rule, from the conviction that it was the wisest, and, to themselves, the most beneficial that can be established. But stickit preachers of the Presbyterian Kirk, or ministers who have seceded, or been expelled from the kirk; broken

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sinde, &c.

traders—men who have failed in every other pursuit and are desperate, are not likely when they take up the trade of newspaper editorship—with the thermometer at 105° in the shade—to be very cool, or circumspect, or moderate. Too many of these men have an inveterate hatred of all established institutions, of all systems of government and administration that are not of their own invention—of every man eminent in rank and station—of every man above them in society and in fortune. They ought to be sent to drive the democratic engine in the United States. They have thrown their papers open to the young, the inconsiderate, and the rash; they have courted contributions from inexperienced officers and civilians, who, covered by the incognito, have in too many cases revealed the secrets of their superiors, and, in still more cases, criticised and ridiculed the very orders they were bound to obey. Every young officer in India has a deal of leisure time on his hands; the excessive heat of the climate during a great part of the year prevents his killing his time in the sports and amusements to which young officers resort in England and in our cooler colonies; it is too hot for their even playing at billiards; and as the long hours must be got rid of, and as they are tempted by editorial flattery to scribble, they sit in their bungalows and write articles. And the effect of the climate on the brain, is but too visible in most of those precious productions. Youths fresh from Addiscombe, ignorant of the country, ignorant of the business of government or of the army, with everything to learn in their profession, have been known to figure as contributors to newspapers, and to have written, within three months after their arrival, the most bitter attacks on their commanding officers. These youths will never become good soldiers, and without good soldiers, and a perfect discipline in the army, and concord and due subordination in the civil service, India is not to be kept. In the same way, young men fresh from Haileybury, destined for the civil service, instead of studying their line of duty, have thrown themselves into the angry, dirty field of newspaper controversy, making themselves critics of the conduct of their superiors. This was not the way in which the Barwells, the Barlows, the Twinings, the Prinseps, the Metcalfes, and all those excellent old civil-servants of the company trained themselves, on reaching India, and made themselves administrators and statesmen! These truths, we know, will not be palatable to those who are enamoured of the abstract idea of liberty of the press; but they are truths, nevertheless, and solemn ones. We are free to mention that precisely the same views as our own were entertained and expressed by the late excellent General Sir George Murray, who, as quarter-master-general to the Duke of Wellington, and a most experienced soldier, must be allowed to have understood something of the nature of an army and of the means by which discipline is strengthened or weakened. The most distinguished of our old East Indians were strongly opposed to the establishment of this newspaper press. No man in his senses who knows anything of that enlightened, high-minded statesman, will suspect Mountstuart Elphinstone of a want of liberality, or of a wish to curb the freedom of discussion; yet he objected to these Indian newspapers, as fraught with mischief. Sir John Malcolm did the same. Nearly every eminent man, who from boyhood to old age had spent his life in India, did the same. Yet now we have newspapers—Heaven knows how many, and how intemperate!—at Calcutta, Benares, Agra, Delhi, Madras, Bombay, &c. &c.; and if their progress be not checked, we shall soon have a journal issuing from every cantonment.

While the war was in progress in Sinde, the *Bombay Times*, which had made itself the organ of a party among the civil servants of the company, who had long been in hostility with the military, continually published matter which might be considered as instigating the Beloochees to prolong the struggle. Its articles teemed with abuse of Sir Charles Napier. For a time—we cannot say for a long time,

for he so rapidly solved the problem—they prognosticated nothing but defeat and ruin for him and his gallant little army. When victory—victory the most complete—was his, they spoke of the veteran general as a man that disgraced the name of Englishman, and the glorious age of Wellington. The Belooches could not read English, or perhaps any other language, but the Ameers had people about them who could read and translate; and on the field of battle, as well as in the towns of Sinde, copies of these un-English newspapers were found.

Incessant was the abuse lavished by these journals upon Lord Ellenborough, who had humbled the pride and reduced the emoluments of the aspiring civil servants, whose vanity and incapacity had contributed more than all other things to our recent misfortunes in Afghanistan; who had "put to flight the political agents and their assistants, who, numerous as locusts, had settled in the countries beyond the Indus."*

"Wild was the uproar these reforms occasioned. All the rage of faction broke loose. No calumny that sordid falsehood could invent, or cowardly anger dictate, was spared; and when malice was at fault, folly stepped in with such charges as, that *the governor-general's state harness was of red leather! He wore gold lace on his pantaloons!* But while such matters were dwelt upon, the incessant activity, the assiduity, the energy, the magnanimity of the man were overlooked. The moral courage and fortitude, which could, in the midst of disaster and abasement of public spirit, at once direct the armies to victory, and purify the administration, which could raise and confide in the military honour, opposing and defying the vituperation of the Indian press, re-echoed by the scarcely more scrupulous press of England; these great and generous qualities were overlooked or sneered at, as well as the complete success they procured for the country. But newspapers are not history, and Lord Ellenborough's well-earned reputation, as an able and victorious, and honest governor-general, will outlive faction and its falsehoods, and its malignant press."*

When the Sikh Ameers, who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle of Meeanee, were conveyed to Bombay, which they reached on the 19th of April, they were received with the utmost kindness and attention consistent with their safe custody, by Sir George Arthur, the governor of that presidency. These "fallen princes" had been what we have represented; but they had been friends of all the political agents who preceded Sir Charles Napier, and the journalists and article-writers could let slip no opportunity of exciting hatred against the governor-general and the hero of Meeanee. Forthwith a flood of sham sympathy and tears was poured upon the Ameers. They were made as interesting as those robbers, the Rohillas, in the days when persecution and impeachment were levelled at the grey and now ever-honoured head of the great Warren Hastings. They were "illustrious victims," "oppressed weeping sufferers," "dignified in misfortune, domestic, and deeply attached to their relations." And the strong arm which had struck them down was represented as the arm of a lawless ruffian, Lord Ellenborough, who came in for a large part of all this abuse, took, of course, a different view of the case from that of the *Bombay Times*. But so also did the Duke of Wellington, who had nothing to do with the Sinde War, and who was nauseously eulogized by these journalists and phrase-mongers.

Immediately after the Battle of Meeanee, the governor-general, in a proclamation, dated from the Palace of Agra, on the 5th March, 1843, announced that Sinde had become part of our eastern dominions; and on the 13th of March, he appointed Major-General Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., governor of the province he had conquered, directing in this second proclamation that all Acts of Parliament for the abo-

* Sir W. F. P. Napier.

* Sir W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sinde, &c.

lition of slavery, and for the suppression of the slave trade, should have full force and effect in every part of Sinde; that the navigation of the Indus should be free to all nations, and that all duties of transit in every part of Sinde should be immedintely and totally abolished.

The Belooches, whose occupation was gone, kept sullenly aloof; but their sword was broken, and it was not apprehended that they could mend it very soon. The Sindian population everywhere expressed their satisfaction at the change of masters.

After Sir Charles' second great victory, the governor-general, being still at Agra, issued on the 11th of April another proclamation. "The major-general," said Lord Ellenborough, "directed his force with the same consummate ability which characterized his operations at Meeanee; and all the troops, worthy of being so commanded, executed their movements with a precision and steadiness which secured the victory to their impetuous valour. The army of Sinde has twice beaten the bravest enemy in Asia, under circumstances which would equally have obtained for it the victory over the best troops of Europe. The governor-general regards with delight the new proofs which the army has given of its pre-eminent qualities in the field, and of its desire to mitigate the necessary calamities of war by mercy to the vanquished. The ordinary expression of thanks would ill convey the extent of the debt of gratitude which the governor-general feels to be due to his Excellency Major-General Sir Charles Napier, on the part of government, the army, and the people of Hindustan. To have punished the treachery of protected princes; to have liberated a nation from its oppressors; to have added a province, fertile as Egypt, to the British empire; and to have effected these great objects by actions in war unsurpassed in brilliancy, whereof a grateful army assigns the success to the ability and valour of its general; these are not ordinary achievements, nor can the ordinary language of praise convey their reward."

It was the Duke of Wellington who moved in the House of Lords the vote of thanks to Lord Ellenborough, and the officers and men who had finished with honour the Afghan war, which Lord Auckland had left in a dishonoured and seemingly hopeless condition. His grace, in his own concise manner, showed the state of the country shortly before the outbreak of the insurrection in Cabul, and detailed the unfortunate operations subsequent to that outbreak —the loss of the commissariat fort, the continued attacks on the cantonments, and the effects of harassing duty and insufficient food upon the spirits and health of the garrison. "It must always happen," said the great captain, "that soldiers badly fed become unhealthy, and lose their spirits and their energy."* The natural results of such a condition of the army was the breaking up of general subordination and obedience to orders. In fact, the discipline of the army was gone; the animals were famishing as well as the men; the

* We have shown in our preceding chapter how cruelly the troops suffered for want of food in their march from the Indus to Cabul. Some recently published letters of General Nott throw a fresh light on this subject. In a letter written at Candaha, in the month of March, 1842, Nott says that our advance in Cabul was as badly managed as it could be. "On that fine soldier, Sir Henry Fane, giving up the command, they omitted giving this beautiful force a competent commander. There was no arrangement, no foresight, a most woful want of military knowledge and information, a wild expenditure of the public money, and yet a reckless neglect and disregard of the comfort, and even the existence, of the troops. Well might the officers and men declare that the hand of Providence alone protected them. There was no forethought, no precaution, no military arrangement; and sure I am, that a talented soldier at the head of two thousand men, would have sent our troops back in disgrace, in spite of their unequalled bravery. But, fortunately, there was no opposition, no defence of this strong country, no union among its people; even their deadly hatred to Shah Soojah could not induce them to forget the quarrels among themselves. As to the political authorities, their weak and undecided conduct renders them unworthy of notice. If the government will employ their civil servants upon such occasions, they ought to precede or follow the army at a distance, but never be present or interfere in any way with its movements." See "Quarterly Review," No. CLVI., published in October, 1846.

soldiers were in almost a state of mutiny, and the followers of the army were in a condition of complete disorder. Never were men in a worse state than those men were in *before*, and for more than a month after, the attack upon Burnes' house." The duke highly commended the prompt decision of Lord Ellenborough, the wisdom of his instructions, and the gallant execution of them by General Nott and other officers. General Nott had succeeded in rescuing many British subjects from captivity and slavery. From the period, said his grace, at which the governor-general landed in India and gave his first orders, more was done to remedy the misfortunes which had taken place than the most sanguine minds could have anticipated.

It was a few nights before this debate that the Duke of Wellington, in defending Lord Ellenborough from the aspersions cast upon him about that truly insignificant affair, the restoration of the Gates of Somnaut, gave utterance to some other most important truths. "The difficulties in India," said he, "are greater now than they formerly were, because there is now what is called a 'free press,' but what I shall call a *licentious press*. With a British population in India of not more than 50,000 persons, including our 25,000 troops, how can the country be governed, if the people are to be excited, and stirred up against the government by this press?" In regard to the supposed mortal offence taken by some of the Indian army, on the matter of the gates, the Duke said, "He might be supposed to know pretty well the feeling of the Indian army; he knew its subordination and discipline to be such, that there was no feeling of distinction as concerns religion or caste, any more than in the British army. He did not mean to say that there might not be a Moslem feeling in India: such a feeling might be written up, and spoken up to any extent and in that manner such mischief as the assailants of Lord Ellenborough anticipated, might be produced."

It was also the Duke of Wellington who warmly supported the vote of thanks proposed by the Earl of Ripon to Sir Charles Napier and the army employed in Sinde, a motion which had been generously seconded by the Earl of Auckland, the late unfortunate governor-general, who declared that more splendid victories had never been achieved in India—not even excepting Plassey and Assaye. The duke, a better judge of military operations, said he never knew an instance in which a general officer had shown, in a higher degree, all the qualifications which were necessary for enabling him to conduct great operations. One of Sir Charles Napier's marches was one of the most curious military feats which he had ever known to be performed, or had ever perused an account of, in his life. His grace was eloquent in praise of the general's second victory near Hyderabad. "He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear; he brought up a reinforcement, and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations of war."

In the Commons Sir Robert Peel was equally warm and eloquent on the same vote. He said that the victories of Meeanee and Hyderabad were mainly to be ascribed to the example set by the personal intrepidity of the leader—that it was most fortunate that, at such a crisis, the command of the British army should be committed to one of three brothers, who had grafted on the stem of an ancient and honourable lineage, that personal nobility which is derived from unblemished private character, high honour, and repeated proofs of valour in the field. "Each of these three brothers learned the art of war under an illustrious commander, during the whole of those memorable campaigns in the Peninsula, of which one of them has been the elo-

quent historian. The exploits of those three brothers during the whole of those campaigns entitle them to the gratitude of their country. In almost every action of the Peninsular war they gave proofs of their military skill and valour. In the actions of Corunna, Busaco, Ciudad Rodrigo, and during the operations of the Pyrenees, they proved that there was no British officer more prodigal of his blood, in the cause of his country, than was each of those brothers. In the page which records a recent naval action, emulating, in the accomplishment of victory by most inadequate means, the glories of St. Vincent—a victory, by the moral effect of which a dynasty has been changed, we find that the name of the commander is 'Napier.' Even in a more circumscribed sphere of action, when last year it became important to vindicate the law before a misguided multitude, the man who at the head of six constables attacked hundreds of people, and made more prisoners than the numbers of his own men, also bore the name of 'Napier.' The motto on the family shield—'Ready, aye ready'—was the characteristic of their conduct."

When Sir Charles Napier was called upon to take the command of the British army in Sinde, he was sixty-two years old; his body was shattered in the service of his country; he had never perfectly recovered from the five terrible wounds he had received at Corunna, and a most perilous bullet-shot at Busaco; but the spirit of the soldier was as brisk as ever in him, and this unwearied spirit, guided by military skill, had inspired unparalleled confidence in those whom he commanded.

"The actions which have been performed by members of the family of Napier," continued Sir Robert Peel, "may appear to the pusillanimous to be foolhardy—to the superficial, the result of lucky accident; but, however desperate they may appear, they have been undertaken, and the difficulties surmounted, by a combination of skill, experience, and personal valour, that however desperate such actions may appear when undertaken by ordinary minds, they are reconcilable with the coolest calculations of prudence when conducted by such men as Sir Charles Napier."

Sir Robert plainly demonstrated that Sir Charles had not needlessly entered into hostile operations; and that for the moral courage with which he determined to act, in opposition to the advice of Major Outram, the political agent, who counselled him not to advance upon Hyderabad, he was pre-eminently entitled to praise. For the heroes who had fallen, no epitaph could be more honourable than the mention made of them in their general's dispatches.

Lord Howick, though opposing the vote of thanks, agreed with Sir Robert Peel, that had Sir Charles Napier followed the advice of Major Outram,* the most disastrous consequences must have ensued.

Commodore Charles Napier, one of this fighting family, told some amusing anecdotes to the House of Commons, in his own peculiar or sailor-like fashion. His cousin Charles had only 1700 bayonets at Meeanee. The nullah or ravine was forty feet wide and seventeen feet deep. His cousin, mounted on his horse Red Rover, was the second to ascend the steep bank—it was inconceivable how it could be done; the excitement in the men carried their very horses through—their exertions went even beyond hunting in Leicestershire! The Commodore preserved no measured terms with political and diplomatic agents. He repeated what Sir John Moore had said of them in Spain, when suffering from the awful blunders committed by our ambassador, the Right Hon. John Hookham Frere—"that they knew nothing, and did nothing but get the country into constant scrapes."

The conquest of Sinde did not terminate the warlike operations of Lord Ellenborough's most active and brilliant administration. The Mahrattas of

* This very gallant officer's apology or defence is before the public. See "The Conquest of Scinde: a Commentary, by Lieut.-Col. Outram, C.B., Resident at Sattarah." Parts I. and II. Edinburgh. 1846.

Gwalior had long been giving us great trouble, and had required a vigilant and expensive attention on the part of the Indian government. They had not been sufficiently beaten to be quiet; they were haunted with recollections of the once powerful Mahratta empire; and they made revolutions in defiance of our authority, and injurious to our interests. On the decease of the late Maharajah, Rao Scindia, the British government acknowledged as his successor the Maharajah Iyajee Rao Scindia, who was nearest in blood to the late Maharajah, and whose adoption by his highness's widow was approved by the chiefs. The widow was appointed regent during the minority of the new Maharajah, but she very wisely transferred the dignity to Mama Sahib, with the concurrence of the chiefs. The British government communicated to the Durbar of Gwalior its entire approval of this arrangement; and the British resident, in the presence of the assembled chiefs, explained to the regent that he was recognised as the responsible head of the state, and as such would receive the support of the British government. Yet after a short time, the regent, Mama Sahib, was violently compelled to quit the Gwalior state, in despite of the remonstrances of the British resident. Men inimical to our government, and to the tranquillity of India were thrust into office by the widow of the late Maharajah. Our resident was instructed to withdraw from Gwalior. The Dada Khan Walla, though opposed by many of the chiefs, virtually usurped the sovereign authority in the Gwalior state, which the British government was bound to maintain in the house of Scindia. The British government demanded that this Dada should be expelled, and delivered up to their charge, as a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the customary relations with Gwalior. After a long delay, the widow and her faction yielded this point; but, presently making a return to intrigue and cabal, the widow set up men who were still more turbulent. The country was rent to pieces by insurrections, plots, wide-spreading conspiracies, and assassinations. The British government could neither permit the existence of an unfriendly government in Gwalior, nor that those territories should be without a government capable of coercing its own subjects, and of maintaining everywhere the relations of good neighbourhood with the subjects of the British government and its allies. "The tender age and the helpless position of the present Maharajah rendered it impossible for him to address to the British government such formal requisitions for aid as circumstances would justify him in demanding, and compel him to demand, under the provisions of the treaty of Boorhampoor; but it would be inconsistent with the good faith, and injurious to the good name of the British government, were it to permit this inability to demand aid, which only gives the Maharajah new claims upon its protection, to deprive his highness of that friendly support in its utmost need which it was the intention of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindia to secure for ever, by that treaty, to himself, his heirs, and successors. The governor-general will, therefore, direct the immediate advance of forces amply sufficient to effect all the just purposes of the British government; to obtain guarantees for the future security of its own subjects on the common frontier of the two states; to protect the person of the Maharajah; to quell disturbances within his highness's territories; and to chastise all who shall remain in disobedience."*

By the 25th of December, the British army had entered the country, not as an enemy, but as a friend to the Maharajah. The governor-general stated, by proclamation, that he had no object but that of restoring good government and tranquillity; and he warned the evil advisers of the perverse widow, that they would be held responsible for any resistance which might be offered to the measures deemed necessary for

* Proclamation of Lord Ellenborough, dated the 18th of December, 1843.

the Maharajah's just authority, and for the security of his person and rights.* In another proclamation, issued two days after the preceding, the governor-general said that his object was to place upon firmer and permanent foundations that friendship between the two states which, for their mutual benefit, had existed so long, and which, not the British government, but the evil disposed advisers of the widow, had now interrupted; that the British army would regard and treat as friends all peaceful cultivators and traders; paying for all supplies brought to the camp, giving compensation for all injury unintentionally done to property, and injuring no one but such as acted hostilely; that so soon as a government capable of maintaining the Maharajah's authority, and willing as well as able to preserve tranquillity on the common frontier, should be established at Gwalior, the British forces would return to their own territory.

Lord Ellenborough had accompanied the troops, who were under the command of Sir Hugh Gough. These troops had moved from Agra early in December, and had crossed the Chumbul river on the 23rd of that month. At the same time, another division, under Major-General Grey, advanced upon Gwalior, from Bundelcund. On the 29th of December the main division crossed the Kohuree river. They found the Mahratta forces drawn up in front of the village of Maharajpoor, in a very strong position, which they had carefully intrenched. The British and native troops were about 14,000 strong, with forty pieces of artillery; the Mahrattas mustered 18,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry with 100 guns. The action commenced by the gallant advance of Major-General Littler's column upon the enemy in front. The Mahrattas received the shock without flinching, their guns doing severe execution as our attacking column advanced. But the British soldiers rushed on. Her Majesty's 39th Foot, well supported by the 56th Native Infantry, soon drove the enemy from their guns, bayoneting the gunners at their posts. The Mahrattas rallied in the village; and here the most sanguinary conflict ensued: the Gwalior troops, after discharging their matchlocks, fought sword in hand with the most determined courage. But General Valiant's brigade took Maharajapoor in reverse; twenty-eight guns were captured at once, and after they had fought with frantic desperation, the Mahrattas being beaten at all points, and having lost their guns, and from 3,000 to 4,000 men in killed and wounded, broke away and fled. But the loss on our side was very severe: we had 106 killed, 684 wounded, and seven missing: seven officers were either killed on the field, or subsequently died of their wounds. Her Majesty's 40th regiment lost two successive commanding officers, Major Stopford and Captain Coddington, who fell at the very muzzles of the Mahratta guns.* The brave and able general bestowed warm praise upon Major-General Valiant, Brigadier Scott, Captain Grant, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, Major-General Littler, and Major Bray, and Major Dick, (these two last-named officers gave the decisive blow,) but all—officers and men, natives as well as Europeans—behaved admirably, feeling that they fought under the eye of a governor-general who could appreciate their services, and who had a large heart for rewarding them.†

* Lord Ellenborough's proclamation, dated Camp, Hingona, December 25, 1843.

* Sir Hugh Gough's Dispatch.

† Mounted on an elephant, his lordship watched the battle close at hand, and exposed himself frankly to cannon-ball and musket-bullet. As everything he did was censured, or indecently ridiculed, his conduct at Gwalior was made matter of censure and ridicule by the newspaper press. But it was not regarded in this light by our hard-fighting soldiers. Only the other day, a fine fellow, returned from India,—a private in that gallant and remarkably handsome regiment, the 16th Lancers,—said to us, in the streets of Canterbury, "Sir, it did our hearts good to see the governor-general on the field at Gwalior, and we fought all the better for it! He might have been hit as well as I was. For soldiers, there never was such a governor-general!"

On the same day another brilliant victory was obtained. On the 28th of December, when Major-General Grey and his column moved from Bundelcund, reached Punniar, about twelve miles from Gwaliôr, they found that a separate force was in that vicinity to stop their progress upon the capital. On the morrow morning from 10,000 to 12,000 Mahrattas showed themselves in a formidable position on some heights, near a fortified village. They were presently attacked, and driven from height to height by Major-General Grey's troops, who forgot the fatigues of their long march so soon as the fighting began.

The consequence of these two victories was the prompt submission of the Durbar to Lord Ellenborough's demands, and the unopposed entrance of the British into the capital. Colonel Stubbs was appointed governor of the Fort of Gwalior, which commands the city; the Mahratta troops were disbanded, and British troops—several regiments of infantry and two of cavalry—were to be maintained in the country at the cost of the Gwalior government. That government was also to pay forthwith the expenses of the campaign. On the 4th of January, 1844—so magically rapid were these operations—the governor-general, writing in the Gwalior residency, announced that this war was finished. He deeply lamented the severe loss in killed and wounded; but this loss had been sustained in a great and necessary service, and the victories of Maharajpoor and Punniar, while they shed new glory upon the British army, had restored the authority of the young prince, and had given new security to the British empire in India. In the same proclamation, Lord Ellenborough cordially congratulated the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, upon his able combinations, by which two victories had been obtained on the same day, and the two wings of the army, proceeding from different points, had been united under the walls of Gwalior.

These stormy events were followed by a perfect calm. The peace, internal and external, was favourable to the finances of the country, which had, of course, suffered a severe drain ever since the commencement of the Affghan war. There was every prospect that the money difficulties would soon be over.

The feeling of the army towards Lord Ellenborough was one that fell little short of adoration; but the hatred and malice of the displaced "politicals" and of too many of the other classes of the civil service, were commensurate with it. The ministerial defence and support of the governor-general had been most triumphant in both houses of Parliament. He was, in a manner, the favourite of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, the Premier; but the Court of Directors, taking umbrage and offence at some of his proceedings, and having, by their charter, the power so to do, recalled Lord Ellenborough from his eminent post towards the end of April, 1844, without asking the consent of her Majesty's ministers, and, apparently, without even consulting with them. This most unexpected event excited much interest, both in Parliament and in the country. On the 26th of April there was a debate upon the subject in the House of Lords. The Marquis of Normanby, who was ready with a criminatory motion respecting the war upon Gwalior, asked the President of the India Board whether it was true that the governor-general of India had been recalled. The Earl of Ripon replied that it was undoubtedly true that the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in the exercise of that power which the Act reserved to them, of removing any of their servants, had removed the governor-general from his situation. Lord Colchester then asked whether the act of the Court of Directors had met with the sanction and approbation of the government. The Earl of Ripon said, "In answer to that question I have only to say, that it *has not!*" The majority of the house cheered the last words. Lord Brougham observed, that there was one most important question which called for the attention of the legislature, and that was, that a perfectly anomalous and inconceivable law should be allowed to continue in force; that the Board of Control (part and parcel of

the government) should have the power of controlling every other act of the Court of Directors in their administration of Indian affairs; and yet that the most important of all acts—that upon which the safety of our Indian empire might depend—the continuance or the removal of the governor-general, should be left solely to the Court of Directors!

Yet so stood the charter! the bond was such! the recal stood as good. The displeasure of the Duke of Wellington, the discontentment of a great part of the public at home, and of the entire army in India, were moderated by the immediate appointment of the excellent Sir Henry Hardinge, the most fitting person to fill the high station so suddenly vacated.

At a farewell entertainment given to him by the military at Calcutta, Lord Ellenborough said, "The only regret I feel at leaving India is, that of being separated from the army. The most agreeable, the most interesting period of my life has been that which I have passed here in cantonments and in camps." These words have had a strained and a false meaning put upon them. The critics of his lordship's conduct, who were numerous, violent, unscrupulous, or very ignorant of the subject, interpreted them into a confession that his lordship was passionately fond of war, and cared nothing for civil affairs. The words, spoken at a festive meeting, simply meant that his lordship was well satisfied with the gallant army and the army with him, and that he recurred, with a natural and laudable pleasure, to the days when he had shared in their toils, and, to no inconsiderable extent, in their privations and dangers. He might be very careful of civil affairs, without entertaining any very warm affection for all the civil servants of the company, or for those "politicals" who had brought our empire to the verge of ruin under his predecessor, and who had on very many occasions embarrassed his own better policy. And, even personally, how had the majority of these men behaved towards the governor-general, from the moment of his arrival in India, or, at the latest, from the moment in which he began to restrain their power and influence, and diminish their enormous emoluments? They banded themselves against him; they treated him with marked incivility and disrespect; they calumniated him as much in London as in Calcutta; they set nearly the whole of the press of India, and not a small portion of the newspaper press of England, upon him; they ridiculed him; they caricatured him; they resorted to every measure by which pride can be hurt, or self-respect irritated. Was it possible, then, for Lord Ellenborough to entertain any great affection for this branch of the service? And was it not fortunate that his lordship had a warm affection for the army, as the army had for him; that his lordship, at a terrible crisis, felt that the heart of a soldier swelled and bounded within him? Look back to the bones bleaching in the passes of Afghanistan—look to our captives on their way to slavery among the barbarians of Central Asia—look to the state of Sinde, to the perilous state of all India, to our obscured prestige, to the want of heart, and notorious want of discipline among a great portion of our troops; and then let the foregoing question be answered.

For the present, we dismiss the subject with a few words, written by an excellent officer who served in India, and in the sense of which we entirely concur.

"We live in an age of faction; the time has not yet arrived when the acts of Lord Ellenborough's administration can be viewed calmly and dispassionately: but when the veil is withdrawn, which is now thrown over them by the prejudice or bitter acrimony of party, they will elicit that universal admiration which their wisdom and beneficial results so justly merit; and Lord Ellenborough, the *regenerator of India*, will be classed among those distinguished men whose names are inseparably associated with the glory of our Eastern empire."*

* Captain J. Bladen Neill's Recollections of Four Years' Service in the East with H. M. 40th Regiment, &c. &c.

We would not have it understood that our severe censure of the "politicals," and of a portion of the civil servants of the company, is meant to apply to the whole of that very numerous and respectable class—the present civil service. A good many of the "politicals" were not civilians, but military men. A very great many of the civil servants behaved admirably through all these seasons of crisis, abstaining from criticism and controversy, and devoting themselves solely to their several duties. They still count among their ranks first-rate administrators and accomplished statesmen.

The chairman of the Court of Directors delivered a complimentary address to Sir Henry Hardinge upon his appointment. But in these compliments somewhat too much care was taken to impress upon the mind of the gallant soldier and experienced man of business the power and supremacy of the court in Leadenhall-street. "It is unnecessary to assure you," said the chairman, "that you are in possession of their entire confidence, a confidence founded on the reputation you have established for yourself, *not only as a soldier, but as a statesman.* You are fully acquainted with the system which the wisdom of Parliament has devised and established for the administration of the vast territories which the East India Company has acquired for the British crown in India. To the Court of Directors, subject to the control of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, is intrusted, as you are aware, the general administration of those territories. The orders which from time to time are transmitted to India, emanate from the Court, and, being confirmed by the Court are then issued, in the name of the Court, for the direction and guidance of the local authorities. You will perceive, therefore, that the maintenance of respect for the authority of the Court is demanded by the existing system of the Indian government; and we are persuaded that you will impress this feeling upon our servants abroad, not merely by precept, but by your example." Then followed an eulogium of the Company's civil servants. "You will not fail to recollect," said the chairman, "that the members of the civil service are educated, not only with particular care, but with a special view to the important duties of civil administration, upon the upright and intelligent performance of which so much of the happiness of the people depends. I doubt not your experience will coincide with that of the great men who in former times have filled the office of governor-general, in enabling you justly to appreciate the eminent qualities of the civil servants in India." After a few sentences on the merits of the army and the native sepoys, the chairman said, "By our latest intelligence we are induced to hope that peace reigns throughout India. I need not say that it is our anxious desire that it should be preserved. You, sir, well know how great are the evils of war, and we feel confident that, whilst ever ready to maintain unimpaired the honour of our country and the supremacy of our arms, your policy will be essentially pacific. To the native states which still retain independence you will extend the shield of British protection. It has hitherto been considered a wise and just policy to uphold and support those states which are in alliance with us: and in dealing with those who are immediately dependent upon our government, we have, with a view to soothe the feelings and conciliate the attachment of both chiefs and people, permitted the former to retain the recognised emblems of authority, their titles, and other insignia of rank and station. Peace, apart from its other advantages, is desirable with a view to the prosperity of our finances and the development of the resources of the country. . . . I feel assured, therefore, that your early and anxious attention will be directed to the best means for averting financial embarrassment, and for placing the public finances on a sound and satisfactory footing. It has long been the desire of the Court to encourage education among the people of India, with a view of cultivating and enlarging their minds, of raising them in their own and our estimation, and of qualifying them for the more responsible offices under our government. It is, however, necessary, with reference to

the subject of education, to exercise great prudence and caution, in order to avoid even the appearance of an interference with their religious feelings and prejudices, and to *maintain on such points the strictest neutrality.* Finally, Sir Henry, I would earnestly recommend the whole body of the people of British India and its dependencies to your paternal care and protection. It has always been the earnest desire of the Court of Directors that the government of the East India Company should be eminently just, moderate, and conciliatory. The supremacy of our power must be maintained, when necessary, by the irresistible force of our arms; *but the empire of India cannot be upheld by the sword alone.* The attachment of the people, their confidence in our sense of justice, and in our desire to maintain the obligations of good faith, must ever be the essential elements of our strength. I beseech you, therefore, to keep these sacred principles habitually and permanently in view."

Little need be said of the services or of the character of a person so universally known and esteemed as Sir Henry Hardinge. Like Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sinde, he had fought heroically at Corunna: he was at Sir John Moore's side when that brave but ill-fated officer received his death wound. Dismounting, he raised Moore from the ground, and tried in vain to stop the effusion of blood with his sash, and with tears in his eyes he helped his beloved general to the rear. There was nowhere a better soldier or a truer man. He was received in India as he merited. He entered heart and soul into the pacific policy which had been recommended to him; and into every means of advancing the prosperity and enlightenment of the country. He at once recommended the construction of railroads in different parts of India, and showed that the valuable products of nature were in a great measure deprived of a profitable market by the want of cheap and expeditious means of transport. He paid all possible attention to the welfare of the natives, and to the important question of education. He promoted the new scheme of government for the formation of barrack and regimental libraries for the benefit of non-commissioned officers and privates; and he most liberally contributed funds of his own to these and other objects connected with the too-long neglected education of the army. He put a new heart into the line by throwing more open the road to promotion. Non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves, and who had educated themselves, received commissions, and were treated by the governor-general and his staff as gentlemen—which they became on the moment they received her Majesty's commission. There was no petty parsimony; but where savings could be made, they were made. Gentle measures were adopted for reconciling her Majesty's officers with the officers of the Company, between whom there had almost always existed invidious distinctions and heart-burnings highly injurious to the service; and the same gentle measures were used for putting an end to the jealousy and rancour which had so mischievously existed between the military in general and the civil servants. Sir Henry Hardinge would have worn "Peace" as his badge and motto; yet had he been only a few months in the country when he found that he could no more be at peace than Lord Ellenborough had been. The web which we have woven over Hindustan is so extensive, and reaches into so many angles and corners, that it is a work of the greatest difficulty to watch and protect every part of it; yet no part can be touched without making the whole tremble in the breeze. The chances of hostilities are thus multitudinous. The chairman of the Court of Directors, in the act of recommending the most pacific policy, had told the governor-general that our dependents and allies must be protected; that the native states which still retained independence must be covered by the shield of British protection; that the supremacy of our power must be maintained by force of arms. Sir Henry Hardinge was therefore under the solemn obligation of girding on the sword whensoever it should become necessary. Shame, impeachment, utter ruin, would fall upon any governor-

general of India who failed so to do. But, in the present case the hostile attack was threatened and soon made, not upon an ally, a protected state, or an independent state, but upon the territory of the Company itself—not upon an angle or corner of the complicated, wide-spreading web, but upon its heart and centre.

Ever since the death of Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore, the Sikhs, the country, and people, had been going through a succession of political convulsions and paroxysms. The reign of order and law had altogether ceased, as at Gwalior. Crimes, assassinations, wholesale massacres had been almost daily events in different parts of the Punjaub. These convulsions could not but affect all the neighbouring countries; and, however disorganized, the Sikhs were excessively powerful in the possession of a numerous, well disciplined army, a tremendous artillery, excellent artillerymen, and skilful European officers.

The Lion of Lahore died on the 30th of June, 1839. His immediate successor was his eldest son, Khurruk Sing, who possessed none of his father's qualifications for rule. His first act was very unpopular; he removed the vizier or prime minister of his father—a man of experience and moderation — and raised a favourite of his own to that high appointment. The dismissed vizier lost his habitual moderation; he entered the Durbar, and slew the new prime minister before his master's eyes. The treasurer and some others shared the same fate. After these tragedies Khurruk Sing shut himself up among his women, rarely appearing in Durbar. His intellect, never strong, became impaired, and the management of public affairs fell into the hands of Nonehal Sing, who had always shown an antipathy to the British. After the mere semblance of a reign which lasted little more than twelve months, Khurruk Sing was reported to have died of a broken heart. Nonehal Sing, the favourite of the Sikhs, and the darling grandson of the old lion, Runjeet Sing, would have been called to the musnud —for he resembled the lion in features and disposition; he was popular with the army, being brave, and having been a soldier from his boyhood; and he was believed, also, to possess the qualities of caution, discretion, and forethought—but, whether by accident or design we know not, Nonehal Sing, on returning from his father's funeral, was killed by a stone falling on his head from one of the gateways of Lahore. Dhyan Sing, Runjeet's vizier, and apparently, also his son or nephew, called up to Lahore Sheer Sing, who had been treated as a prince of the blood, although he had never been acknowledged by Runjeet Sing as his real son. Sheer Sing was to succeed to the musnud; and he, too, was extremely popular with the army. But the mother of the late Nonehal Sing was determined to frustrate the intention of the formidable vizier. And this woman, being aided by some of the most powerful sirdars in the Punjaub, soon expelled Sheer Sing from Lahore. Then Dhyan Sing, the ex-vizier, to whom she refused employment, set himself to overthrow her government, persuading the sirdars and soldiers that it was shameful to submit to the rule of a female, and that they must have a man of energy and talent to govern them and keep together the conquests which the Lion of Lahore had made. Sheer Sing was presently recalled from his retirement. The Ranee, or mother of Nonehal Sing, ordered the gates of Lahore to be shut; but the gatekeepers joined the standard of Sheer Sing; and General Ventura, one of the skilful Italians who had disciplined the Punjaub army, acknowledged him as king. The widow was left helpless and nearly deserted; and in 1841, Sheer Sing was seated on the throne of Lahore. He entrusted the management of affairs to Dhyan Sing, Runjeet's favourite vizier; and he gave himself up solely to hunting and drinking, and other pleasures and debaucheries. He became a complete drunkard. The vizier was speedily dissatisfied with the prince he had elevated to the musnud. Intriguers and plotters stepped in between the prince and the minister. In a fit of drunkenness, Sheer Sing, the

Maharajah, put his signature to an order for the execution of Dhyan Sing, the grand vizier; and the vizier, being duly warned of this proceeding, signed a death-warrant for the Maharajah. The sober man was quicker than the drunken one: Sheer Sing was shot in the heart by an English rifle, and had only time to exclaim, "What have you done, villain!" His head was separated from his body, and joyfully exhibited to the revolutionists. Pertaub Sing, the son of the murdered Maharajah, was despatched by another assassin while he was at his prayers. But the assassins could not agree with the vizier, Dhyan Sing, who had signed Sheer Sing's death-warrant, and so they shot him in the back, and he fell dead also. The report of the vizier's death quickly spread through the city of Lahore, and Misr Lal Sing, who afterwards made himself conspicuous in the war with the British, was despatched to bring into the fort Heera Sing, son of the murdered vizier. This young Rajah knew that the death of Sheer Sing had been determined on, but he little suspected that his own father would so soon share the same fate. He had purposely absented himself from the palace that morning, and had gone to the house of General Avitabili, another of the Italian officers who had formed the Punjaub army and artillery; and he was there found haranguing the troops, and telling them not to mind the death of Maharajah. Upon learning his father's death, Heera Sing ascended to the terrace or flat roof of Avitabili's house, and was for a short time very disconsolate, and very much terrified. He then dispatched a message to the several Sirdars who were in Lahore, requesting their immediate attendance. The chiefs soon arrived, when the young Rajah unbuckled his sword, laid it before them, and bared his neck. "The sword," said he, "has this day deprived my father of life. I am left alone and fatherless, and I now throw myself upon your protection. Kill me, or give me your support!" This appeal had the desired effect. Heera Sing next addressed the common soldiers, promising every man of them an advance of three rupees a month if they would obey him. The soldiers received the proposition with loud cheers. In the meantime, Adjeet Sing, whose followers had assassinated the Maharajah, and who had, with his own hand, shot the Vizier Dhyan Sing, had caused Dhuleep Sing to be proclaimed Maharajah by beat of drum, and himself vizier. But the son of the slain vizier put himself rapidly in motion; and both Ventura and Avitabili espoused his cause, and backed him with their well-served guns. During the night of this same bloody day, Heera Sing reached the Delhi gate, followed by the Sirdars and numerous troops. The gate, apparently, was blown open by the artillery, and then commenced a street fight in which heavy guns were used on both sides, and a great slaughter committed. But on the following morning victory declared for Heera Sing; Leena Sing, who had murdered at his prayers the son of the late Maharajah, was mortally wounded; Adjeet Sing, who had shot the late vizier, being driven out of the fort, was attempting to escape over a wall by means of a rope, when he was clutched by a soldier. He took off his golden bracelets and threw them at the man, imploring him to spare his life; but the soldier cut off his head and hurried with it, as with the most acceptable of presents, to Heera Sing. The sight of the ghastly head of his father's murderer only quickened the rage of the young Rajah. Every man that could not escape out of the fort and out of the city was butchered. The city was given up to plunder. The Ranee's house was ransacked. The merchants in the city and the helpless shop-keepers fled, leaving everything to the infuriated Sikhs, who committed all kinds of outrages, cutting off the noses of the poor women in the streets. Horrible cruelties were perpetrated upon the connexions and adherents of Adjeet Sing. Heera Sing set up no claim to the throne of Lahore; so soon as the fighting was over, he went and kissed the young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing's feet, in token of submission; but

Heera Sing became vizier or prime minister, as his murdered father had been before him.* This settlement was effected in 1843, while the British were in the field against Gwalior. It is confidently asserted that the Sikhs at this period intended to invade the British territories, and were only warned therefrom by a considerable force which Lord Ellenborough had kept on the watch at Loodiana and Ferozepoor, and by the signal overthrow of the Mahrattas on the fields of Maharajpoor and Punniar. Heera Sing, as grand vizier, found very great difficulty in keeping the soldiers steady to his interests, for the treasury was exhausted, and the troops expected a continuance of the guerdons which he had promised in his extreme peril. To keep matters quiet, he murdered his own uncle, a powerful Sirdar, and a favourite with the army. He was murdered himself shortly afterwards, together with his cunning Hindu Pundit.

The young Maharájah Dhuleep Sing was not much above four years old. He was chosen because there was no other lineal descendant of the great Runjeet left alive, if we except the children of Sheer Sing, whose eldest son, Pertaub Sing, had been murdered on the same morning as his father. On the death of Heera Sing, the mother of the young Maharajah appointed her brother Juwaheer Sing to the office of vizier. But the soldiers, not liking his rule, murdered Juwaheer before the eyes of the infant Maharajah and his mother! Ghoolab Sing refused to take upon himself the perilous office of vizier, which now seemed sure to lead to a bloody grave, except upon conditions which were not acceded to. The country, therefore, remained without a vizier, without a government! The "Punches" of the army became, in reality, the masters and mis-rulers of the Punjaub, and everything was decided by their passions, caprices, or supposed personal interests. These "Punches" were not such pleasant humorists as our street drolls, or as the London Charivari Punch, or as the great Neapolitan Policinella, the prince, if not the father, of all Punches. They had no drollery in them; they were seldom seen to smile; and of late they had been as rarely seen without the red hand. They had been accustomed, under Runjeet Sing, to invasions and conquests, and to the profits derivable therefrom. They were elated by many years of success; they formed an immense force numerically; they possessed what seemed inexhaustible military stores; they knew themselves to be strong of arm and steady in battle; and they had confidence in the military skill and science of their French and Italian commanders. They wanted employment, and they fancied they could best seek it beyond the Sutledge, within the Company's territories. The Maharajah was in the nursery; his mother and guardian was helpless; and even the more prudent and pacific of the sirdars were whirled along by the war torrent, for the will of the soldiery, the dictation of the Punches, was not to be resisted without the risk of being murdered. An army was therefore ordered to assemble by the very individual—the widowed mother of the Maharajah—whose wishes were against the armament, and the sirdars were obliged to join it. The very cautious Ghoolab Sing, who had refused the post of vizier, and who was surrounded by a very strong and devoted party of his own, did, indeed, venture to demand the reason of the Sikhs breaking treaty with the British. He asked them what cause of offence the British had given them? To these questions no satisfactory reply could be given. Ghoolab Sing anticipated that the Sikhs must fail in their daring invasion; but instead of openly opposing their views, which would have drawn an attack upon himself, he promised his support, agreed to send up supplies to Lahore, and even promised to join the Khalsa troops. This conduct completely deceived the Sikhs, who, though unwilling to await his arrival, firmly believed that they might rely on his sup-

* History of the Sikhs, containing an account of the war between the Sikhs and the British in 1846-6, by W. L. Macgregor, M.D., Surgeon to the Hon. Company's 1st European Light Infantry.

port and presence. But even could Ghoolab Sing have believed that the Sikhs would be successful, it was evidently his interest to await the result of the struggle, knowing well, as he did, that, whatever result might follow, his position would be a safe one. "If, as he really thought, the Sikh army would be destroyed by their powerful opponent, then he could safely step in as a mediator between the British and the Sikhs, and while obtaining the credit of restoring peace, he would insure independence for himself. The Rajah had a difficult part to play, and the repeated demands of the Sikh army that he would join it, obliged him to leave Jummoo, and proceed to Lahore; but he had determined to keep clear of the struggle until the onset should show how he was to act.

"Had Ghoolab Sing succeeded Juwaheer Sing as prime minister, he would have used his best endeavours to prevent a collision between the Sikhs and the British; but he did not forget that a brother and nephew who had held that responsible post had both fallen victims to the sword, and a similar fate might befal him. From every consideration, therefore, the Rajah believed that a rupture with the British would most effectually accomplish his ambitious views; and he was resolved to act with great caution and avoid mixing himself up in the quarrel. Even when he reached Lahore, after the war had begun, and he was requested by the Ranee and the Punches of the army to join the latter, he availed himself of the excuse of wishing to act independently at the head of his own troops in any work she might assign to him."*

All that was passing at Lahore could not be unknown to Sir Henry Hardinge; but as his predecessor had been censured for precipitancy, the present governor-general was determined not to bring out his array until the last moment, or until the moment when there could be no possible mistake as to the intentions of the lawless soldiery, whose will was the only law in the country beyond the Sutledge. The orders from the home authorities were so stringent not to interfere, unless aggression were first perpetrated by the Sikhs, that the Indian government was crippled. And it was further crippled by the short-sighted economy which had reduced our forces on the Punjaub frontier towards the Sutledge. That frontier was a very long one; and in a military sense, a winding river, or any river, is about the worst line for defence. Had Sir Henry Hardinge been left to himself, he might possibly have anticipated the movement of the Sikhs. He certainly would have had a greater force near the banks of the river; but in any case it would have been impossible to guard the whole of that lengthened and bad frontier. Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, did all that he could to prepare against the storm; his acts were under the control of the governor-general, so far as the organizing an army was concerned; but trusting to his own foresight and military experience, he gave early warning to the troops on the frontier, and to those at the important military station of Meerut, to be on the alert, and to hold themselves in readiness to move whithersoever their presence might be required.*

It must be borne in mind that the Sutledge was not strictly the boundary line between the Sikh country and British India. The Sikhs held territory on the inner or left bank of the river; but some portion of that territory was under our protection, and we possessed two advanced frontier posts—Loodiana and Ferozepoor.

On the 2nd of December, 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge arrived at Umballa. From this point we may take up his own words, as contained in a dispatch to the Secret Committee at the India House:—

"I had moved with my camp on the 6th of December from Umballa towards Loodiana, peaceably making my progress by the route I had announced, with the intention of visiting the Sikh protected states, according to

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs

* Dr. M'Gregor.

the usual custom of my predecessors. In common with the most experienced officers of the Indian government, I was not of opinion that the Sikh army would cross the Sutledge with its infantry and artillery. I considered it probable that some act of aggression would be committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling the British government to interfere, to which course the Sikh chiefs knew I was most averse; but I concurred with the commander-in-chief, and the chief secretary to the government, as well as my political agent, Major Broadfoot, that offensive operations, on a large scale, would not be resorted to. Exclusive of the political reasons which induced me to carry my forbearance as far as it was possible, I was confident, from the opinions given by the commander-in-chief and Major-General Sir John Littler, in command of the forces at Ferozepoor, that that post would resist any attack from the Sikh army as long as its provisions lasted; and that I could at any time relieve it, under the ordinary circumstances of an Asiatic army making an irruption into our territories, provided it had not the means of laying siege to the fort and the entrenched camp. Up to this period no act of aggression had been committed by the Sikh army. The Lahore government had as good a right to reinforce their bank of the river Sutledge, as we had to reinforce our posts on that river. The Sikh army had, in 1843 and 1844, moved down upon the river from Lahore, and after remaining there encamped a few weeks, had returned to the capital. These reasons, and, above all, my extreme anxiety to avoid hostilities, induced me not to make any hasty movement with our army, which, when the two armies came into each other's presence, might bring about a collision. The army had, however, been ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and on the 7th and 8th of December, when I heard from Lahore that preparations were making on a large scale for artillery, stores, and all the munitions of war, I wrote to the commander-in-chief, directing his excellency, on the 11th, to move up the force from Umballa, from Meerut, and some other stations in the rear. Up to this time no infantry or artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutledge. Nevertheless, I considered it prudent no longer to delay the forward movement of our troops, having given to the Lahore government the most ample time for a reply to our remonstrance. On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicolson, the assistant political agent at Ferozepoor, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the other hand, the information received by Major Broadfoot on that day from Lahore, was not of a character to make it probable that any Sikh movement on a large scale was meditated. On the 10th, no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicolson's report, and the usual opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutledge. The troops, however, moved on the 10th, 11th, and 12th, in pursuance of the orders given on the 7th and 8th; and the whole of the forces destined to move up to the Sutledge were in full march on the 12th. I did not consider the force moving up from Umballa to be sufficient to force its way to relieve Ferozepoor, if a large Sikh army, with a numerous and well-served park of artillery, should attempt to intercept it in its approach to Ferozepoor, as, in such case, it could with difficulty receive any aid from that garrison. Being some days march in advance of the commander-in-chief, I rode over to Loodiana; and having inspected the fort, the cantonments, and the troops, it appeared to me most advisable that the whole of this force should be moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Loodiana to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the more infirm soldiers of the regiments at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very improbable contingency. The risk to be incurred of leaving the town and the cantonments liable to be plundered, was maturely considered,

and I had no hesitation in incurring that risk to insure the strength and sufficiency of the force which might separately be brought into action with the whole of the Sikh army. I therefore ordered Brigadier Wheeler to be prepared to march at the shortest notice. The Umballa force, in march, was 7500 men, and 36 guns; the Loodiana force amounted to 5000 men and 12 guns.

"The commander-in-chief concurred in these views; and this fine body of men, by a rapid march on Busseean, an important point, where the roads leading from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, formed the advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been laid in at Busseean. Up to the morning of the 12th, the information from Lahore had not materially varied; but by the reports received on that day, the general aspect of affairs appeared more warlike. Still no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved down to the river.

"On the 13th, I first received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutledge, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river."

On that same day, the 13th, Sir Henry issued the following proclamation:—

"The British government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjaub.

"In the year 1809, a treaty of amity and concord was concluded between the British government and the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed by the British government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the late Maharajah.

"The same friendly relations have been maintained with the successors of Maharajah Runjeet Sing by the British government up to the present time.

"Since the death of the late Maharajah Sheer Sing, the disorganized state of the Lahore government has made it incumbent on the governor-general, in council, to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier; the nature of these measures, and the cause of their adoption, were at the time fully explained to the Lahore durbar.

"Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore government during the last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the durbar, the governor-general, in council, has continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord which had so long existed between the two States, for the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown on every occasion the utmost forbearance, from consideration to the helpless state of the infant Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, whom the British government had recognised as the successor to the late Maharajah Shere Sing.

"The governor-general, in council, sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh government re-established in the Punjaub, able to control its army and to protect its subjects. He had not, up to the present moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected by the patriotic efforts of the Sikhs and people of that country.

"The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British frontier, as it was alleged by the orders of the durbar, for the purpose of invading the British territory.

"The governor-general's agent, by direction of the governor-general, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was repeated. The governor-general, unwilling to believe in the hostile intentions of the Sikh government, to which no provocation had been given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a tendency to embarrass the government of the Maharajah, or to induce collision between the two states.

"When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation, and while active military preparations were continued at Lahore, the governor-general considered it necessary to order the advance of troops towards the frontier, to reinforce the frontier posts.

"The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

"The governor-general must, therefore, take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace.

"The governor-general hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, on the left, or British banks of the Sutledge, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

"The governor-general will respect the existing rights of all jagheerdars, zeminders, and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British government.

"The governor-general hereby calls upon all the chiefs and sirdars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these states. Those of the chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British government, and will be punished accordingly.

"The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutledge are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

"All subjects of the British government, and those who possess estates on both sides of the river Sutledge, who, by their faithful adherence to the British government may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges.

"On the other hand, all subjects of the British government who shall continue in the service of the Lahore State, and who disobey this proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side of the Sutledge confiscated, and declared to be aliens and enemies of the British government."

The time which had elapsed between the first hostile preparations at Lahore, and the actual crossing of the river by the Sikhs, was too short to allow of any extensive preparations being made by us. The crisis, however, demanded the utmost exertion on the part of the governor-general and commander-in-chief; and when it was known that a Sikh force was actually on the left bank of the Sutledge, Sir Henry, being no longer restricted by the home orders, lost no time in setting all the troops in our other provinces in motion towards the frontier. The celerity of the movement of some of these troops was admirable. Fortunately, and most providentially, Lord Ellenborough had established a large force at Umballa, which could be thus available at a moment's notice. The troops at this station were gathered round Sir Henry Hardinge at the time he issued his proclamation.

The Sikh army, under the command of the Sirdar Tej Sing, having crossed the Sutledge, invested Ferozepoor on one side, and took up an entrenched position at the village of Ferozeshuhur, or Ferozeshah, about ten miles in advance of Ferozepore, and nearly the same distance from the memorable village of Moodkee. Ferozepoor was garrisoned by a body of rather more than 5000 troops, with twenty-one guns, under the command of Major-General Sir John Littler. The head quarters of Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, were nearly 150 miles from Ferozepoor. The great object, therefore, was to effect a junction between the separated portions of the Anglo-Indian army. For this purpose, the orders mentioned in the dispatch just quoted were issued by the governor-general to Sir Hugh Gough, to move up towards Ferozepoor by forced marches. And by the 18th of December these troops reached the

village of Moodkee, after traversing a desert of deep, heavy sand, and suffering severely from want of water as well as from fatigue. When they took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee, the men were in a state of great exhaustion. They had scarcely rested three hours, and they were cooking their dinners, when information was received that the Sikh army was advancing. The troops were hastily got under arms and moved to their positions. Sir Hugh Gough says—"I immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles, when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and forty guns. They evidently had either just taken up this position, or were advancing in order of battle against us.

"To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flanks.

"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle and such undulations as the ground afforded; and, whilst our twelve battalions formed from echellon of brigade into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3d Light Dragoons, with the second brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a portion of the 4th Lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.

"This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echellon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster,

for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object."

This victory, though glorious as victory could be, was dearly purchased. Major-General Sir Robert Sale, the hero of Jellalabad, had his left thigh shattered by grape shot, and the wound proved mortal; Sir John M'Caskill was shot through the breast and died there; almost every officer attached to the governor-general as aide-de-camp was either killed or wounded; in all, 657 were wounded, and 215 slain. Many officers were shot by the Sikhs, who concealed themselves among the trees and jungle for this purpose, after their main body had fled, and the officers thus killed were returning to their camp, elated by victory, and unsuspicious of danger. In this way, Captain Jasper Trower, of the artillery, met his death; and his brave farrier Sergeant shared the same fate while attempting to avenge the death of his captain.*

The available force in European infantry was very small, consisting merely of her Majesty's 9th, 31st, 50th, and 80th regiments; the only European cavalry present was her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons. These dashing dragoons pursued the Sikhs, but the nature of the ground rendered the charge less effectual than it otherwise would have been. The sabres of the dragoons penetrated with difficulty the thick quilted clothes of the Sikhs, yet they slew many and overthrew all who attempted to resist their impetuous career. It was the first time the Sikhs had encountered European dragoons and infantry; they could compare them to nothing else but *demons*.†

Everybody was astonished at the precision and celerity of the Sikh artillery practice. The men had been long taught by Messrs. Allard and Court, and the Signors Ventura and Avitabili, and no expense had been spared on this arm. The old Maharajah, Runjeet Sing, had devoted the greatest attention to his ordnance department, and had cast an immense number of guns in his arsenal at Lahore, under the superintendence of Monsieur Court, a very scientific French officer. But he had never entrusted any command in the artillery to Europeans, being of opinion that this powerful arm ought to be kept exclusively in the possession of his own people. "An estimate might have been formed of the number of guns possessed by Runjeet Sing, from the circumstance of his usually having one hundred pieces of ordnance at the celebration of the Dusserah festival, and which kept up an incessant fire with blank cartridges, while twenty thousand muskets responded with continued and unremitting roll. We have ourselves been present on such occasions, and the sound was perfectly deafening: the Maharajah used to remark, "That is the way I fire against my enemies in battle, only quicker, and with many more guns and muskets than are now present."* Since the death of Runjeet Sing, the Sikhs had not ceased to increase the number of their guns; and the events of this campaign proved, that they could bring nearly 500 guns into the field, independently of those employed in the forts of Lahore, Govind-gur, and Umritsa, besides having numerous guns at Peshawur and Mooltan. Their artillery, previously to their crossing the Sutledge, may be safely estimated at 500 guns of all calibres. Since the death of Monsieur Allard, the discipline of their cavalry had been neglected. It had been supposed by too many, that the whole Sikh army had deteriorated so much since the days of Runjeet Sing, that they might be considered next to a rabble; but it ought not to have been forgotten, that the Sikh, by nature and institutions, is a soldier; he cares for no other employment than that of war; every other pursuit is interdicted by the tenets of his mixed but peculiar religion. Their fanaticism had cooled, but had not evaporated. They still fervently believed that the founder of their sect, Nahak Shah, who was born

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.
† Ibid.

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.

about the middle of the fifteenth century, had been sent from heaven to reconcile the jarring faiths of the Mahommedan and Hindu; that their commingled religion was perfect and divine; that Gura-Govind, who flourished at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and who, by the complete abolition of the system of castes, drew individuals of every caste to the profession of arms, had had a divine mission, and that the united Sikh warriors must ultimately occupy the whole of Hindustan, and establish in it their own faith: the profession of arms was therefore the religious duty of every man among them. Paradise awaited every Sikh warrior that fell in battle.* The men who had fought at Moodkee fully expected that their march would end at Calcutta.

Though beaten, the Sikhs were satisfied that, with an overwhelming number of guns strongly entrenched, they might safely await the attack of the British, who possessed at Moodkee but little strength in this important arm. No blame could be attached to our commander-in-chief, for he was obliged to fight with the means at his disposal. The heavy guns and mortars were not up, and his enemy must be beaten. If he had waited for his artillery, there was every likelihood that he would have had the whole Sikh army upon him.

On the 19th of December, our heavy guns reached Moodkee, escorted by her Majesty's 29th, the 1st European light infantry, and two regiments of native infantry.† Every possible care had been taken of these troops in their rapid advance by the governor-general and commander-in-chief. Elephants were dispatched to Churruk, seven and twenty miles from Moodkee, to carry those who might be unable to walk. When near Moodkee, and almost overcome by fatigue and the terrible desert thirst, water was distributed to them, which had been brought out on elephants from headquarters. Being thus refreshed, the men marched vigorously into Moodkee, where the governor-general's band welcomed them with a joyous burst of music. The 20th was a day of rest. On the morning of the 21st, the commander-in-chief resolved to attack the Sikhs in their entrenchments at Ferozeshuhur or Ferozeshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united. Sir Hugh Gough could now count 16,700 men, and sixty-nine guns; but the latter were chiefly horse artillery.* The Sikh forces varied from 48,000 to 60,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, in fixed batteries. They had been crossing the Sutledge in great numbers; and only a few battalions, with fifty or sixty guns, had been left at Lahore. Tej Sing, their real commander-in-chief, had been informed that the only arm in which he could trust was his artillery, and that even his guns could not be considered safe, since the British at Moodkee, as previously at Maharajpoor, had seized the guns at the point of the bayonet. But the Sirdar conceived that such desperate courage only belonged to the European portion of the army, and from the smallness of their number, he imagined, that, with upwards of 100 guns, he could defy their utmost efforts. He knew well that their guns of a large calibre were few in number, and could never silence his own, many of which were of battering calibre. In short, he came to the conclusion that his position was safe, and victory on the part of the British next to impossible.

Our army of the Sutledge began to move at three o'clock in the morning, leaving a detachment from each regiment, and a regiment and a half of native infantry, in the camp at Moodkee, to keep guard over the baggage and the wounded; and by daylight the several regiments had joined their several brigades. The whole marched onwards, making a long detour with a view of attacking the weakest points in the enemy's position, though, as matters

* Malcolm's Sketch of the Sikhs, in Asiatic Researches.

† The 11th and 41st.

* Governor-General's Dispatch to the Secret Committee, dated, Camp, Ferozepoor, 31st December, 1845.

turned out, the attack was made on the strongest. Several halts were made, for the march was a fatiguing one of nearly sixteen miles. About two o'clock in the afternoon, Sir John Littler joined them. Our force was now raised to about 20,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, and 900 artillerymen. After passing a mud village, the troops were halted and formed into battle array, in sight of the Sikhs. When Tej Sing saw the British preparing for the contest after a long march, and without any chance of obtaining water or food, his hopes must have been raised to the highest pitch. In his entrenched camp, food and water had been stored up in abundance; his troops were quite fresh, and confident of victory.

When preparing for battle, our soldiers found that they were actually fronting the longest and strongest side of the entrenchment, which was in the form of a parallelogram, of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah, the shorter sides looking towards the Sutledge and Moodkee, and the long one towards Ferozepoor and the open country.* But the Sikhs were fully prepared to place their guns in position on whatever side the attack should be made. They were thoroughly acquainted with the country; and knowing by what roads their enemy could advance, they readily prepared for their reception. Thus it mattered not much whether our approach was made on the longer or shorter side, though the preparations on the side fronting Ferozepoor showed that it was considered by the Sikhs as the proper front of their position. How the British officers were led to believe the contrary, appears a question only to be solved by supposing that the information given on native authority must have misled them.

"The ground in front, like that at Moodkee, was jungley; the three divisions of the British, under the command of Major-General Gilbert, Sir John Littler, and Brigadier Wallace, deployed into line, with the whole of their artillery in their centre, except three troops of horse-artillery, one on either flank, and one in support. The reserve was under Sir Harry Smith, and the cavalry, small in number, formed the second line, with the brigade in reserve to cover each wing."* The artillery were ordered to the front, and the infantry wheeled into line. After a reasonable time had been allowed for the mortar practice, which it was speedily seen would never silence Tej Sing's guns, our artillery opened their fire to ascertain the position of the batteries; and the Sikhs then responded at somewhat less than a mile's distance—a distance which the calibre of our guns could not work at. Our artillery, therefore, made a nearer advance, protected by the whole of our infantry. When several hundred yards nearer, our guns were unlimbered, and several rounds of shot fired; this was repeated until they approached within three hundred yards of the batteries. Then, seeing that these Sikh guns could not be silenced, the infantry advanced amidst a murderous shower of shot and grape, and captured them with matchless gallantry.†

General Gilbert's division was completely successful in carrying these batteries, and entered the Sikh camp. But when all the batteries of the Sikhs seemed within the grasp of our infantry, a fire of musketry was opened upon them from behind the guns. The Sikh infantry were lying down, and, consequently, fired high, killing many mounted officers. Almost the whole of General Gilbert's division passed to the right of the village of Ferozeshah, which formed the centre of the enemy's position. On forcing the batteries, our infantry were exposed, not only to musketry, but to a terrific explosion from a mine, which blew up in the rear of the guns, and did much mischief among the advancing troops. Everything was blown into the air, and for a time there was nothing but confusion. After this, several smaller mines exploded, making a noise like an

* The Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Ibid. † Ibid.

uninterrupted discharge of thunder-clouds, and filling the whole atmosphere above with smoke and murky flame. Sir Harry Smith drove on into the village of Ferozeshah, and cleared it. He then proceeded farther into the entrenched camp, but halted in consequence of the coming on of night. "In spite of the indomitable bravery of the British, a portion only of the Sikh entrenchment was carried. Night fell, but still the battle raged."* Throughout that dreadful night, the enemy's cavalry and infantry moved about, harassing and firing on the British who were bivouacked. A large Sikh gun was brought up close, and its contents discharged, but so near, that the grape could not spread itself, and the men and officers thus escaped. The chargers of some of the officers were, however, knocked over, while their masters, lying on the ground, were holding them by the rein. This was, indeed, a fearful position to be in. In some places, our troops were scattered far apart, in others they were mixed. From the intervals left between the European infantry regiments and the native brigades, there was no possibility of forming a line or acting in concert. In the darkness of the night the men that were mixed could not regain their proper positions. "If a regiment had attempted to move right or left in search of another, the Sikh guns were sure to be directed to the spot; and where the 50th bivouacked, Sir Harry Smith, with admirable prudence, forbade a shot to be fired in return for any that might be directed against his position. The white covers were taken off the caps, which served as marks for the enemy, and every means adopted for keeping the men out of the hostile fire. The gallant soldiers who had, at the point of the bayonet, captured t e batteries of the Sikhs, were thus glad to actually conceal themselves under the darkness of night. It was not flight, but as near an approach to it as can be well conceived; and no wonder, if, at this time, the governor-general of India felt the precarious position of the troops. Never, in the annals of warfare in India, had matters attained such a threatening crisis. The European Infantry alone could now support him, and he knew well what their daring bravery had accomplished at Plassy, Bhurtpoor, and Ghuznee."

In this action, "the reserve was brought up by Sir Harry Smith, and seized another portion of the position, while the 3rd Dragoons charged and took some batteries; yet the Sikhs remained in position, and in possession of a considerable portion of the quadrangle."

The attack on the left, where the Ferozepoor force was engaged under the command of Sir John Littler, had not been quite so successful. The fire there was terrific. There was a half-moon battery at a corner of the Sikh position, which played with such deadly effect on her Majesty's 62nd Regiment, that those brave men were checked, and then withdrawn.

On the morning of the 22nd, the battle was renewed by daylight. The British infantry formed into line, supported on either flank by the horse artillery, while the fire was opened from the centre by a few heavy guns and a few flights of rockets. But on these a masked battery of the Sikhs played with great effect, dismounting the British guns and blowing up their tumbrels.* "We were assured," says Dr. M'Gregor, "by the horse artillery men, that they had never witnessed anything so terrific as the effect of the Sikh guns on theirs, which they described as being blown into the air." The battle must clearly be won by the British infantry. The governor-general, who had offered to act as second in command, now placed himself at the head of the left, and the commander-in-chief took post on the right. The line advanced unchecked—for they would be checked by nothing—sweeping all before them; then changing front they swept the rest of the camp and dislodged the enemy from his last position. They captured seventy-eight pieces of cannon, and were masters of the field; but Tej Sing presently brought up fresh battalions

* The Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Ibid.

and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorchurras, or irregular horse, who had been kept in reserve near the river. The Sirdar "drove in the British cavalry, and made strenuous efforts to regain his original position, but was unable to effect his object. Still the Sirdar renewed the contest by a combined attack on the left of the British, which compelled them to change their whole front to the right; his guns played with great effect, while those of the British were rendered useless from want of ammunition, *the whole of which had been expended.*"* But soon an attack was made on the Sirdar by the whole mass of the British infantry, supported on their flanks by the cavalry; and then guns were captured and ranks broken, and the Sikhs ceased their firing and abandoned the field. Before this decisive moment, a panic had spread among our camp *followers*; the bearers of the doolies were throwing down our wounded men and the instruments and apparatus of our surgeons, and were running off for Ferozepoor. Fortunately that place was not more than eight or nine miles, by the direct road, from the scene of action, and the authorities there, in the commissariat and executive departments, used their utmost endeavours to bring in the wounded. The doolies were sent back for more; elephants, carts, &c., were put in requisition, and during the whole night of the 22d, the wounded were being brought in, or they found their way in on foot, in a state of dreadful exhaustion from pain, loss of blood, and want of food and water. "The writer of this narrative," says Dr. M'Gregor, "had an opportunity on the morning of the 23d, of witnessing the lamentable condition of the brave European soldier who had bled for his country's cause, now imploring in vain for a mouthful of water. . . . But by noon they were all in their own quarters; and quilts and cots were furnished in abundance. In fact, it was almost incredible how the commissariat and executive departments could supply so much comfort in such a short space of time. The wounded owe much to the unwearied efforts of Captain W. B. Thomson and Lieutenant Goodwyn (who responded to every call) for their comparatively snug condition on the 23d and 24th, and it was a gratifying sight to the governor-general when he visited them, to find so much comfort where he anticipated so little. He generously gave strict orders, that everything required should be supplied, and without the usual formality of an indent. Sir Henry Hardinge visited all the wounded men and officers, and had a cheerful word for all. If a poor man had lost an arm, the governor-general consoled him by pointing to his own sleeve, and assuring him he would soon be all right. The men were delighted at the urbanity and kindness shown towards them by the governor of India, and for a time forgot their own sufferings in the admiration which his kindness elicited."* Sir Henry visited the poor sufferers again and again, and watched over their welfare with a solicitude that could not have been surpassed if they had been his own children. During the terrible night he had spent in the Sikh camp, he had shared the privations of the soldiers, and had suffered pangs unknown to them, for the fate of his whole army, the fate perhaps of all India, was hanging on a thread. Delivering his watch and star to his son's care, he showed that he was determined to leave the field a victor or die in the struggle. In the hard fight of the morrow he had escaped unhurt; but he had seen many who were very dear to him fall around him. Many upon whom he counted as the hope and future glory of his country went down under the Sikh guns. The commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, whose arduous military duties did not allow him to visit the wounded until some days later, did everything in his power to cheer the men, praising their undaunted bravery in one of the hardest battles ever fought in India. He spoke to all and listened to all, and did his utmost to gratify their every wish.

The British had lost upwards of 2000 in killed and wounded, including thirty-

* Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs, &c.

seven officers among the slain, and double that number among the wounded, several of whom afterwards died. The loss on the part of the Sikhs was computed at 8000.

Major Somerset, military secretary to the governor-general, on the morning of the 22d, was borne to the rear mortally wounded, "while conducting himself with the hereditary courage of his race."* Major Broadfoot, political agent, also fell: "he was brave as he was able in every branch of the political and military service."† Major Broadfoot was the last of three brave brothers, who held appointments in the Company's army and fell in battle. Captain P. Nicholson, assistant political agent from Ferozepoor, was also killed in the action of the 21st. With the exception of Captain Mills, who took the command of a troop of horse artillery, all the political agents were either killed or wounded in this fierce struggle. Among the other truly distinguished officers who perished were Colonel Wallace, Captain Thomas Box, "a soldier every inch of him," Captain d'Arcy Todd, Major Baldwin, a Peninsular officer, and Lieutenants Pollard and Bernard. Pollard had been wounded at Moodkee; but no persuasion could prevent his again joining his gallant regiment, her Majesty's 31st. The 3rd Dragoons suffered severely, having three officers killed, six officers wounded, and fifty-two rank and file killed. Among those who shared the dangers of this battle were Prince Waldemar of Prussia, and his staff, Counts Grueben and Oriolo, and Dr. Hoffmeister; the last officer was unfortunately killed by a grape shot. Prince Waldemar left the field at the request of the governor-general, who was unwilling that a foreign prince should be further subjected to the risk of losing his life. The issue of the battle was not then decided; but fortunately the prince returned to Ferozepoor, and had the satisfaction of knowing, that though the British had a fierce foe to contend with, victory had decided for them.‡

Fine phrases would be thrown away upon conduct and heroism such as were displayed at Ferozepoor. The plain professional dispatches of Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough form the best eulogium. All behaved nobly. Unfortunately, in the hurry of the moment, Sir John Littler, in a private dispatch, used the words "panic struck" as applicable to her Majesty's 62nd regiment, and attributed some irresolution on the part of the native regiments in his division to the example of the 62nd. The charges were groundless. Before the 62nd fell back, it had seven officers killed and ten wounded, seventy-six rank and file killed and 154 wounded. The regiment was numerically weak; its loss was greater than that of any other European regiment present. Both the governor-general and commander-in-chief did all they could to remove the injurious impression; and at home, in the House of Lords, the Duke of Wellington stood manfully forward to vindicate the fame of the heroic band, and apply balm to their wounded pride. On the 2nd of March, during the debate on the vote of thanks to the army of the Sutledge, the great captain said:—"It is not generally known, my lords, but I know it, that the fortified position which has been referred to was closed in by intrenchments, and that it ought to be called a fortress, instead of a fortified position. Notwithstanding, also, the advantage which troops in India generally possess, of having water carried for every company, these troops laboured under the singular disadvantage of being deprived of water for nearly twenty-four hours, in consequence of the persons who were employed to get water not being able to procure it, and the troops consequently had not even that refreshment. Under these circumstances it was that the troops carried this position, not, certainly, without great loss, but a loss which I hope has not left them in a state otherwise than efficient, if their services should be required on a different occasion. I really must say, that I have not for a length of time heard of an action which has given me such unqualified satisfaction, except in one par-

* Sir Henry Hardinge's Dispatch.
† Ibid. ‡ Dr. M'Gregor.

ticular, for I have read with pain of one regiment to which the word 'panic' was attached. I have thought it my duty to inquire into the circumstances attending that regiment, and I find that it lost five-twelfths of its numbers in the engagement, and an immense number of officers and non-commissioned officers. I have seen an account which states, that in the first quarter of an hour, from the moment when the regiment was first engaged, one-third of its officers fell. I cannot question the accuracy of the report of the operations made by a general officer (Sir John Littler), but I wish that this officer, when he sat down to prepare an elaborate report of the conduct of the troops under his command, had referred to the number of killed and wounded, and had inquired what losses this regiment had sustained. If he had inquired, I believe he would have found, that when this regiment was compelled to pause, the men were actually mowed down by the severity of the fire under which they had advanced. I have inquired further into the case of that regiment, and I find that it has been sixteen years in the East Indies, and that in the course of the last forty years, it has served thirty-three years of that period abroad, passing only seven years in the United Kingdom. I find also that in the course of the sixteen years during which that regiment has served in the East Indies, it has been in all parts of India, and its ranks have been in fact recruited twice over; and, at this moment, I find that of the men who made the attack and suffered this loss, three-fourths of them had not been seven years in the service. I will not detain your lordships longer, but seeing that word 'panic,' I thought it my duty to inquire into all the circumstances connected with this regiment, and I have found a most extraordinary report of their good conduct made by the same general officer on a former occasion."

Great pains were taken by the Sikh army to conceal from the durbar the extent of their discomfiture; but much anxiety and irresolution were believed to prevail at Lahore.* They believed that our army would follow up its advantages by crossing the river immediately and marching on the capital; but this was a movement not to be thought of without a powerful battering train, more European troops, and especially more cavalry. When our weak force in horse was driven in at Ferozeshah, Sir Henry Hardinge was reported to have said, "I would give half a lack of rupees if her Majesty's 16th Lancers were but here!" It was now wisely resolved to wait for the guns and mortars moving upwards with the 16th Lancers, the 9th Lancers, and her Majesty's 10th and 53rd Regiments of Foot, which, with the 3rd Light Dragoons, and the 43rd and 59th Regiments of Native Infantry, had composed the Meerut force under Sir John Grey. The Sinde troops, under Sir Charles Napier, had also been ordered up, and their services were likely to be needed for checking the governor of Mooltan, who had already made several attacks on convoys of supplies, and on soldiers coming up the river.

Upon this seeming indecision of the British, the Sikhs resolved to make another effort to maintain their position on the left bank of the Sutledge; and for this purpose, they began to construct a new bridge of boats, not very far from the spot where they crossed the river after having been driven from Ferozeshah. Our army of the Sutledge had retired somewhat from the river, and no opposition was offered by them. The bridge of boats was soon constructed, and a *tête de pont* thrown up in front of it with much military skill, in a position very favourable to defence. The opposite banks were high, and the river, where the bridge was laid, made a slight curve inwards, so as to throw the opposite banks sufficiently forward to afford protection to both flanks of the advanced position from heavy artillery placed in battery. Above the bridge, and not far

* Note from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee of the East India Company, dated January 1, 1846.

from it, was a good ford, which facilitated the communication between the forces on the opposite bank. Advantage had also been taken of the paucity of our troops at Loodiana, to effect a passage for a force of about 10,000 men of all arms, in the neighbourhood of that town. No attack was made either on the town or cantonment of Loodiana; the object of this force appeared to be rather to entrench itself near the place at which it crossed, in order to obstruct our progress and to cut off the passage of supplies, *en route* to Ferozepoor, and to intercept the communication between the posts. As soon as the Meerut force joined the Commander-in-Chief's camp, immediate measures were taken to reinforce the Loodiana post, and the station at Busseean; some Native Infantry, some Light Cavalry, and some guns, were sent thither, and the sick, the women, and the children, were removed thence to Umballa. Meanwhile, Sir Harry Smith had been detached to reduce Dhurnkote, and keep open the communication for supplies and ammunition from our rear. Sir Harry was now reinforced, and having soon with him 7000 men and twenty-four guns, it was confidently believed that he could at one and the same time relieve Loodiana and protect the whole of our rear. Dhurnkote was evacuated at Sir Harry's approach. In marching from Dhurnkote, Sir Harry lost a good deal of his baggage, and sustained some heavy fusilades, which he did not wait to return. His troops were much harassed when he reached Loodiana. His presence put an end to the consternation which was becoming general in that part of the country. The Sirdar Runjoor Sing had strongly entrenched himself at Aliwal, about eight miles to the westward of Loodiana; he had 20,000 men and fifty-six guns, and on the evening of the 26th of January he received a reinforcement of twelve guns and 4000 regular troops. Sir Harry Smith most gallantly attacked the Sikhs on the 28th of January, with not more than 10,000 men in all. The right of the Sikh force rested on Roomaree, and their left on Walleepoor, and they advanced some distance from their entrenched camp and cannonaded the British for half-an-hour, until our brave fellows stormed the village of Aliwal—the key of their position. The whole of the British line then began to advance upon different lines. Her Majesty's 16th Lancers charged in the most gallant style, but the Sikhs lay down on the ground, and the Lancers could not well reach them, while they either fired their muskets at the 16th, or cut desperately at men and horses with their keen swords. This distinguished cavalry regiment had upwards of 100 men killed and wounded. The great mass of Sikh infantry could be broken only by our artillery. One Sikh cannon after another was captured. So ably were the orders of attack conducted, each column and line arriving at its point of attack to the very moment, that the enemy were soon driven headlong back over the river; and all the Sikh guns were captured or destroyed. Only one gun was carried by the Sikhs to the opposite bank, and there it was spiked by Lieutenant Holmes of the Irregular Cavalry, and gunner Scott of the Horse Artillery, who forded the river in pursuit. The victory was so complete, and the confusion among the Sikhs so great, that, had Sir Harry Smith been in a condition to follow, he might have driven them before him to Lahore. Camp carriages, munitions of war, all things that Runjoor Sing had brought with him, were captured. These were indeed "glorious operations;" this was indeed a "complete and decisive victory."* It cost us in all about 400 killed and wounded.

There was now for a short time a perfect lull in the campaign. The Sikhs at Sobraon went on strengthening their position, and adding to their guns on their *tête de pont;* and Sir Hugh Gough waited for his artillery and reinforcements. From the 14th of January till the beginning of February the enemy

* Dispatches of the Governor-General, Sir Harry Smith, and Sir Hugh Gough. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.

were industriously employed in building their defences, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer. On the 9th of February, when Major-General Sir Harry Smith had rejoined, when the siege-train and ammunition had arrived from Delhi, and when the governor-general had returned to camp, our army advanced on Sobraon, and the plan of attack on this formidable entrenchment was settled. Although, on the first intelligence of the battle of Aliwal, and at sight of the numerous bodies which floated from the neighbourhood of that battle field down to the bridge of boats at Sobraon, the Sikhs seemed much shaken and disheartened, they now appeared to be as confident as ever of being able to defy us in their entrenched position, and to prevent our passage of the river. The soldiers were chiefly those who had been trained by the French and Italian officers. They had strong walls, only to be surmounted by scaling ladders, which afforded a secure protection for triple lines of musketry. In all they were 30,000 men, with seventy pieces of artillery; their position was united by a good bridge to a reserve on the opposite bank, on which was a considerable camp, and some artillery commanding and flanking the field works on the side of the British.*

Sir Hugh Gough ordered his whole army to march on Sobraon at half-past 3 o'clock on the morning of Tuesday, the 10th of February, when his men would be fresh, and there would be a certainty of many hours of daylight. To pass another night like that which had been spent within the enemy's camp at Ferozeshah, was by all means to be avoided. The troops began to move out of camp at the very moment appointed, and they marched in silence to their destination. Sir Hugh was now much stronger in cavalry, and very strong in artillery. He at once put his battering and disposable artillery in position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the works of the Sikhs. It had been intended that the cannonade should have commenced at daybreak, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and river, that it became necessary to wait. It was half-past six before the whole of our artillery fire was developed. "Nothing could be conceived grander than the effect of the batteries when they opened, as the cannonade passed along from the Sutledge to Little Sobraon, in one continued roar of guns and mortars; while, ever and anon, the rocket, like a spirit of fire, winged its rapid flight high above the batteries in its progress towards the Sikh entrenchment. Well might the commander-in-chief call the opening of the cannonade "most spirited and well directed." The Sikh guns responded with shot and shells, but neither appeared to do much execution; the latter was seen bursting in mid-air ere they reached the British batteries; while some of the shot passed over Rhodawala, and struck the ground in front of General Gilbert's division. It now became a grand artillery concert, and the infantry divisions and brigades looked on with a certain degree of interest, somewhat allied, however, to vexation, lest the artillery should have the whole work to themselves! The commander-in-chief, however, was determined to give full play to an arm which he did not possess to an efficient extent in other hard-fought battles. It was reported, that the guns were to play for four hours at least; but there is some reason to believe, that the rapid firing had nearly exhausted the ammunition before half that time had elapsed; and it was once more to be proved, that the British infantry were not to remain mute spectators of a battle. "Notwithstanding," wrote the commander-in-chief, "the formidable calibre of our guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way in which they were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they could have silenced the fire of seventy pieces, behind well constructed batteries of earth, planks, and fascines,

* Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Ibid.

or dislodge troops covered either by redoubt or epaulments, or within a treble line of trenches."*

Compared with Ferozeshah, the works at Sobraon were regular fortifications, in the construction of which, no labour had been spared. The utmost ingenuity of the Sikhs and their European advisers had been exerted to render this, their last strong-hold, impregnable. A French officer is said to have assured Tej Singh that it was utterly impossible for the British to make good their entrance. The British were now about to try with the musket and the bayonet. "At nine o'clock, Brigadier Stacey's brigade, supported on either flank by Captains Horford's and Fordyce's batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troop of horse artillery, moved to the attack in admirable order. The infantry and guns aided each other correlatively. The former marched steadily on in line, which they halted only to correct when necessary; the latter took up successive positions at the gallop, until at length, they were within three hundred yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs. But notwithstanding the regularity and coolness, and the scientific character of this assault, which Brigadier Wilkinson well supported, so hot was the fire of cannon, musketry, and zambooruks,† kept up by the Khalsa troops, that it seemed for some moments impossible that the entrenchment could be won under it."‡ There was a temporary check, or pause, "but soon persevering gallantry triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction to see the gallant Brigadier Stacey's soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion before them within the area of their encampment."§ Every impediment was cleared, the entrenchments were passed, and our matchless infantry stood erect and compact within the Sikh camp. "Her Majesty's 10th, 53rd, and 80th regiments, with the 33rd, 43rd, 59th, and 63rd native infantry, moving at a firm and steady pace, never fired a shot till they had passed the barriers opposed to them —*a forbearance much to be commended, and most worthy of constant imitation, to which may be attributed the success of their first effort, and the small loss they sustained.* This attack was crowned with all the success it deserved, and, led by its gallant commander, Major-General Sir Robert Dick, obtained the admiration of the army, which witnessed its disciplined valour. When checked by the formidable obstacles and superior numbers to which the attacking division was opposed, the second division, under Major-General Gilbert, afforded the most opportune assistance by rapidly advancing to the attack of the enemy's batteries, entering their fortified position after a severe struggle, and sweeping through the interior of the camp. This division inflicted a very severe loss on the retreating enemy."* "We happened to be with a portion of Gilbert's division," says Doctor M'Gregor, "when the order arrived from the governor-general, and the troops immediately advanced. Onward they went; but if intended to support Stacey on the right of the enemy's position, they missed the object, for they unfortunately came in front of the centre and strongest portion of the encampment, unsupported either by artillery or cavalry. Her Majesty's 29th, and the 1st European Light Infantry, with undaunted bravery rushed forward, crossed a dry nullah, and found themselves exposed to one of the hottest fires of musketry that can possibly be imagined; and what rendered it still more galling was, that the Sikhs were themselves concealed behind high walls, over which the European soldiers could not climb. To remain under such a fire without the power of returning it with any effect would have been madness; the men would have been annihilated. Thrice did her Majesty's 29th regiment charge

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.

† Guns mounted on camels, and carrying a pound shot.

‡ The Commander-in-Chief's Dispatches.

§ Ibid.

* General order by the Governor-General of India, dated, Camp, Kessoora, February 14th, 1846.

the works, and thrice were they obliged to retire, each time followed by the Sikhs, who spared none, and cut to pieces the wounded. Similar was the fate of the 1st European Light Infantry, who, in retiring, had their ranks thinned by musketry, and their wounded men and officers cut up by the savage Sikhs. To the latter, the nullah presented an admirable defence, for the slope was towards them, while the Europeans on the high bank were completely exposed. At length, the second division, which at Ferozeshah had driven the Sikhs before them, capturing their guns at the point of the bayonet, and entering their encampment, were led to the right of the entrenchment at Sobraon."* This second division was emulated by the 1st division under Sir Harry Smith, which dashed against the enemy's left. Yet was it not until the cavalry of the left, under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward and ridden through the openings of the entrenchments (made by our sappers) in single file, and re-formed as they passed them; and the third dragoons had galloped over and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field-works; and the weight of three entire divisions of infantry, with every field artillery gun which could be sent to their aid;—it was not until all this had been cast into the scale, that victory finally declared for the British. The fire of the Sikhs slackened, then ceased nearly altogether; and the victors, pressing them on every side, swept them in masses over the bridge of boats, and into the Sutledge, which a sudden rise of seven inches had rendered scarcely fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water, they suffered a terrible carnage from our horse artillery. Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous passage. This awful slaughter would have excited compassion, had they not, in the earlier part of the action, sullied their bravery by slaughtering and mangling every wounded soldier whom the fortune of war left at their mercy. "The enemy's shattered forces," says the governor-general, "were driven into the river, with a loss which far exceeded that which the most experienced officers had ever witnessed. Thus terminated, in the brief space of two hours, this most remarkable conflict, in which the military combinations of the commander-in-chief were fully and ably carried into effect. The enemy's select regiments of regular infantry have been dispersed, and a large proportion destroyed, with the loss, since the campaign began, of 220 pieces of artillery taken in action."*

Within the entrenchments above sixty-seven guns were captured, together with upwards of 200 camel swivels and numerous standards. Before the hour of noon this great battle was over. It might, indeed, be well termed a glorious fight, and complete in its results. The battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had weakened the power of the Sikhs, but the battle of Sobraon had completely broken it. It was, of course, bought at a dear price. It was the Waterloo of India, and bloody like that field. Her Majesty's 29th regiment alone exhibited a loss in killed and wounded of thirteen officers, eight serjeants, and 167 rank and file. The loss of the 1st European Light Infantry was still heavier. Her Majesty's 31st, which had fought most nobly at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had seven officers and 147 rank and file killed and wounded at Sobraon. Her Majesty's 50th, or Queen's Own, had twelve officers and 227 rank and file killed and wounded. Her Majesty's 10th foot lost three officers, three serjeants, and 127 rank and file. These regiments suffered the most, but other regiments suffered severely. We have not yet seen any accurate list of the total loss. The brave Sir Robert Dick, who led the attack on the entrenchments, received a mortal wound after he had entered them; "thus fell, most gloriously, at the moment of victory,

* History of the Sikhs.

* General order.

this veteran officer, displaying the same energy and intrepidity as when, thirty-five years ago, in Spain, he was the distinguished leader of the 42nd Highlanders." Brigadier Charles Cyril Taylor, who commanded the third brigade of the second division, also fell. Brigadier MacLaren was borne off the field mortally wounded, while leading the 4th brigade of the centre division against the strongest part of the entrenchments. When put into his bed, he said he *must* cross the Sutledge with the gallant European Light Infantry, even though he were carried in a dooly. Major-General Gilbert was slightly wounded; and the gallant veteran Colonel Ryan, of the 50th, was severely wounded.

Fearful had been the loss of the Sikhs. Five days after the action, and when the walls of the entrenchment had been nearly levelled with the ground, the sand bank in the middle of the river was completely covered with their dead bodies, and the ground within their encampment thickly strewed with carcases of men and horses. With the permission of the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, they returned to carry off their dead; but the task was found too irksome, and many hundreds, not swept away by the river, were left as food for the jackal, the wild dog, and the vulture.

All was now dead silence in the valley of the Sutledge, which, during the mighty combat, had reverberated with full 120 pieces of ordnance. Praises and thanks were not spared by the governor-general and commander-in-chief. The list is too long to be given, but foremost on it appear the names of Sir Harry Smith, Major-General Gilbert, Brigadiers Penny, Hicks, Stacey, Wilkinson, and the Honorable T. Ashburnham, Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, Brigadiers Cureton, Scott, and Campbell, who had handled the cavalry so well; Lieutenant-Colonel White; Brigadier Smith, the commanding engineer; Major Abbott of the engineers; Brigadier Gowan, commanding the artillery; Major Grant, who managed the howitzer practice; and Lieutenant-Colonel Barr, Acting Adjutant-General; Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, Acting Quartermaster General, &c. &c. And of his own personal staff the governor-general had to thank and applaud, Lord Arthur Hay, Captain Peel, Captain Hardinge, Lieutenant-Colonel Benson, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, Major Laurence, Captain Mills, and others. He also desired to record his obligations to Prince Waldemar of Prussia, and to the officers of his Royal Highness's staff, Count Oriola and Count Gruben. "This gallant and amiable prince," said his excellency, "with his brave associates of the Prussian army, has shared all the dangers, and secured for himself the respect and admiration, of the British army; and the governor-general begs to convey to his Royal Highness and to his staff his cordial thanks for the ready offers of their services on the field of battle." *

The evening after the battle of Sobraon six regiments of native infantry crossed the Sutledge, and on the following day the bridge of boats was nearly completed by the able and indefatigable Major Abbott, of the engineers. Had the British then followed up the Sikhs they might have made their way without resistance to Lahore, and have there renewed the conflict; but such was not the intention of our commanders, and the capital of the Punjaub was destined to be occupied by the British without any repetition of the life-consuming struggles which had occurred on the left bank of the Sutledge. If pressed, they would have fought desperately in their despair; but the vaunted power of the Sikhs was in reality destroyed. Sham Sing, Dhubal Sing, Hera Sing, Kishen Sing, Mobaruck Ali, Newag Khan, all their bravest sirdars and leaders, had perished. The discomfited warriors who survived, being left to themselves, began to disperse. Our army quietly crossed the river and took undisputed possession of Kussoor, which in former times had twice defied the power of Runjeet Sing. On the 14th of February, the governor-

* General order, dated, Camp, Kussoor, February 14th, 1846.

general announced by proclamation, dated from Kussoor, that the British army had crossed the Sutledge and entered the Punjaub, "in accordance with the intentions expressed in the proclamation of the 13th December last, as having been forced upon him, for the purpose of 'effectually protecting the British provinces, and vindicating the authority of the British government, and punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of the public peace." Military operations against the government and army of the Lahore state, had not been undertaken by the government of India from any desire of territorial aggrandizement. "No extension of territory," said the proclamation, "was desired by the government of India; the measures necessary for providing indemnity for the past, and security for the future, will, however, involve the retention, by the British government, of a portion of the country hitherto under the government of the Lahore state. The government of India has frequently declared that it did not desire to subvert the Sikh government in the Punjaub; and although the conduct of the Durbar has been such as to justify the most severe and extreme measures of retribution, (the infliction of which may yet be required by sound policy, if the recent acts of violence be not amply atoned for, and immediate submission tendered;) nevertheless, the governor-general is still willing that an opportunity should be given to the Durbar and to the chiefs, to submit themselves to the British government, and by a return to good faith and the observance of prudent counsels, enable the governor-general to organize a Sikh government, in the person of a descendant of its founder, the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the faithful ally of the British power. The governor-general, at this moment of a complete and decisive victory, cannot give a stronger proof of the forbearance and moderation of the British government, than by making this declaration of his intention: the terms and mode of arrangement remaining for further adjustment. The governor-general therefore calls upon all those chiefs who are the well-wishers of the descendants of Runjeet Sing, and especially such chiefs as have not participated in the hostile proceedings against the British power, to act in concert with him, for carrying into effect such arrangement as shall maintain a Sikh government at Lahore, capable of controlling its army and protecting its subjects, and based upon principles that shall provide for the future tranquillity of the Sikh states, shall secure the British frontier from a repetition of acts of aggression, and shall prove to the whole world the moderation and justice of the paramount power in India. If this opportunity of rescuing the Sikh nation from military anarchy and misrule be neglected, and hostile opposition to the British army be renewed, the government of India will make such other arrangements for the future government of the Punjaub, as the interests and security of the British power may render just and expedient."

The Ranee, or mother of the Maharajah, forthwith sent emissaries to the governor-general; and Ghoolab Sing, whose wily policy we have explained, and who was now determined to carry it through, at whatever sacrifice on the part of the Sikhs, became the mediator between the fallen state of Lahore and our victorious army. He proceeded with all expedition towards Kussoor, to endeavour, if possible, to arrest the progress of our troops; but his intentions and hopes were frustrated, for the governor-general indignantly refused to enter into any separate compact with him, or to listen to any arrangement which would prevent him from sealing any treaty that might be made under the walls of Lahore. Having failed in preventing the advance of the British, Ghoolab Sing changed his tactics, and determined on bringing the young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing into the governor-general's camp. The parties met at Lulleeana. Out of respect for the late Runjeet Sing, and the tender years of his grandson, Sir Henry Hardinge received Dhuleep Sing with high honours, and with the utmost kindness. He repeated to the prince his earnest

wish that a wise and tranquil government should exist in the Punjaub under the descendant of the late Runjeet, who had preserved a strict alliance with the British for a period of thirty years.

The heads of a treaty were soon sketched and agreed to. The government of Lahore was to pay, as an indemnity for the expense of the war, a crore and a half of rupees, or about one million five hundred thousand pounds sterling. All the guns we had taken were to be retained, and all those which the Sikhs had ever pointed against the British were to be given up. The troops and their turbulent leaders were to be disbanded for ever.

Our army had advanced to Kanwa Kutchwa on the 19th of February, the governor-general having first issued (from Lulleeana on the 18th) to the chiefs, merchants, traders, ryots, and other inhabitants of Lahore and Umritsir, a proclamation, assuring them that the Maharajah and Durbar had acquiesced in all the terms proposed to them, as a means of reëstablishing friendly relations; that they, the chiefs, merchants, traders, peasants, &c., had nothing to fear from the British army; and that they might, in all confidence, pursue their ordinary occupations. On the morning of the 20th, the whole army marched to Lahore—a distance of fourteen miles—and encamped on the parade ground, about two and a half miles from the city gate; and, in the afternoon of that same day, the young Maharajah, Dhuleep Sing, was restored to the palace of the rulers of Lahore, in charge of the chief secretary of our government, escorted by British officers and troops in their best attire. On alighting from his elephant, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired by the horse artillery. The secretary of government, and the officers, took leave of the Maharajah at the palace gate, and then returned to the camp. On the 22nd, in fulfilment of one of Sir Henry Hardinge's conditions, Sir Hugh Gough, with a brigade, took formal and peaceful possession of the Padshahee-Musjid and Huzzoree-Bagh, which formed part of the citadel of Lahore. Supplies of all sorts were willingly brought to this brigade as well as to the camp; and the observance of a strict discipline by all our troops entirely removed the apprehensions and doubts of the people.*

On the 8th of March, the following treaty was signed in the state tent of the governor-general:—

"ARTICLE I.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, his heirs and successors, on the other.

"ARTICLE II.—The Maharajah of Lahore renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connexion with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej, and engages never to have any concern with those territories or the inhabitants thereof.

"ARTICLE III.—The Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights, in the Doab, or country, hill and plain, situated between the rivers Beas and Sutlej.

"ARTICLE IV.—The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article III., payment of one and a half crore of rupees; and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government, for its eventual payment, the Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the hill countries which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah.

"ARTICLE V.—The Maharajah will pay to the British Government the sum of fifty lakhs of rupees on or before the ratification of this treaty.

"ARTICLE VI.—The Maharajah engages to disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them

* Dispatches of the governor-general and commander-in-chief.

their arms; and his Highness agrees to re-organize the Regular or Aeen regiments of infantry, upon the system, and according to the regulations, as to pay and allowances, observed in the time of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing. The Maharajah further engages to pay up allowances to the soldiers that are discharged, under provisions of this article.

"ARTICLE VII.—The regular army of the Lahore state shall henceforth be limited to twenty-five battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry; this number at no time to be exceeded, without the concurrence of the British government; and should it be necessary at any time, for any special cause, that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British government; and when the especial necessity shall have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this article.

"ARTICLE VIII.—The Maharajah will surrender to the British government all the guns, thirty-six in number, which have been pointed against the British troops, and which, having been placed on the right bank of the river Sutlej, were not captured at the battle of Sobraon.

"ARTICLE IX.—The control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuations of the latter river, commonly called the Garrah and Punjund, to the confluence of the Indus, at Mithunkote, and the control of the Indus from Mithunkote to the borders of Beeloochistan, shall, in respect to tolls and ferries, rest with the British government. The provisions of this article shall not interfere with the passage of boats belonging to the Lahore government, on the said rivers, for the purposes of traffic, or the conveyance of passengers up and down their course. Regarding the ferries between the two countries respectively, at the several ghats of the said river, it is agreed, that the British government, after defraying all the expenses of management and establishments, shall account to the Lahore government for one-half of the net profits of the ferry collections. The provisions of this article have no reference to the ferries on that part of the river Sutlej which forms the boundary of Buhawalpore and Lahore respectively.

"ARTICLE X.—If the British government should, at any time, desire to pass troops through the territories of his Highness the Maharajah for the protection of the British territories, or those of their allies, the British troops shall, on such special occasions, due notice being given, be allowed to pass through the Lahore territories. In such case the officers of the Lahore state will afford facilities in providing supplies and boats for the passage of the rivers; and the British government will pay the full price of all such provisions and boats, and will make fair compensation for all private property that may be endamaged. The British government will, moreover, observe all due consideration to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of those tracts through which the army may pass.

"ARTICLE XI.—The Maharajah engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British government.

"ARTICLE XII.—In consideration of the services rendered by Rajah Goolab Sing, of Jummoo, to the Lahore state, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British governments, the Maharajah hereby agrees to recognise the independent sovereignty of Rajah Goolab Sing in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Rajah Goolab Sing by separate agreement between himself and the British government, with the dependencies thereof which may have been in the Rajah's possession since the time of the late Maharajah Kurruk Sing; and the British government, in consideration of the good conduct of Rajah Goolab Sing, also agrees to recognise his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British government.

"ARTICLE XIII.—In the event of

any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore state and Rajah Goolab Sing, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British government, and by its decision the Maharajah engages to abide.

"ARTICLE XIV.—The limits of the Lahore territories shall not be at any time changed, without the concurrence of the British government.

"ARTICLE XV.—The British government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore states, but in all cases or questions which may be referred to the British government, the governor-general will give the aid of his advice and good offices for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore government.

"ARTICLE XVI.—The subjects of either state shall, on visiting the territories of the other, be on the footing of the subjects of the most favoured nation."

We could not close our narrative at a more glorious period than this. Such a series of brilliant exploits has seldom occurred in the limited space of three years. Ever since the conclusion of the treaty, the Punjaub has been perfectly tranquil; the robber bands have been put down, and an effective police established as well here as in Sinde. All our Indian possessions have been restored to tranquillity, and a happy feeling of security; and the governor-general, who has been only slightly rewarded by being raised to the peerage as Lord Hardinge, is as careful and as successful in peace as he was glorious in war. A recent letter from India says—"Of wars and tumults there are none to record; the most profound peace prevails throughout the length and breadth of the land. Lord Hardinge is wholly occupied in improving the country, and assisting in the development of its immense resources."

The terrible Akbar Khan has gone to his account, having been poisoned by some of his own people; others of those murderous Afghan chiefs have fallen in battle, or under the dagger of the assassin. Fierce destructive wars still rage, both in Lower and in Upper Afghanistan, but scarcely a faint echo of them reaches the Indus.

T. C. Savill, Printer, 4, Chandos-street, Covent-garden.

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Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 March, 2016